forked from Minki/linux
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d770e558e2
commit
90f8572b0f
10
fs/exec.c
10
fs/exec.c
@ -98,6 +98,12 @@ static inline void put_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
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module_put(fmt->module);
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}
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bool path_noexec(const struct path *path)
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{
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return (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) ||
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(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_USELIB
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/*
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* Note that a shared library must be both readable and executable due to
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@ -132,7 +138,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
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goto exit;
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error = -EACCES;
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if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
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if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
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goto exit;
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fsnotify_open(file);
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@ -777,7 +783,7 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
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if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
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goto exit;
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if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
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if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
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goto exit;
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err = deny_write_access(file);
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@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ retry:
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* with the "noexec" flag.
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*/
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res = -EACCES;
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if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
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if (path_noexec(&path))
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goto out_path_release;
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}
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@ -134,6 +134,8 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
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}
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sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
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/* User space would break if executables appear on proc */
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sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
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}
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return dget(sb->s_root);
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@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
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SYSFS_MAGIC, &new_sb, ns);
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if (IS_ERR(root) || !new_sb)
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kobj_ns_drop(KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET, ns);
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else if (new_sb)
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/* Userspace would break if executables appear on sysfs */
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root->d_sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
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return root;
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}
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@ -1244,6 +1244,7 @@ struct mm_struct;
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/* sb->s_iflags */
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#define SB_I_CGROUPWB 0x00000001 /* cgroup-aware writeback enabled */
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#define SB_I_NOEXEC 0x00000002 /* Ignore executables on this fs */
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/* Possible states of 'frozen' field */
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enum {
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@ -3030,4 +3031,6 @@ static inline bool dir_relax(struct inode *inode)
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return !IS_DEADDIR(inode);
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}
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extern bool path_noexec(const struct path *path);
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#endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
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@ -1668,8 +1668,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
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* overall picture.
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*/
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) ||
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exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
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goto exit;
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err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
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@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
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* mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
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*/
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if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
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if (!(file && (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)))
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if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
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prot |= PROT_EXEC;
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if (!(flags & MAP_FIXED))
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@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
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case MAP_PRIVATE:
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if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
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return -EACCES;
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if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) {
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if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
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if (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
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return -EPERM;
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vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
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@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
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/* handle executable mappings and implied executable
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* mappings */
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if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) {
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if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
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return -EPERM;
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} else if ((prot & PROT_READ) && !(prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
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@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
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* ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
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* NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
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*/
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if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
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if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
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#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
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if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
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unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
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