Threshold Event Counter Multiplier (TECM) is part of Monitor Mode
Control Register A (MMCRA). This field along with Threshold Event
Counter Exponent (TECE) is used to get threshould counter value.
In Power10, this is a 8bit field, so patch fixes the
current code to modify the MMCRA[TECM] extraction macro to
handle this change. ISA v3.1 says this is a 7 bit field but
POWER10 it's actually 8 bits which will hopefully be fixed
in ISA v3.1 update.
Fixes: 170a315f41 ("powerpc/perf: Support to export MMCRA[TEC*] field to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1608022578-1532-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
According to ISAv3.1 and ISAv3.0b, the msgsndp is described to split
RB in:
msgtype <- (RB) 32:36
payload <- (RB) 37:63
t <- (RB) 57:63
The current way of getting 'msgtype', and 't' is missing their MSB:
msgtype: ((arg >> 27) & 0xf) : Gets (RB) 33:36, missing bit 32
t: (arg &= 0x3f) : Gets (RB) 58:63, missing bit 57
Fixes this by applying the correct mask.
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Bras <leobras.c@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208215707.31149-1-leobras.c@gmail.com
Fix the following coccinelle warnings:
./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:476:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
./arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_xics.c:504:3-15: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable
Reported-by: Tosk Robot <tencent_os_robot@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <kaixuxia@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604730382-5810-1-git-send-email-kaixuxia@tencent.com
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=ZTHO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'efi-next-for-v5.11-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core
Pull followup fixes for EFI from Ard Biesheuvel:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201215080144.17077-1-ardb@kernel.org
The kernel test robot measured a -1.6% performance regression on
will-it-scale/sched_yield due to commit:
2558aacff8 ("sched/hotplug: Ensure only per-cpu kthreads run during hotplug")
Even though we were careful to replace a single load with another
single load from the same cacheline.
Restore finish_lock_switch() to the exact state before the offending
patch and solve the problem differently.
Fixes: 2558aacff8 ("sched/hotplug: Ensure only per-cpu kthreads run during hotplug")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201210161408.GX3021@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
An SEV-ES guest is started by invoking a new SEV initialization ioctl,
KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. This identifies the guest as an SEV-ES guest, which is
used to drive the appropriate ASID allocation, VMSA encryption, etc.
Before being able to run an SEV-ES vCPU, the vCPU VMSA must be encrypted
and measured. This is done using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command after all
calls to LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA have been performed, but before LAUNCH_MEASURE
has been performed. In order to establish the encrypted VMSA, the current
(traditional) VMSA and the GPRs are synced to the page that will hold the
encrypted VMSA and then LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is invoked. The vCPU is then
marked as having protected guest state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e9643245adb809caf3a87c09997926d2f3d6ff41.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The run sequence is different for an SEV-ES guest compared to a legacy or
even an SEV guest. The guest vCPU register state of an SEV-ES guest will
be restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT. There is no need to restore the
guest registers directly and through VMLOAD before VMRUN and no need to
save the guest registers directly and through VMSAVE on VMEXIT.
Update the svm_vcpu_run() function to skip register state saving and
restoring and provide an alternative function for running an SEV-ES guest
in vmenter.S
Additionally, certain host state is restored across an SEV-ES VMRUN. As
a result certain register states are not required to be restored upon
VMEXIT (e.g. FS, GS, etc.), so only do that if the guest is not an SEV-ES
guest.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fb1c66d32f2194e171b95fc1a8affd6d326e10c1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB vCPU load/put requirements. SEV-ES
hardware will restore certain registers on VMEXIT, but not save them on
VMRUN (see Table B-3 and Table B-4 of the AMD64 APM Volume 2), so make the
following changes:
General vCPU load changes:
- During vCPU loading, perform a VMSAVE to the per-CPU SVM save area and
save the current values of XCR0, XSS and PKRU to the per-CPU SVM save
area as these registers will be restored on VMEXIT.
General vCPU put changes:
- Do not attempt to restore registers that SEV-ES hardware has already
restored on VMEXIT.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <019390e9cb5e93cd73014fa5a040c17d42588733.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB initialization requirements for
vCPU creation and vCPU load/put requirements. This includes:
General VMCB initialization changes:
- Set a VMCB control bit to enable SEV-ES support on the vCPU.
- Set the VMCB encrypted VM save area address.
- CRx registers are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be
updated. Remove the CRx register read and write intercepts and replace
them with CRx register write traps to track the CRx register values.
- Certain MSR values are part of the encrypted register state and cannot
be updated. Remove certain MSR intercepts (EFER, CR_PAT, etc.).
- Remove the #GP intercept (no support for "enable_vmware_backdoor").
- Remove the XSETBV intercept since the hypervisor cannot modify XCR0.
General vCPU creation changes:
- Set the initial GHCB gpa value as per the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <3a8aef366416eddd5556dfa3fdc212aafa1ad0a2.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV and SEV-ES guests each have dedicated ASID ranges. Update the ASID
allocation routine to return an ASID in the respective range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d7aed505e31e3954268b2015bb60a1486269c780.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SVM host save area is used to restore some host state on VMEXIT of an
SEV-ES guest. After allocating the save area, clear it and add the
encryption mask to the SVM host save area physical address that is
programmed into the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b77aa28af6d7f1a0cb545959e08d6dc75e0c3cba.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines how NMIs are to be handled for an SEV-ES
guest. To detect the completion of an NMI the hypervisor must not
intercept the IRET instruction (because a #VC while running the NMI will
issue an IRET) and, instead, must receive an NMI Complete exit event from
the guest.
Update the KVM support for detecting the completion of NMIs in the guest
to follow the GHCB specification. When an SEV-ES guest is active, the
IRET instruction will no longer be intercepted. Now, when the NMI Complete
exit event is received, the iret_interception() function will be called
to simulate the completion of the NMI.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5ea3dd69b8d4396cefdc9048ebc1ab7caa70a847.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The guest FPU state is automatically restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT
by the hardware, so there is no reason to do this in KVM. Eliminate the
allocation of the guest_fpu save area and key off that to skip operations
related to the guest FPU state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <173e429b4d0d962c6a443c4553ffdaf31b7665a4.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES guests do not currently support SMM. Update the has_emulated_msr()
kvm_x86_ops function to take a struct kvm parameter so that the capability
can be reported at a VM level.
Since this op is also called during KVM initialization and before a struct
kvm instance is available, comments will be added to each implementation
of has_emulated_msr() to indicate the kvm parameter can be null.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <75de5138e33b945d2fb17f81ae507bda381808e3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since many of the registers used by the SEV-ES are encrypted and cannot
be read or written, adjust the __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to take into
account whether the VMSA/guest state is encrypted.
For __get_sregs(), return the actual value that is in use by the guest
for all registers being tracked using the write trap support.
For __set_sregs(), skip setting of all guest registers values.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <23051868db76400a9b07a2020525483a1e62dbcf.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.
Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.
For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, MMIO is performed to a shared (un-encrypted) page
so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or write to it and each
see the contents.
The GHCB specification provides software-defined VMGEXIT exit codes to
indicate a request for an MMIO read or an MMIO write. Add support to
recognize the MMIO requests and invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the MMIO operation. These routines use common KVM support
to complete the MMIO operation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <af8de55127d5bcc3253d9b6084a0144c12307d4d.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT MSR protocol
processing. The vCPU will be common for the trace events. The MSR
protocol processing is guided by the GHCB GPA in the VMCB, so the GHCB
GPA will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively. Additionally, the exit event will contain the
return code for the event.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5b3b440c3e0db43ff2fc02813faa94fa54896b0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT processing. The vCPU
id and the exit reason will be common for the trace events. The exit info
fields will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <25357dca49a38372e8f483753fb0c1c2a70a6898.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x100 is a request for termination of the guest. The guest has
encountered some situation for which it has requested to be terminated.
The GHCB MSR value contains the reason for the request.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f3a1f7850c75b6ea4101e15bbb4a3af1a203f1dc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x004 is a request for CPUID information. Only a single CPUID
result register can be sent per invocation, so the protocol defines the
register that is requested. The GHCB MSR value is set to the CPUID
register value as per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fd7ee347d3936e484c06e9001e340bf6387092cd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x002 is a request to set the GHCB MSR value to the SEV INFO as
per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c23c163a505290a0d1b9efc4659b838c8c902cbc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.
Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest has protected state.
Additionally, an SEV-ES guest must only and always intercept DR7 reads and
writes. Update set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() to account for
this.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8db966fa2f9803d6454ce773863025d0e2e7f3cc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.
Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This will be used by SEV-ES to inject MSR failure via the GHCB.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Simplify the four functions that handle {kernel,user} {rd,wr}msr, there
is still some repetition between the two instances of rdmsr but the
whole business of calling kvm_inject_gp and kvm_skip_emulated_instruction
can be unified nicely.
Because complete_emulated_wrmsr now becomes essentially a call to
kvm_complete_insn_gp, remove complete_emulated_msr.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is no need to inject a #GP from kvm_mtrr_set_msr, kvm_emulate_wrmsr will
handle it.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It can take multiple iterations until all components for an attached DSI
bridge are up leading to several:
[ 3.796425] mxsfb 30320000.lcd-controller: Cannot connect bridge: -517
[ 3.816952] mxsfb 30320000.lcd-controller: [drm:mxsfb_probe [mxsfb]] *ERROR* failed to attach bridge: -517
Silence this by checking for -EPROBE_DEFER and using dev_err_probe() so
we set a deferred reason in case a dependency fails to probe (which
quickly happens on small config/DT changes due to the rather long probe
chain which can include bridges, phys, panels, backights, leds, etc.).
This also removes the only DRM_DEV_ERROR() usage, the rest of the driver
uses dev_err().
Signed-off-by: Guido Günther <agx@sigxcpu.org>
Fixes: c42001e357 ("drm: mxsfb: Use drm_panel_bridge")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/d5761eb871adde5464ba112b89d966568bc2ff6c.1608020391.git.agx@sigxcpu.org
I wanted to look up something and noticed the hyperlink doesn't work.
While fixing that also noticed a trivial kerneldoc comment typo in the
same section, fix that too.
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201204200242.2671481-1-daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch
- Preliminary support for managed interrupts on platform devices
- Correctly identify allocation of MSIs proxyied by another device
- Remove the fasteoi IPI flow which has been proved useless
- Generalise the Ocelot support to new SoCs
- Improve GICv4.1 vcpu entry, matching the corresponding KVM optimisation
- Work around spurious interrupts on Qualcomm PDC
- Random fixes and cleanups
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=7Z24
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'irqchip-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/maz/arm-platforms into irq/core
Pull irqchip updates for 5.11 from Marc Zyngier:
- Preliminary support for managed interrupts on platform devices
- Correctly identify allocation of MSIs proxyied by another device
- Remove the fasteoi IPI flow which has been proved useless
- Generalise the Ocelot support to new SoCs
- Improve GICv4.1 vcpu entry, matching the corresponding KVM optimisation
- Work around spurious interrupts on Qualcomm PDC
- Random fixes and cleanups
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212135626.1479884-1-maz@kernel.org
When building tinyconfig on parisc the following warnign shows up:
/tmp/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c:338:12: warning: 'proc_pcxl_dma_show' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static int proc_pcxl_dma_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mark the function as __maybe_unused to fix the warning.
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
The || condition in hdev->fd_active_type != HCLGE_FD_ARFS_ACTIVE ||
hdev->fd_active_type != HCLGE_FD_RULE_NONE will always be true because
hdev->fd_active_type cannot be equal to two different values at the same
time. The expression is always true which is not correct. Fix this by
replacing || with && to correct the logic in the expression.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Constant expression result")
Fixes: 0205ec041e ("net: hns3: add support for hw tc offload of tc flower")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Huazhong Tan <tanhuazhong@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201215000033.85383-1-colin.king@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
proc_fs was used, in af_packet, without a surrounding #ifdef,
although there is no hard dependency on proc_fs.
That caused the initialization of the af_packet module to fail
when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n.
Specifically, proc_create_net() was used in af_packet.c,
and when it fails, packet_net_init() returns -ENOMEM.
It will always fail when the kernel is compiled without proc_fs,
because, proc_create_net() for example always returns NULL.
The calling order that starts in af_packet.c is as follows:
packet_init()
register_pernet_subsys()
register_pernet_operations()
__register_pernet_operations()
ops_init()
ops->init() (packet_net_ops.init=packet_net_init())
proc_create_net()
It worked in the past because register_pernet_subsys()'s return value
wasn't checked before this Commit 36096f2f4f ("packet: Fix error path in
packet_init.").
It always returned an error, but was not checked before, so everything
was working even when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n.
The fix here is simply to add the necessary #ifdef.
This also fixes a similar error in tls_proc.c, that was found by Jakub
Kicinski.
Fixes: d26b698dd3 ("net/tls: add skeleton of MIB statistics")
Fixes: 36096f2f4f ("packet: Fix error path in packet_init")
Signed-off-by: Yonatan Linik <yonatanlinik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Andra Paraschiv says:
====================
vsock: Add flags field in the vsock address
vsock enables communication between virtual machines and the host they are
running on. Nested VMs can be setup to use vsock channels, as the multi
transport support has been available in the mainline since the v5.5 Linux
kernel has been released.
Implicitly, if no host->guest vsock transport is loaded, all the vsock packets
are forwarded to the host. This behavior can be used to setup communication
channels between sibling VMs that are running on the same host. One example can
be the vsock channels that can be established within AWS Nitro Enclaves
(see Documentation/virt/ne_overview.rst).
To be able to explicitly mark a connection as being used for a certain use case,
add a flags field in the vsock address data structure. The value of the flags
field is taken into consideration when the vsock transport is assigned. This
way can distinguish between different use cases, such as nested VMs / local
communication and sibling VMs.
The flags field can be set in the user space application connect logic. On the
listen path, the field can be set in the kernel space logic.
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214161122.37717-1-andraprs@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The vsock flags field can be set in the connect path (user space app)
and the (listen) receive path (kernel space logic).
When the vsock transport is assigned, the remote CID is used to
distinguish between types of connection.
Use the vsock flags value (in addition to the CID) from the remote
address to decide which vsock transport to assign. For the sibling VMs
use case, all the vsock packets need to be forwarded to the host, so
always assign the guest->host transport if the VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag
is set. For the other use cases, the vsock transport assignment logic is
not changed.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* Update the "remote_flags" local variable type to reflect the change of
the "svm_flags" field to be 1 byte in size.
v2 -> v3
* Update bitwise check logic to not compare result to the flag value.
v1 -> v2
* Use bitwise operator to check the vsock flag.
* Use the updated "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST" flag naming.
* Merge the checks for the g2h transport assignment in one "if" block.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The vsock flags can be set during the connect() setup logic, when
initializing the vsock address data structure variable. Then the vsock
transport is assigned, also considering this flags field.
The vsock transport is also assigned on the (listen) receive path. The
flags field needs to be set considering the use case.
Set the value of the vsock flags of the remote address to the one
targeted for packets forwarding to the host, if the following conditions
are met:
* The source CID of the packet is higher than VMADDR_CID_HOST.
* The destination CID of the packet is higher than VMADDR_CID_HOST.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* No changes.
v2 -> v3
* No changes.
v1 -> v2
* Set the vsock flag on the receive path in the vsock transport
assignment logic.
* Use bitwise operator for the vsock flag setup.
* Use the updated "VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST" flag naming.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Check if the provided flags value from the vsock address data structure
includes the supported flags in the corresponding kernel version.
The first byte of the "svm_zero" field is used as "svm_flags", so add
the flags check instead.
Changelog
v3 -> v4
* New patch in v4.
Signed-off-by: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
