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397 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Christian Brauner
|
43b4506326
|
open: return EINVAL for O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT
After a couple of years and multiple LTS releases we received a report
that the behavior of O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT changed starting with v5.7.
On kernels prior to v5.7 combinations of O_DIRECTORY, O_CREAT, O_EXCL
had the following semantics:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: create regular file
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: EISDIR
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: create regular file
* d exists and is a regular file: EEXIST
* d exists and is a directory: EEXIST
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
On kernels since to v5.7 combinations of O_DIRECTORY, O_CREAT, O_EXCL
have the following semantics:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: ENOTDIR (create regular file)
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: EISDIR
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOTDIR (create regular file)
* d exists and is a regular file: EEXIST
* d exists and is a directory: EEXIST
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
This is a fairly substantial semantic change that userspace didn't
notice until Pedro took the time to deliberately figure out corner
cases. Since no one noticed this breakage we can somewhat safely assume
that O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT combinations are likely unused.
The v5.7 breakage is especially weird because while ENOTDIR is returned
indicating failure a regular file is actually created. This doesn't make
a lot of sense.
Time was spent finding potential users of this combination. Searching on
codesearch.debian.net showed that codebases often express semantical
expectations about O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT which are completely contrary
to what our code has done and currently does.
The expectation often is that this particular combination would create
and open a directory. This suggests users who tried to use that
combination would stumble upon the counterintuitive behavior no matter
if pre-v5.7 or post v5.7 and quickly realize neither semantics give them
what they want. For some examples see the code examples in [1] to [3]
and the discussion in [4].
There are various ways to address this issue. The lazy/simple option
would be to restore the pre-v5.7 behavior and to just live with that bug
forever. But since there's a real chance that the O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT
quirk isn't relied upon we should try to get away with murder(ing bad
semantics) first. If we need to Frankenstein pre-v5.7 behavior later so
be it.
So let's simply return EINVAL categorically for O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT
combinations. In addition to cleaning up the old bug this also opens up
the possiblity to make that flag combination do something more intuitive
in the future.
Starting with this commit the following semantics apply:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: EINVAL
* d exists and is a regular file: EINVAL
* d exists and is a directory: EINVAL
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: EINVAL
* d exists and is a regular file: EINVAL
* d exists and is a directory: EINVAL
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
One additional note, O_TMPFILE is implemented as:
#define __O_TMPFILE 020000000
#define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
#define O_TMPFILE_MASK (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
For older kernels it was important to return an explicit error when
O_TMPFILE wasn't supported. So O_TMPFILE requires that O_DIRECTORY is
raised alongside __O_TMPFILE. It also enforced that O_CREAT wasn't
specified. Since O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT could be used to create a regular
allowing that combination together with __O_TMPFILE would've meant that
false positives were possible, i.e., that a regular file was created
instead of a O_TMPFILE. This could've been used to trick userspace into
thinking it operated on a O_TMPFILE when it wasn't.
Now that we block O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT completely the check for O_CREAT
in the __O_TMPFILE branch via if ((flags & O_TMPFILE_MASK) != O_TMPFILE)
can be dropped. Instead we can simply check verify that O_DIRECTORY is
raised via if (!(flags & O_DIRECTORY)) and explain this in two comments.
As Aleksa pointed out O_PATH is unaffected by this change since it
always returned EINVAL if O_CREAT was specified - with or without
O_DIRECTORY.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230320071442.172228-1-pedro.falcato@gmail.com
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/flatpak/1.14.4-1/subprojects/libglnx/glnx-dirfd.c/?hl=324#L324 [1]
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/flatpak-builder/1.2.3-1/subprojects/libglnx/glnx-shutil.c/?hl=251#L251 [2]
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/ostree/2022.7-2/libglnx/glnx-dirfd.c/?hl=324#L324 [3]
Link: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/11/26/14 [4]
Reported-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
||
Mateusz Guzik
|
981ee95cc1 |
vfs: avoid duplicating creds in faccessat if possible
access(2) remains commonly used, for example on exec:
access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK)
or when running gcc: strace -c gcc empty.c
% time seconds usecs/call calls errors syscall
------ ----------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------------
0.00 0.000000 0 42 26 access
It falls down to do_faccessat without the AT_EACCESS flag, which in turn
results in allocation of new creds in order to modify fsuid/fsgid and
caps. This is a very expensive process single-threaded and most notably
multi-threaded, with numerous structures getting refed and unrefed on
imminent new cred destruction.
Turns out for typical consumers the resulting creds would be identical
and this can be checked upfront, avoiding the hard work.
An access benchmark plugged into will-it-scale running on Cascade Lake
shows:
test proc before after
access1 1 1310582 2908735 (+121%) # distinct files
access1 24 4716491 63822173 (+1353%) # distinct files
access2 24 2378041 5370335 (+125%) # same file
The above benchmarks are not integrated into will-it-scale, but can be
found in a pull request:
https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/pull/36/files
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
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Linus Torvalds
|
ea5aac6fae |
fs.v6.3
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Merge tag 'fs.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs hardening update from Christian Brauner:
"Jan pointed out that during shutdown both filp_close() and super block
destruction will use basic printk logging when bugs are detected. This
causes issues in a few scenarios:
- Tools like syzkaller cannot figure out that the logged message
indicates a bug.
- Users that explicitly opt in to have the kernel bug on data
corruption by selecting CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION should see
the kernel crash when they did actually select that option.
- When there are busy inodes after the superblock is shut down later
access to such a busy inodes walks through freed memory. It would
be better to cleanly crash instead.
All of this can be addressed by using the already existing
CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() macro in these places when kernel bugs are
detected. Its logging improvement is useful for all users.
Otherwise this only has a meaningful behavioral effect when users do
select CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION which means this is backward
compatible for regular users"
* tag 'fs.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
05e6295f7b |
fs.idmapped.v6.3
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Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
- Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for
mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in
|
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Jann Horn
|
47d586913f
|
fs: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected
Currently, filp_close() and generic_shutdown_super() use printk() to log messages when bugs are detected. This is problematic because infrastructure like syzkaller has no idea that this message indicates a bug. In addition, some people explicitly want their kernels to BUG() when kernel data corruption has been detected (CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION). And finally, when generic_shutdown_super() detects remaining inodes on a system without CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION, it would be nice if later accesses to a busy inode would at least crash somewhat cleanly rather than walking through freed memory. To address all three, use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are detected. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
4d7ca40901
|
fs: port vfs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
9452e93e6d
|
fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
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|
Christian Brauner
|
4609e1f18e
|
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
abf08576af
|
fs: port vfs_*() helpers to struct mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
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Jeff Layton
|
c65454a947 |
fs: remove locks_inode
locks_inode was turned into a wrapper around file_inode in
|
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|
Jeff Layton
|
5970e15dbc |
filelock: move file locking definitions to separate header file
The file locking definitions have lived in fs.h since the dawn of time, but they are only used by a small subset of the source files that include it. Move the file locking definitions to a new header file, and add the appropriate #include directives to the source files that need them. By doing this we trim down fs.h a bit and limit the amount of rebuilding that has to be done when we make changes to the file locking APIs. Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
299e2b1967 |
Landlock updates for v6.2-rc1
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iIYEABYIAC4WIQSVyBthFV4iTW/VU1/l49DojIL20gUCY5b27RAcbWljQGRpZ2lr b2QubmV0AAoJEOXj0OiMgvbSg9YA/0K10H+VsGt1+qqR4+w9SM7SFzbgszrV3Yw9 rwiPgaPVAP9rxXPr2bD2hAk7/Lv9LeJ2kfM9RzMErP1A6UsC5YVbDA== =mAG7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "This adds file truncation support to Landlock, contributed by Günther Noack. As described by Günther [1], the goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock. The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [2]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock. The new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE access right covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case where existing regular files are overwritten. Additionally, this introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file. An ongoing patch documents this use case [3]. In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files)" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com [1] Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.1/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags [2] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [3] * tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: samples/landlock: Document best-effort approach for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2) selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support landlock: Support file truncation landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed() security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook |
||
Günther Noack
|
3350607dc5
|
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file. This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations. Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
ed5a7047d2
|
attr: use consistent sgid stripping checks
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
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|
Linus Torvalds
|
7a3353c5c4 |
struct file-related stuff
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQQqUNBr3gm4hGXdBJlZ7Krx/gZQ6wUCYzxjIQAKCRBZ7Krx/gZQ 6/FPAQCNCZygQzd+54//vo4kTwv5T2Bv3hS8J51rASPJT87/BQD/TfCLS5urt/Gt 81A1dFOfnTXseofuBKyGSXwQm0dWpgA= =PLre -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pull-file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs file updates from Al Viro: "struct file-related stuff" * tag 'pull-file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: dma_buf_getfile(): don't bother with ->f_flags reassignments Change calling conventions for filldir_t locks: fix TOCTOU race when granting write lease |
||
Tetsuo Handa
|
f52d74b190
|
open: always initialize ownership fields
Beginning of the merge window we introduced the vfs{g,u}id_t types in
|
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Amir Goldstein
|
d6da19c9ca |
locks: fix TOCTOU race when granting write lease
Thread A trying to acquire a write lease checks the value of i_readcount
and i_writecount in check_conflicting_open() to verify that its own fd
is the only fd referencing the file.
Thread B trying to open the file for read will call break_lease() in
do_dentry_open() before incrementing i_readcount, which leaves a small
window where thread A can acquire the write lease and then thread B
completes the open of the file for read without breaking the write lease
that was acquired by thread A.
Fix this race by incrementing i_readcount before checking for existing
leases, same as the case with i_writecount.
Use a helper put_file_access() to decrement i_readcount or i_writecount
in do_dentry_open() and __fput().
Fixes:
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|
Linus Torvalds
|
5264406cdb |
iov_iter work, part 1 - isolated cleanups and optimizations.
One of the goals is to reduce the overhead of using ->read_iter()
and ->write_iter() instead of ->read()/->write(); new_sync_{read,write}()
has a surprising amount of overhead, in particular inside iocb_flags().
That's why the beginning of the series is in this pile; it's not directly
iov_iter-related, but it's a part of the same work...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'pull-work.iov_iter-base' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
"Part 1 - isolated cleanups and optimizations.
One of the goals is to reduce the overhead of using ->read_iter() and
->write_iter() instead of ->read()/->write().
new_sync_{read,write}() has a surprising amount of overhead, in
particular inside iocb_flags(). That's the explanation for the
beginning of the series is in this pile; it's not directly
iov_iter-related, but it's a part of the same work..."
* tag 'pull-work.iov_iter-base' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
first_iovec_segment(): just return address
iov_iter: massage calling conventions for first_{iovec,bvec}_segment()
iov_iter: first_{iovec,bvec}_segment() - simplify a bit
iov_iter: lift dealing with maxpages out of first_{iovec,bvec}_segment()
iov_iter_get_pages{,_alloc}(): cap the maxsize with MAX_RW_COUNT
iov_iter_bvec_advance(): don't bother with bvec_iter
copy_page_{to,from}_iter(): switch iovec variants to generic
keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file
iocb: delay evaluation of IS_SYNC(...) until we want to check IOCB_DSYNC
struct file: use anonymous union member for rcuhead and llist
btrfs: use IOMAP_DIO_NOSYNC
teach iomap_dio_rw() to suppress dsync
No need of likely/unlikely on calls of check_copy_size()
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a782e86649 |
Saner handling of "lseek should fail with ESPIPE" - gets rid of
magical no_llseek thing and makes checks consistent. In particular, ad-hoc "can we do splice via internal pipe" checks got saner (and somewhat more permissive, which is what Jason had been after, AFAICT) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQQqUNBr3gm4hGXdBJlZ7Krx/gZQ6wUCYug2xgAKCRBZ7Krx/gZQ 6wxWAQDqeg+xMq2FGPXmgjCa+Cp3PXH96Lp6f3hHzakIDx+t8gEAxvuiXAD22Mct 6S1SKuGj0iDIuM4L7hUiWTiY/bDXSAc= =3EC/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pull-work.lseek' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs lseek updates from Al Viro: "Jason's lseek series. Saner handling of 'lseek should fail with ESPIPE' - this gets rid of the magical no_llseek thing and makes checks consistent. In particular, the ad-hoc "can we do splice via internal pipe" checks got saner (and somewhat more permissive, which is what Jason had been after, AFAICT)" * tag 'pull-work.lseek' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: fs: remove no_llseek fs: check FMODE_LSEEK to control internal pipe splicing vfio: do not set FMODE_LSEEK flag dma-buf: remove useless FMODE_LSEEK flag fs: do not compare against ->llseek fs: clear or set FMODE_LSEEK based on llseek function |
||
Jason A. Donenfeld
|
868941b144 |
fs: remove no_llseek
Now that all callers of ->llseek are going through vfs_llseek(), we don't gain anything by keeping no_llseek around. Nothing actually calls it and setting ->llseek to no_lseek is completely equivalent to leaving it NULL. Longer term (== by the end of merge window) we want to remove all such intializations. To simplify the merge window this commit does *not* touch initializers - it only defines no_llseek as NULL (and simplifies the tests on file opening). At -rc1 we'll need do a mechanical removal of no_llseek - git grep -l -w no_llseek | grep -v porting.rst | while read i; do sed -i '/\<no_llseek\>/d' $i done would do it. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Jason A. Donenfeld
|
e7478158e1 |
fs: clear or set FMODE_LSEEK based on llseek function
Pipe-like behaviour on llseek(2) (i.e. unconditionally failing with -ESPIPE) can be expresses in 3 ways: 1) ->llseek set to NULL in file_operations 2) ->llseek set to no_llseek in file_operations 3) FMODE_LSEEK *not* set in ->f_mode. Enforce (3) in cases (1) and (2); that will allow to simplify the checks and eventually get rid of no_llseek boilerplate. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
b27c82e129
|
attr: port attribute changes to new types
Now that we introduced new infrastructure to increase the type safety
for filesystems supporting idmapped mounts port the first part of the
vfs over to them.
This ports the attribute changes codepaths to rely on the new better
helpers using a dedicated type.
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Fileystems raising FS_ALLOW_IDMAP can't simply write ia_vfs{g,u}id to
inode->i_{g,u}id since they are different types. Instead they need to
use the dedicated vfs{g,u}id_to_k{g,u}id() helpers that map the
vfs{g,u}id into the filesystem.
The other nice effect is that filesystems like overlayfs don't need to
care about idmappings explicitly anymore and can simply set up struct
iattr accordingly directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=win6+ahs1EwLkcq8apqLi_1wXFWbrPf340zYEhObpz4jA@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-9-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
||
Al Viro
|
164f4064ca |
keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file
* calculate at the time we set FMODE_OPENED (do_dentry_open() for normal opens, alloc_file() for pipe()/socket()/etc.) * update when handling F_SETFL * keep in a new field - file->f_iocb_flags; since that thing is needed only before the refcount reaches zero, we can put it into the same anon union where ->f_rcuhead and ->f_llist live - those are used only after refcount reaches zero. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
35b51afd23 |
RISC-V Patches for the 5.19 Merge Window, Part 1
* Support for the Svpbmt extension, which allows memory attributes to be encoded in pages. * Support for the Allwinner D1's implementation of page-based memory attributes. * Support for running rv32 binaries on rv64 systems, via the compat subsystem. * Support for kexec_file(). * Support for the new generic ticket-based spinlocks, which allows us to also move to qrwlock. These should have already gone in through the asm-geneic tree as well. * A handful of cleanups and fixes, include some larger ones around atomics and XIP. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCAAxFiEEKzw3R0RoQ7JKlDp6LhMZ81+7GIkFAmKWOx8THHBhbG1lckBk YWJiZWx0LmNvbQAKCRAuExnzX7sYieAiEADAUdP7ctoaSQwk5skd/fdA3b4KJuKn 1Zjl+Br32WP0DlbirYBYWRUQZnCCsvABbTiwSJMcG7NBpU5pyQ5XDtB3OA5kJswO Fdp8Nd53//+GK1M5zdEM9OdgvT9fbfTZ3qTu8bKsROOQhGwnYL+Csc9KjFRqEmzN oQii0jlb3n5PM4FL3GsbV4uMn9zzkP9mnVAPQktcock2EKFEK/Fy3uNYMQiO2KPi n8O6bIDaeRdQ6SurzWOuOkt0cro0tEF85ilzT04mynQsOU0el5oGqCxnOhNH3VWg ndqPT6Yafw12hZOtbKJeP+nF8IIR6aJLP3jOtRwEVgcfbXYAw4QwbAV8kQZISefN ipn8JGY7GX9Y9TYU692OUGkcmAb3/dxb6c0WihBdvJ0M6YyLD5X+YKHNuG2onLgK ss43C5Mxsu629rsjdu/PV91B1+pve3rG9siVmF+g4eo0x9rjMq6/JB0Kal/8SLI1 Je5T55d5ujV1a2XxhZLQOSD5owrK7J1M9owb0bloTnr9nVwFTWDrfEQEU82o3kP+ Xm+FfXktnz9ai55NjkMbbEur5D++dKJhBavwCTnBcTrJmMtEH0R45GTK9ZehP+WC rNVrRXjIsS18wsTfJxnkZeFQA38as6VBKTzvwHvOgzTrrZU1/xk3lpkouYtAO6BG gKacHshVilmUuA== =Loi6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.19-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt: - Support for the Svpbmt extension, which allows memory attributes to be encoded in pages - Support for the Allwinner D1's implementation of page-based memory attributes - Support for running rv32 binaries on rv64 systems, via the compat subsystem - Support for kexec_file() - Support for the new generic ticket-based spinlocks, which allows us to also move to qrwlock. These should have already gone in through the asm-geneic tree as well - A handful of cleanups and fixes, include some larger ones around atomics and XIP * tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.19-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (51 commits) RISC-V: Prepare dropping week attribute from arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add] riscv: compat: Using seperated vdso_maps for compat_vdso_info RISC-V: Fix the XIP build RISC-V: Split out the XIP fixups into their own file RISC-V: ignore xipImage RISC-V: Avoid empty create_*_mapping definitions riscv: Don't output a bogus mmu-type on a no MMU kernel riscv: atomic: Add custom conditional atomic operation implementation riscv: atomic: Optimize dec_if_positive functions riscv: atomic: Cleanup unnecessary definition RISC-V: Load purgatory in kexec_file RISC-V: Add purgatory RISC-V: Support for kexec_file on panic RISC-V: Add kexec_file support RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode kexec_file: Fix kexec_file.c build error for riscv platform riscv: compat: Add COMPAT Kbuild skeletal support riscv: compat: ptrace: Add compat_arch_ptrace implement riscv: compat: signal: Add rt_frame implementation riscv: add memory-type errata for T-Head ... |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
6d29d7fe4f |
NFSD 5.19 Release Notes
We introduce "courteous server" in this release. Previously NFSD would purge open and lock state for an unresponsive client after one lease period (typically 90 seconds). Now, after one lease period, another client can open and lock those files and the unresponsive client's lease is purged; otherwise if the unrespon- sive client's open and lock state is uncontended, the server retains that open and lock state for up to 24 hours, allowing the client's workload to resume after a lengthy network partition. A longstanding issue with NFSv4 file creation is also addressed. Previously a file creation can fail internally, returning an error to the client, but leave the newly created file in place as an artifact. The file creation code path has been reorganized so that internal failures and race conditions are less likely to result in an unwanted file creation. A fault injector has been added to help exercise paths that are run during kernel metadata cache invalidation. These caches contain information maintained by user space about exported filesystems. Many of our test workloads do not trigger cache invalidation. There is one patch that is needed to support PREEMPT_RT and a fix for an ancient "sleep while spin-locked" splat that seems to have become easier to hit since v5.18-rc3. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEKLLlsBKG3yQ88j7+M2qzM29mf5cFAmKPliAACgkQM2qzM29m f5dB3BAAorPa2L8xu5P1Ge1oTNogNSOVRkLPDzEkfEwK07ZM2qvz78eMZGkMziJ/ strorvBWl3SWBlVtTePgNpJUjgYQ75MRRwaX7Qh2WuHeRKm1JlZm0/NId3+zKgbh N40QI20jdswWcNDuhidxVFFWurd09GlcM4z1cu8gZLbfthkiUOjZoPiLkXeNcvhk 7wC9GiueWxHefYQQDAKh1nQS/L0GG1EkzJdJo7WUVAldZ9qVY9LpmJVMRqrBBbta XrFYfpeY1zFFDY4Qolyz5PUJSeQuDj9PctlhoZ6B1hp56PD/6yaqVhYXiPxtlALj tITtktfiekULZkgfvfvyzssCv+wkbYiaEBZcSSCauR7dkGOmBmajO+cf7vpsERgE fbCU8DWGk78SMeehdCrO+26cV37VP+8c2t2Txq/rG5Eq4ZoCi++Hj5poRboFLqb+ oom+0Ee0LfcAKXkxH5gWTPTblHo49GzGitPZtRzTgZ9uFnVwvEaJ4+t0ij0J8JpL HuVtWrg5/REhqpEvOSwF0sRmkYWLTu7KdueGn/iZ8xUi7GHEue01NsVkClohKJcR WOjWrbNCNF/LJaG88MX0z5u7IO7s9bOHphd7PJ92vR+4YsehW3uRhk+rNi2ZBqQz hzULfu8BiaicV9fdB/hDcMmKQD6U6due2AVVPtxTf5XY+CHQNRY= =phE1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'nfsd-5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux Pull nfsd updates from Chuck Lever: "We introduce 'courteous server' in this release. Previously NFSD would purge open and lock state for an unresponsive client after one lease period (typically 90 seconds). Now, after one lease period, another client can open and lock those files and the unresponsive client's lease is purged; otherwise if the unresponsive client's open and lock state is uncontended, the server retains that open and lock state for up to 24 hours, allowing the client's workload to resume after a lengthy network partition. A longstanding issue with NFSv4 file creation is also addressed. Previously a file creation can fail internally, returning an error to the client, but leave the newly created file in place as an artifact. The file creation code path has been reorganized so that internal failures and race conditions are less likely to result in an unwanted file creation. A fault injector has been added to help exercise paths that are run during kernel metadata cache invalidation. These caches contain information maintained by user space about exported filesystems. Many of our test workloads do not trigger cache invalidation. There is one patch that is needed to support PREEMPT_RT and a fix for an ancient 'sleep while spin-locked' splat that seems to have become easier to hit since v5.18-rc3" * tag 'nfsd-5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux: (36 commits) NFSD: nfsd_file_put() can sleep NFSD: Add documenting comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner() NFSD: Modernize nfsd4_release_lockowner() NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner() nfsd: destroy percpu stats counters after reply cache shutdown nfsd: Fix null-ptr-deref in nfsd_fill_super() nfsd: Unregister the cld notifier when laundry_wq create failed SUNRPC: Use RMW bitops in single-threaded hot paths NFSD: Clean up the show_nf_flags() macro NFSD: Trace filecache opens NFSD: Move documenting comment for nfsd4_process_open2() NFSD: Fix whitespace NFSD: Remove dprintk call sites from tail of nfsd4_open() NFSD: Instantiate a struct file when creating a regular NFSv4 file NFSD: Clean up nfsd_open_verified() NFSD: Remove do_nfsd_create() NFSD: Refactor NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE) NFSD: Refactor NFSv3 CREATE NFSD: Refactor nfsd_create_setattr() NFSD: Avoid calling fh_drop_write() twice in do_nfsd_create() ... |
||
Chuck Lever
|
fb70bf124b |
NFSD: Instantiate a struct file when creating a regular NFSv4 file
There have been reports of races that cause NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE) to return an error even though the requested file was created. NFSv4 does not provide a status code for this case. To mitigate some of these problems, reorganize the NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE) logic to allocate resources before the file is actually created, and open the new file while the parent directory is still locked. Two new APIs are added: + Add an API that works like nfsd_file_acquire() but does not open the underlying file. The OPEN(CREATE) path can use this API when it already has an open file. + Add an API that is kin to dentry_open(). NFSD needs to create a file and grab an open "struct file *" atomically. The alloc_empty_file() has to be done before the inode create. If it fails (for example, because the NFS server has exceeded its max_files limit), we avoid creating the file and can still return an error to the NFS client. BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=382 Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Tested-by: JianHong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com> |
||
NeilBrown
|
a2ad63daa8 |
VFS: add FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT file flag
Currently various places test if direct IO is possible on a file by checking for the existence of the direct_IO address space operation. This is a poor choice, as the direct_IO operation may not be used - it is only used if the generic_file_*_iter functions are called for direct IO and some filesystems - particularly NFS - don't do this. Instead, introduce a new f_mode flag: FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT and change the various places to check this (avoiding pointer dereferences). do_dentry_open() will set this flag if ->direct_IO is present, so filesystems do not need to be changed. NFS *is* changed, to set the flag explicitly and discard the direct_IO entry in the address_space_operations for files. Other filesystems which currently use noop_direct_IO could usefully be changed to set this flag instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778128.29473.15189737957277399416.stgit@noble.brown Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Guo Ren
|
59c10c52f5
|
riscv: compat: syscall: Add compat_sys_call_table implementation
Implement compat sys_call_table and some system call functions: truncate64, ftruncate64, fallocate, pread64, pwrite64, sync_file_range, readahead, fadvise64_64 which need argument translation. Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Tested-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405071314.3225832-12-guoren@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> |
||
Christoph Hellwig
|
7b12e49669 |
fs: remove fs.f_write_hint
The value is now completely unused except for reporting it back through the F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT ioctl, so remove the value and the two ioctls for it. Trying to use the F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT and F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT fcntls will now return EINVAL, just like it would on a kernel that never supported this functionality in the first place. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308060529.736277-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
||
Christian Brauner
|
bd303368b7
|
fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems
In previous patches we added new and modified existing helpers to handle
idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. In this final
patch we convert all relevant places in the vfs to actually pass the
filesystem's idmapping into these helpers.
With this the vfs is in shape to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems
mounted with an idmapping. Note that this is just the generic
infrastructure. Actually adding support for idmapped mounts to a
filesystem mountable with an idmapping is follow-up work.
In this patch we extend the definition of an idmapped mount from a mount
that that has the initial idmapping attached to it to a mount that has
an idmapping attached to it which is not the same as the idmapping the
filesystem was mounted with.
As before we do not allow the initial idmapping to be attached to a
mount. In addition this patch prevents that the idmapping the filesystem
was mounted with can be attached to a mount created based on this
filesystem.
This has multiple reasons and advantages. First, attaching the initial
idmapping or the filesystem's idmapping doesn't make much sense as in
both cases the values of the i_{g,u}id and other places where k{g,u}ids
are used do not change. Second, a user that really wants to do this for
whatever reason can just create a separate dedicated identical idmapping
to attach to the mount. Third, we can continue to use the initial
idmapping as an indicator that a mount is not idmapped allowing us to
continue to keep passing the initial idmapping into the mapping helpers
to tell them that something isn't an idmapped mount even if the
filesystem is mounted with an idmapping.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-11-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-11-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-11-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
4472071331
|
fs: use low-level mapping helpers
In a few places the vfs needs to interact with bare k{g,u}ids directly
instead of struct inode. These are just a few. In previous patches we
introduced low-level mapping helpers that are able to support
filesystems mounted an idmapping. This patch simply converts the places
to use these new helpers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-7-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-7-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-7-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
a793d79ea3
|
fs: move mapping helpers
The low-level mapping helpers were so far crammed into fs.h. They are
out of place there. The fs.h header should just contain the higher-level
mapping helpers that interact directly with vfs objects such as struct
super_block or struct inode and not the bare mapping helpers. Similarly,
only vfs and specific fs code shall interact with low-level mapping
helpers. And so they won't be made accessible automatically through
regular {g,u}id helpers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-3-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-3-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-3-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
512b7931ad |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "257 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: scripts, ocfs2, vfs, and mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kconfig, dax, kasan, debug, pagecache, gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, iomap, tracing, vmalloc, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, tools, memblock, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, readahead, nommu, ksm, vmstat, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap, zsmalloc, highmem, zram, cleanups, kfence, and damon)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (257 commits) mm/damon: remove return value from before_terminate callback mm/damon: fix a few spelling mistakes in comments and a pr_debug message mm/damon: simplify stop mechanism Docs/admin-guide/mm/pagemap: wordsmith page flags descriptions Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: simplify the content Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix a wrong link Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix wrong example commands mm/damon/dbgfs: add adaptive_targets list check before enable monitor_on mm/damon: remove unnecessary variable initialization Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon: add a document for DAMON_RECLAIM mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based Reclamation (DAMON_RECLAIM) selftests/damon: support watermarks mm/damon/dbgfs: support watermarks mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism tools/selftests/damon: update for regions prioritization of schemes mm/damon/dbgfs: support prioritization weights mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization mm/damon/schemes: prioritize regions within the quotas mm/damon/selftests: support schemes quotas mm/damon/dbgfs: support quotas of schemes ... |
||
Rongwei Wang
|
8468e937df |
mm, thp: fix incorrect unmap behavior for private pages
When truncating pagecache on file THP, the private pages of a process
should not be unmapped mapping. This incorrect behavior on a dynamic
shared libraries which will cause related processes to happen core dump.
A simple test for a DSO (Prerequisite is the DSO mapped in file THP):
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The test only to open a target DSO, and do nothing. But this operation
will lead one or more process to happen core dump. This patch mainly to
fix this bug.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-3-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes:
|
||
|
Rongwei Wang
|
55fc0d9174 |
mm, thp: lock filemap when truncating page cache
Patch series "fix two bugs for file THP".
This patch (of 2):
Transparent huge page has supported read-only non-shmem files. The
file- backed THP is collapsed by khugepaged and truncated when written
(for shared libraries).
However, there is a race when multiple writers truncate the same page
cache concurrently.
In that case, subpage(s) of file THP can be revealed by find_get_entry
in truncate_inode_pages_range, which will trigger PageTail BUG_ON in
truncate_inode_page, as follows:
page:000000009e420ff2 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff pfn:0x50c3ff
head:0000000075ff816d order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x37fffe0000010815(locked|uptodate|lru|arch_1|head)
raw: 37fffe0000000000 fffffe0013108001 dead000000000122 dead000000000400
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 37fffe0000010815 fffffe001066bd48 ffff000404183c20 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000600 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff000c0345a000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTail(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:213!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) rfkill(E) ...
CPU: 14 PID: 11394 Comm: check_madvise_d Kdump: ...
Hardware name: ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
Call trace:
truncate_inode_page+0x64/0x70
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x550/0x7e4
truncate_pagecache+0x58/0x80
do_dentry_open+0x1e4/0x3c0
vfs_open+0x38/0x44
do_open+0x1f0/0x310
path_openat+0x114/0x1dc
do_filp_open+0x84/0x134
do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x164
__arm64_sys_openat+0x74/0xc0
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x220
do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa0
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0
Code: aa0103e0 900061e1 910ec021 9400d300 (d4210000)
This patch mainly to lock filemap when one enter truncate_pagecache(),
avoiding truncating the same page cache concurrently.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-1-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-2-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes:
|
||
Richard Guy Briggs
|
571e5c0efc |
audit: add OPENAT2 record to list "how" info
Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's four existing arguments. Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve. The new record in the context of an event would look like: time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021 type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle= 73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D 7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2" inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0 type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests" type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437 success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18 items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2" exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> [PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
||
|
Jeff Layton
|
f7e33bdbd6 |
fs: remove mandatory file locking support
We added CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING in 2015, and soon after turned it off in Fedora and RHEL8. Several other distros have followed suit. I've heard of one problem in all that time: Someone migrated from an older distro that supported "-o mand" to one that didn't, and the host had a fstab entry with "mand" in it which broke on reboot. They didn't actually _use_ mandatory locking so they just removed the mount option and moved on. This patch rips out mandatory locking support wholesale from the kernel, along with the Kconfig option and the Documentation file. It also changes the mount code to ignore the "mand" mount option instead of erroring out, and to throw a big, ugly warning. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
58ec9059b3 |
Merge branch 'work.namei' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs name lookup updates from Al Viro:
"Small namei.c patch series, mostly to simplify the rules for nameidata
state. It's actually from the previous cycle - but I didn't post it
for review in time...
Changes visible outside of fs/namei.c: file_open_root() calling
conventions change, some freed bits in LOOKUP_... space"
* 'work.namei' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
namei: make sure nd->depth is always valid
teach set_nameidata() to handle setting the root as well
take LOOKUP_{ROOT,ROOT_GRABBED,JUMPED} out of LOOKUP_... space
switch file_open_root() to struct path
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
71bd934101 |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton: "190 patches. Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, kconfig, proc, z3fold, zbud, ras, mempolicy, memblock, migration, thp, nommu, kconfig, madvise, memory-hotplug, zswap, zsmalloc, zram, cleanups, kfence, and hmm), procfs, sysctl, misc, core-kernel, lib, lz4, checkpatch, init, kprobes, nilfs2, hfs, signals, exec, kcov, selftests, compress/decompress, and ipc" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits) ipc/util.c: use binary search for max_idx ipc/sem.c: use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for use_global_lock ipc: use kmalloc for msg_queue and shmid_kernel ipc sem: use kvmalloc for sem_undo allocation lib/decompressors: remove set but not used variabled 'level' selftests/vm/pkeys: exercise x86 XSAVE init state selftests/vm/pkeys: refill shadow register after implicit kernel write selftests/vm/pkeys: handle negative sys_pkey_alloc() return code selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really, really random kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures exec: remove checks in __register_bimfmt() x86: signal: don't do sas_ss_reset() until we are certain that sigframe won't be abandoned hfsplus: report create_date to kstat.btime hfsplus: remove unnecessary oom message nilfs2: remove redundant continue statement in a while-loop kprobes: remove duplicated strong free_insn_page in x86 and s390 init: print out unknown kernel parameters checkpatch: do not complain about positive return values starting with EPOLL checkpatch: improve the indented label test checkpatch: scripts/spdxcheck.py now requires python3 ... |
||
Collin Fijalkovich
|
eb6ecbed0a |
mm, thp: relax the VM_DENYWRITE constraint on file-backed THPs
Transparent huge pages are supported for read-only non-shmem files, but
are only used for vmas with VM_DENYWRITE. This condition ensures that
file THPs are protected from writes while an application is running
(ETXTBSY). Any existing file THPs are then dropped from the page cache
when a file is opened for write in do_dentry_open(). Since sys_mmap
ignores MAP_DENYWRITE, this constrains the use of file THPs to vmas
produced by execve().
Systems that make heavy use of shared libraries (e.g. Android) are unable
to apply VM_DENYWRITE through the dynamic linker, preventing them from
benefiting from the resultant reduced contention on the TLB.
This patch reduces the constraint on file THPs allowing use with any
executable mapping from a file not opened for write (see
inode_is_open_for_write()). It also introduces additional conditions to
ensure that files opened for write will never be backed by file THPs.
Restricting the use of THPs to executable mappings eliminates the risk
that a read-only file later opened for write would encounter significant
latencies due to page cache truncation.
The ld linker flag '-z max-page-size=(hugepage size)' can be used to
produce executables with the necessary layout. The dynamic linker must
map these file's segments at a hugepage size aligned vma for the mapping
to be backed with THPs.
Comparison of the performance characteristics of 4KB and 2MB-backed
libraries follows; the Android dex2oat tool was used to AOT compile an
example application on a single ARM core.
4KB Pages:
==========
count event_name # count / runtime
598,995,035,942 cpu-cycles # 1.800861 GHz
81,195,620,851 raw-stall-frontend # 244.112 M/sec
347,754,466,597 iTLB-loads # 1.046 G/sec
2,970,248,900 iTLB-load-misses # 0.854122% miss rate
Total test time: 332.854998 seconds.
2MB Pages:
==========
count event_name # count / runtime
592,872,663,047 cpu-cycles # 1.800358 GHz
76,485,624,143 raw-stall-frontend # 232.261 M/sec
350,478,413,710 iTLB-loads # 1.064 G/sec
803,233,322 iTLB-load-misses # 0.229182% miss rate
Total test time: 329.826087 seconds
A check of /proc/$(pidof dex2oat64)/smaps shows THPs in use:
/apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so
FilePmdMapped: 4096 kB
/apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart-compiler.so
FilePmdMapped: 2048 kB
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210406000930.3455850-1-cfijalkovich@google.com
Signed-off-by: Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
cfe80306a0
|
open: don't silently ignore unknown O-flags in openat2()
The new openat2() syscall verifies that no unknown O-flag values are
set and returns an error to userspace if they are while the older open
syscalls like open() and openat() simply ignore unknown flag values:
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID (1 << 31)
struct open_how how = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID,
.resolve = 0,
};
/* fails */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how, sizeof(how));
/* succeeds */
fd = openat(-EBADF, "/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID);
However, openat2() silently truncates the upper 32 bits meaning:
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_LOWER32 (1 << 31)
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_UPPER32 (1 << 40)
struct open_how how_lowe32 = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_LOWER32,
};
struct open_how how_upper32 = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_UPPER32,
};
/* fails */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how_lower32, sizeof(how_lower32));
/* succeeds */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how_upper32, sizeof(how_upper32));
Fix this by preventing the immediate truncation in build_open_flags().
There's a snafu here though stripping FMODE_* directly from flags would
cause the upper 32 bits to be truncated as well due to integer promotion
rules since FMODE_* is unsigned int, O_* are signed ints (yuck).
In addition, struct open_flags currently defines flags to be 32 bit
which is reasonable. If we simply were to bump it to 64 bit we would
need to change a lot of code preemptively which doesn't seem worth it.
So simply add a compile-time check verifying that all currently known
O_* flags are within the 32 bit range and fail to build if they aren't
anymore.
This change shouldn't regress old open syscalls since they silently
truncate any unknown values anyway. It is a tiny semantic change for
openat2() but it is very unlikely people pass ing > 32 bit unknown flags
and the syscall is relatively new too.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528092417.3942079-3-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
||
|
Al Viro
|
ffb37ca3bd |
switch file_open_root() to struct path
... and provide file_open_root_mnt(), using the root of given mount. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7d6beb71da |
idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
b8b546a061
|
open: handle idmapped mounts
For core file operations such as changing directories or chrooting, determining file access, changing mode or ownership the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend the various helpers to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. When changing file ownership we need to map the uid and gid from the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-17-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
643fe55a06
|
open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate()
When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
2f221d6f7b
|
attr: handle idmapped mounts
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
47291baa8d
|
namei: make permission helpers idmapped mount aware
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument. On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
02f92b3868
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fs: add file and path permissions helpers
Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit. Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g. ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more complex argument passing than necessary. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
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Jens Axboe
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99668f6180 |
fs: expose LOOKUP_CACHED through openat2() RESOLVE_CACHED
Now that we support non-blocking path resolution internally, expose it via openat2() in the struct open_how ->resolve flags. This allows applications using openat2() to limit path resolution to the extent that it is already cached. If the lookup cannot be satisfied in a non-blocking manner, openat2(2) will return -1/-EAGAIN. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Linus Torvalds
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faf145d6f3 |
Merge branch 'exec-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman: "This set of changes ultimately fixes the interaction of posix file lock and exec. Fundamentally most of the change is just moving where unshare_files is called during exec, and tweaking the users of files_struct so that the count of files_struct is not unnecessarily played with. Along the way fcheck and related helpers were renamed to more accurately reflect what they do. There were also many other small changes that fell out, as this is the first time in a long time much of this code has been touched. Benchmarks haven't turned up any practical issues but Al Viro has observed a possibility for a lot of pounding on task_lock. So I have some changes in progress to convert put_files_struct to always rcu free files_struct. That wasn't ready for the merge window so that will have to wait until next time" * 'exec-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits) exec: Move io_uring_task_cancel after the point of no return coredump: Document coredump code exclusively used by cell spufs file: Remove get_files_struct file: Rename __close_fd_get_file close_fd_get_file file: Replace ksys_close with close_fd file: Rename __close_fd to close_fd and remove the files parameter file: Merge __alloc_fd into alloc_fd file: In f_dupfd read RLIMIT_NOFILE once. file: Merge __fd_install into fd_install proc/fd: In fdinfo seq_show don't use get_files_struct bpf/task_iter: In task_file_seq_get_next use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu proc/fd: In proc_readfd_common use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu file: Implement task_lookup_next_fd_rcu kcmp: In get_file_raw_ptr use task_lookup_fd_rcu proc/fd: In tid_fd_mode use task_lookup_fd_rcu file: Implement task_lookup_fd_rcu file: Rename fcheck lookup_fd_rcu file: Replace fcheck_files with files_lookup_fd_rcu file: Factor files_lookup_fd_locked out of fcheck_files file: Rename __fcheck_files to files_lookup_fd_raw ... |