linux/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c

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/*
* Copyright (C) 1995-1996 Gary Thomas (gdt@linuxppc.org)
* Copyright 2007-2010 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* Modified by Cort Dougan (cort@cs.nmt.edu)
* and Paul Mackerras (paulus@samba.org)
*/
/*
* This file handles the architecture-dependent parts of hardware exceptions
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/extable.h>
#include <linux/module.h> /* print_modules */
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/backlight.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <asm/emulated_ops.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/machdep.h>
#include <asm/rtas.h>
#include <asm/pmc.h>
#include <asm/reg.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_PMAC_BACKLIGHT
#include <asm/backlight.h>
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
#include <asm/firmware.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tm.h>
#endif
[POWERPC] Add the use of the firmware soft-reset-nmi to kdump. With this patch, kdump uses the firmware soft-reset NMI for two purposes: 1) Initiate the kdump (take a crash dump) by issuing a soft-reset. 2) Break a CPU out of a deadlock condition that is detected during kdump processing. When a soft-reset is initiated each CPU will enter system_reset_exception() and set its corresponding bit in the global bit-array cpus_in_sr then call die(). When die() finds the CPU's bit set in cpu_in_sr crash_kexec() is called to initiate a crash dump. The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() is called the "crashing CPU". All other CPUs are "secondary CPUs". The secondary CPU's pass through to crash_kexec_secondary() and sleep. The crashing CPU waits for all CPUs to enter via soft-reset then boots the kdump kernel (see crash_soft_reset_check()) When the system crashes due to a panic or exception, crash_kexec() is called by panic() or die(). The crashing CPU sends an IPI to all other CPUs to notify them of the pending shutdown. If a CPU is in a deadlock or hung state with interrupts disabled, the IPI will not be delivered. The result being, that the kdump kernel is not booted. This problem is solved with the use of a firmware generated soft-reset. After the crashing_cpu has issued the IPI, it waits for 10 sec for all CPUs to enter crash_ipi_callback(). A CPU signifies its entry to crash_ipi_callback() by setting its corresponding bit in the cpus_in_crash bit array. After 10 sec, if one or more CPUs have not set their bit in cpus_in_crash we assume that the CPU(s) is deadlocked. The operator is then prompted to generate a soft-reset to break the deadlock. Each CPU enters the soft reset handler as described above. Two conditions must be handled at this point: 1) The system crashed because the operator generated a soft-reset. See 2) The system had crashed before the soft-reset was generated ( in the case of a Panic or oops). The first CPU to enter crash_kexec() uses the state of the kexec_lock to determine this state. If kexec_lock is already held then condition 2 is true and crash_kexec_secondary() is called, else; this CPU is flagged as the crashing CPU, the kexec_lock is acquired and crash_kexec() proceeds as described above. Each additional CPUs responding to the soft-reset will pass through crash_kexec() to kexec_secondary(). All secondary CPUs call crash_ipi_callback() readying them self's for the shutdown. When ready they clear their bit in cpus_in_sr. The crashing CPU waits in kexec_secondary() until all other CPUs have cleared their bits in cpus_in_sr. The kexec kernel boot is then started. Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Wilder <dwilder@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
2006-06-23 22:29:34 +00:00
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/ppc-opcode.h>
#include <asm/rio.h>
#include <asm/fadump.h>
#include <asm/switch_to.h>
#include <asm/tm.h>
#include <asm/debug.h>
#include <asm/asm-prototypes.h>
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix TB corruption in guest exit path on HMI interrupt When a guest is assigned to a core it converts the host Timebase (TB) into guest TB by adding guest timebase offset before entering into guest. During guest exit it restores the guest TB to host TB. This means under certain conditions (Guest migration) host TB and guest TB can differ. When we get an HMI for TB related issues the opal HMI handler would try fixing errors and restore the correct host TB value. With no guest running, we don't have any issues. But with guest running on the core we run into TB corruption issues. If we get an HMI while in the guest, the current HMI handler invokes opal hmi handler before forcing guest to exit. The guest exit path subtracts the guest TB offset from the current TB value which may have already been restored with host value by opal hmi handler. This leads to incorrect host and guest TB values. With split-core, things become more complex. With split-core, TB also gets split and each subcore gets its own TB register. When a hmi handler fixes a TB error and restores the TB value, it affects all the TB values of sibling subcores on the same core. On TB errors all the thread in the core gets HMI. With existing code, the individual threads call opal hmi handle independently which can easily throw TB out of sync if we have guest running on subcores. Hence we will need to co-ordinate with all the threads before making opal hmi handler call followed by TB resync. This patch introduces a sibling subcore state structure (shared by all threads in the core) in paca which holds information about whether sibling subcores are in Guest mode or host mode. An array in_guest[] of size MAX_SUBCORE_PER_CORE=4 is used to maintain the state of each subcore. The subcore id is used as index into in_guest[] array. Only primary thread entering/exiting the guest is responsible to set/unset its designated array element. On TB error, we get HMI interrupt on every thread on the core. Upon HMI, this patch will now force guest to vacate the core/subcore. Primary thread from each subcore will then turn off its respective bit from the above bitmap during the guest exit path just after the guest->host partition switch is complete. All other threads that have just exited the guest OR were already in host will wait until all other subcores clears their respective bit. Once all the subcores turn off their respective bit, all threads will will make call to opal hmi handler. It is not necessary that opal hmi handler would resync the TB value for every HMI interrupts. It would do so only for the HMI caused due to TB errors. For rest, it would not touch TB value. Hence to make things simpler, primary thread would call TB resync explicitly once for each core immediately after opal hmi handler instead of subtracting guest offset from TB. TB resync call will restore the TB with host value. Thus we can be sure about the TB state. One of the primary threads exiting the guest will take up the responsibility of calling TB resync. It will use one of the top bits (bit 63) from subcore state flags bitmap to make the decision. The first primary thread (among the subcores) that is able to set the bit will have to call the TB resync. Rest all other threads will wait until TB resync is complete. Once TB resync is complete all threads will then proceed. Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
2016-05-15 04:14:26 +00:00
#include <asm/hmi.h>
#include <sysdev/fsl_pci.h>
#include <asm/kprobes.h>
#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUGGER) || defined(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)
int (*__debugger)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_ipi)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_bpt)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_sstep)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_iabr_match)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_break_match)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
int (*__debugger_fault_handler)(struct pt_regs *regs) __read_mostly;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_ipi);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_bpt);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_sstep);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_iabr_match);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_break_match);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__debugger_fault_handler);
#endif
/* Transactional Memory trap debug */
#ifdef TM_DEBUG_SW
#define TM_DEBUG(x...) printk(KERN_INFO x)
#else
#define TM_DEBUG(x...) do { } while(0)
#endif
/*
* Trap & Exception support
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PMAC_BACKLIGHT
static void pmac_backlight_unblank(void)
{
mutex_lock(&pmac_backlight_mutex);
if (pmac_backlight) {
struct backlight_properties *props;
props = &pmac_backlight->props;
props->brightness = props->max_brightness;
props->power = FB_BLANK_UNBLANK;
backlight_update_status(pmac_backlight);
}
mutex_unlock(&pmac_backlight_mutex);
}
#else
static inline void pmac_backlight_unblank(void) { }
#endif
static arch_spinlock_t die_lock = __ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
static int die_owner = -1;
static unsigned int die_nest_count;
static int die_counter;
static unsigned long oops_begin(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int cpu;
unsigned long flags;
oops_enter();
/* racy, but better than risking deadlock. */
raw_local_irq_save(flags);
cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (!arch_spin_trylock(&die_lock)) {
if (cpu == die_owner)
/* nested oops. should stop eventually */;
else
arch_spin_lock(&die_lock);
}
die_nest_count++;
die_owner = cpu;
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
if (machine_is(powermac))
pmac_backlight_unblank();
return flags;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin);
static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
int signr)
{
bust_spinlocks(0);
add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
oops_exit();
printk("\n");
if (!die_nest_count) {
/* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */
die_owner = -1;
arch_spin_unlock(&die_lock);
}
raw_local_irq_restore(flags);
crash_fadump(regs, "die oops");
/*
* A system reset (0x100) is a request to dump, so we always send
* it through the crashdump code.
*/
if (kexec_should_crash(current) || (TRAP(regs) == 0x100)) {
crash_kexec(regs);
/*
* We aren't the primary crash CPU. We need to send it
* to a holding pattern to avoid it ending up in the panic
* code.
*/
crash_kexec_secondary(regs);
}
if (!signr)
return;
/*
* While our oops output is serialised by a spinlock, output
* from panic() called below can race and corrupt it. If we
* know we are going to panic, delay for 1 second so we have a
* chance to get clean backtraces from all CPUs that are oopsing.
*/
if (in_interrupt() || panic_on_oops || !current->pid ||
is_global_init(current)) {
mdelay(MSEC_PER_SEC);
}
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
if (panic_on_oops)
panic("Fatal exception");
do_exit(signr);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
static int __die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
{
printk("Oops: %s, sig: %ld [#%d]\n", str, err, ++die_counter);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN))
printk("LE ");
else
printk("BE ");
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
pr_cont("PREEMPT ");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
pr_cont("SMP NR_CPUS=%d ", NR_CPUS);
#endif
if (debug_pagealloc_enabled())
pr_cont("DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ");
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
pr_cont("NUMA ");
#endif
pr_cont("%s\n", ppc_md.name ? ppc_md.name : "");
if (notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return 1;
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
return 0;
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__die);
void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
{
unsigned long flags;
if (debugger(regs))
return;
flags = oops_begin(regs);
if (__die(str, regs, err))
err = 0;
oops_end(flags, regs, err);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(die);
void user_single_step_siginfo(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct pt_regs *regs, siginfo_t *info)
{
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->si_signo = SIGTRAP;
info->si_code = TRAP_TRACE;
info->si_addr = (void __user *)regs->nip;
}
void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
siginfo_t info;
const char fmt32[] = KERN_INFO "%s[%d]: unhandled signal %d " \
"at %08lx nip %08lx lr %08lx code %x\n";
const char fmt64[] = KERN_INFO "%s[%d]: unhandled signal %d " \
"at %016lx nip %016lx lr %016lx code %x\n";
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
die("Exception in kernel mode", regs, signr);
return;
}
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(current, signr)) {
printk_ratelimited(regs->msr & MSR_64BIT ? fmt64 : fmt32,
current->comm, current->pid, signr,
addr, regs->nip, regs->link, code);
}
if (arch_irqs_disabled() && !arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs))
local_irq_enable();
current->thread.trap_nr = code;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.si_signo = signr;
info.si_code = code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
force_sig_info(signr, &info, current);
}
void system_reset_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/*
* Avoid crashes in case of nested NMI exceptions. Recoverability
* is determined by RI and in_nmi
*/
bool nested = in_nmi();
if (!nested)
nmi_enter();
__this_cpu_inc(irq_stat.sreset_irqs);
/* See if any machine dependent calls */
if (ppc_md.system_reset_exception) {
if (ppc_md.system_reset_exception(regs))
goto out;
}
die("System Reset", regs, SIGABRT);
out:
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
BUG_ON(get_paca()->in_nmi == 0);
if (get_paca()->in_nmi > 1)
panic("Unrecoverable nested System Reset");
#endif
/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */
if (!(regs->msr & MSR_RI))
panic("Unrecoverable System Reset");
if (!nested)
nmi_exit();
/* What should we do here? We could issue a shutdown or hard reset. */
}
powerpc/book3s: handle machine check in Linux host. Move machine check entry point into Linux. So far we were dependent on firmware to decode MCE error details and handover the high level info to OS. This patch introduces early machine check routine that saves the MCE information (srr1, srr0, dar and dsisr) to the emergency stack. We allocate stack frame on emergency stack and set the r1 accordingly. This allows us to be prepared to take another exception without loosing context. One thing to note here that, if we get another machine check while ME bit is off then we risk a checkstop. Hence we restrict ourselves to save only MCE information and register saved on PACA_EXMC save are before we turn the ME bit on. We use paca->in_mce flag to differentiate between first entry and nested machine check entry which helps proper use of emergency stack. We increment paca->in_mce every time we enter in early machine check handler and decrement it while leaving. When we enter machine check early handler first time (paca->in_mce == 0), we are sure nobody is using MC emergency stack and allocate a stack frame at the start of the emergency stack. During subsequent entry (paca->in_mce > 0), we know that r1 points inside emergency stack and we allocate separate stack frame accordingly. This prevents us from clobbering MCE information during nested machine checks. The early machine check handler changes are placed under CPU_FTR_HVMODE section. This makes sure that the early machine check handler will get executed only in hypervisor kernel. This is the code flow: Machine Check Interrupt | V 0x200 vector ME=0, IR=0, DR=0 | V +-----------------------------------------------+ |machine_check_pSeries_early: | ME=0, IR=0, DR=0 | Alloc frame on emergency stack | | Save srr1, srr0, dar and dsisr on stack | +-----------------------------------------------+ | (ME=1, IR=0, DR=0, RFID) | V machine_check_handle_early ME=1, IR=0, DR=0 | V +-----------------------------------------------+ | machine_check_early (r3=pt_regs) | ME=1, IR=0, DR=0 | Things to do: (in next patches) | | Flush SLB for SLB errors | | Flush TLB for TLB errors | | Decode and save MCE info | +-----------------------------------------------+ | (Fall through existing exception handler routine.) | V machine_check_pSerie ME=1, IR=0, DR=0 | (ME=1, IR=1, DR=1, RFID) | V machine_check_common ME=1, IR=1, DR=1 . . . Signed-off-by: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2013-10-30 14:34:08 +00:00
/*
* I/O accesses can cause machine checks on powermacs.
* Check if the NIP corresponds to the address of a sync
* instruction for which there is an entry in the exception
* table.
* Note that the 601 only takes a machine check on TEA
* (transfer error ack) signal assertion, and does not
* set any of the top 16 bits of SRR1.
* -- paulus.
*/
static inline int check_io_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
unsigned long msr = regs->msr;
const struct exception_table_entry *entry;
unsigned int *nip = (unsigned int *)regs->nip;
if (((msr & 0xffff0000) == 0 || (msr & (0x80000 | 0x40000)))
&& (entry = search_exception_tables(regs->nip)) != NULL) {
/*
* Check that it's a sync instruction, or somewhere
* in the twi; isync; nop sequence that inb/inw/inl uses.
* As the address is in the exception table
* we should be able to read the instr there.
* For the debug message, we look at the preceding
* load or store.
*/
if (*nip == PPC_INST_NOP)
nip -= 2;
else if (*nip == PPC_INST_ISYNC)
--nip;
if (*nip == PPC_INST_SYNC || (*nip >> 26) == OP_TRAP) {
unsigned int rb;
--nip;
rb = (*nip >> 11) & 0x1f;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s bad port %lx at %p\n",
(*nip & 0x100)? "OUT to": "IN from",
regs->gpr[rb] - _IO_BASE, nip);
regs->msr |= MSR_RI;
regs->nip = extable_fixup(entry);
return 1;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
/* On 4xx, the reason for the machine check or program exception
is in the ESR. */
#define get_reason(regs) ((regs)->dsisr)
#define REASON_FP ESR_FP
#define REASON_ILLEGAL (ESR_PIL | ESR_PUO)
#define REASON_PRIVILEGED ESR_PPR
#define REASON_TRAP ESR_PTR
/* single-step stuff */
#define single_stepping(regs) (current->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IC)
#define clear_single_step(regs) (current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IC)
#else
/* On non-4xx, the reason for the machine check or program
exception is in the MSR. */
#define get_reason(regs) ((regs)->msr)
#define REASON_TM SRR1_PROGTM
#define REASON_FP SRR1_PROGFPE
#define REASON_ILLEGAL SRR1_PROGILL
#define REASON_PRIVILEGED SRR1_PROGPRIV
#define REASON_TRAP SRR1_PROGTRAP
#define single_stepping(regs) ((regs)->msr & MSR_SE)
#define clear_single_step(regs) ((regs)->msr &= ~MSR_SE)
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_E500)
int machine_check_e500mc(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long mcsr = mfspr(SPRN_MCSR);
unsigned long reason = mcsr;
int recoverable = 1;
if (reason & MCSR_LD) {
recoverable = fsl_rio_mcheck_exception(regs);
if (recoverable == 1)
goto silent_out;
}
printk("Machine check in kernel mode.\n");
printk("Caused by (from MCSR=%lx): ", reason);
if (reason & MCSR_MCP)
printk("Machine Check Signal\n");
if (reason & MCSR_ICPERR) {
printk("Instruction Cache Parity Error\n");
/*
* This is recoverable by invalidating the i-cache.
*/
mtspr(SPRN_L1CSR1, mfspr(SPRN_L1CSR1) | L1CSR1_ICFI);
while (mfspr(SPRN_L1CSR1) & L1CSR1_ICFI)
;
/*
* This will generally be accompanied by an instruction
* fetch error report -- only treat MCSR_IF as fatal
* if it wasn't due to an L1 parity error.
*/
reason &= ~MCSR_IF;
}
if (reason & MCSR_DCPERR_MC) {
printk("Data Cache Parity Error\n");
/*
* In write shadow mode we auto-recover from the error, but it
* may still get logged and cause a machine check. We should
* only treat the non-write shadow case as non-recoverable.
*/
if (!(mfspr(SPRN_L1CSR2) & L1CSR2_DCWS))
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_L2MMU_MHIT) {
printk("Hit on multiple TLB entries\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_NMI)
printk("Non-maskable interrupt\n");
if (reason & MCSR_IF) {
printk("Instruction Fetch Error Report\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_LD) {
printk("Load Error Report\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_ST) {
printk("Store Error Report\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_LDG) {
printk("Guarded Load Error Report\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_TLBSYNC)
printk("Simultaneous tlbsync operations\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BSL2_ERR) {
printk("Level 2 Cache Error\n");
recoverable = 0;
}
if (reason & MCSR_MAV) {
u64 addr;
addr = mfspr(SPRN_MCAR);
addr |= (u64)mfspr(SPRN_MCARU) << 32;
printk("Machine Check %s Address: %#llx\n",
reason & MCSR_MEA ? "Effective" : "Physical", addr);
}
silent_out:
mtspr(SPRN_MCSR, mcsr);
return mfspr(SPRN_MCSR) == 0 && recoverable;
}
int machine_check_e500(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long reason = mfspr(SPRN_MCSR);
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_RBERR) {
if (fsl_rio_mcheck_exception(regs))
return 1;
if (fsl_pci_mcheck_exception(regs))
return 1;
}
printk("Machine check in kernel mode.\n");
printk("Caused by (from MCSR=%lx): ", reason);
if (reason & MCSR_MCP)
printk("Machine Check Signal\n");
if (reason & MCSR_ICPERR)
printk("Instruction Cache Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_DCP_PERR)
printk("Data Cache Push Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_DCPERR)
printk("Data Cache Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_IAERR)
printk("Bus - Instruction Address Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_RAERR)
printk("Bus - Read Address Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_WAERR)
printk("Bus - Write Address Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_IBERR)
printk("Bus - Instruction Data Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_RBERR)
printk("Bus - Read Data Bus Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_WBERR)
printk("Bus - Write Data Bus Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_IPERR)
printk("Bus - Instruction Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_RPERR)
printk("Bus - Read Parity Error\n");
return 0;
}
int machine_check_generic(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 0;
}
#elif defined(CONFIG_E200)
int machine_check_e200(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long reason = mfspr(SPRN_MCSR);
printk("Machine check in kernel mode.\n");
printk("Caused by (from MCSR=%lx): ", reason);
if (reason & MCSR_MCP)
printk("Machine Check Signal\n");
if (reason & MCSR_CP_PERR)
printk("Cache Push Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_CPERR)
printk("Cache Parity Error\n");
if (reason & MCSR_EXCP_ERR)
printk("ISI, ITLB, or Bus Error on first instruction fetch for an exception handler\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_IRERR)
printk("Bus - Read Bus Error on instruction fetch\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_DRERR)
printk("Bus - Read Bus Error on data load\n");
if (reason & MCSR_BUS_WRERR)
printk("Bus - Write Bus Error on buffered store or cache line push\n");
return 0;
}
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC32)
int machine_check_generic(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long reason = regs->msr;
printk("Machine check in kernel mode.\n");
printk("Caused by (from SRR1=%lx): ", reason);
switch (reason & 0x601F0000) {
case 0x80000:
printk("Machine check signal\n");
break;
case 0: /* for 601 */
case 0x40000:
case 0x140000: /* 7450 MSS error and TEA */
printk("Transfer error ack signal\n");
break;
case 0x20000:
printk("Data parity error signal\n");
break;
case 0x10000:
printk("Address parity error signal\n");
break;
case 0x20000000:
printk("L1 Data Cache error\n");
break;
case 0x40000000:
printk("L1 Instruction Cache error\n");
break;
case 0x00100000:
printk("L2 data cache parity error\n");
break;
default:
printk("Unknown values in msr\n");
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* everything else */
void machine_check_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
int recover = 0;
/* 64s accounts the mce in machine_check_early when in HVMODE */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) || !cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_HVMODE))
__this_cpu_inc(irq_stat.mce_exceptions);
add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
/* See if any machine dependent calls. In theory, we would want
* to call the CPU first, and call the ppc_md. one if the CPU
* one returns a positive number. However there is existing code
* that assumes the board gets a first chance, so let's keep it
* that way for now and fix things later. --BenH.
*/
if (ppc_md.machine_check_exception)
recover = ppc_md.machine_check_exception(regs);
else if (cur_cpu_spec->machine_check)
recover = cur_cpu_spec->machine_check(regs);
if (recover > 0)
goto bail;
if (debugger_fault_handler(regs))
goto bail;
if (check_io_access(regs))
goto bail;
die("Machine check", regs, SIGBUS);
/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */
if (!(regs->msr & MSR_RI))
panic("Unrecoverable Machine check");
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void SMIException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
die("System Management Interrupt", regs, SIGABRT);
}
void handle_hmi_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct pt_regs *old_regs;
old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
irq_enter();
if (ppc_md.handle_hmi_exception)
ppc_md.handle_hmi_exception(regs);
irq_exit();
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
}
void unknown_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
printk("Bad trap at PC: %lx, SR: %lx, vector=%lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr, regs->trap);
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, 0, 0);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void instruction_breakpoint_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
if (notify_die(DIE_IABR_MATCH, "iabr_match", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto bail;
if (debugger_iabr_match(regs))
goto bail;
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_BRKPT, regs->nip);
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void RunModeException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, 0, 0);
}
void single_step_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
clear_single_step(regs);
if (kprobe_post_handler(regs))
return;
if (notify_die(DIE_SSTEP, "single_step", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
goto bail;
if (debugger_sstep(regs))
goto bail;
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_TRACE, regs->nip);
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(single_step_exception);
/*
* After we have successfully emulated an instruction, we have to
* check if the instruction was being single-stepped, and if so,
* pretend we got a single-step exception. This was pointed out
* by Kumar Gala. -- paulus
*/
static void emulate_single_step(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (single_stepping(regs))
single_step_exception(regs);
}
static inline int __parse_fpscr(unsigned long fpscr)
{
int ret = 0;
/* Invalid operation */
if ((fpscr & FPSCR_VE) && (fpscr & FPSCR_VX))
ret = FPE_FLTINV;
/* Overflow */
else if ((fpscr & FPSCR_OE) && (fpscr & FPSCR_OX))
ret = FPE_FLTOVF;
/* Underflow */
else if ((fpscr & FPSCR_UE) && (fpscr & FPSCR_UX))
ret = FPE_FLTUND;
/* Divide by zero */
else if ((fpscr & FPSCR_ZE) && (fpscr & FPSCR_ZX))
ret = FPE_FLTDIV;
/* Inexact result */
else if ((fpscr & FPSCR_XE) && (fpscr & FPSCR_XX))
ret = FPE_FLTRES;
return ret;
}
static void parse_fpe(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int code = 0;
flush_fp_to_thread(current);
code = __parse_fpscr(current->thread.fp_state.fpscr);
_exception(SIGFPE, regs, code, regs->nip);
}
/*
* Illegal instruction emulation support. Originally written to
* provide the PVR to user applications using the mfspr rd, PVR.
* Return non-zero if we can't emulate, or -EFAULT if the associated
* memory access caused an access fault. Return zero on success.
*
* There are a couple of ways to do this, either "decode" the instruction
* or directly match lots of bits. In this case, matching lots of
* bits is faster and easier.
*
*/
static int emulate_string_inst(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instword)
{
u8 rT = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
u8 rA = (instword >> 16) & 0x1f;
u8 NB_RB = (instword >> 11) & 0x1f;
u32 num_bytes;
unsigned long EA;
int pos = 0;
/* Early out if we are an invalid form of lswx */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_STRING_MASK) == PPC_INST_LSWX)
if ((rT == rA) || (rT == NB_RB))
return -EINVAL;
EA = (rA == 0) ? 0 : regs->gpr[rA];
switch (instword & PPC_INST_STRING_MASK) {
case PPC_INST_LSWX:
case PPC_INST_STSWX:
EA += NB_RB;
num_bytes = regs->xer & 0x7f;
break;
case PPC_INST_LSWI:
case PPC_INST_STSWI:
num_bytes = (NB_RB == 0) ? 32 : NB_RB;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
while (num_bytes != 0)
{
u8 val;
u32 shift = 8 * (3 - (pos & 0x3));
/* if process is 32-bit, clear upper 32 bits of EA */
if ((regs->msr & MSR_64BIT) == 0)
EA &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
switch ((instword & PPC_INST_STRING_MASK)) {
case PPC_INST_LSWX:
case PPC_INST_LSWI:
if (get_user(val, (u8 __user *)EA))
return -EFAULT;
/* first time updating this reg,
* zero it out */
if (pos == 0)
regs->gpr[rT] = 0;
regs->gpr[rT] |= val << shift;
break;
case PPC_INST_STSWI:
case PPC_INST_STSWX:
val = regs->gpr[rT] >> shift;
if (put_user(val, (u8 __user *)EA))
return -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* move EA to next address */
EA += 1;
num_bytes--;
/* manage our position within the register */
if (++pos == 4) {
pos = 0;
if (++rT == 32)
rT = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int emulate_popcntb_inst(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instword)
{
u32 ra,rs;
unsigned long tmp;
ra = (instword >> 16) & 0x1f;
rs = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
tmp = regs->gpr[rs];
tmp = tmp - ((tmp >> 1) & 0x5555555555555555ULL);
tmp = (tmp & 0x3333333333333333ULL) + ((tmp >> 2) & 0x3333333333333333ULL);
tmp = (tmp + (tmp >> 4)) & 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0fULL;
regs->gpr[ra] = tmp;
return 0;
}
static int emulate_isel(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instword)
{
u8 rT = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
u8 rA = (instword >> 16) & 0x1f;
u8 rB = (instword >> 11) & 0x1f;
u8 BC = (instword >> 6) & 0x1f;
u8 bit;
unsigned long tmp;
tmp = (rA == 0) ? 0 : regs->gpr[rA];
bit = (regs->ccr >> (31 - BC)) & 0x1;
regs->gpr[rT] = bit ? tmp : regs->gpr[rB];
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
static inline bool tm_abort_check(struct pt_regs *regs, int cause)
{
/* If we're emulating a load/store in an active transaction, we cannot
* emulate it as the kernel operates in transaction suspended context.
* We need to abort the transaction. This creates a persistent TM
* abort so tell the user what caused it with a new code.
*/
if (MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(regs->msr)) {
tm_enable();
tm_abort(cause);
return true;
}
return false;
}
#else
static inline bool tm_abort_check(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason)
{
return false;
}
#endif
static int emulate_instruction(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
u32 instword;
u32 rd;
if (!user_mode(regs))
return -EINVAL;
CHECK_FULL_REGS(regs);
if (get_user(instword, (u32 __user *)(regs->nip)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Emulate the mfspr rD, PVR. */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_MFSPR_PVR_MASK) == PPC_INST_MFSPR_PVR) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(mfpvr, regs);
rd = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
regs->gpr[rd] = mfspr(SPRN_PVR);
return 0;
}
/* Emulating the dcba insn is just a no-op. */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_DCBA_MASK) == PPC_INST_DCBA) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(dcba, regs);
return 0;
}
/* Emulate the mcrxr insn. */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_MCRXR_MASK) == PPC_INST_MCRXR) {
int shift = (instword >> 21) & 0x1c;
unsigned long msk = 0xf0000000UL >> shift;
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(mcrxr, regs);
regs->ccr = (regs->ccr & ~msk) | ((regs->xer >> shift) & msk);
regs->xer &= ~0xf0000000UL;
return 0;
}
/* Emulate load/store string insn. */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_STRING_GEN_MASK) == PPC_INST_STRING) {
if (tm_abort_check(regs,
TM_CAUSE_EMULATE | TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT))
return -EINVAL;
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(string, regs);
return emulate_string_inst(regs, instword);
}
/* Emulate the popcntb (Population Count Bytes) instruction. */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_POPCNTB_MASK) == PPC_INST_POPCNTB) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(popcntb, regs);
return emulate_popcntb_inst(regs, instword);
}
/* Emulate isel (Integer Select) instruction */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_ISEL_MASK) == PPC_INST_ISEL) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(isel, regs);
return emulate_isel(regs, instword);
}
/* Emulate sync instruction variants */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_SYNC_MASK) == PPC_INST_SYNC) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(sync, regs);
asm volatile("sync");
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
/* Emulate the mfspr rD, DSCR. */
if ((((instword & PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR_USER_MASK) ==
PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR_USER) ||
((instword & PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR_MASK) ==
PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR)) &&
cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_DSCR)) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(mfdscr, regs);
rd = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
regs->gpr[rd] = mfspr(SPRN_DSCR);
return 0;
}
/* Emulate the mtspr DSCR, rD. */
if ((((instword & PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR_USER_MASK) ==
PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR_USER) ||
((instword & PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR_MASK) ==
PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR)) &&
cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_DSCR)) {
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(mtdscr, regs);
rd = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
current->thread.dscr = regs->gpr[rd];
current->thread.dscr_inherit = 1;
mtspr(SPRN_DSCR, current->thread.dscr);
return 0;
}
#endif
return -EINVAL;
}
int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long addr)
{
return is_kernel_addr(addr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
static int emulate_math(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int ret;
extern int do_mathemu(struct pt_regs *regs);
ret = do_mathemu(regs);
if (ret >= 0)
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(math, regs);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
emulate_single_step(regs);
return 0;
case 1: {
int code = 0;
code = __parse_fpscr(current->thread.fp_state.fpscr);
_exception(SIGFPE, regs, code, regs->nip);
return 0;
}
case -EFAULT:
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_MAPERR, regs->nip);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
#else
static inline int emulate_math(struct pt_regs *regs) { return -1; }
#endif
void program_check_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
unsigned int reason = get_reason(regs);
/* We can now get here via a FP Unavailable exception if the core
* has no FPU, in that case the reason flags will be 0 */
if (reason & REASON_FP) {
/* IEEE FP exception */
parse_fpe(regs);
goto bail;
}
if (reason & REASON_TRAP) {
unsigned long bugaddr;
/* Debugger is first in line to stop recursive faults in
* rcu_lock, notify_die, or atomic_notifier_call_chain */
if (debugger_bpt(regs))
goto bail;
if (kprobe_handler(regs))
goto bail;
/* trap exception */
if (notify_die(DIE_BPT, "breakpoint", regs, 5, 5, SIGTRAP)
== NOTIFY_STOP)
goto bail;
bugaddr = regs->nip;
/*
* Fixup bugaddr for BUG_ON() in real mode
*/
if (!is_kernel_addr(bugaddr) && !(regs->msr & MSR_IR))
bugaddr += PAGE_OFFSET;
if (!(regs->msr & MSR_PR) && /* not user-mode */
report_bug(bugaddr, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN) {
regs->nip += 4;
goto bail;
}
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_BRKPT, regs->nip);
goto bail;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (reason & REASON_TM) {
/* This is a TM "Bad Thing Exception" program check.
* This occurs when:
* - An rfid/hrfid/mtmsrd attempts to cause an illegal
* transition in TM states.
* - A trechkpt is attempted when transactional.
* - A treclaim is attempted when non transactional.
* - A tend is illegally attempted.
* - writing a TM SPR when transactional.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs) &&
report_bug(regs->nip, regs) == BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN) {
regs->nip += 4;
goto bail;
}
/* If usermode caused this, it's done something illegal and
* gets a SIGILL slap on the wrist. We call it an illegal
* operand to distinguish from the instruction just being bad
* (e.g. executing a 'tend' on a CPU without TM!); it's an
* illegal /placement/ of a valid instruction.
*/
if (user_mode(regs)) {
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPN, regs->nip);
goto bail;
} else {
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unexpected TM Bad Thing exception "
"at %lx (msr 0x%x)\n", regs->nip, reason);
die("Unrecoverable exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
}
#endif
powerpc: Skip emulating & leave interrupts off for kernel program checks In the program check handler we handle some causes with interrupts off and others with interrupts on. We need to enable interrupts to handle the emulation cases, because they access userspace memory and might sleep. For faults in the kernel we don't want to do any emulation, and emulate_instruction() enforces that. do_mathemu() doesn't but probably should. The other disadvantage of enabling interrupts for kernel faults is that we may take another interrupt, and recurse. As seen below: --- Exception: e40 at c000000000004ee0 performance_monitor_relon_pSeries_1 [link register ] c00000000000f858 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x38/0x90 [c000000fb185dc10] 0000000000000000 (unreliable) [c000000fb185dc80] c0000000007d8558 .program_check_exception+0x298/0x2d0 [c000000fb185dd00] c000000000002f40 emulation_assist_common+0x140/0x180 --- Exception: e40 at c000000000004ee0 performance_monitor_relon_pSeries_1 [link register ] c00000000000f858 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x38/0x90 [c000000fb185dff0] 00000000008b9190 (unreliable) [c000000fb185e060] c0000000007d8558 .program_check_exception+0x298/0x2d0 So avoid both problems by checking if the fault was in the kernel and skipping the enable of interrupts and the emulation. Go straight to delivering the SIGILL, which for kernel faults calls die() and so on, dropping us in the debugger etc. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2013-08-15 05:22:19 +00:00
/*
* If we took the program check in the kernel skip down to sending a
* SIGILL. The subsequent cases all relate to emulating instructions
* which we should only do for userspace. We also do not want to enable
* interrupts for kernel faults because that might lead to further
* faults, and loose the context of the original exception.
*/
if (!user_mode(regs))
goto sigill;
/* We restore the interrupt state now */
if (!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs))
local_irq_enable();
/* (reason & REASON_ILLEGAL) would be the obvious thing here,
* but there seems to be a hardware bug on the 405GP (RevD)
* that means ESR is sometimes set incorrectly - either to
* ESR_DST (!?) or 0. In the process of chasing this with the
* hardware people - not sure if it can happen on any illegal
* instruction or only on FP instructions, whether there is a
* pattern to occurrences etc. -dgibson 31/Mar/2003
*/
if (!emulate_math(regs))
goto bail;
/* Try to emulate it if we should. */
if (reason & (REASON_ILLEGAL | REASON_PRIVILEGED)) {
switch (emulate_instruction(regs)) {
case 0:
regs->nip += 4;
emulate_single_step(regs);
goto bail;
case -EFAULT:
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_MAPERR, regs->nip);
goto bail;
}
}
powerpc: Skip emulating & leave interrupts off for kernel program checks In the program check handler we handle some causes with interrupts off and others with interrupts on. We need to enable interrupts to handle the emulation cases, because they access userspace memory and might sleep. For faults in the kernel we don't want to do any emulation, and emulate_instruction() enforces that. do_mathemu() doesn't but probably should. The other disadvantage of enabling interrupts for kernel faults is that we may take another interrupt, and recurse. As seen below: --- Exception: e40 at c000000000004ee0 performance_monitor_relon_pSeries_1 [link register ] c00000000000f858 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x38/0x90 [c000000fb185dc10] 0000000000000000 (unreliable) [c000000fb185dc80] c0000000007d8558 .program_check_exception+0x298/0x2d0 [c000000fb185dd00] c000000000002f40 emulation_assist_common+0x140/0x180 --- Exception: e40 at c000000000004ee0 performance_monitor_relon_pSeries_1 [link register ] c00000000000f858 .arch_local_irq_restore+0x38/0x90 [c000000fb185dff0] 00000000008b9190 (unreliable) [c000000fb185e060] c0000000007d8558 .program_check_exception+0x298/0x2d0 So avoid both problems by checking if the fault was in the kernel and skipping the enable of interrupts and the emulation. Go straight to delivering the SIGILL, which for kernel faults calls die() and so on, dropping us in the debugger etc. Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2013-08-15 05:22:19 +00:00
sigill:
if (reason & REASON_PRIVILEGED)
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_PRVOPC, regs->nip);
else
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(program_check_exception);
/*
* This occurs when running in hypervisor mode on POWER6 or later
* and an illegal instruction is encountered.
*/
void emulation_assist_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
regs->msr |= REASON_ILLEGAL;
program_check_exception(regs);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(emulation_assist_interrupt);
void alignment_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
int sig, code, fixed = 0;
/* We restore the interrupt state now */
if (!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs))
local_irq_enable();
if (tm_abort_check(regs, TM_CAUSE_ALIGNMENT | TM_CAUSE_PERSISTENT))
goto bail;
/* we don't implement logging of alignment exceptions */
if (!(current->thread.align_ctl & PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS))
fixed = fix_alignment(regs);
if (fixed == 1) {
regs->nip += 4; /* skip over emulated instruction */
emulate_single_step(regs);
goto bail;
}
/* Operand address was bad */
if (fixed == -EFAULT) {
sig = SIGSEGV;
code = SEGV_ACCERR;
} else {
sig = SIGBUS;
code = BUS_ADRALN;
}
if (user_mode(regs))
_exception(sig, regs, code, regs->dar);
else
bad_page_fault(regs, regs->dar, sig);
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
powerpc/mm: Preserve CFAR value on SLB miss caused by access to bogus address Currently, if userspace or the kernel accesses a completely bogus address, for example with any of bits 46-59 set, we first take an SLB miss interrupt, install a corresponding SLB entry with VSID 0, retry the instruction, then take a DSI/ISI interrupt because there is no HPT entry mapping the address. However, by the time of the second interrupt, the Come-From Address Register (CFAR) has been overwritten by the rfid instruction at the end of the SLB miss interrupt handler. Since bogus accesses can often be caused by a function return after the stack has been overwritten, the CFAR value would be very useful as it could indicate which function it was whose return had led to the bogus address. This patch adds code to create a full exception frame in the SLB miss handler in the case of a bogus address, rather than inserting an SLB entry with a zero VSID field. Then we call a new slb_miss_bad_addr() function in C code, which delivers a signal for a user access or creates an oops for a kernel access. In the latter case the oops message will show the CFAR value at the time of the access. In the case of the radix MMU, a segment miss interrupt indicates an access outside the ranges mapped by the page tables. Previously this was handled by the code for an unrecoverable SLB miss (one with MSR[RI] = 0), which is not really correct. With this patch, we now handle these interrupts with slb_miss_bad_addr(), which is much more consistent. Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-02 11:49:21 +00:00
void slb_miss_bad_addr(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
if (user_mode(regs))
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_BNDERR, regs->dar);
else
bad_page_fault(regs, regs->dar, SIGSEGV);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void StackOverflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_CRIT "Kernel stack overflow in process %p, r1=%lx\n",
current, regs->gpr[1]);
debugger(regs);
show_regs(regs);
panic("kernel stack overflow");
}
void nonrecoverable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_ERR "Non-recoverable exception at PC=%lx MSR=%lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
debugger(regs);
die("nonrecoverable exception", regs, SIGKILL);
}
void kernel_fp_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable FP Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable FP Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void altivec_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state = exception_enter();
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* A user program has executed an altivec instruction,
but this kernel doesn't support altivec. */
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
goto bail;
}
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable VMX/Altivec Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
bail:
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
void vsx_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (user_mode(regs)) {
/* A user program has executed an vsx instruction,
but this kernel doesn't support vsx. */
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
return;
}
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable VSX Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable VSX Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
static void tm_unavailable(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (user_mode(regs)) {
current->thread.load_tm++;
regs->msr |= MSR_TM;
tm_enable();
tm_restore_sprs(&current->thread);
return;
}
#endif
pr_emerg("Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception "
"%lx at %lx\n", regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
void facility_unavailable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
static char *facility_strings[] = {
[FSCR_FP_LG] = "FPU",
[FSCR_VECVSX_LG] = "VMX/VSX",
[FSCR_DSCR_LG] = "DSCR",
[FSCR_PM_LG] = "PMU SPRs",
[FSCR_BHRB_LG] = "BHRB",
[FSCR_TM_LG] = "TM",
[FSCR_EBB_LG] = "EBB",
[FSCR_TAR_LG] = "TAR",
[FSCR_MSGP_LG] = "MSGP",
[FSCR_SCV_LG] = "SCV",
};
char *facility = "unknown";
u64 value;
powerpc: Fix handling of DSCR related facility unavailable exception Currently DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) can be accessed with mfspr or mtspr instructions inside a thread via two different SPR numbers. One being the user accessible problem state SPR number 0x03 and the other being the privilege state SPR number 0x11. All access through the privilege state SPR number get emulated through illegal instruction exception. Any access through the problem state SPR number raises one facility unavailable exception which sets the thread based dscr_inherit bit and enables DSCR facility through FSCR register thus allowing direct access to DSCR without going through this exception in the future. We set the thread.dscr_inherit bit whether the access was with mfspr or mtspr instruction which is neither correct nor does it match the behaviour through the instruction emulation code path driven from privilege state SPR number. User currently observes two different kind of behaviour when accessing the DSCR through these two SPR numbers. This problem can be observed through these two test cases by replacing the privilege state SPR number with the problem state SPR number. (1) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_default_test.c (2) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_explicit_test.c This patch fixes the problem by making sure that the behaviour visible to the user remains the same irrespective of which SPR number is being used. Inside facility unavailable exception, we check whether it was cuased by a mfspr or a mtspr isntrucction. In case of mfspr instruction, just emulate the instruction. In case of mtspr instruction, set the thread based dscr_inherit bit and also enable the facility through FSCR. All user SPR based mfspr instruction will be emulated till one user SPR based mtspr has been executed. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-05-21 06:43:01 +00:00
u32 instword, rd;
u8 status;
bool hv;
hv = (regs->trap == 0xf80);
if (hv)
value = mfspr(SPRN_HFSCR);
else
value = mfspr(SPRN_FSCR);
status = value >> 56;
if (status == FSCR_DSCR_LG) {
powerpc: Fix handling of DSCR related facility unavailable exception Currently DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) can be accessed with mfspr or mtspr instructions inside a thread via two different SPR numbers. One being the user accessible problem state SPR number 0x03 and the other being the privilege state SPR number 0x11. All access through the privilege state SPR number get emulated through illegal instruction exception. Any access through the problem state SPR number raises one facility unavailable exception which sets the thread based dscr_inherit bit and enables DSCR facility through FSCR register thus allowing direct access to DSCR without going through this exception in the future. We set the thread.dscr_inherit bit whether the access was with mfspr or mtspr instruction which is neither correct nor does it match the behaviour through the instruction emulation code path driven from privilege state SPR number. User currently observes two different kind of behaviour when accessing the DSCR through these two SPR numbers. This problem can be observed through these two test cases by replacing the privilege state SPR number with the problem state SPR number. (1) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_default_test.c (2) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_explicit_test.c This patch fixes the problem by making sure that the behaviour visible to the user remains the same irrespective of which SPR number is being used. Inside facility unavailable exception, we check whether it was cuased by a mfspr or a mtspr isntrucction. In case of mfspr instruction, just emulate the instruction. In case of mtspr instruction, set the thread based dscr_inherit bit and also enable the facility through FSCR. All user SPR based mfspr instruction will be emulated till one user SPR based mtspr has been executed. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-05-21 06:43:01 +00:00
/*
* User is accessing the DSCR register using the problem
* state only SPR number (0x03) either through a mfspr or
* a mtspr instruction. If it is a write attempt through
* a mtspr, then we set the inherit bit. This also allows
* the user to write or read the register directly in the
* future by setting via the FSCR DSCR bit. But in case it
* is a read DSCR attempt through a mfspr instruction, we
* just emulate the instruction instead. This code path will
* always emulate all the mfspr instructions till the user
* has attempted at least one mtspr instruction. This way it
powerpc: Fix handling of DSCR related facility unavailable exception Currently DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) can be accessed with mfspr or mtspr instructions inside a thread via two different SPR numbers. One being the user accessible problem state SPR number 0x03 and the other being the privilege state SPR number 0x11. All access through the privilege state SPR number get emulated through illegal instruction exception. Any access through the problem state SPR number raises one facility unavailable exception which sets the thread based dscr_inherit bit and enables DSCR facility through FSCR register thus allowing direct access to DSCR without going through this exception in the future. We set the thread.dscr_inherit bit whether the access was with mfspr or mtspr instruction which is neither correct nor does it match the behaviour through the instruction emulation code path driven from privilege state SPR number. User currently observes two different kind of behaviour when accessing the DSCR through these two SPR numbers. This problem can be observed through these two test cases by replacing the privilege state SPR number with the problem state SPR number. (1) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_default_test.c (2) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_explicit_test.c This patch fixes the problem by making sure that the behaviour visible to the user remains the same irrespective of which SPR number is being used. Inside facility unavailable exception, we check whether it was cuased by a mfspr or a mtspr isntrucction. In case of mfspr instruction, just emulate the instruction. In case of mtspr instruction, set the thread based dscr_inherit bit and also enable the facility through FSCR. All user SPR based mfspr instruction will be emulated till one user SPR based mtspr has been executed. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-05-21 06:43:01 +00:00
* preserves the same behaviour when the user is accessing
* the DSCR through privilege level only SPR number (0x11)
* which is emulated through illegal instruction exception.
* We always leave HFSCR DSCR set.
*/
powerpc: Fix handling of DSCR related facility unavailable exception Currently DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) can be accessed with mfspr or mtspr instructions inside a thread via two different SPR numbers. One being the user accessible problem state SPR number 0x03 and the other being the privilege state SPR number 0x11. All access through the privilege state SPR number get emulated through illegal instruction exception. Any access through the problem state SPR number raises one facility unavailable exception which sets the thread based dscr_inherit bit and enables DSCR facility through FSCR register thus allowing direct access to DSCR without going through this exception in the future. We set the thread.dscr_inherit bit whether the access was with mfspr or mtspr instruction which is neither correct nor does it match the behaviour through the instruction emulation code path driven from privilege state SPR number. User currently observes two different kind of behaviour when accessing the DSCR through these two SPR numbers. This problem can be observed through these two test cases by replacing the privilege state SPR number with the problem state SPR number. (1) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_default_test.c (2) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_explicit_test.c This patch fixes the problem by making sure that the behaviour visible to the user remains the same irrespective of which SPR number is being used. Inside facility unavailable exception, we check whether it was cuased by a mfspr or a mtspr isntrucction. In case of mfspr instruction, just emulate the instruction. In case of mtspr instruction, set the thread based dscr_inherit bit and also enable the facility through FSCR. All user SPR based mfspr instruction will be emulated till one user SPR based mtspr has been executed. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-05-21 06:43:01 +00:00
if (get_user(instword, (u32 __user *)(regs->nip))) {
pr_err("Failed to fetch the user instruction\n");
return;
}
/* Write into DSCR (mtspr 0x03, RS) */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR_USER_MASK)
== PPC_INST_MTSPR_DSCR_USER) {
rd = (instword >> 21) & 0x1f;
current->thread.dscr = regs->gpr[rd];
current->thread.dscr_inherit = 1;
current->thread.fscr |= FSCR_DSCR;
mtspr(SPRN_FSCR, current->thread.fscr);
powerpc: Fix handling of DSCR related facility unavailable exception Currently DSCR (Data Stream Control Register) can be accessed with mfspr or mtspr instructions inside a thread via two different SPR numbers. One being the user accessible problem state SPR number 0x03 and the other being the privilege state SPR number 0x11. All access through the privilege state SPR number get emulated through illegal instruction exception. Any access through the problem state SPR number raises one facility unavailable exception which sets the thread based dscr_inherit bit and enables DSCR facility through FSCR register thus allowing direct access to DSCR without going through this exception in the future. We set the thread.dscr_inherit bit whether the access was with mfspr or mtspr instruction which is neither correct nor does it match the behaviour through the instruction emulation code path driven from privilege state SPR number. User currently observes two different kind of behaviour when accessing the DSCR through these two SPR numbers. This problem can be observed through these two test cases by replacing the privilege state SPR number with the problem state SPR number. (1) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_default_test.c (2) http://ozlabs.org/~anton/junkcode/dscr_explicit_test.c This patch fixes the problem by making sure that the behaviour visible to the user remains the same irrespective of which SPR number is being used. Inside facility unavailable exception, we check whether it was cuased by a mfspr or a mtspr isntrucction. In case of mfspr instruction, just emulate the instruction. In case of mtspr instruction, set the thread based dscr_inherit bit and also enable the facility through FSCR. All user SPR based mfspr instruction will be emulated till one user SPR based mtspr has been executed. Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2015-05-21 06:43:01 +00:00
}
/* Read from DSCR (mfspr RT, 0x03) */
if ((instword & PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR_USER_MASK)
== PPC_INST_MFSPR_DSCR_USER) {
if (emulate_instruction(regs)) {
pr_err("DSCR based mfspr emulation failed\n");
return;
}
regs->nip += 4;
emulate_single_step(regs);
}
return;
}
if (status == FSCR_TM_LG) {
/*
* If we're here then the hardware is TM aware because it
* generated an exception with FSRM_TM set.
*
* If cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM) is false, then either firmware
* told us not to do TM, or the kernel is not built with TM
* support.
*
* If both of those things are true, then userspace can spam the
* console by triggering the printk() below just by continually
* doing tbegin (or any TM instruction). So in that case just
* send the process a SIGILL immediately.
*/
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
goto out;
tm_unavailable(regs);
return;
}
if ((hv || status >= 2) &&
(status < ARRAY_SIZE(facility_strings)) &&
facility_strings[status])
facility = facility_strings[status];
/* We restore the interrupt state now */
if (!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs))
local_irq_enable();
pr_err_ratelimited("%sFacility '%s' unavailable (%d), exception at 0x%lx, MSR=%lx\n",
hv ? "Hypervisor " : "", facility, status, regs->nip, regs->msr);
out:
if (user_mode(regs)) {
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_ILLOPC, regs->nip);
return;
}
die("Unexpected facility unavailable exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
void fp_unavailable_tm(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Note: This does not handle any kind of FP laziness. */
TM_DEBUG("FP Unavailable trap whilst transactional at 0x%lx, MSR=%lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
/* We can only have got here if the task started using FP after
* beginning the transaction. So, the transactional regs are just a
* copy of the checkpointed ones. But, we still need to recheckpoint
* as we're enabling FP for the process; it will return, abort the
* transaction, and probably retry but now with FP enabled. So the
* checkpointed FP registers need to be loaded.
*/
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-13 04:56:29 +00:00
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_FAC_UNAV);
/* Reclaim didn't save out any FPRs to transact_fprs. */
/* Enable FP for the task: */
regs->msr |= (MSR_FP | current->thread.fpexc_mode);
/* This loads and recheckpoints the FP registers from
* thread.fpr[]. They will remain in registers after the
* checkpoint so we don't need to reload them after.
* If VMX is in use, the VRs now hold checkpointed values,
* so we don't want to load the VRs from the thread_struct.
*/
tm_recheckpoint(&current->thread, MSR_FP);
/* If VMX is in use, get the transactional values back */
if (regs->msr & MSR_VEC) {
powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers There is currently an inconsistency as to how the entire CPU register state is saved and restored when a thread uses transactional memory (TM). Using transactional memory results in the CPU having duplicated (almost) all of its register state. This duplication results in a set of registers which can be considered 'live', those being currently modified by the instructions being executed and another set that is frozen at a point in time. On context switch, both sets of state have to be saved and (later) restored. These two states are often called a variety of different things. Common terms for the state which only exists after the CPU has entered a transaction (performed a TBEGIN instruction) in hardware are 'transactional' or 'speculative'. Between a TBEGIN and a TEND or TABORT (or an event that causes the hardware to abort), regardless of the use of TSUSPEND the transactional state can be referred to as the live state. The second state is often to referred to as the 'checkpointed' state and is a duplication of the live state when the TBEGIN instruction is executed. This state is kept in the hardware and will be rolled back to on transaction failure. Currently all the registers stored in pt_regs are ALWAYS the live registers, that is, when a thread has transactional registers their values are stored in pt_regs and the checkpointed state is in ckpt_regs. A strange opposite is true for fp_state/vr_state. When a thread is non transactional fp_state/vr_state holds the live registers. When a thread has initiated a transaction fp_state/vr_state holds the checkpointed state and transact_fp/transact_vr become the structure which holds the live state (at this point it is a transactional state). This method creates confusion as to where the live state is, in some circumstances it requires extra work to determine where to put the live state and prevents the use of common functions designed (probably before TM) to save the live state. With this patch pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state all represent the same thing and the other structures [pending rename] are for checkpointed state. Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-23 06:18:24 +00:00
msr_check_and_set(MSR_VEC);
load_vr_state(&current->thread.vr_state);
/* At this point all the VSX state is loaded, so enable it */
regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
}
}
void altivec_unavailable_tm(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* See the comments in fp_unavailable_tm(). This function operates
* the same way.
*/
TM_DEBUG("Vector Unavailable trap whilst transactional at 0x%lx,"
"MSR=%lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-13 04:56:29 +00:00
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_FAC_UNAV);
regs->msr |= MSR_VEC;
tm_recheckpoint(&current->thread, MSR_VEC);
current->thread.used_vr = 1;
if (regs->msr & MSR_FP) {
powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers There is currently an inconsistency as to how the entire CPU register state is saved and restored when a thread uses transactional memory (TM). Using transactional memory results in the CPU having duplicated (almost) all of its register state. This duplication results in a set of registers which can be considered 'live', those being currently modified by the instructions being executed and another set that is frozen at a point in time. On context switch, both sets of state have to be saved and (later) restored. These two states are often called a variety of different things. Common terms for the state which only exists after the CPU has entered a transaction (performed a TBEGIN instruction) in hardware are 'transactional' or 'speculative'. Between a TBEGIN and a TEND or TABORT (or an event that causes the hardware to abort), regardless of the use of TSUSPEND the transactional state can be referred to as the live state. The second state is often to referred to as the 'checkpointed' state and is a duplication of the live state when the TBEGIN instruction is executed. This state is kept in the hardware and will be rolled back to on transaction failure. Currently all the registers stored in pt_regs are ALWAYS the live registers, that is, when a thread has transactional registers their values are stored in pt_regs and the checkpointed state is in ckpt_regs. A strange opposite is true for fp_state/vr_state. When a thread is non transactional fp_state/vr_state holds the live registers. When a thread has initiated a transaction fp_state/vr_state holds the checkpointed state and transact_fp/transact_vr become the structure which holds the live state (at this point it is a transactional state). This method creates confusion as to where the live state is, in some circumstances it requires extra work to determine where to put the live state and prevents the use of common functions designed (probably before TM) to save the live state. With this patch pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state all represent the same thing and the other structures [pending rename] are for checkpointed state. Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-23 06:18:24 +00:00
msr_check_and_set(MSR_FP);
load_fp_state(&current->thread.fp_state);
regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
}
}
void vsx_unavailable_tm(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long orig_msr = regs->msr;
/* See the comments in fp_unavailable_tm(). This works similarly,
* though we're loading both FP and VEC registers in here.
*
* If FP isn't in use, load FP regs. If VEC isn't in use, load VEC
* regs. Either way, set MSR_VSX.
*/
TM_DEBUG("VSX Unavailable trap whilst transactional at 0x%lx,"
"MSR=%lx\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr);
current->thread.used_vsr = 1;
/* If FP and VMX are already loaded, we have all the state we need */
if ((orig_msr & (MSR_FP | MSR_VEC)) == (MSR_FP | MSR_VEC)) {
regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
return;
}
/* This reclaims FP and/or VR regs if they're already enabled */
powerpc: Don't corrupt transactional state when using FP/VMX in kernel Currently, when we have a process using the transactional memory facilities on POWER8 (that is, the processor is in transactional or suspended state), and the process enters the kernel and the kernel then uses the floating-point or vector (VMX/Altivec) facility, we end up corrupting the user-visible FP/VMX/VSX state. This happens, for example, if a page fault causes a copy-on-write operation, because the copy_page function will use VMX to do the copy on POWER8. The test program below demonstrates the bug. The bug happens because when FP/VMX state for a transactional process is stored in the thread_struct, we store the checkpointed state in .fp_state/.vr_state and the transactional (current) state in .transact_fp/.transact_vr. However, when the kernel wants to use FP/VMX, it calls enable_kernel_fp() or enable_kernel_altivec(), which saves the current state in .fp_state/.vr_state. Furthermore, when we return to the user process we return with FP/VMX/VSX disabled. The next time the process uses FP/VMX/VSX, we don't know which set of state (the current register values, .fp_state/.vr_state, or .transact_fp/.transact_vr) we should be using, since we have no way to tell if we are still in the same transaction, and if not, whether the previous transaction succeeded or failed. Thus it is necessary to strictly adhere to the rule that if FP has been enabled at any point in a transaction, we must keep FP enabled for the user process with the current transactional state in the FP registers, until we detect that it is no longer in a transaction. Similarly for VMX; once enabled it must stay enabled until the process is no longer transactional. In order to keep this rule, we add a new thread_info flag which we test when returning from the kernel to userspace, called TIF_RESTORE_TM. This flag indicates that there is FP/VMX/VSX state to be restored before entering userspace, and when it is set the .tm_orig_msr field in the thread_struct indicates what state needs to be restored. The restoration is done by restore_tm_state(). The TIF_RESTORE_TM bit is set by new giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional helpers, which are called from enable_kernel_fp/altivec, giveup_vsx, and flush_fp/altivec_to_thread instead of giveup_fpu/altivec. The other thing to be done is to get the transactional FP/VMX/VSX state from .fp_state/.vr_state when doing reclaim, if that state has been saved there by giveup_fpu/altivec_maybe_transactional. Having done this, we set the FP/VMX bit in the thread's MSR after reclaim to indicate that that part of the state is now valid (having been reclaimed from the processor's checkpointed state). Finally, in the signal handling code, we move the clearing of the transactional state bits in the thread's MSR a bit earlier, before calling flush_fp_to_thread(), so that we don't unnecessarily set the TIF_RESTORE_TM bit. This is the test program: /* Michael Neuling 4/12/2013 * * See if the altivec state is leaked out of an aborted transaction due to * kernel vmx copy loops. * * gcc -m64 htm_vmxcopy.c -o htm_vmxcopy * */ /* We don't use all of these, but for reference: */ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { long double vecin = 1.3; long double vecout; unsigned long pgsize = getpagesize(); int i; int fd; int size = pgsize*16; char tmpfile[] = "/tmp/page_faultXXXXXX"; char buf[pgsize]; char *a; uint64_t aborted = 0; fd = mkstemp(tmpfile); assert(fd >= 0); memset(buf, 0, pgsize); for (i = 0; i < size; i += pgsize) assert(write(fd, buf, pgsize) == pgsize); unlink(tmpfile); a = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); assert(a != MAP_FAILED); asm __volatile__( "lxvd2x 40,0,%[vecinptr] ; " // set 40 to initial value TBEGIN "beq 3f ;" TSUSPEND "xxlxor 40,40,40 ; " // set 40 to 0 "std 5, 0(%[map]) ;" // cause kernel vmx copy page TABORT TRESUME TEND "li %[res], 0 ;" "b 5f ;" "3: ;" // Abort handler "li %[res], 1 ;" "5: ;" "stxvd2x 40,0,%[vecoutptr] ; " : [res]"=r"(aborted) : [vecinptr]"r"(&vecin), [vecoutptr]"r"(&vecout), [map]"r"(a) : "memory", "r0", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7"); if (aborted && (vecin != vecout)){ printf("FAILED: vector state leaked on abort %f != %f\n", (double)vecin, (double)vecout); exit(1); } munmap(a, size); close(fd); printf("PASSED!\n"); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
2014-01-13 04:56:29 +00:00
tm_reclaim_current(TM_CAUSE_FAC_UNAV);
regs->msr |= MSR_VEC | MSR_FP | current->thread.fpexc_mode |
MSR_VSX;
/* This loads & recheckpoints FP and VRs; but we have
* to be sure not to overwrite previously-valid state.
*/
tm_recheckpoint(&current->thread, regs->msr & ~orig_msr);
powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers There is currently an inconsistency as to how the entire CPU register state is saved and restored when a thread uses transactional memory (TM). Using transactional memory results in the CPU having duplicated (almost) all of its register state. This duplication results in a set of registers which can be considered 'live', those being currently modified by the instructions being executed and another set that is frozen at a point in time. On context switch, both sets of state have to be saved and (later) restored. These two states are often called a variety of different things. Common terms for the state which only exists after the CPU has entered a transaction (performed a TBEGIN instruction) in hardware are 'transactional' or 'speculative'. Between a TBEGIN and a TEND or TABORT (or an event that causes the hardware to abort), regardless of the use of TSUSPEND the transactional state can be referred to as the live state. The second state is often to referred to as the 'checkpointed' state and is a duplication of the live state when the TBEGIN instruction is executed. This state is kept in the hardware and will be rolled back to on transaction failure. Currently all the registers stored in pt_regs are ALWAYS the live registers, that is, when a thread has transactional registers their values are stored in pt_regs and the checkpointed state is in ckpt_regs. A strange opposite is true for fp_state/vr_state. When a thread is non transactional fp_state/vr_state holds the live registers. When a thread has initiated a transaction fp_state/vr_state holds the checkpointed state and transact_fp/transact_vr become the structure which holds the live state (at this point it is a transactional state). This method creates confusion as to where the live state is, in some circumstances it requires extra work to determine where to put the live state and prevents the use of common functions designed (probably before TM) to save the live state. With this patch pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state all represent the same thing and the other structures [pending rename] are for checkpointed state. Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-23 06:18:24 +00:00
msr_check_and_set(orig_msr & (MSR_FP | MSR_VEC));
if (orig_msr & MSR_FP)
powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers There is currently an inconsistency as to how the entire CPU register state is saved and restored when a thread uses transactional memory (TM). Using transactional memory results in the CPU having duplicated (almost) all of its register state. This duplication results in a set of registers which can be considered 'live', those being currently modified by the instructions being executed and another set that is frozen at a point in time. On context switch, both sets of state have to be saved and (later) restored. These two states are often called a variety of different things. Common terms for the state which only exists after the CPU has entered a transaction (performed a TBEGIN instruction) in hardware are 'transactional' or 'speculative'. Between a TBEGIN and a TEND or TABORT (or an event that causes the hardware to abort), regardless of the use of TSUSPEND the transactional state can be referred to as the live state. The second state is often to referred to as the 'checkpointed' state and is a duplication of the live state when the TBEGIN instruction is executed. This state is kept in the hardware and will be rolled back to on transaction failure. Currently all the registers stored in pt_regs are ALWAYS the live registers, that is, when a thread has transactional registers their values are stored in pt_regs and the checkpointed state is in ckpt_regs. A strange opposite is true for fp_state/vr_state. When a thread is non transactional fp_state/vr_state holds the live registers. When a thread has initiated a transaction fp_state/vr_state holds the checkpointed state and transact_fp/transact_vr become the structure which holds the live state (at this point it is a transactional state). This method creates confusion as to where the live state is, in some circumstances it requires extra work to determine where to put the live state and prevents the use of common functions designed (probably before TM) to save the live state. With this patch pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state all represent the same thing and the other structures [pending rename] are for checkpointed state. Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-23 06:18:24 +00:00
load_fp_state(&current->thread.fp_state);
if (orig_msr & MSR_VEC)
powerpc: tm: Always use fp_state and vr_state to store live registers There is currently an inconsistency as to how the entire CPU register state is saved and restored when a thread uses transactional memory (TM). Using transactional memory results in the CPU having duplicated (almost) all of its register state. This duplication results in a set of registers which can be considered 'live', those being currently modified by the instructions being executed and another set that is frozen at a point in time. On context switch, both sets of state have to be saved and (later) restored. These two states are often called a variety of different things. Common terms for the state which only exists after the CPU has entered a transaction (performed a TBEGIN instruction) in hardware are 'transactional' or 'speculative'. Between a TBEGIN and a TEND or TABORT (or an event that causes the hardware to abort), regardless of the use of TSUSPEND the transactional state can be referred to as the live state. The second state is often to referred to as the 'checkpointed' state and is a duplication of the live state when the TBEGIN instruction is executed. This state is kept in the hardware and will be rolled back to on transaction failure. Currently all the registers stored in pt_regs are ALWAYS the live registers, that is, when a thread has transactional registers their values are stored in pt_regs and the checkpointed state is in ckpt_regs. A strange opposite is true for fp_state/vr_state. When a thread is non transactional fp_state/vr_state holds the live registers. When a thread has initiated a transaction fp_state/vr_state holds the checkpointed state and transact_fp/transact_vr become the structure which holds the live state (at this point it is a transactional state). This method creates confusion as to where the live state is, in some circumstances it requires extra work to determine where to put the live state and prevents the use of common functions designed (probably before TM) to save the live state. With this patch pt_regs, fp_state and vr_state all represent the same thing and the other structures [pending rename] are for checkpointed state. Acked-by: Simon Guo <wei.guo.simon@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2016-09-23 06:18:24 +00:00
load_vr_state(&current->thread.vr_state);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM */
void performance_monitor_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
powerpc: Replace __get_cpu_var uses This still has not been merged and now powerpc is the only arch that does not have this change. Sorry about missing linuxppc-dev before. V2->V2 - Fix up to work against 3.18-rc1 __get_cpu_var() is used for multiple purposes in the kernel source. One of them is address calculation via the form &__get_cpu_var(x). This calculates the address for the instance of the percpu variable of the current processor based on an offset. Other use cases are for storing and retrieving data from the current processors percpu area. __get_cpu_var() can be used as an lvalue when writing data or on the right side of an assignment. __get_cpu_var() is defined as : __get_cpu_var() always only does an address determination. However, store and retrieve operations could use a segment prefix (or global register on other platforms) to avoid the address calculation. this_cpu_write() and this_cpu_read() can directly take an offset into a percpu area and use optimized assembly code to read and write per cpu variables. This patch converts __get_cpu_var into either an explicit address calculation using this_cpu_ptr() or into a use of this_cpu operations that use the offset. Thereby address calculations are avoided and less registers are used when code is generated. At the end of the patch set all uses of __get_cpu_var have been removed so the macro is removed too. The patch set includes passes over all arches as well. Once these operations are used throughout then specialized macros can be defined in non -x86 arches as well in order to optimize per cpu access by f.e. using a global register that may be set to the per cpu base. Transformations done to __get_cpu_var() 1. Determine the address of the percpu instance of the current processor. DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, y); int *x = &__get_cpu_var(y); Converts to int *x = this_cpu_ptr(&y); 2. Same as #1 but this time an array structure is involved. DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, y[20]); int *x = __get_cpu_var(y); Converts to int *x = this_cpu_ptr(y); 3. Retrieve the content of the current processors instance of a per cpu variable. DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, y); int x = __get_cpu_var(y) Converts to int x = __this_cpu_read(y); 4. Retrieve the content of a percpu struct DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mystruct, y); struct mystruct x = __get_cpu_var(y); Converts to memcpy(&x, this_cpu_ptr(&y), sizeof(x)); 5. Assignment to a per cpu variable DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, y) __get_cpu_var(y) = x; Converts to __this_cpu_write(y, x); 6. Increment/Decrement etc of a per cpu variable DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, y); __get_cpu_var(y)++ Converts to __this_cpu_inc(y) Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> CC: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> [mpe: Fix build errors caused by set/or_softirq_pending(), and rework assignment in __set_breakpoint() to use memcpy().] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2014-10-21 20:23:25 +00:00
__this_cpu_inc(irq_stat.pmu_irqs);
perf_irq(regs);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
static void handle_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long debug_status)
{
int changed = 0;
/*
* Determine the cause of the debug event, clear the
* event flags and send a trap to the handler. Torez
*/
if (debug_status & (DBSR_DAC1R | DBSR_DAC1W)) {
dbcr_dac(current) &= ~(DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
current->thread.debug.dbcr2 &= ~DBCR2_DAC12MODE;
#endif
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_DAC1), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
5);
changed |= 0x01;
} else if (debug_status & (DBSR_DAC2R | DBSR_DAC2W)) {
dbcr_dac(current) &= ~(DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W);
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_DAC2), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
6);
changed |= 0x01;
} else if (debug_status & DBSR_IAC1) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC1;
dbcr_iac_range(current) &= ~DBCR_IAC12MODE;
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_IAC1), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
1);
changed |= 0x01;
} else if (debug_status & DBSR_IAC2) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC2;
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_IAC2), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
2);
changed |= 0x01;
} else if (debug_status & DBSR_IAC3) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC3;
dbcr_iac_range(current) &= ~DBCR_IAC34MODE;
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_IAC3), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
3);
changed |= 0x01;
} else if (debug_status & DBSR_IAC4) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC4;
do_send_trap(regs, mfspr(SPRN_IAC4), debug_status, TRAP_HWBKPT,
4);
changed |= 0x01;
}
/*
* At the point this routine was called, the MSR(DE) was turned off.
* Check all other debug flags and see if that bit needs to be turned
* back on or not.
*/
if (DBCR_ACTIVE_EVENTS(current->thread.debug.dbcr0,
current->thread.debug.dbcr1))
regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
else
/* Make sure the IDM flag is off */
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IDM;
if (changed & 0x01)
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR0, current->thread.debug.dbcr0);
}
void DebugException(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long debug_status)
{
current->thread.debug.dbsr = debug_status;
/* Hack alert: On BookE, Branch Taken stops on the branch itself, while
* on server, it stops on the target of the branch. In order to simulate
* the server behaviour, we thus restart right away with a single step
* instead of stopping here when hitting a BT
*/
if (debug_status & DBSR_BT) {
regs->msr &= ~MSR_DE;
/* Disable BT */
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR0, mfspr(SPRN_DBCR0) & ~DBCR0_BT);
/* Clear the BT event */
mtspr(SPRN_DBSR, DBSR_BT);
/* Do the single step trick only when coming from userspace */
if (user_mode(regs)) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_BT;
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IDM | DBCR0_IC;
regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
return;
}
if (kprobe_post_handler(regs))
return;
if (notify_die(DIE_SSTEP, "block_step", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP) {
return;
}
if (debugger_sstep(regs))
return;
} else if (debug_status & DBSR_IC) { /* Instruction complete */
regs->msr &= ~MSR_DE;
/* Disable instruction completion */
mtspr(SPRN_DBCR0, mfspr(SPRN_DBCR0) & ~DBCR0_IC);
/* Clear the instruction completion event */
mtspr(SPRN_DBSR, DBSR_IC);
if (kprobe_post_handler(regs))
return;
if (notify_die(DIE_SSTEP, "single_step", regs, 5,
5, SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP) {
return;
}
if (debugger_sstep(regs))
return;
if (user_mode(regs)) {
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IC;
if (DBCR_ACTIVE_EVENTS(current->thread.debug.dbcr0,
current->thread.debug.dbcr1))
regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
else
/* Make sure the IDM bit is off */
current->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IDM;
}
_exception(SIGTRAP, regs, TRAP_TRACE, regs->nip);
} else
handle_debug(regs, debug_status);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(DebugException);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS */
#if !defined(CONFIG_TAU_INT)
void TAUException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk("TAU trap at PC: %lx, MSR: %lx, vector=%lx %s\n",
regs->nip, regs->msr, regs->trap, print_tainted());
}
#endif /* CONFIG_INT_TAU */
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
void altivec_assist_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int err;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "VMX/Altivec assist exception in kernel mode"
" at %lx\n", regs->nip);
die("Kernel VMX/Altivec assist exception", regs, SIGILL);
}
flush_altivec_to_thread(current);
PPC_WARN_EMULATED(altivec, regs);
err = emulate_altivec(regs);
if (err == 0) {
regs->nip += 4; /* skip emulated instruction */
emulate_single_step(regs);
return;
}
if (err == -EFAULT) {
/* got an error reading the instruction */
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_ACCERR, regs->nip);
} else {
/* didn't recognize the instruction */
/* XXX quick hack for now: set the non-Java bit in the VSCR */
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR "Unrecognized altivec instruction "
"in %s at %lx\n", current->comm, regs->nip);
current->thread.vr_state.vscr.u[3] |= 0x10000;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_BOOKE
void CacheLockingException(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
unsigned long error_code)
{
/* We treat cache locking instructions from the user
* as priv ops, in the future we could try to do
* something smarter
*/
if (error_code & (ESR_DLK|ESR_ILK))
_exception(SIGILL, regs, ILL_PRVOPC, regs->nip);
return;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_FSL_BOOKE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SPE
void SPEFloatingPointException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
extern int do_spe_mathemu(struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned long spefscr;
int fpexc_mode;
int code = 0;
int err;
flush_spe_to_thread(current);
spefscr = current->thread.spefscr;
fpexc_mode = current->thread.fpexc_mode;
if ((spefscr & SPEFSCR_FOVF) && (fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_OVF)) {
code = FPE_FLTOVF;
}
else if ((spefscr & SPEFSCR_FUNF) && (fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_UND)) {
code = FPE_FLTUND;
}
else if ((spefscr & SPEFSCR_FDBZ) && (fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_DIV))
code = FPE_FLTDIV;
else if ((spefscr & SPEFSCR_FINV) && (fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_INV)) {
code = FPE_FLTINV;
}
else if ((spefscr & (SPEFSCR_FG | SPEFSCR_FX)) && (fpexc_mode & PR_FP_EXC_RES))
code = FPE_FLTRES;
err = do_spe_mathemu(regs);
if (err == 0) {
regs->nip += 4; /* skip emulated instruction */
emulate_single_step(regs);
return;
}
if (err == -EFAULT) {
/* got an error reading the instruction */
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_ACCERR, regs->nip);
} else if (err == -EINVAL) {
/* didn't recognize the instruction */
printk(KERN_ERR "unrecognized spe instruction "
"in %s at %lx\n", current->comm, regs->nip);
} else {
_exception(SIGFPE, regs, code, regs->nip);
}
return;
}
void SPEFloatingPointRoundException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
extern int speround_handler(struct pt_regs *regs);
int err;
preempt_disable();
if (regs->msr & MSR_SPE)
giveup_spe(current);
preempt_enable();
regs->nip -= 4;
err = speround_handler(regs);
if (err == 0) {
regs->nip += 4; /* skip emulated instruction */
emulate_single_step(regs);
return;
}
if (err == -EFAULT) {
/* got an error reading the instruction */
_exception(SIGSEGV, regs, SEGV_ACCERR, regs->nip);
} else if (err == -EINVAL) {
/* didn't recognize the instruction */
printk(KERN_ERR "unrecognized spe instruction "
"in %s at %lx\n", current->comm, regs->nip);
} else {
_exception(SIGFPE, regs, 0, regs->nip);
return;
}
}
#endif
/*
* We enter here if we get an unrecoverable exception, that is, one
* that happened at a point where the RI (recoverable interrupt) bit
* in the MSR is 0. This indicates that SRR0/1 are live, and that
* we therefore lost state by taking this exception.
*/
void unrecoverable_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_EMERG "Unrecoverable exception %lx at %lx\n",
regs->trap, regs->nip);
die("Unrecoverable exception", regs, SIGABRT);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(unrecoverable_exception);
#if defined(CONFIG_BOOKE_WDT) || defined(CONFIG_40x)
/*
* Default handler for a Watchdog exception,
* spins until a reboot occurs
*/
void __attribute__ ((weak)) WatchdogHandler(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Generic WatchdogHandler, implement your own */
mtspr(SPRN_TCR, mfspr(SPRN_TCR)&(~TCR_WIE));
return;
}
void WatchdogException(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk (KERN_EMERG "PowerPC Book-E Watchdog Exception\n");
WatchdogHandler(regs);
}
#endif
/*
* We enter here if we discover during exception entry that we are
* running in supervisor mode with a userspace value in the stack pointer.
*/
void kernel_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_EMERG "Bad kernel stack pointer %lx at %lx\n",
regs->gpr[1], regs->nip);
die("Bad kernel stack pointer", regs, SIGABRT);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kernel_bad_stack);
void __init trap_init(void)
{
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS
#define WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(type) .type = { .name = #type }
struct ppc_emulated ppc_emulated = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(altivec),
#endif
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(dcba),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(dcbz),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(fp_pair),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(isel),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(mcrxr),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(mfpvr),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(multiple),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(popcntb),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(spe),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(string),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(sync),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(unaligned),
#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(math),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(vsx),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(mfdscr),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(mtdscr),
WARN_EMULATED_SETUP(lq_stq),
#endif
};
u32 ppc_warn_emulated;
void ppc_warn_emulated_print(const char *type)
{
pr_warn_ratelimited("%s used emulated %s instruction\n", current->comm,
type);
}
static int __init ppc_warn_emulated_init(void)
{
struct dentry *dir, *d;
unsigned int i;
struct ppc_emulated_entry *entries = (void *)&ppc_emulated;
if (!powerpc_debugfs_root)
return -ENODEV;
dir = debugfs_create_dir("emulated_instructions",
powerpc_debugfs_root);
if (!dir)
return -ENOMEM;
d = debugfs_create_u32("do_warn", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, dir,
&ppc_warn_emulated);
if (!d)
goto fail;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ppc_emulated)/sizeof(*entries); i++) {
d = debugfs_create_u32(entries[i].name, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, dir,
(u32 *)&entries[i].val.counter);
if (!d)
goto fail;
}
return 0;
fail:
debugfs_remove_recursive(dir);
return -ENOMEM;
}
device_initcall(ppc_warn_emulated_init);
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_EMULATED_STATS */