In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption (via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace. In this case, the affected files are in debugfs (and should therefore only be accessible to root), and the read handlers check that *pos is zero (meaning that at least sys_splice() can't trigger kernel memory corruption). Because of the root requirement, this is not a security fix, but rather a cleanup. For the read handlers, fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic. Add min() calls to the write handlers. Fixes:4a2da0b8c0("IB/mlx5: Add debug control parameters for congestion control") Fixes:e126ba97db("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
13 KiB
13 KiB