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1f75619a72
19378 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Linus Torvalds
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1f75619a72 |
- Fix a wrong check in the function reporting whether a CPU executes (or
not) a NMI handler - Ratelimit unknown NMIs messages in order to not potentially slow down the machine - Other fixlets -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXvN0wACgkQEsHwGGHe VUqZLg//fo0puvI2XVjcyW2aNZXNyCWUID5J0HvIZqLveQQQzOopfuX4NLfgKSRR GUX3k/jlfO9pku+gz6rQRYi8kaTlY8rScf9XpbUBgZZg3Pz2/ySel5uhPpHatgZ7 Zj455XALGVLA3T4bFKfCvUGKmRVmSTyXgPg3i/yFpfVzRZ8yhvAyJWJSWxJpFOpC Eeg/cXUUPjlb2qOom0Bk9BEjG8Ez76yImAlN5ys/csG2Fe7iE3rU+DQ2IfU/yLfI 22QNZa8xGJY47c7iP1A/tGsxKGu5Pjsz4I2QvobWhteeiu+03g2NUWUcAaP+3/GN 6hj2IeiNAkhDcWaJMS9U5vaVAcfDZzTEErkPf896bk6lrR0UY1CRQlJzEQZLz1Vy 0ZVUuppY2hBcTj3YA9h65a/+sdsxAUG4BdsUJ63jHejJYEPN5YSFvL5wXZlxj3GO XVVMsHMs9Lgnz1x+xzAB8SmmoPSj6qdMneY1Xp92cEtV6QQM/EinTfIcTUtvDACZ 9FJ77Iu6Up4hemftTGOC8eVqr+V0Q8M5x2Xs8NQAwlq9dnFVQCIwd/LjdRDyJ3Gw ksFrq6Cv94Fi4bqmQi4CY04GH3kc5ua9sDeTM7rkBMm6RRSTO2NBgIOqHcBbrlOT B3kSUqoUB6BEqlRRqP/YZ8YSOL5FWk2A2WDKtp8+ThkDYixGy1M= =Jt9B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_misc_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull misc x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Fix a wrong check in the function reporting whether a CPU executes (or not) a NMI handler - Ratelimit unknown NMIs messages in order to not potentially slow down the machine - Other fixlets * tag 'x86_misc_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/nmi: Fix the inverse "in NMI handler" check Documentation/maintainer-tip: Add C++ tail comments exception Documentation/maintainer-tip: Add Closes tag x86/nmi: Rate limit unknown NMI messages Documentation/kernel-parameters: Add spec_rstack_overflow to mitigations=off |
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Linus Torvalds
|
38b334fc76 |
- Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support. This will allow the
kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side, providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment up to date. This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the next cycle. - Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and -mcmodel=kernel - The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXvH0wACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrzmA//VS/n6dhHRnm/nAGngr4PeegkgV1OhyKYFfiZ272rT6P9QvblQrgcY0dc Ij1DOhEKlke51pTHvMOQ33B3P4Fuc0mx3dpCLY0up5V26kzQiKCjRKEkC4U1bcw8 W4GqMejaR89bE14bYibmwpSib9T/uVsV65eM3xf1iF5UvsnoUaTziymDoy+nb43a B1pdd5vcl4mBNqXeEvt0qjg+xkMLpWUI9tJDB8mbMl/cnIFGgMZzBaY8oktHSROK QpuUnKegOgp1RXpfLbNjmZ2Q4Rkk4MNazzDzWq3EIxaRjXL3Qp507ePK7yeA2qa0 J3jCBQc9E2j7lfrIkUgNIzOWhMAXM2YH5bvH6UrIcMi1qsWJYDmkp2MF1nUedjdf Wj16/pJbeEw1aKKIywJGwsmViSQju158vY3SzXG83U/A/Iz7zZRHFmC/ALoxZptY Bi7VhfcOSpz98PE3axnG8CvvxRDWMfzBr2FY1VmQbg6VBNo1Xl1aP/IH1I8iQNKg /laBYl/qP+1286TygF1lthYROb1lfEIJprgi2xfO6jVYUqPb7/zq2sm78qZRfm7l 25PN/oHnuidfVfI/H3hzcGubjOG9Zwra8WWYBB2EEmelf21rT0OLqq+eS4T6pxFb GNVfc0AzG77UmqbrpkAMuPqL7LrGaSee4NdU3hkEdSphlx1/YTo= =c1ps -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add the x86 part of the SEV-SNP host support. This will allow the kernel to be used as a KVM hypervisor capable of running SNP (Secure Nested Paging) guests. Roughly speaking, SEV-SNP is the ultimate goal of the AMD confidential computing side, providing the most comprehensive confidential computing environment up to date. This is the x86 part and there is a KVM part which did not get ready in time for the merge window so latter will be forthcoming in the next cycle. - Rework the early code's position-dependent SEV variable references in order to allow building the kernel with clang and -fPIE/-fPIC and -mcmodel=kernel - The usual set of fixes, cleanups and improvements all over the place * tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits) x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS crypto: ccp - Have it depend on AMD_IOMMU iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry() x86/sev: Fix position dependent variable references in startup code crypto: ccp: Make snp_range_list static x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT Documentation: virt: Fix up pre-formatted text block for SEV ioctls crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands when SNP is enabled crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data when SNP is enabled crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list crypto: ccp: Provide an API to issue SEV and SNP commands ... |
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Linus Torvalds
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2edfd1046f |
- Rework different aspects of the resctrl code like adding arch-specific
accessors and splitting the locking, in order to accomodate ARM's MPAM implementation of hw resource control and be able to use the same filesystem control interface like on x86. Work by James Morse - Improve the memory bandwidth throttling heuristic to handle workloads with not too regular load levels which end up penalized unnecessarily - Use CPUID to detect the memory bandwidth enforcement limit on AMD - The usual set of fixes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXvGP8ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUo7nw//e3qGYx09qA6UShcIjz4e9cVM3gUraBn82rd4T6oeIfU5ecJn6auJzlVO cvlRFumaLbrNZXHd+Ww5VG0g0LVEcLmqS2ER295Rbp5gTvbDTNrmIAgriUpxER42 UkVtI4/y+P5980Y0Jl1j5xECACIdXFxJEGO3Eiok0rk3ZRhcFZgf1T2/35F2Jiif hXAtvmkeTBxldhcdgovdaoR7SIY4MBZjgB1zX5WqJGlFdxfc6RaYbpCnl8rVXF2J 2DSUvHjtXco9MWNDm9c2bwNzXHV3EaAvUiCwmfoNeXCCJEqpyYFaPs3U61RnlwQe ucAtSXeRx8YmJAVNJTjSR4Cou0stQDJdLZx0yYgoAvhXqwcpePilMzfHwdHkZ/5V K7Kwl+VbJ1JxnTJgYmcgJ3juF7R7VW+stiKZOTkFYvBsWzXvCK5w+w1JScbdphqa P878tySa58ehIaEf9/472QpA+zbItENsf1OFytfbJPKAJhnKMG73X4lrt6swSZBW a1rmTGqG0ufuPiXT9XDajgeFR/15RQWcYtXPVXmWLaIJ+hHhRc57v11qy0uIMs9V o0uRtdJP2SL+7rEm26VPjBXyS3orf2tvigrXnYeyNpTR/RVhMHL4n+0kxs4p9ELf 3oD4vd/KqyGHo7LO5QMm52eSxfHLpJzgFL02inBgFTFtmWMWpy8= =v7bo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_cache_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull resource control updates from Borislav Petkov: - Rework different aspects of the resctrl code like adding arch-specific accessors and splitting the locking, in order to accomodate ARM's MPAM implementation of hw resource control and be able to use the same filesystem control interface like on x86. Work by James Morse - Improve the memory bandwidth throttling heuristic to handle workloads with not too regular load levels which end up penalized unnecessarily - Use CPUID to detect the memory bandwidth enforcement limit on AMD - The usual set of fixes * tag 'x86_cache_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (30 commits) x86/resctrl: Remove lockdep annotation that triggers false positive x86/resctrl: Separate arch and fs resctrl locks x86/resctrl: Move domain helper migration into resctrl_offline_cpu() x86/resctrl: Add CPU offline callback for resctrl work x86/resctrl: Allow overflow/limbo handlers to be scheduled on any-but CPU x86/resctrl: Add CPU online callback for resctrl work x86/resctrl: Add helpers for system wide mon/alloc capable x86/resctrl: Make rdt_enable_key the arch's decision to switch x86/resctrl: Move alloc/mon static keys into helpers x86/resctrl: Make resctrl_mounted checks explicit x86/resctrl: Allow arch to allocate memory needed in resctrl_arch_rmid_read() x86/resctrl: Allow resctrl_arch_rmid_read() to sleep x86/resctrl: Queue mon_event_read() instead of sending an IPI x86/resctrl: Add cpumask_any_housekeeping() for limbo/overflow x86/resctrl: Move CLOSID/RMID matching and setting to use helpers x86/resctrl: Allocate the cleanest CLOSID by searching closid_num_dirty_rmid x86/resctrl: Use __set_bit()/__clear_bit() instead of open coding x86/resctrl: Track the number of dirty RMID a CLOSID has x86/resctrl: Allow RMID allocation to be scoped by CLOSID x86/resctrl: Access per-rmid structures by index ... |
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Linus Torvalds
|
bfdb395a7c |
- Relax the PAT MSR programming which was unnecessarily using the MTRR
programming protocol of disabling the cache around the changes. The reason behind this is the current algorithm triggering a #VE exception for TDX guests and unnecessarily complicating things -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXux8sACgkQEsHwGGHe VUodOw//diEAM3//Ht733soDDMYuc3pnLBgpIvEYtU7nvo7rVuNJASUny+WmQNVl Szm1ATl88I0H1t54CAdvd398csKlZPmsO/puu/sLiJrvmjXtH4raE/u9lFjpdBwo yoSbgb8v15No0JlszeE782rJfAHQ01FK7LbEuV0EKF3dx+KDZQPY8E+/LGVNeyh4 X7OWh2RJHUKENYxYgQBBuw2Hkm9HXIgyQiKe9eIrEwpHskCmZ/y8F8LazohVmw8L XqlUZFCmKPwHsLE44sWq5coXoN28RKZfQ2D7jvhts8AwwU1RRoFv5WgCXhFe0Rfe dPfLm93PvxxUYV0OHyCsKeJJkA8KH+vuXiaC1iw7Za6Ipkio1LzNAc/pxa/Q4x8Y dwOM+WI/OdXz8KHQAJlU37ZNGbnA/ETWumNN7SrqqxvKzUbjcjDwZqIqneFT0dg6 c5quB/fgj+lL1xXk9EDE4HrOkzLv3/ax449oLFkJ3JKfRRMAzQalRaTwjTh/hufM 7Eig3iNRN+G6bItXC6XoQjDBEEJP7LplXT8jNQkVbHyMg8WPPToxtJGXBnR73PQp q8+Iv3gLqM5EPqetdAtElVRhikmPHPqCdcBj47EHCoPFsQ1E9b72BUutDH0MVEG4 BIFCWQ4DS+3OXX/BZf7P5UOcPDcGkP+2PqbUmiBRB5I3174XQDQ= =nNC0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_mtrr_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 MTRR update from Borislav Petkov: - Relax the PAT MSR programming which was unnecessarily using the MTRR programming protocol of disabling the cache around the changes. The reason behind this is the current algorithm triggering a #VE exception for TDX guests and unnecessarily complicating things * tag 'x86_mtrr_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/pat: Simplify the PAT programming protocol |
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Linus Torvalds
|
742582acec |
- Have AMD Zen common init code run on all families from Zen1 onwards
in order to save some future enablement effort -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXuxn4ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUolmQ//djDJa11FTQ5Zfnu8RjH4LFe6ZanLMIP93urT8rRuOfhlOZLHqxFGvJHy 1K1yT34NmHdXBsVWX7MxDmyhRJMOhgkkgGhYaBqZWrcV1RO26PKg8FS5B/a3BsVI Y7ryOOqWNg0Hf/++Qm0zSq21VEH3Ehq4gYitK0irX/gBbHQMdui63pbLqOHwdszG bhgMSI42EjZxpbR1ow5Bx7dia0ChBODbV4WeVB0eZo47mSJU4eu8yDPuy5+5ywwA fOOVWZ2e12HrisfJYxL01vivU/pK0WYB2gJlAKv0tp+Q2ReIvo/vh4w2MHC1c+YT X8e95rz1jzzlTkEKt4iWE/NZ1XS30z77jGbKVLxl8lsWswTtup48xLw0idLHc39L M0ayY3yXbWRVxSltucH2DVKMzG8IP5XNeG53qfiMqIHsoYbmnVgxWk/0HrtgcrSL jvcU4f2hwehO/ZvwlRyRlQACOlDSHGehNHmAVK3BqxYxM2+a9ArTA2KmnbC6+U9u LAKaXlf+lMo6lszHDqKb+GUePqZ4EX01X4EuSTRX/G6qD4RMZIu1+4sBwfr79miE uKJvRIT9DH74+OLPeSt/osdbGAK26BzJM9ZnqkdcggOMM/tHPNkQ5YTK/lStP3gl JAh8ih/Or9p3LQHNKIU1zoT0MOKv6Mbr8n+MPYAhaS/oNpST6Bs= =h7IU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cpu update from Borislav Petkov: - Have AMD Zen common init code run on all families from Zen1 onwards in order to save some future enablement effort * tag 'x86_cpu_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/CPU/AMD: Do the common init on future Zens too |
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Linus Torvalds
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d8941ce52b |
- Constify yet another static struct bus_type instance now that the
driver core can handle that -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmXuxYIACgkQEsHwGGHe VUrVGBAAgOB8RglOqSCaF2m//92E2TyXKGSpXXuiizuHbV4G7v+yRgunbX99XOBa wGkeja0rqovmjaSNOK3B4Hp6/eSXycdKgL8KfMRqa7VzGcla4oN097d6Nvz1YPo3 YL/8sJ04wy1CrF2Hgxj9bFF/ni0WFUgRr8GvlzKqeYGm7rRP2V8kNk64beAMa1GR XTwoqSVq9cA88/Xnw4/qnYG2HxIL+Eu1uJWtkb47EWGD6qzsgC7t+PE0aKrqcTC8 jzcbiINHPK10FxoXGq3xa1yJQH02E83w0EmjhGmQ06/3gHQVoSUFrO0k4rOJJ7KI GvAOYMGjkG/vuX0a2+FcxYoU/ODUuA8tiHK9x1HBkqLPzkiz3FPwQQ0yjfqOyo95 6dPd2EeUPjSK12xZ2LM22jyfhkIX6v02QjbmkwkP5pVcQ2WQOQVaOQzITZ/5vhLu /Eaw+wRj8PBf2Jxv8yX885+qT9owkZIH2jSsVajGpMdoOTkS4R0CmUtPq7D43pGb PEUabjcGBkSLGvHeKV0xmMeGAMDrsYNcqZ09RJdnIJ4LExI7tsR7lw5jwRSf0M/O 3Vg8ZSW4WlWkTzK5ikFitB8p6fWCe2MhE22zdEJhOei4Wzfz1MmvfcgQW6k9i2KB AqZGlkg148ItHA56+NMUIgKUqPyblQixR97VkpZoHUAlMdaSdd4= =RL7O -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ras_core_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull RAS fixlet from Borislav Petkov: - Constify yet another static struct bus_type instance now that the driver core can handle that * tag 'ras_core_for_v6.9_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mce: Make mce_subsys const |
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Linus Torvalds
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720c857907 |
Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED):
FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes: 1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved in nested exception scenarios. 2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry of #NMI code to handle this. 3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI. 4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a stack trace. 5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment 6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion on large systems. 7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources FRED addresses these shortcomings by: 1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra complexity of preserving it in software. 2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested exception uses the currently interrupt stack. 3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for per CPU variable access is done in hardware. 4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the return from NMI. 5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP 6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt, syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes the vector space restriction. The first hardware implementations will still have the current restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires further changes to the local APIC. 7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the required local APIC changes are in place. The series implements the initial FRED support by: - Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism. - Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED requires to store context and meta information - Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB. - Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE - Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to demultiplex the events - Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc. The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs. the existing IDT implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and therefore have no impact on IDT based systems. It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED simulation and as of now there are know outstanding problems. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmXuKPgTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoWyUEACevJMHU+Ot9zqBPizSWxByM1uunHbp bjQXhaFeskd3mt7k7HU6GsPRSmC3q4lliP1Y9ypfbU0DvYSI2h/PhMWizjhmot2y nIvFpl51r/NsI+JHx1oXcFetz0eGHEqBui/4YQ/swgOCMymYgfqgHhazXTdldV3g KpH9/8W3AeGvw79uzXFH9tjBzTkbvywpam3v0LYNDJWTCuDkilyo8PjhsgRZD4x3 V9f1nLD7nSHZW8XLoktdJJ38bKwI2Lhao91NQ0ErwopekA4/9WphZEKsDpidUSXJ sn1O148oQ8X92IO2OaQje8XC5pLGr5GqQBGPWzRH56P/Vd3+WOwBxaFoU6Drxc5s tIe23ZjkVcpA8EEG7BQBZV1Un/NX7XaCCnMniOt0RauXw+1NaslX7t/tnUAh5F1V TWCH4D0I0oJ0qJ7kNliGn2BP3agYXOVg81xVEUjT6KfHcYU4ImUrwi+BkeNXuXtL Ch5ADnbYAcUjWLFnAmEmaRtfmfNGY5T7PeGFHW2RRkaOJ88v5g14Voo6gPJaDUPn wMQ0nLq1xN4xZWF6ZgfRqAhArvh20k38ZujRku5vXEqnhOugQ76TF2UYiFEwOXbQ 8jcM+yEBLGgBz7tGMwmIAml6kfxaFF1KPpdrtcPxNkGlbE6KTSuIolLx2YGUvlSU 6/O8nwZy49ckmQ== =Ib7w -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 FRED support from Thomas Gleixner: "Support for x86 Fast Return and Event Delivery (FRED). FRED is a replacement for IDT event delivery on x86 and addresses most of the technical nightmares which IDT exposes: 1) Exception cause registers like CR2 need to be manually preserved in nested exception scenarios. 2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is suboptimal for nested exceptions as the interrupt stack mechanism rewinds the stack on each entry which requires a massive effort in the low level entry of #NMI code to handle this. 3) No hardware distinction between entry from kernel or from user which makes establishing kernel context more complex than it needs to be especially for unconditionally nestable exceptions like NMI. 4) NMI nesting caused by IRET unconditionally reenabling NMIs, which is a problem when the perf NMI takes a fault when collecting a stack trace. 5) Partial restore of ESP when returning to a 16-bit segment 6) Limitation of the vector space which can cause vector exhaustion on large systems. 7) Inability to differentiate NMI sources FRED addresses these shortcomings by: 1) An extended exception stack frame which the CPU uses to save exception cause registers. This ensures that the meta information for each exception is preserved on stack and avoids the extra complexity of preserving it in software. 2) Hardware interrupt stack switching is non-rewinding if a nested exception uses the currently interrupt stack. 3) The entry points for kernel and user context are separate and GS BASE handling which is required to establish kernel context for per CPU variable access is done in hardware. 4) NMIs are now nesting protected. They are only reenabled on the return from NMI. 5) FRED guarantees full restore of ESP 6) FRED does not put a limitation on the vector space by design because it uses a central entry points for kernel and user space and the CPUstores the entry type (exception, trap, interrupt, syscall) on the entry stack along with the vector number. The entry code has to demultiplex this information, but this removes the vector space restriction. The first hardware implementations will still have the current restricted vector space because lifting this limitation requires further changes to the local APIC. 7) FRED stores the vector number and meta information on stack which allows having more than one NMI vector in future hardware when the required local APIC changes are in place. The series implements the initial FRED support by: - Reworking the existing entry and IDT handling infrastructure to accomodate for the alternative entry mechanism. - Expanding the stack frame to accomodate for the extra 16 bytes FRED requires to store context and meta information - Providing FRED specific C entry points for events which have information pushed to the extended stack frame, e.g. #PF and #DB. - Providing FRED specific C entry points for #NMI and #MCE - Implementing the FRED specific ASM entry points and the C code to demultiplex the events - Providing detection and initialization mechanisms and the necessary tweaks in context switching, GS BASE handling etc. The FRED integration aims for maximum code reuse vs the existing IDT implementation to the extent possible and the deviation in hot paths like context switching are handled with alternatives to minimalize the impact. The low level entry and exit paths are seperate due to the extended stack frame and the hardware based GS BASE swichting and therefore have no impact on IDT based systems. It has been extensively tested on existing systems and on the FRED simulation and as of now there are no outstanding problems" * tag 'x86-fred-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits) x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization MAINTAINERS: Add a maintainer entry for FRED x86/fred: Fix a build warning with allmodconfig due to 'inline' failing to inline properly x86/fred: Invoke FRED initialization code to enable FRED x86/fred: Add FRED initialization functions x86/syscall: Split IDT syscall setup code into idt_syscall_init() KVM: VMX: Call fred_entry_from_kvm() for IRQ/NMI handling x86/entry: Add fred_entry_from_kvm() for VMX to handle IRQ/NMI x86/entry/calling: Allow PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS being used beyond actual entry code x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled x86/traps: Add sysvec_install() to install a system interrupt handler x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code x86/fred: Add a machine check entry stub for FRED x86/fred: Add a NMI entry stub for FRED x86/fred: Add a debug fault entry stub for FRED x86/idtentry: Incorporate definitions/declarations of the FRED entries x86/fred: Make exc_page_fault() work for FRED x86/fred: Allow single-step trap and NMI when starting a new task x86/fred: No ESPFIX needed when FRED is enabled ... |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
ca7e917769 |
Rework of APIC enumeration and topology evaluation:
The current implementation has a couple of shortcomings: - It fails to handle hybrid systems correctly. - The APIC registration code which handles CPU number assignents is in the middle of the APIC code and detached from the topology evaluation. - The various mechanisms which enumerate APICs, ACPI, MPPARSE and guest specific ones, tweak global variables as they see fit or in case of XENPV just hack around the generic mechanisms completely. - The CPUID topology evaluation code is sprinkled all over the vendor code and reevaluates global variables on every hotplug operation. - There is no way to analyze topology on the boot CPU before bringing up the APs. This causes problems for infrastructure like PERF which needs to size certain aspects upfront or could be simplified if that would be possible. - The APIC admission and CPU number association logic is incomprehensible and overly complex and needs to be kept around after boot instead of completing this right after the APIC enumeration. This update addresses these shortcomings with the following changes: - Rework the CPUID evaluation code so it is common for all vendors and provides information about the APIC ID segments in a uniform way independent of the number of segments (Thread, Core, Module, ..., Die, Package) so that this information can be computed instead of rewriting global variables of dubious value over and over. - A few cleanups and simplifcations of the APIC, IO/APIC and related interfaces to prepare for the topology evaluation changes. - Seperation of the parser stages so the early evaluation which tries to find the APIC address can be seperately overridden from the late evaluation which enumerates and registers the local APIC as further preparation for sanitizing the topology evaluation. - A new registration and admission logic which - encapsulates the inner workings so that parsers and guest logic cannot longer fiddle in it - uses the APIC ID segments to build topology bitmaps at registration time - provides a sane admission logic - allows to detect the crash kernel case, where CPU0 does not run on the real BSP, automatically. This is required to prevent sending INIT/SIPI sequences to the real BSP which would reset the whole machine. This was so far handled by a tedious command line parameter, which does not even work in nested crash scenarios. - Associates CPU number after the enumeration completed and prevents the late registration of APICs, which was somehow tolerated before. - Converting all parsers and guest enumeration mechanisms over to the new interfaces. This allows to get rid of all global variable tweaking from the parsers and enumeration mechanisms and sanitizes the XEN[PV] handling so it can use CPUID evaluation for the first time. - Mopping up existing sins by taking the information from the APIC ID segment bitmaps. This evaluates hybrid systems correctly on the boot CPU and allows for cleanups and fixes in the related drivers, e.g. PERF. The series has been extensively tested and the minimal late fallout due to a broken ACPI/MADT table has been addressed by tightening the admission logic further. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmXuDawTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYobE7EACngItF+UOTCoCV6och2lL6HVoIdZD1 Y5oaAgD+WzQSz/lBkH6b9kZSyvjlMo6O9GlnGX+ii+VUnijDp4VrspnxbJDaKEq3 gOfsSg2Tk+ps50HqMcZawjjBYJb/TmvKwEV2XuzIBPOONSWLNjvN7nBSzLl1eF9/ 8uCE39/8aB5K3GXryRyXdo2uLu6eHTVC0aYFu/kLX1/BbVqF5NMD3sz9E9w8+D/U MIIMEMXy4Fn+P2o0vVH+gjUlwI76mJbB1WqCX/sqbVacXrjl3KfNJRiisTFIOOYV 8o+rIV0ef5X9xmZqtOXAdyZQzj++Gwmz9+4TU1M4YHtS7UkYn6AluOjvVekCc+gc qXE3WhqKfCK2/carRMLQxAMxNeRylkZG+Wuv1Qtyjpe9JX2dTqtems0f4DMp9DKf b7InO3z39kJanpqcUG2Sx+GWanetfnX+0Ho2Moqu6Xi+2ATr1PfMG/Wyr5/WWOfV qApaHSTwa+J43mSzP6BsXngEv085EHSGM5tPe7u46MCYFqB21+bMl+qH82KjMkOe c6uZovFQMmX2WBlqJSYGVCH+Jhgvqq8HFeRs19Hd4enOt3e6LE3E74RBVD1AyfLV 1b/m8tYB/o871ZlEZwDCGVrV/LNnA7PxmFpq5ZHLpUt39g2/V0RH1puBVz1e97pU YsTT7hBCUYzgjQ== =/5oR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86-apic-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 APIC updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Rework of APIC enumeration and topology evaluation. The current implementation has a couple of shortcomings: - It fails to handle hybrid systems correctly. - The APIC registration code which handles CPU number assignents is in the middle of the APIC code and detached from the topology evaluation. - The various mechanisms which enumerate APICs, ACPI, MPPARSE and guest specific ones, tweak global variables as they see fit or in case of XENPV just hack around the generic mechanisms completely. - The CPUID topology evaluation code is sprinkled all over the vendor code and reevaluates global variables on every hotplug operation. - There is no way to analyze topology on the boot CPU before bringing up the APs. This causes problems for infrastructure like PERF which needs to size certain aspects upfront or could be simplified if that would be possible. - The APIC admission and CPU number association logic is incomprehensible and overly complex and needs to be kept around after boot instead of completing this right after the APIC enumeration. This update addresses these shortcomings with the following changes: - Rework the CPUID evaluation code so it is common for all vendors and provides information about the APIC ID segments in a uniform way independent of the number of segments (Thread, Core, Module, ..., Die, Package) so that this information can be computed instead of rewriting global variables of dubious value over and over. - A few cleanups and simplifcations of the APIC, IO/APIC and related interfaces to prepare for the topology evaluation changes. - Seperation of the parser stages so the early evaluation which tries to find the APIC address can be seperately overridden from the late evaluation which enumerates and registers the local APIC as further preparation for sanitizing the topology evaluation. - A new registration and admission logic which - encapsulates the inner workings so that parsers and guest logic cannot longer fiddle in it - uses the APIC ID segments to build topology bitmaps at registration time - provides a sane admission logic - allows to detect the crash kernel case, where CPU0 does not run on the real BSP, automatically. This is required to prevent sending INIT/SIPI sequences to the real BSP which would reset the whole machine. This was so far handled by a tedious command line parameter, which does not even work in nested crash scenarios. - Associates CPU number after the enumeration completed and prevents the late registration of APICs, which was somehow tolerated before. - Converting all parsers and guest enumeration mechanisms over to the new interfaces. This allows to get rid of all global variable tweaking from the parsers and enumeration mechanisms and sanitizes the XEN[PV] handling so it can use CPUID evaluation for the first time. - Mopping up existing sins by taking the information from the APIC ID segment bitmaps. This evaluates hybrid systems correctly on the boot CPU and allows for cleanups and fixes in the related drivers, e.g. PERF. The series has been extensively tested and the minimal late fallout due to a broken ACPI/MADT table has been addressed by tightening the admission logic further" * tag 'x86-apic-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (76 commits) x86/topology: Ignore non-present APIC IDs in a present package x86/apic: Build the x86 topology enumeration functions on UP APIC builds too smp: Provide 'setup_max_cpus' definition on UP too smp: Avoid 'setup_max_cpus' namespace collision/shadowing x86/bugs: Use fixed addressing for VERW operand x86/cpu/topology: Get rid of cpuinfo::x86_max_cores x86/cpu/topology: Provide __num_[cores|threads]_per_package x86/cpu/topology: Rename topology_max_die_per_package() x86/cpu/topology: Rename smp_num_siblings x86/cpu/topology: Retrieve cores per package from topology bitmaps x86/cpu/topology: Use topology logical mapping mechanism x86/cpu/topology: Provide logical pkg/die mapping x86/cpu/topology: Simplify cpu_mark_primary_thread() x86/cpu/topology: Mop up primary thread mask handling x86/cpu/topology: Use topology bitmaps for sizing x86/cpu/topology: Let XEN/PV use topology from CPUID/MADT x86/xen/smp_pv: Count number of vCPUs early x86/cpu/topology: Assign hotpluggable CPUIDs during init x86/cpu/topology: Reject unknown APIC IDs on ACPI hotplug x86/topology: Add a mechanism to track topology via APIC IDs ... |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
80a76c60e5 |
Updates for timekeeping and PTP core:
The cross-timestamp mechanism which allows to correlate hardware clocks uses clocksource pointers for describing the correlation. That's suboptimal as drivers need to obtain the pointer, which requires needless exports and exposing internals. This can be completely avoided by assigning clocksource IDs and using them for describing the correlated clock source. This update adds clocksource IDs to all clocksources in the tree which can be exposed to this mechanism and removes the pointer and now needless exports. This is separate from the timer core changes as it was provided to the PTP folks to build further changes on top. A related improvement for the core and the correlation handling has not made it this time, but is expected to get ready for the next round. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmXuAsoTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoQSFD/0Qvyrm/tKgJwdOZrXAmcPkCRu4amrv z5GiZtMt6/GHN6JA6ZkR9tjpYnh/NrhxaGxD2k9kcUsaj1tEZyGULNYtfPXsS/j0 SVOVpuagqppPGryfqnxgnZk7M+zjGAxb58miGMEkk08Ex7ysAkujGnmfHzNBP1mz Ryeeime6aOVB8jhISS68GtAYZ5fD0fWjXfN7DN9G1faJwmF82nJLKkGFy7E1TV9Y IYaW4r/EZuRATXesnIg6YAjop3l3qK1J8hMAam7OqvOqVzGCs0QNg9usg9Pf6je4 BaELA6GIwDw8ncR5865ONVC8Qpw8/AgChNf7WJrXsP1xBL56FFDmyTPGJMcUFXya G7s/YIQSj+yXg9+LPMAQqFTqLolnwspBw/fz2ctShpbnGbs8lmnAOTAjNz5lBddd vrQSn3Gtcj9vHP5OTKXSzHIYGmbvTZp0acsTtuSQGGzJySgVD43m1/xwY5eb11gp vS57GADgqTli8mrgipVPZCQ3o87RxNMqqda9lrEG/6lfuJ1rUGZWTkvqoasJI/jq mGiWidFhDOGHaJJUQajLIHPXLll+NN2LIa4wcZqPWE4qdtBAqtutkPfVAC5O0Qot dA1eWjW02i1Hy7SsUwlpivlDO+MoMn7hqmfXxA01u/x4y8UCnB+vSjWs0LdVlG3G xWIbTzzp7HKEwg== =xKya -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'timers-ptp-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull clocksource updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Updates for timekeeping and PTP core. The cross-timestamp mechanism which allows to correlate hardware clocks uses clocksource pointers for describing the correlation. That's suboptimal as drivers need to obtain the pointer, which requires needless exports and exposing internals. This can all be completely avoided by assigning clocksource IDs and using them for describing the correlated clock source. So this adds clocksource IDs to all clocksources in the tree which can be exposed to this mechanism and removes the pointer and now needless exports. A related improvement for the core and the correlation handling has not made it this time, but is expected to get ready for the next round" * tag 'timers-ptp-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: kvmclock: Unexport kvmclock clocksource treewide: Remove system_counterval_t.cs, which is never read timekeeping: Evaluate system_counterval_t.cs_id instead of .cs ptp/kvm, arm_arch_timer: Set system_counterval_t.cs_id to constant x86/kvm, ptp/kvm: Add clocksource ID, set system_counterval_t.cs_id x86/tsc: Add clocksource ID, set system_counterval_t.cs_id timekeeping: Add clocksource ID to struct system_counterval_t x86/tsc: Correct kernel-doc notation |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
4527e83780 |
Updates for the MSI interrupt subsystem and RISC-V initial MSI support:
- Core and platform-MSI The core changes have been adopted from previous work which converted ARM[64] to the new per device MSI domain model, which was merged to support multiple MSI domain per device. The ARM[64] changes are being worked on too, but have not been ready yet. The core and platform-MSI changes have been split out to not hold up RISC-V and to avoid that RISC-V builds on the scheduled for removal interfaces. The core support provides new interfaces to handle wire to MSI bridges in a straight forward way and introduces new platform-MSI interfaces which are built on top of the per device MSI domain model. Once ARM[64] is converted over the old platform-MSI interfaces and the related ugliness in the MSI core code will be removed. - Drivers: - Add a new driver for the Andes hart-level interrupt controller - Rework the SiFive PLIC driver to prepare for MSI suport - Expand the RISC-V INTC driver to support the new RISC-V AIA controller which provides the basis for MSI on RISC-V - A few fixup for the fallout of the core changes. The actual MSI parts for RISC-V were finalized late and have been post-poned for the next merge window. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmXt7MsTHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYofrMD/9Dag12ttmbE2uqzTzlTxc7RHC2MX5n VJLt84FNNwGPA4r7WLOOqHrfuvfoGjuWT9pYMrVaXCglRG1CMvL10kHMB2f28UWv Qpc5PzbJwpD6tqyfRSFHMoJp63DAI8IpS7J3I8bqnRD8+0PwYn3jMA1+iMZkH0B7 8uO3mxlFhQ7BFvIAeMEAhR0szuAfvXqEtpi1iTgQTrQ4Je4Rf1pmLjEe2rkwDvF4 p3SAmPIh4+F3IjO7vNsVkQ2yOarTP2cpSns6JmO8mrobLIVX7ZCQ6uVaVCfBhxfx WttuJO6Bmh/I15yDe/waH6q9ym+0VBwYRWi5lonMpViGdq4/D2WVnY1mNeLRIfjl X65aMWE1+bhiqyIIUfc24hacf0UgBIlMEW4kJ31VmQzb+OyLDXw+UvzWg1dO6XdA 3L6j1nRgHk0ea5yFyH6SfH/mrfeyqHuwHqo17KFyHxD3jM2H1RRMplpbwXiOIepp KJJ/O06eMEzHqzn4B8GCT2EvX6L2ehgoWbLeEDNLQh/3LwA9OdcBzPr6gsweEl0U Q7szJgUWZHeMr39F2rnt0GmvkEuu6muEp/nQzfnohjoYZ0PhpMLSq++4Gi+Ko3fz 2IyecJ+tlbSfyM5//8AdNnOSpsTG3f8u6B/WwhGp5lIDwMnMzCssgfQmRnc3Uyv5 kU3pdMjURJaTUA== =7aXj -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'irq-msi-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull MSI updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Updates for the MSI interrupt subsystem and initial RISC-V MSI support. The core changes have been adopted from previous work which converted ARM[64] to the new per device MSI domain model, which was merged to support multiple MSI domain per device. The ARM[64] changes are being worked on too, but have not been ready yet. The core and platform-MSI changes have been split out to not hold up RISC-V and to avoid that RISC-V builds on the scheduled for removal interfaces. The core support provides new interfaces to handle wire to MSI bridges in a straight forward way and introduces new platform-MSI interfaces which are built on top of the per device MSI domain model. Once ARM[64] is converted over the old platform-MSI interfaces and the related ugliness in the MSI core code will be removed. The actual MSI parts for RISC-V were finalized late and have been post-poned for the next merge window. Drivers: - Add a new driver for the Andes hart-level interrupt controller - Rework the SiFive PLIC driver to prepare for MSI suport - Expand the RISC-V INTC driver to support the new RISC-V AIA controller which provides the basis for MSI on RISC-V - A few fixup for the fallout of the core changes" * tag 'irq-msi-2024-03-10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (29 commits) irqchip/riscv-intc: Fix low-level interrupt handler setup for AIA x86/apic/msi: Use DOMAIN_BUS_GENERIC_MSI for HPET/IO-APIC domain search genirq/matrix: Dynamic bitmap allocation irqchip/riscv-intc: Add support for RISC-V AIA irqchip/sifive-plic: Improve locking safety by using irqsave/irqrestore irqchip/sifive-plic: Parse number of interrupts and contexts early in plic_probe() irqchip/sifive-plic: Cleanup PLIC contexts upon irqdomain creation failure irqchip/sifive-plic: Use riscv_get_intc_hwnode() to get parent fwnode irqchip/sifive-plic: Use devm_xyz() for managed allocation irqchip/sifive-plic: Use dev_xyz() in-place of pr_xyz() irqchip/sifive-plic: Convert PLIC driver into a platform driver irqchip/riscv-intc: Introduce Andes hart-level interrupt controller irqchip/riscv-intc: Allow large non-standard interrupt number genirq/irqdomain: Don't call ops->select for DOMAIN_BUS_ANY tokens irqchip/imx-intmux: Handle pure domain searches correctly genirq/msi: Provide MSI_FLAG_PARENT_PM_DEV genirq/irqdomain: Reroute device MSI create_mapping genirq/msi: Provide allocation/free functions for "wired" MSI interrupts genirq/msi: Optionally use dev->fwnode for device domain genirq/msi: Provide DOMAIN_BUS_WIRED_TO_MSI ... |
||
Changbin Du
|
c0935fca6b |
x86/sev: Disable KMSAN for memory encryption TUs
Instrumenting sev.c and mem_encrypt_identity.c with KMSAN will result in a triple-faulting kernel. Some of the code is invoked too early during boot, before KMSAN is ready. Disable KMSAN instrumentation for the two translation units. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240308044401.1120395-1-changbin.du@huawei.com |
||
Xin Li (Intel)
|
c416b5bac6 |
x86/fred: Fix init_task thread stack pointer initialization
As TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING was defined as 0 on x86_64, it went unnoticed that the initialization of the .sp field in INIT_THREAD and some calculations in the low level startup code do not take the padding into account. FRED enabled kernels require a 16 byte padding, which means that the init task initialization and the low level startup code use the wrong stack offset. Subtract TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING in all affected places to adjust for this. Fixes: |
||
Thomas Gleixner
|
f0551af021 |
x86/topology: Ignore non-present APIC IDs in a present package
Borislav reported that one of his systems has a broken MADT table which
advertises eight present APICs and 24 non-present APICs in the same
package.
The non-present ones are considered hot-pluggable by the topology
evaluation code, which is obviously bogus as there is no way to hot-plug
within the same package.
As the topology evaluation code accounts for hot-pluggable CPUs in a
package, the maximum number of cores per package is computed wrong, which
in turn causes the uncore performance counter driver to access non-existing
MSRs. It will probably confuse other entities which rely on the maximum
number of cores and threads per package too.
Cure this by ignoring hot-pluggable APIC IDs within a present package.
In theory it would be reasonable to just do this unconditionally, but then
there is this thing called reality^Wvirtualization which ruins
everything. Virtualization is the only existing user of "physical" hotplug
and the virtualization tools allow the above scenario. Whether that is
actually in use or not is unknown.
As it can be argued that the virtualization case is not affected by the
issues which exposed the reported problem, allow the bogosity if the kernel
determined that it is running in a VM for now.
Fixes:
|
||
Jiri Bohac
|
7fd817c906 |
x86/e820: Don't reserve SETUP_RNG_SEED in e820
SETUP_RNG_SEED in setup_data is supplied by kexec and should
not be reserved in the e820 map.
Doing so reserves 16 bytes of RAM when booting with kexec.
(16 bytes because data->len is zeroed by parse_setup_data so only
sizeof(setup_data) is reserved.)
When kexec is used repeatedly, each boot adds two entries in the
kexec-provided e820 map as the 16-byte range splits a larger
range of usable memory. Eventually all of the 128 available entries
get used up. The next split will result in losing usable memory
as the new entries cannot be added to the e820 map.
Fixes:
|
||
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
|
d7b69b590b |
x86/sev: Dump SEV_STATUS
It is, and will be even more useful in the future, to dump the SEV features enabled according to SEV_STATUS. Do so: [ 0.542753] Memory Encryption Features active: AMD SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP [ 0.544425] SEV: Status: SEV SEV-ES SEV-SNP DebugSwap Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240219094216.GAZdMieDHKiI8aaP3n@fat_crate.local |
||
Ingo Molnar
|
9b9c280b9a |
Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/apic, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
||
Ingo Molnar
|
6be4ec2968 |
x86/apic: Build the x86 topology enumeration functions on UP APIC builds too
These functions are mostly pointless on UP, but nevertheless the 64-bit UP APIC build already depends on the existence of topology_apply_cmdline_limits_early(), which caused a build bug, resolve it by making them available under CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC, as their prototypes already are. Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
||
Breno Leitao
|
d54e56f31a |
x86/nmi: Fix the inverse "in NMI handler" check
Commit |
||
Paolo Bonzini
|
6890cb1ace |
x86/cpu/intel: Detect TME keyid bits before setting MTRR mask registers
MKTME repurposes the high bit of physical address to key id for encryption key and, even though MAXPHYADDR in CPUID[0x80000008] remains the same, the valid bits in the MTRR mask register are based on the reduced number of physical address bits. detect_tme() in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c detects TME and subtracts it from the total usable physical bits, but it is called too late. Move the call to early_init_intel() so that it is called in setup_arch(), before MTRRs are setup. This fixes boot on TDX-enabled systems, which until now only worked with "disable_mtrr_cleanup". Without the patch, the values written to the MTRRs mask registers were 52-bit wide (e.g. 0x000fffff_80000800) and the writes failed; with the patch, the values are 46-bit wide, which matches the reduced MAXPHYADDR that is shown in /proc/cpuinfo. Reported-by: Zixi Chen <zixchen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240131230902.1867092-3-pbonzini%40redhat.com |
||
Paolo Bonzini
|
9a458198eb |
x86/cpu: Allow reducing x86_phys_bits during early_identify_cpu()
In commit |
||
Thomas Gleixner
|
c147e1ef59 |
x86/apic/msi: Use DOMAIN_BUS_GENERIC_MSI for HPET/IO-APIC domain search
The recent restriction to invoke irqdomain_ops::select() only when the
domain bus token is not DOMAIN_BUS_ANY breaks the search for the parent MSI
domain of HPET and IO-APIC. The latter causes a full boot fail.
The restriction itself makes sense to avoid adding DOMAIN_BUS_ANY matches
into the various ARM specific select() callbacks. Reverting this change
would obviously break ARM platforms again and require DOMAIN_BUS_ANY
matches added to various places.
A simpler solution is to use the DOMAIN_BUS_GENERIC_MSI token for the HPET
and IO-APIC parent domain search. This works out of the box because the
affected parent domains check only for the firmware specification content
and not for the bus token.
Fixes:
|
||
James Morse
|
c0d848fcb0 |
x86/resctrl: Remove lockdep annotation that triggers false positive
get_domain_from_cpu() walks a list of domains to find the one that
contains the specified CPU. This needs to be protected against races
with CPU hotplug when the list is modified. It has recently gained
a lockdep annotation to check this.
The lockdep annotation causes false positives when called via IPI as the
lock is held, but by another process. Remove it.
[ bp: Refresh it ontop of x86/cache. ]
Fixes:
|
||
Kirill A. Shutemov
|
ffc92cf3db |
x86/pat: Simplify the PAT programming protocol
The programming protocol for the PAT MSR follows the MTRR programming protocol. However, this protocol is cumbersome and requires disabling caching (CR0.CD=1), which is not possible on some platforms. Specifically, a TDX guest is not allowed to set CR0.CD. It triggers a #VE exception. It turns out that the requirement to follow the MTRR programming protocol for PAT programming is unnecessarily strict. The new Intel Software Developer Manual (http://www.intel.com/sdm) (December 2023) relaxes this requirement, please refer to the section titled "Programming the PAT" for more information. In short, this section provides an alternative PAT update sequence which doesn't need to disable caches around the PAT update but only to flush those caches and TLBs. The AMD documentation does not link PAT programming to MTRR and is there fore, fine too. The kernel only needs to flush the TLB after updating the PAT MSR. The set_memory code already takes care of flushing the TLB and cache when changing the memory type of a page. [ bp: Expand commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124130650.496056-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com |
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Pawan Gupta
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6613d82e61 |
x86/bugs: Use ALTERNATIVE() instead of mds_user_clear static key
The VERW mitigation at exit-to-user is enabled via a static branch mds_user_clear. This static branch is never toggled after boot, and can be safely replaced with an ALTERNATIVE() which is convenient to use in asm. Switch to ALTERNATIVE() to use the VERW mitigation late in exit-to-user path. Also remove the now redundant VERW in exc_nmi() and arch_exit_to_user_mode(). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240213-delay-verw-v8-4-a6216d83edb7%40linux.intel.com |
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James Morse
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fb700810d3 |
x86/resctrl: Separate arch and fs resctrl locks
resctrl has one mutex that is taken by the architecture-specific code, and the filesystem parts. The two interact via cpuhp, where the architecture code updates the domain list. Filesystem handlers that walk the domains list should not run concurrently with the cpuhp callback modifying the list. Exposing a lock from the filesystem code means the interface is not cleanly defined, and creates the possibility of cross-architecture lock ordering headaches. The interaction only exists so that certain filesystem paths are serialised against CPU hotplug. The CPU hotplug code already has a mechanism to do this using cpus_read_lock(). MPAM's monitors have an overflow interrupt, so it needs to be possible to walk the domains list in irq context. RCU is ideal for this, but some paths need to be able to sleep to allocate memory. Because resctrl_{on,off}line_cpu() take the rdtgroup_mutex as part of a cpuhp callback, cpus_read_lock() must always be taken first. rdtgroup_schemata_write() already does this. Most of the filesystem code's domain list walkers are currently protected by the rdtgroup_mutex taken in rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(). The exceptions are rdt_bit_usage_show() and the mon_config helpers which take the lock directly. Make the domain list protected by RCU. An architecture-specific lock prevents concurrent writers. rdt_bit_usage_show() could walk the domain list using RCU, but to keep all the filesystem operations the same, this is changed to call cpus_read_lock(). The mon_config helpers send multiple IPIs, take the cpus_read_lock() in these cases. The other filesystem list walkers need to be able to sleep. Add cpus_read_lock() to rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() so that the cpuhp callbacks can't be invoked when file system operations are occurring. Add lockdep_assert_cpus_held() in the cases where the rdtgroup_kn_lock_live() call isn't obvious. Resctrl's domain online/offline calls now need to take the rdtgroup_mutex themselves. [ bp: Fold in a build fix: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87zfvwieli.ffs@tglx ] Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-25-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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eeff1d4f11 |
x86/resctrl: Move domain helper migration into resctrl_offline_cpu()
When a CPU is taken offline the resctrl filesystem code needs to check if it was the CPU nominated to perform the periodic overflow and limbo work. If so, another CPU needs to be chosen to do this work. This is currently done in core.c, mixed in with the code that removes the CPU from the domain's mask, and potentially free()s the domain. Move the migration of the overflow and limbo helpers into the filesystem code, into resctrl_offline_cpu(). As resctrl_offline_cpu() runs before the architecture code has removed the CPU from the domain mask, the callers need to be told which CPU is being removed, to avoid picking it as the new CPU. This uses the exclude_cpu feature previously added. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-24-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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258c91e84f |
x86/resctrl: Add CPU offline callback for resctrl work
The resctrl architecture specific code may need to free a domain when a CPU goes offline, it also needs to reset the CPUs PQR_ASSOC register. Amongst other things, the resctrl filesystem code needs to clear this CPU from the cpu_mask of any control and monitor groups. Currently, this is all done in core.c and called from resctrl_offline_cpu(), making the split between architecture and filesystem code unclear. Move the filesystem work to remove the CPU from the control and monitor groups into a filesystem helper called resctrl_offline_cpu(), and rename the one in core.c resctrl_arch_offline_cpu(). Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-23-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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978fcca954 |
x86/resctrl: Allow overflow/limbo handlers to be scheduled on any-but CPU
When a CPU is taken offline resctrl may need to move the overflow or limbo handlers to run on a different CPU. Once the offline callbacks have been split, cqm_setup_limbo_handler() will be called while the CPU that is going offline is still present in the CPU mask. Pass the CPU to exclude to cqm_setup_limbo_handler() and mbm_setup_overflow_handler(). These functions can use a variant of cpumask_any_but() when selecting the CPU. -1 is used to indicate no CPUs need excluding. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-22-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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1b3e50ce7f |
x86/resctrl: Add CPU online callback for resctrl work
The resctrl architecture specific code may need to create a domain when a CPU comes online, it also needs to reset the CPUs PQR_ASSOC register. The resctrl filesystem code needs to update the rdtgroup_default CPU mask when CPUs are brought online. Currently, this is all done in one function, resctrl_online_cpu(). It will need to be split into architecture and filesystem parts before resctrl can be moved to /fs/. Pull the rdtgroup_default update work out as a filesystem specific cpu_online helper. resctrl_online_cpu() is the obvious name for this, which means the version in core.c needs renaming. resctrl_online_cpu() is called by the arch code once it has done the work to add the new CPU to any domains. In future patches, resctrl_online_cpu() will take the rdtgroup_mutex itself. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-21-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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30017b6070 |
x86/resctrl: Add helpers for system wide mon/alloc capable
resctrl reads rdt_alloc_capable or rdt_mon_capable to determine whether any of the resources support the corresponding features. resctrl also uses the static keys that affect the architecture's context-switch code to determine the same thing. This forces another architecture to have the same static keys. As the static key is enabled based on the capable flag, and none of the filesystem uses of these are in the scheduler path, move the capable flags behind helpers, and use these in the filesystem code instead of the static key. After this change, only the architecture code manages and uses the static keys to ensure __resctrl_sched_in() does not need runtime checks. This avoids multiple architectures having to define the same static keys. Cases where the static key implicitly tested if the resctrl filesystem was mounted all have an explicit check now. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-20-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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0a2f4d9b54 |
x86/resctrl: Make rdt_enable_key the arch's decision to switch
rdt_enable_key is switched when resctrl is mounted. It was also previously used to prevent a second mount of the filesystem. Any other architecture that wants to support resctrl has to provide identical static keys. Now that there are helpers for enabling and disabling the alloc/mon keys, resctrl doesn't need to switch this extra key, it can be done by the arch code. Use the static-key increment and decrement helpers, and change resctrl to ensure the calls are balanced. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-19-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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5db6a4a75c |
x86/resctrl: Move alloc/mon static keys into helpers
resctrl enables three static keys depending on the features it has enabled. Another architecture's context switch code may look different, any static keys that control it should be buried behind helpers. Move the alloc/mon logic into arch-specific helpers as a preparatory step for making the rdt_enable_key's status something the arch code decides. This means other architectures don't have to mirror the static keys. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-18-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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13e5769deb |
x86/resctrl: Make resctrl_mounted checks explicit
The rdt_enable_key is switched when resctrl is mounted, and used to prevent a second mount of the filesystem. It also enables the architecture's context switch code. This requires another architecture to have the same set of static keys, as resctrl depends on them too. The existing users of these static keys are implicitly also checking if the filesystem is mounted. Make the resctrl_mounted checks explicit: resctrl can keep track of whether it has been mounted once. This doesn't need to be combined with whether the arch code is context switching the CLOSID. rdt_mon_enable_key is never used just to test that resctrl is mounted, but does also have this implication. Add a resctrl_mounted to all uses of rdt_mon_enable_key. This will allow the static key changing to be moved behind resctrl_arch_ calls. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-17-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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e557999f80 |
x86/resctrl: Allow arch to allocate memory needed in resctrl_arch_rmid_read()
Depending on the number of monitors available, Arm's MPAM may need to allocate a monitor prior to reading the counter value. Allocating a contended resource may involve sleeping. __check_limbo() and mon_event_count() each make multiple calls to resctrl_arch_rmid_read(), to avoid extra work on contended systems, the allocation should be valid for multiple invocations of resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). The memory or hardware allocated is not specific to a domain. Add arch hooks for this allocation, which need calling before resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). The allocated monitor is passed to resctrl_arch_rmid_read(), then freed again afterwards. The helper can be called on any CPU, and can sleep. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-16-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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6fde1424f2 |
x86/resctrl: Allow resctrl_arch_rmid_read() to sleep
MPAM's cache occupancy counters can take a little while to settle once the monitor has been configured. The maximum settling time is described to the driver via a firmware table. The value could be large enough that it makes sense to sleep. To avoid exposing this to resctrl, it should be hidden behind MPAM's resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). resctrl_arch_rmid_read() may be called via IPI meaning it is unable to sleep. In this case, it should return an error if it needs to sleep. This will only affect MPAM platforms where the cache occupancy counter isn't available immediately, nohz_full is in use, and there are no housekeeping CPUs in the necessary domain. There are three callers of resctrl_arch_rmid_read(): __mon_event_count() and __check_limbo() are both called from a non-migrateable context. mon_event_read() invokes __mon_event_count() using smp_call_on_cpu(), which adds work to the target CPUs workqueue. rdtgroup_mutex() is held, meaning this cannot race with the resctrl cpuhp callback. __check_limbo() is invoked via schedule_delayed_work_on() also adds work to a per-cpu workqueue. The remaining call is add_rmid_to_limbo() which is called in response to a user-space syscall that frees an RMID. This opportunistically reads the LLC occupancy counter on the current domain to see if the RMID is over the dirty threshold. This has to disable preemption to avoid reading the wrong domain's value. Disabling preemption here prevents resctrl_arch_rmid_read() from sleeping. add_rmid_to_limbo() walks each domain, but only reads the counter on one domain. If the system has more than one domain, the RMID will always be added to the limbo list. If the RMIDs usage was not over the threshold, it will be removed from the list when __check_limbo() runs. Make this the default behaviour. Free RMIDs are always added to the limbo list for each domain. The user visible effect of this is that a clean RMID is not available for re-allocation immediately after 'rmdir()' completes. This behaviour was never portable as it never happened on a machine with multiple domains. Removing this path allows resctrl_arch_rmid_read() to sleep if its called with interrupts unmasked. Document this is the expected behaviour, and add a might_sleep() annotation to catch changes that won't work on arm64. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-15-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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09909e0981 |
x86/resctrl: Queue mon_event_read() instead of sending an IPI
Intel is blessed with an abundance of monitors, one per RMID, that can be read from any CPU in the domain. MPAMs monitors reside in the MMIO MSC, the number implemented is up to the manufacturer. This means when there are fewer monitors than needed, they need to be allocated and freed. MPAM's CSU monitors are used to back the 'llc_occupancy' monitor file. The CSU counter is allowed to return 'not ready' for a small number of micro-seconds after programming. To allow one CSU hardware monitor to be used for multiple control or monitor groups, the CPU accessing the monitor needs to be able to block when configuring and reading the counter. Worse, the domain may be broken up into slices, and the MMIO accesses for each slice may need performing from different CPUs. These two details mean MPAMs monitor code needs to be able to sleep, and IPI another CPU in the domain to read from a resource that has been sliced. mon_event_read() already invokes mon_event_count() via IPI, which means this isn't possible. On systems using nohz-full, some CPUs need to be interrupted to run kernel work as they otherwise stay in user-space running realtime workloads. Interrupting these CPUs should be avoided, and scheduling work on them may never complete. Change mon_event_read() to pick a housekeeping CPU, (one that is not using nohz_full) and schedule mon_event_count() and wait. If all the CPUs in a domain are using nohz-full, then an IPI is used as the fallback. This function is only used in response to a user-space filesystem request (not the timing sensitive overflow code). This allows MPAM to hide the slice behaviour from resctrl, and to keep the monitor-allocation in monitor.c. When the IPI fallback is used on machines where MPAM needs to make an access on multiple CPUs, the counter read will always fail. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-14-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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a4846aaf39 |
x86/resctrl: Add cpumask_any_housekeeping() for limbo/overflow
The limbo and overflow code picks a CPU to use from the domain's list of online CPUs. Work is then scheduled on these CPUs to maintain the limbo list and any counters that may overflow. cpumask_any() may pick a CPU that is marked nohz_full, which will either penalise the work that CPU was dedicated to, or delay the processing of limbo list or counters that may overflow. Perhaps indefinitely. Delaying the overflow handling will skew the bandwidth values calculated by mba_sc, which expects to be called once a second. Add cpumask_any_housekeeping() as a replacement for cpumask_any() that prefers housekeeping CPUs. This helper will still return a nohz_full CPU if that is the only option. The CPU to use is re-evaluated each time the limbo/overflow work runs. This ensures the work will move off a nohz_full CPU once a housekeeping CPU is available. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-13-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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6eca639d83 |
x86/resctrl: Move CLOSID/RMID matching and setting to use helpers
When switching tasks, the CLOSID and RMID that the new task should use are stored in struct task_struct. For x86 the CLOSID known by resctrl, the value in task_struct, and the value written to the CPU register are all the same thing. MPAM's CPU interface has two different PARTIDs - one for data accesses the other for instruction fetch. Storing resctrl's CLOSID value in struct task_struct implies the arch code knows whether resctrl is using CDP. Move the matching and setting of the struct task_struct properties to use helpers. This allows arm64 to store the hardware format of the register, instead of having to convert it each time. __rdtgroup_move_task()s use of READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() ensures torn values aren't seen as another CPU may schedule the task being moved while the value is being changed. MPAM has an additional corner-case here as the PMG bits extend the PARTID space. If the scheduler sees a new-CLOSID but old-RMID, the task will dirty an RMID that the limbo code is not watching causing an inaccurate count. x86's RMID are independent values, so the limbo code will still be watching the old-RMID in this circumstance. To avoid this, arm64 needs both the CLOSID/RMID WRITE_ONCE()d together. Both values must be provided together. Because MPAM's RMID values are not unique, the CLOSID must be provided when matching the RMID. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-12-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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6eac36bb9e |
x86/resctrl: Allocate the cleanest CLOSID by searching closid_num_dirty_rmid
MPAM's PMG bits extend its PARTID space, meaning the same PMG value can be used for different control groups. This means once a CLOSID is allocated, all its monitoring ids may still be dirty, and held in limbo. Instead of allocating the first free CLOSID, on architectures where CONFIG_RESCTRL_RMID_DEPENDS_ON_CLOSID is enabled, search closid_num_dirty_rmid[] to find the cleanest CLOSID. The CLOSID found is returned to closid_alloc() for the free list to be updated. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-11-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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5d920b6881 |
x86/resctrl: Use __set_bit()/__clear_bit() instead of open coding
The resctrl CLOSID allocator uses a single 32bit word to track which CLOSID are free. The setting and clearing of bits is open coded. Convert the existing open coded bit manipulations of closid_free_map to use __set_bit() and friends. These don't need to be atomic as this list is protected by the mutex. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-10-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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b30a55df60 |
x86/resctrl: Track the number of dirty RMID a CLOSID has
MPAM's PMG bits extend its PARTID space, meaning the same PMG value can be used for different control groups. This means once a CLOSID is allocated, all its monitoring ids may still be dirty, and held in limbo. Keep track of the number of RMID held in limbo each CLOSID has. This will allow a future helper to find the 'cleanest' CLOSID when allocating. The array is only needed when CONFIG_RESCTRL_RMID_DEPENDS_ON_CLOSID is defined. This will never be the case on x86. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-9-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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c4c0376eef |
x86/resctrl: Allow RMID allocation to be scoped by CLOSID
MPAMs RMID values are not unique unless the CLOSID is considered as well. alloc_rmid() expects the RMID to be an independent number. Pass the CLOSID in to alloc_rmid(). Use this to compare indexes when allocating. If the CLOSID is not relevant to the index, this ends up comparing the free RMID with itself, and the first free entry will be used. With MPAM the CLOSID is included in the index, so this becomes a walk of the free RMID entries, until one that matches the supplied CLOSID is found. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-8-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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6791e0ea30 |
x86/resctrl: Access per-rmid structures by index
x86 systems identify traffic using the CLOSID and RMID. The CLOSID is used to lookup the control policy, the RMID is used for monitoring. For x86 these are independent numbers. Arm's MPAM has equivalent features PARTID and PMG, where the PARTID is used to lookup the control policy. The PMG in contrast is a small number of bits that are used to subdivide PARTID when monitoring. The cache-occupancy monitors require the PARTID to be specified when monitoring. This means MPAM's PMG field is not unique. There are multiple PMG-0, one per allocated CLOSID/PARTID. If PMG is treated as equivalent to RMID, it cannot be allocated as an independent number. Bitmaps like rmid_busy_llc need to be sized by the number of unique entries for this resource. Treat the combined CLOSID and RMID as an index, and provide architecture helpers to pack and unpack an index. This makes the MPAM values unique. The domain's rmid_busy_llc and rmid_ptrs[] are then sized by index, as are domain mbm_local[] and mbm_total[]. x86 can ignore the CLOSID field when packing and unpacking an index, and report as many indexes as RMID. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-7-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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40fc735b78 |
x86/resctrl: Track the closid with the rmid
x86's RMID are independent of the CLOSID. An RMID can be allocated, used and freed without considering the CLOSID. MPAM's equivalent feature is PMG, which is not an independent number, it extends the CLOSID/PARTID space. For MPAM, only PMG-bits worth of 'RMID' can be allocated for a single CLOSID. i.e. if there is 1 bit of PMG space, then each CLOSID can have two monitor groups. To allow resctrl to disambiguate RMID values for different CLOSID, everything in resctrl that keeps an RMID value needs to know the CLOSID too. This will always be ignored on x86. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-6-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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311639e951 |
x86/resctrl: Move RMID allocation out of mkdir_rdt_prepare()
RMIDs are allocated for each monitor or control group directory, because each of these needs its own RMID. For control groups, rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon() later goes on to allocate the CLOSID. MPAM's equivalent of RMID is not an independent number, so can't be allocated until the CLOSID is known. An RMID allocation for one CLOSID may fail, whereas another may succeed depending on how many monitor groups a control group has. The RMID allocation needs to move to be after the CLOSID has been allocated. Move the RMID allocation out of mkdir_rdt_prepare() to occur in its caller, after the mkdir_rdt_prepare() call. This allows the RMID allocator to know the CLOSID. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-5-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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b1de313979 |
x86/resctrl: Create helper for RMID allocation and mondata dir creation
When monitoring is supported, each monitor and control group is allocated an RMID. For control groups, rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon() later goes on to allocate the CLOSID. MPAM's equivalent of RMID are not an independent number, so can't be allocated until the CLOSID is known. An RMID allocation for one CLOSID may fail, whereas another may succeed depending on how many monitor groups a control group has. The RMID allocation needs to move to be after the CLOSID has been allocated. Move the RMID allocation and mondata dir creation to a helper. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Peter Newman <peternewman@google.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-4-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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James Morse
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3f7b07380d |
x86/resctrl: Free rmid_ptrs from resctrl_exit()
rmid_ptrs[] is allocated from dom_data_init() but never free()d. While the exit text ends up in the linker script's DISCARD section, the direction of travel is for resctrl to be/have loadable modules. Add resctrl_put_mon_l3_config() to cleanup any memory allocated by rdt_get_mon_l3_config(). There is no reason to backport this to a stable kernel. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Tested-by: Carl Worth <carl@os.amperecomputing.com> # arm64 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213184438.16675-3-james.morse@arm.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> |
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Thomas Gleixner
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89b0f15f40 |
x86/cpu/topology: Get rid of cpuinfo::x86_max_cores
Now that __num_cores_per_package and __num_threads_per_package are available, cpuinfo::x86_max_cores and the related math all over the place can be replaced with the ready to consume data. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213210253.176147806@linutronix.de |
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Borislav Petkov (AMD)
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03ceaf678d |
x86/CPU/AMD: Do the common init on future Zens too
There's no need to enable the common Zen init stuff for each new family - just do it by default on everything >= 0x17 family. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240201161024.30839-1-bp@alien8.de |
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Thomas Gleixner
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fd43b8ae76 |
x86/cpu/topology: Provide __num_[cores|threads]_per_package
Expose properly accounted information and accessors so the fiddling with other topology variables can be replaced. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Tested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240213210253.120958987@linutronix.de |