drm: Do not drop root privileges for a fancier younger process

When a second process opens the device and master transferrence is
complete, we walk the list of open devices and remove their
authentication. This also revokes our root privilege. Instead of simply
dropping the authentication, this patch reverts the authenticated state
back to its original value.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Wilson 2013-10-29 08:55:57 +00:00 committed by Dave Airlie
parent 33e3fd5567
commit 1020dc6990
2 changed files with 4 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -239,7 +239,8 @@ static int drm_open_helper(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp,
priv->ioctl_count = 0;
/* for compatibility root is always authenticated */
priv->authenticated = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
priv->always_authenticated = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
priv->authenticated = priv->always_authenticated;
priv->lock_count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->lhead);
@ -533,7 +534,7 @@ int drm_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
list_for_each_entry(temp, &dev->filelist, lhead) {
if ((temp->master == file_priv->master) &&
(temp != file_priv))
temp->authenticated = 0;
temp->authenticated = temp->always_authenticated;
}
/**

View File

@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ struct drm_prime_file_private {
/** File private data */
struct drm_file {
int always_authenticated;
int authenticated;
struct pid *pid;
kuid_t uid;