License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
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/*
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* guest access functions
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*
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* Copyright IBM Corp. 2014
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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2017-02-03 23:16:44 +00:00
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#include <linux/mm_types.h>
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2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
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#include <linux/err.h>
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2020-06-09 04:32:38 +00:00
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#include <linux/pgtable.h>
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2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
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#include <linux/bitfield.h>
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2024-02-05 20:32:12 +00:00
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#include <asm/access-regs.h>
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2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
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#include <asm/fault.h>
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2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
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#include <asm/gmap.h>
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2024-07-03 15:59:00 +00:00
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#include <asm/dat-bits.h>
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2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
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#include "kvm-s390.h"
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#include "gaccess.h"
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/*
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* vaddress union in order to easily decode a virtual address into its
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* region first index, region second index etc. parts.
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*/
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union vaddress {
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unsigned long addr;
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struct {
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unsigned long rfx : 11;
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unsigned long rsx : 11;
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unsigned long rtx : 11;
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unsigned long sx : 11;
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unsigned long px : 8;
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unsigned long bx : 12;
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};
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struct {
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unsigned long rfx01 : 2;
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unsigned long : 9;
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unsigned long rsx01 : 2;
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unsigned long : 9;
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unsigned long rtx01 : 2;
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unsigned long : 9;
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unsigned long sx01 : 2;
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unsigned long : 29;
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};
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};
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/*
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* raddress union which will contain the result (real or absolute address)
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* after a page table walk. The rfaa, sfaa and pfra members are used to
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* simply assign them the value of a region, segment or page table entry.
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*/
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union raddress {
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unsigned long addr;
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unsigned long rfaa : 33; /* Region-Frame Absolute Address */
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unsigned long sfaa : 44; /* Segment-Frame Absolute Address */
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unsigned long pfra : 52; /* Page-Frame Real Address */
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};
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2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
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union alet {
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u32 val;
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struct {
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u32 reserved : 7;
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u32 p : 1;
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u32 alesn : 8;
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u32 alen : 16;
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};
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};
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union ald {
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u32 val;
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struct {
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u32 : 1;
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u32 alo : 24;
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u32 all : 7;
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};
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};
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struct ale {
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unsigned long i : 1; /* ALEN-Invalid Bit */
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unsigned long : 5;
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unsigned long fo : 1; /* Fetch-Only Bit */
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unsigned long p : 1; /* Private Bit */
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unsigned long alesn : 8; /* Access-List-Entry Sequence Number */
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unsigned long aleax : 16; /* Access-List-Entry Authorization Index */
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unsigned long : 32;
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unsigned long : 1;
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unsigned long asteo : 25; /* ASN-Second-Table-Entry Origin */
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unsigned long : 6;
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unsigned long astesn : 32; /* ASTE Sequence Number */
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2017-06-21 14:49:15 +00:00
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};
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2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
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struct aste {
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unsigned long i : 1; /* ASX-Invalid Bit */
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unsigned long ato : 29; /* Authority-Table Origin */
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unsigned long : 1;
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unsigned long b : 1; /* Base-Space Bit */
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unsigned long ax : 16; /* Authorization Index */
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unsigned long atl : 12; /* Authority-Table Length */
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unsigned long : 2;
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unsigned long ca : 1; /* Controlled-ASN Bit */
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unsigned long ra : 1; /* Reusable-ASN Bit */
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unsigned long asce : 64; /* Address-Space-Control Element */
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unsigned long ald : 32;
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unsigned long astesn : 32;
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/* .. more fields there */
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2017-06-21 14:49:15 +00:00
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};
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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int ipte_lock_held(struct kvm *kvm)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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{
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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if (sclp.has_siif) {
|
2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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int rc;
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_lock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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rc = kvm_s390_get_ipte_control(kvm)->kh != 0;
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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return rc;
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}
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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return kvm->arch.ipte_lock_count != 0;
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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}
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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static void ipte_lock_simple(struct kvm *kvm)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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{
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union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.ipte_mutex);
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kvm->arch.ipte_lock_count++;
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if (kvm->arch.ipte_lock_count > 1)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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goto out;
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2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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retry:
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_lock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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ic = kvm_s390_get_ipte_control(kvm);
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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do {
|
2014-11-25 12:17:34 +00:00
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old = READ_ONCE(*ic);
|
2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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if (old.k) {
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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cond_resched();
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2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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goto retry;
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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}
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new = old;
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new.k = 1;
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} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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out:
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.ipte_mutex);
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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}
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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static void ipte_unlock_simple(struct kvm *kvm)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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{
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union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.ipte_mutex);
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kvm->arch.ipte_lock_count--;
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if (kvm->arch.ipte_lock_count)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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goto out;
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_lock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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ic = kvm_s390_get_ipte_control(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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do {
|
2014-11-25 12:17:34 +00:00
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old = READ_ONCE(*ic);
|
KVM: s390: Fix ipte locking
ipte_unlock_siif uses cmpxchg to replace the in-memory data of the ipte
lock together with ACCESS_ONCE for the intial read.
union ipte_control {
unsigned long val;
struct {
unsigned long k : 1;
unsigned long kh : 31;
unsigned long kg : 32;
};
};
[...]
static void ipte_unlock_siif(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
ic = &vcpu->kvm->arch.sca->ipte_control;
do {
new = old = ACCESS_ONCE(*ic);
new.kh--;
if (!new.kh)
new.k = 0;
} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
if (!new.kh)
wake_up(&vcpu->kvm->arch.ipte_wq);
}
The new value, is loaded twice from memory with gcc 4.7.2 of
fedora 18, despite the ACCESS_ONCE:
--->
l %r4,0(%r3) <--- load first 32 bit of lock (k and kh) in r4
alfi %r4,2147483647 <--- add -1 to r4
llgtr %r4,%r4 <--- zero out the sign bit of r4
lg %r1,0(%r3) <--- load all 64 bit of lock into new
lgr %r2,%r1 <--- load the same into old
risbg %r1,%r4,1,31,32 <--- shift and insert r4 into the bits 1-31 of
new
llihf %r4,2147483647
ngrk %r4,%r1,%r4
jne aa0 <ipte_unlock+0xf8>
nihh %r1,32767
lgr %r4,%r2
csg %r4,%r1,0(%r3)
cgr %r2,%r4
jne a70 <ipte_unlock+0xc8>
If the memory value changes between the first load (l) and the second
load (lg) we are broken. If that happens VCPU threads will hang
(unkillable) in handle_ipte_interlock.
Andreas Krebbel analyzed this and tracked it down to a compiler bug in
that version:
"while it is not that obvious the C99 standard basically forbids
duplicating the memory access also in that case. For an argumentation of
a similiar case please see:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=22278#c43
For the implementation-defined cases regarding volatile there are some
GCC-specific clarifications which can be found here:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Volatiles.html#Volatiles
I've tracked down the problem with a reduced testcase. The problem was
that during a tree level optimization (SRA - scalar replacement of
aggregates) the volatile marker is lost. And an RTL level optimizer (CSE
- common subexpression elimination) then propagated the memory read into
its second use introducing another access to the memory location. So
indeed Christian's suspicion that the union access has something to do
with it is correct (since it triggered the SRA optimization).
This issue has been reported and fixed in the GCC 4.8 development cycle:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145"
This patch replaces the ACCESS_ONCE scheme with a barrier() based scheme
that should work for all supported compilers.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
2014-11-04 07:31:16 +00:00
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new = old;
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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new.k = 0;
|
|
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} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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wake_up(&kvm->arch.ipte_wq);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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out:
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2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.ipte_mutex);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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}
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|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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static void ipte_lock_siif(struct kvm *kvm)
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2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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{
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union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
|
|
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|
2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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retry:
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
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read_lock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
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ic = kvm_s390_get_ipte_control(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
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do {
|
2014-11-25 12:17:34 +00:00
|
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old = READ_ONCE(*ic);
|
2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
|
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if (old.kg) {
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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cond_resched();
|
2015-04-22 16:08:39 +00:00
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goto retry;
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
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}
|
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new = old;
|
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new.k = 1;
|
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new.kh++;
|
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} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
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read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ipte_unlock_siif(struct kvm *kvm)
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
read_lock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
ic = kvm_s390_get_ipte_control(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
2014-11-25 12:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
old = READ_ONCE(*ic);
|
KVM: s390: Fix ipte locking
ipte_unlock_siif uses cmpxchg to replace the in-memory data of the ipte
lock together with ACCESS_ONCE for the intial read.
union ipte_control {
unsigned long val;
struct {
unsigned long k : 1;
unsigned long kh : 31;
unsigned long kg : 32;
};
};
[...]
static void ipte_unlock_siif(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
union ipte_control old, new, *ic;
ic = &vcpu->kvm->arch.sca->ipte_control;
do {
new = old = ACCESS_ONCE(*ic);
new.kh--;
if (!new.kh)
new.k = 0;
} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
if (!new.kh)
wake_up(&vcpu->kvm->arch.ipte_wq);
}
The new value, is loaded twice from memory with gcc 4.7.2 of
fedora 18, despite the ACCESS_ONCE:
--->
l %r4,0(%r3) <--- load first 32 bit of lock (k and kh) in r4
alfi %r4,2147483647 <--- add -1 to r4
llgtr %r4,%r4 <--- zero out the sign bit of r4
lg %r1,0(%r3) <--- load all 64 bit of lock into new
lgr %r2,%r1 <--- load the same into old
risbg %r1,%r4,1,31,32 <--- shift and insert r4 into the bits 1-31 of
new
llihf %r4,2147483647
ngrk %r4,%r1,%r4
jne aa0 <ipte_unlock+0xf8>
nihh %r1,32767
lgr %r4,%r2
csg %r4,%r1,0(%r3)
cgr %r2,%r4
jne a70 <ipte_unlock+0xc8>
If the memory value changes between the first load (l) and the second
load (lg) we are broken. If that happens VCPU threads will hang
(unkillable) in handle_ipte_interlock.
Andreas Krebbel analyzed this and tracked it down to a compiler bug in
that version:
"while it is not that obvious the C99 standard basically forbids
duplicating the memory access also in that case. For an argumentation of
a similiar case please see:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=22278#c43
For the implementation-defined cases regarding volatile there are some
GCC-specific clarifications which can be found here:
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Volatiles.html#Volatiles
I've tracked down the problem with a reduced testcase. The problem was
that during a tree level optimization (SRA - scalar replacement of
aggregates) the volatile marker is lost. And an RTL level optimizer (CSE
- common subexpression elimination) then propagated the memory read into
its second use introducing another access to the memory location. So
indeed Christian's suspicion that the union access has something to do
with it is correct (since it triggered the SRA optimization).
This issue has been reported and fixed in the GCC 4.8 development cycle:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145"
This patch replaces the ACCESS_ONCE scheme with a barrier() based scheme
that should work for all supported compilers.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.16+
2014-11-04 07:31:16 +00:00
|
|
|
new = old;
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
new.kh--;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new.kh)
|
|
|
|
|
new.k = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
} while (cmpxchg(&ic->val, old.val, new.val) != old.val);
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
read_unlock(&kvm->arch.sca_lock);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!new.kh)
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up(&kvm->arch.ipte_wq);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
void ipte_lock(struct kvm *kvm)
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sclp.has_siif)
|
|
|
|
|
ipte_lock_siif(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_lock_simple(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
void ipte_unlock(struct kvm *kvm)
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sclp.has_siif)
|
|
|
|
|
ipte_unlock_siif(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_unlock_simple(kvm);
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-09 11:44:40 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ar_translation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union asce *asce, u8 ar,
|
2015-11-16 14:42:11 +00:00
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode)
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union alet alet;
|
|
|
|
|
struct ale ale;
|
|
|
|
|
struct aste aste;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ald_addr, authority_table_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
union ald ald;
|
|
|
|
|
int eax, rc;
|
|
|
|
|
u8 authority_table;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ar >= NUM_ACRS)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-20 21:12:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vcpu->arch.acrs_loaded)
|
|
|
|
|
save_access_regs(vcpu->run->s.regs.acrs);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
alet.val = vcpu->run->s.regs.acrs[ar];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ar == 0 || alet.val == 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
asce->val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[1];
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
} else if (alet.val == 1) {
|
|
|
|
|
asce->val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[7];
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alet.reserved)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ALET_SPECIFICATION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alet.p)
|
|
|
|
|
ald_addr = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[5];
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
ald_addr = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[2];
|
|
|
|
|
ald_addr &= 0x7fffffc0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = read_guest_real(vcpu, ald_addr + 16, &ald.val, sizeof(union ald));
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (alet.alen / 8 > ald.all)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ALEN_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0x7fffffff - ald.alo * 128 < alet.alen * 16)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = read_guest_real(vcpu, ald.alo * 128 + alet.alen * 16, &ale,
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct ale));
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ale.i == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ALEN_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ale.alesn != alet.alesn)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ALE_SEQUENCE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = read_guest_real(vcpu, ale.asteo * 64, &aste, sizeof(struct aste));
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (aste.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASTE_VALIDITY;
|
|
|
|
|
if (aste.astesn != ale.astesn)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASTE_SEQUENCE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ale.p == 1) {
|
|
|
|
|
eax = (vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[8] >> 16) & 0xffff;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ale.aleax != eax) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (eax / 16 > aste.atl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_EXTENDED_AUTHORITY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
authority_table_addr = aste.ato * 4 + eax / 4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = read_guest_real(vcpu, authority_table_addr,
|
|
|
|
|
&authority_table,
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(u8));
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((authority_table & (0x40 >> ((eax & 3) * 2))) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_EXTENDED_AUTHORITY;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-16 14:42:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ale.fo == 1 && mode == GACC_STORE)
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
asce->val = aste.asce;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
enum prot_type {
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_LA = 0,
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_KEYC = 1,
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_ALC = 2,
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_DAT = 3,
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_IEP = 4,
|
2022-08-25 19:25:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Dummy value for passing an initialized value when code != PGM_PROTECTION */
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_NONE,
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static int trans_exc_ending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int code, unsigned long gva, u8 ar,
|
|
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, enum prot_type prot, bool terminate)
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_s390_pgm_info *pgm = &vcpu->arch.pgm;
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
union teid *teid;
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(pgm, 0, sizeof(*pgm));
|
|
|
|
|
pgm->code = code;
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid = (union teid *)&pgm->trans_exc_code;
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (code) {
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case PGM_PROTECTION:
|
|
|
|
|
switch (prot) {
|
2022-08-25 19:25:40 +00:00
|
|
|
case PROT_NONE:
|
|
|
|
|
/* We should never get here, acts like termination */
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
case PROT_TYPE_IEP:
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b61 = 1;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-12-15 14:58:14 +00:00
|
|
|
case PROT_TYPE_LA:
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b56 = 1;
|
2016-12-15 14:58:14 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PROT_TYPE_KEYC:
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b60 = 1;
|
2016-12-15 14:58:14 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case PROT_TYPE_ALC:
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b60 = 1;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
case PROT_TYPE_DAT:
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b61 = 1;
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (terminate) {
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->b56 = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
teid->b60 = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
teid->b61 = 0;
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
case PGM_ASCE_TYPE:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_PAGE_TRANSLATION:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION:
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* op_access_id only applies to MOVE_PAGE -> set bit 61
|
|
|
|
|
* exc_access_id has to be set to 0 for some instructions. Both
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
* cases have to be handled by the caller.
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2023-10-12 07:40:42 +00:00
|
|
|
teid->addr = gva >> PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
|
teid->fsi = mode == GACC_STORE ? TEID_FSI_STORE : TEID_FSI_FETCH;
|
|
|
|
|
teid->as = psw_bits(vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw).as;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
case PGM_ALEN_TRANSLATION:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_ALE_SEQUENCE:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_ASTE_VALIDITY:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_ASTE_SEQUENCE:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_EXTENDED_AUTHORITY:
|
2016-07-29 09:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* We can always store exc_access_id, as it is
|
|
|
|
|
* undefined for non-ar cases. It is undefined for
|
|
|
|
|
* most DAT protection exceptions.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-05-31 17:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
pgm->exc_access_id = ar;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return code;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static int trans_exc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int code, unsigned long gva, u8 ar,
|
|
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, enum prot_type prot)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return trans_exc_ending(vcpu, code, gva, ar, mode, prot, false);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
static int get_vcpu_asce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union asce *asce,
|
2016-12-09 11:44:40 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long ga, u8 ar, enum gacc_mode mode)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2015-11-16 14:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
struct psw_bits psw = psw_bits(vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-06-03 08:56:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!psw.dat) {
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
asce->val = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
asce->r = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-03 08:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mode == GACC_IFETCH) && (psw.as != PSW_BITS_AS_HOME))
|
|
|
|
|
psw.as = PSW_BITS_AS_PRIMARY;
|
2015-11-16 14:48:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (psw.as) {
|
2017-06-03 08:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
case PSW_BITS_AS_PRIMARY:
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
asce->val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[1];
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-03 08:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
case PSW_BITS_AS_SECONDARY:
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
asce->val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[7];
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-03 08:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
case PSW_BITS_AS_HOME:
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
asce->val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[13];
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-03 08:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
case PSW_BITS_AS_ACCREG:
|
2015-11-16 14:42:11 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = ar_translation(vcpu, asce, ar, mode);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc > 0)
|
2016-05-31 18:21:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return trans_exc(vcpu, rc, ga, ar, mode, PROT_TYPE_ALC);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int deref_table(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, unsigned long *val)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, val, sizeof(*val));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* guest_translate - translate a guest virtual into a guest absolute address
|
|
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
|
|
|
|
* @gva: guest virtual address
|
|
|
|
|
* @gpa: points to where guest physical (absolute) address should be stored
|
2015-01-22 09:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* @asce: effective asce
|
2015-11-16 14:42:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* @mode: indicates the access mode to be used
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* @prot: returns the type for protection exceptions
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Translate a guest virtual address into a guest absolute address by means
|
2015-02-26 22:16:44 +00:00
|
|
|
* of dynamic address translation as specified by the architecture.
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the resulting absolute address is not available in the configuration
|
|
|
|
|
* an addressing exception is indicated and @gpa will not be changed.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Returns: - zero on success; @gpa contains the resulting absolute address
|
|
|
|
|
* - a negative value if guest access failed due to e.g. broken
|
|
|
|
|
* guest mapping
|
2023-06-28 14:23:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* - a positive value if an access exception happened. In this case
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* the returned value is the program interruption code as defined
|
|
|
|
|
* by the architecture
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long guest_translate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva,
|
2015-01-22 09:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *gpa, const union asce asce,
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, enum prot_type *prot)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union vaddress vaddr = {.addr = gva};
|
|
|
|
|
union raddress raddr = {.addr = gva};
|
|
|
|
|
union page_table_entry pte;
|
|
|
|
|
int dat_protection = 0;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int iep_protection = 0;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
union ctlreg0 ctlreg0;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ptr;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int edat1, edat2, iep;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctlreg0.val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0];
|
2015-02-02 14:42:51 +00:00
|
|
|
edat1 = ctlreg0.edat && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 8);
|
|
|
|
|
edat2 = edat1 && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 78);
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
iep = ctlreg0.iep && test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 130);
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (asce.r)
|
|
|
|
|
goto real_address;
|
2024-07-03 15:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = asce.rsto * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (asce.dt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION1:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rfx * 8;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rsx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rsx * 8;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx || vaddr.rsx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rtx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rtx * 8;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx || vaddr.rsx || vaddr.rtx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.sx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.sx * 8;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
switch (asce.dt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION1: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region1_table_entry rfte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rfte.val))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rfte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rfte.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION1)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rsx01 < rfte.tf || vaddr.rsx01 > rfte.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (edat1)
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= rfte.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rfte.rto * PAGE_SIZE + vaddr.rsx * 8;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region2_table_entry rste;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rste.val))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rste.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rste.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION2)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rtx01 < rste.tf || vaddr.rtx01 > rste.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (edat1)
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= rste.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rste.rto * PAGE_SIZE + vaddr.rtx * 8;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region3_table_entry rtte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &rtte.val))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION3)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.cr && asce.p && edat2)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.fc && edat2) {
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= rtte.fc1.p;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
iep_protection = rtte.fc1.iep;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raddr.rfaa = rtte.fc1.rfaa;
|
|
|
|
|
goto absolute_address;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.sx01 < rtte.fc0.tf)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.sx01 > rtte.fc0.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (edat1)
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= rtte.fc0.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rtte.fc0.sto * PAGE_SIZE + vaddr.sx * 8;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT: {
|
|
|
|
|
union segment_table_entry ste;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &ste.val))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.tt != TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.cs && asce.p)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.fc && edat1) {
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= ste.fc1.p;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
iep_protection = ste.fc1.iep;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raddr.sfaa = ste.fc1.sfaa;
|
|
|
|
|
goto absolute_address;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= ste.fc0.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = ste.fc0.pto * (PAGE_SIZE / 2) + vaddr.px * 8;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, ptr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
if (deref_table(vcpu->kvm, ptr, &pte.val))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_PAGE_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pte.z)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
dat_protection |= pte.p;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
iep_protection = pte.iep;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raddr.pfra = pte.pfra;
|
|
|
|
|
real_address:
|
|
|
|
|
raddr.addr = kvm_s390_real_to_abs(vcpu, raddr.addr);
|
|
|
|
|
absolute_address:
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_STORE && dat_protection) {
|
|
|
|
|
*prot = PROT_TYPE_DAT;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_IFETCH && iep_protection && iep) {
|
|
|
|
|
*prot = PROT_TYPE_IEP;
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, raddr.addr))
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
*gpa = raddr.addr;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int is_low_address(unsigned long ga)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for address ranges 0..511 and 4096..4607 */
|
|
|
|
|
return (ga & ~0x11fful) == 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 09:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
static int low_address_protection_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
|
|
|
|
|
const union asce asce)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union ctlreg0 ctlreg0 = {.val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0]};
|
|
|
|
|
psw_t *psw = &vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ctlreg0.lap)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-06-03 08:56:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (psw_bits(*psw).dat && asce.p)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:11 +00:00
|
|
|
static int vm_check_access_key(struct kvm *kvm, u8 access_key,
|
|
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
u8 storage_key, access_control;
|
|
|
|
|
bool fetch_protected;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hva;
|
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (access_key == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hva = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
|
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva))
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
r = get_guest_storage_key(current->mm, hva, &storage_key);
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
if (r)
|
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
|
access_control = FIELD_GET(_PAGE_ACC_BITS, storage_key);
|
|
|
|
|
if (access_control == access_key)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
fetch_protected = storage_key & _PAGE_FP_BIT;
|
|
|
|
|
if ((mode == GACC_FETCH || mode == GACC_IFETCH) && !fetch_protected)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool fetch_prot_override_applicable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum gacc_mode mode,
|
|
|
|
|
union asce asce)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
psw_t *psw = &vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long override;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_FETCH || mode == GACC_IFETCH) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* check if fetch protection override enabled */
|
|
|
|
|
override = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0];
|
|
|
|
|
override &= CR0_FETCH_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE;
|
|
|
|
|
/* not applicable if subject to DAT && private space */
|
|
|
|
|
override = override && !(psw_bits(*psw).dat && asce.p);
|
|
|
|
|
return override;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool fetch_prot_override_applies(unsigned long ga, unsigned int len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return ga < 2048 && ga + len <= 2048;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool storage_prot_override_applicable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* check if storage protection override enabled */
|
|
|
|
|
return vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0] & CR0_STORAGE_PROTECTION_OVERRIDE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static bool storage_prot_override_applies(u8 access_control)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* matches special storage protection override key (9) -> allow */
|
|
|
|
|
return access_control == PAGE_SPO_ACC;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vcpu_check_access_key(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 access_key,
|
|
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, union asce asce, gpa_t gpa,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ga, unsigned int len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
u8 storage_key, access_control;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hva;
|
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* access key 0 matches any storage key -> allow */
|
|
|
|
|
if (access_key == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* caller needs to ensure that gfn is accessible, so we can
|
|
|
|
|
* assume that this cannot fail
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
hva = gfn_to_hva(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gpa));
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
r = get_guest_storage_key(current->mm, hva, &storage_key);
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
if (r)
|
|
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
|
access_control = FIELD_GET(_PAGE_ACC_BITS, storage_key);
|
|
|
|
|
/* access key matches storage key -> allow */
|
|
|
|
|
if (access_control == access_key)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_FETCH || mode == GACC_IFETCH) {
|
|
|
|
|
/* it is a fetch and fetch protection is off -> allow */
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(storage_key & _PAGE_FP_BIT))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (fetch_prot_override_applicable(vcpu, mode, asce) &&
|
|
|
|
|
fetch_prot_override_applies(ga, len))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (storage_prot_override_applicable(vcpu) &&
|
|
|
|
|
storage_prot_override_applies(access_control))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* guest_range_to_gpas() - Calculate guest physical addresses of page fragments
|
|
|
|
|
* covering a logical range
|
|
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
|
|
|
|
* @ga: guest address, start of range
|
|
|
|
|
* @ar: access register
|
|
|
|
|
* @gpas: output argument, may be NULL
|
|
|
|
|
* @len: length of range in bytes
|
|
|
|
|
* @asce: address-space-control element to use for translation
|
|
|
|
|
* @mode: access mode
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* @access_key: access key to mach the range's storage keys against
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Translate a logical range to a series of guest absolute addresses,
|
|
|
|
|
* such that the concatenation of page fragments starting at each gpa make up
|
|
|
|
|
* the whole range.
|
|
|
|
|
* The translation is performed as if done by the cpu for the given @asce, @ar,
|
|
|
|
|
* @mode and state of the @vcpu.
|
|
|
|
|
* If the translation causes an exception, its program interruption code is
|
|
|
|
|
* returned and the &struct kvm_s390_pgm_info pgm member of @vcpu is modified
|
|
|
|
|
* such that a subsequent call to kvm_s390_inject_prog_vcpu() will inject
|
|
|
|
|
* a correct exception into the guest.
|
|
|
|
|
* The resulting gpas are stored into @gpas, unless it is NULL.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Note: All fragments except the first one start at the beginning of a page.
|
|
|
|
|
* When deriving the boundaries of a fragment from a gpa, all but the last
|
|
|
|
|
* fragment end at the end of the page.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Return:
|
|
|
|
|
* * 0 - success
|
|
|
|
|
* * <0 - translation could not be performed, for example if guest
|
|
|
|
|
* memory could not be accessed
|
|
|
|
|
* * >0 - an access exception occurred. In this case the returned value
|
|
|
|
|
* is the program interruption code and the contents of pgm may
|
|
|
|
|
* be used to inject an exception into the guest.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int guest_range_to_gpas(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long ga, u8 ar,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *gpas, unsigned long len,
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
const union asce asce, enum gacc_mode mode,
|
|
|
|
|
u8 access_key)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
psw_t *psw = &vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int offset = offset_in_page(ga);
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int fragment_len;
|
2016-05-31 18:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int lap_enabled, rc = 0;
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
enum prot_type prot;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long gpa;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-01-22 09:44:11 +00:00
|
|
|
lap_enabled = low_address_protection_enabled(vcpu, asce);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
while (min(PAGE_SIZE - offset, len) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
fragment_len = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset, len);
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ga = kvm_s390_logical_to_effective(vcpu, ga);
|
2016-05-31 18:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_STORE && lap_enabled && is_low_address(ga))
|
|
|
|
|
return trans_exc(vcpu, PGM_PROTECTION, ga, ar, mode,
|
|
|
|
|
PROT_TYPE_LA);
|
2017-06-03 08:56:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (psw_bits(*psw).dat) {
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = guest_translate(vcpu, ga, &gpa, asce, mode, &prot);
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
gpa = kvm_s390_real_to_abs(vcpu, ga);
|
2024-02-15 15:29:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!kvm_is_gpa_in_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) {
|
2016-05-31 18:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
2022-08-25 19:25:40 +00:00
|
|
|
prot = PROT_NONE;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-31 18:13:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2017-06-07 10:45:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return trans_exc(vcpu, rc, ga, ar, mode, prot);
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = vcpu_check_access_key(vcpu, access_key, mode, asce, gpa, ga,
|
|
|
|
|
fragment_len);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return trans_exc(vcpu, rc, ga, ar, mode, PROT_TYPE_KEYC);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (gpas)
|
|
|
|
|
*gpas++ = gpa;
|
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
ga += fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
len -= fragment_len;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-26 16:45:49 +00:00
|
|
|
static int access_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
|
|
|
|
|
void *data, unsigned int len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const unsigned int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
const gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2024-09-17 15:18:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn))
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rc = kvm_read_guest_page(kvm, gfn, data, offset, len);
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
access_guest_page_with_key(struct kvm *kvm, enum gacc_mode mode, gpa_t gpa,
|
|
|
|
|
void *data, unsigned int len, u8 access_key)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
|
|
|
|
|
bool writable;
|
|
|
|
|
gfn_t gfn;
|
|
|
|
|
hva_t hva;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
|
|
|
|
|
slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
|
|
|
|
|
hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gfn, &writable);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva))
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Check if it's a ro memslot, even tho that can't occur (they're unsupported).
|
|
|
|
|
* Don't try to actually handle that case.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!writable && mode == GACC_STORE)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
hva += offset_in_page(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = copy_to_user_key((void __user *)hva, data, len, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rc = copy_from_user_key(data, (void __user *)hva, len, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mode == GACC_STORE)
|
|
|
|
|
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, slot, gfn);
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:11 +00:00
|
|
|
int access_guest_abs_with_key(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, void *data,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len, enum gacc_mode mode, u8 access_key)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
int fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (min(PAGE_SIZE - offset, len) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
fragment_len = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset, len);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = access_guest_page_with_key(kvm, mode, gpa, data, fragment_len, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
len -= fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
data += fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
gpa += fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
int access_guest_with_key(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long ga, u8 ar,
|
|
|
|
|
void *data, unsigned long len, enum gacc_mode mode,
|
|
|
|
|
u8 access_key)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
psw_t *psw = &vcpu->arch.sie_block->gpsw;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long nr_pages, idx;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long gpa_array[2];
|
2021-11-26 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int fragment_len;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *gpas;
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
enum prot_type prot;
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
int need_ipte_lock;
|
|
|
|
|
union asce asce;
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
bool try_storage_prot_override;
|
|
|
|
|
bool try_fetch_prot_override;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!len)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-05-31 17:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ga = kvm_s390_logical_to_effective(vcpu, ga);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = get_vcpu_asce(vcpu, &asce, ga, ar, mode);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
nr_pages = (((ga & ~PAGE_MASK) + len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
gpas = gpa_array;
|
|
|
|
|
if (nr_pages > ARRAY_SIZE(gpa_array))
|
|
|
|
|
gpas = vmalloc(array_size(nr_pages, sizeof(unsigned long)));
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gpas)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
try_fetch_prot_override = fetch_prot_override_applicable(vcpu, mode, asce);
|
|
|
|
|
try_storage_prot_override = storage_prot_override_applicable(vcpu);
|
2017-06-03 08:56:07 +00:00
|
|
|
need_ipte_lock = psw_bits(*psw).dat && !asce.r;
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (need_ipte_lock)
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_lock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Since we do the access further down ultimately via a move instruction
|
|
|
|
|
* that does key checking and returns an error in case of a protection
|
|
|
|
|
* violation, we don't need to do the check during address translation.
|
|
|
|
|
* Skip it by passing access key 0, which matches any storage key,
|
|
|
|
|
* obviating the need for any further checks. As a result the check is
|
|
|
|
|
* handled entirely in hardware on access, we only need to take care to
|
|
|
|
|
* forego key protection checking if fetch protection override applies or
|
|
|
|
|
* retry with the special key 9 in case of storage protection override.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
rc = guest_range_to_gpas(vcpu, ga, ar, gpas, len, asce, mode, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
for (idx = 0; idx < nr_pages; idx++) {
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
fragment_len = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(gpas[idx]), len);
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (try_fetch_prot_override && fetch_prot_override_applies(ga, fragment_len)) {
|
|
|
|
|
rc = access_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, mode, gpas[idx],
|
|
|
|
|
data, fragment_len);
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
rc = access_guest_page_with_key(vcpu->kvm, mode, gpas[idx],
|
|
|
|
|
data, fragment_len, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc == PGM_PROTECTION && try_storage_prot_override)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = access_guest_page_with_key(vcpu->kvm, mode, gpas[idx],
|
|
|
|
|
data, fragment_len, PAGE_SPO_ACC);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2021-11-26 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
len -= fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
data += fragment_len;
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
ga = kvm_s390_logical_to_effective(vcpu, ga + fragment_len);
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc > 0) {
|
|
|
|
|
bool terminate = (mode == GACC_STORE) && (idx > 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-08-25 19:25:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc == PGM_PROTECTION)
|
|
|
|
|
prot = PROT_TYPE_KEYC;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
prot = PROT_NONE;
|
2022-05-12 13:10:17 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = trans_exc_ending(vcpu, rc, ga, ar, mode, prot, terminate);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2014-01-10 13:33:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (need_ipte_lock)
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_unlock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nr_pages > ARRAY_SIZE(gpa_array))
|
|
|
|
|
vfree(gpas);
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int access_guest_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra,
|
2015-11-16 14:42:11 +00:00
|
|
|
void *data, unsigned long len, enum gacc_mode mode)
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-11-26 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long gpa;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (len && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
|
gpa = kvm_s390_real_to_abs(vcpu, gra);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
fragment_len = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(gpa), len);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:49 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = access_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, mode, gpa, data, fragment_len);
|
2021-11-26 16:45:47 +00:00
|
|
|
len -= fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
gra += fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
data += fragment_len;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
KVM: s390: gaccess: Check if guest address is in memslot
Previously, access_guest_page() did not check whether the given guest
address is inside of a memslot. This is not a problem, since
kvm_write_guest_page/kvm_read_guest_page return -EFAULT in this case.
However, -EFAULT is also returned when copy_to/from_user fails.
When emulating a guest instruction, the address being outside a memslot
usually means that an addressing exception should be injected into the
guest.
Failure in copy_to/from_user however indicates that something is wrong
in userspace and hence should be handled there.
To be able to distinguish these two cases, return PGM_ADDRESSING in
access_guest_page() when the guest address is outside guest memory. In
access_guest_real(), populate vcpu->arch.pgm.code such that
kvm_s390_inject_prog_cond() can be used in the caller for injecting into
the guest (if applicable).
Since this adds a new return value to access_guest_page(), we need to make
sure that other callers are not confused by the new positive return value.
There are the following users of access_guest_page():
- access_guest_with_key() does the checking itself (in
guest_range_to_gpas()), so this case should never happen. Even if, the
handling is set up properly.
- access_guest_real() just passes the return code to its callers, which
are:
- read_guest_real() - see below
- write_guest_real() - see below
There are the following users of read_guest_real():
- ar_translation() in gaccess.c which already returns PGM_*
- setup_apcb10(), setup_apcb00(), setup_apcb11() in vsie.c which always
return -EFAULT on read_guest_read() nonzero return - no change
- shadow_crycb(), handle_stfle() always present this as validity, this
could be handled better but doesn't change current behaviour - no change
There are the following users of write_guest_real():
- kvm_s390_store_status_unloaded() always returns -EFAULT on
write_guest_real() failure.
Fixes: 2293897805c2 ("KVM: s390: add architecture compliant guest access functions")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240917151904.74314-2-nrb@linux.ibm.com
Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
2024-09-17 15:18:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc > 0)
|
|
|
|
|
vcpu->arch.pgm.code = rc;
|
2014-01-01 15:26:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-02-06 16:46:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* cmpxchg_guest_abs_with_key() - Perform cmpxchg on guest absolute address.
|
|
|
|
|
* @kvm: Virtual machine instance.
|
|
|
|
|
* @gpa: Absolute guest address of the location to be changed.
|
|
|
|
|
* @len: Operand length of the cmpxchg, required: 1 <= len <= 16. Providing a
|
|
|
|
|
* non power of two will result in failure.
|
|
|
|
|
* @old_addr: Pointer to old value. If the location at @gpa contains this value,
|
|
|
|
|
* the exchange will succeed. After calling cmpxchg_guest_abs_with_key()
|
|
|
|
|
* *@old_addr contains the value at @gpa before the attempt to
|
|
|
|
|
* exchange the value.
|
|
|
|
|
* @new: The value to place at @gpa.
|
|
|
|
|
* @access_key: The access key to use for the guest access.
|
|
|
|
|
* @success: output value indicating if an exchange occurred.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Atomically exchange the value at @gpa by @new, if it contains *@old.
|
|
|
|
|
* Honors storage keys.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Return: * 0: successful exchange
|
|
|
|
|
* * >0: a program interruption code indicating the reason cmpxchg could
|
|
|
|
|
* not be attempted
|
|
|
|
|
* * -EINVAL: address misaligned or len not power of two
|
|
|
|
|
* * -EAGAIN: transient failure (len 1 or 2)
|
|
|
|
|
* * -EOPNOTSUPP: read-only memslot (should never occur)
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int cmpxchg_guest_abs_with_key(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, int len,
|
|
|
|
|
__uint128_t *old_addr, __uint128_t new,
|
|
|
|
|
u8 access_key, bool *success)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
|
|
|
|
|
bool writable;
|
|
|
|
|
hva_t hva;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ALIGNED(gpa, len))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hva = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gfn, &writable);
|
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_is_error_hva(hva))
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ADDRESSING;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Check if it's a read-only memslot, even though that cannot occur
|
|
|
|
|
* since those are unsupported.
|
|
|
|
|
* Don't try to actually handle that case.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!writable)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hva += offset_in_page(gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* The cmpxchg_user_key macro depends on the type of "old", so we need
|
|
|
|
|
* a case for each valid length and get some code duplication as long
|
|
|
|
|
* as we don't introduce a new macro.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
switch (len) {
|
|
|
|
|
case 1: {
|
|
|
|
|
u8 old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_user_key((u8 __user *)hva, &old, *old_addr, new, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
*success = !ret && old == *old_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
*old_addr = old;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
case 2: {
|
|
|
|
|
u16 old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_user_key((u16 __user *)hva, &old, *old_addr, new, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
*success = !ret && old == *old_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
*old_addr = old;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
case 4: {
|
|
|
|
|
u32 old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_user_key((u32 __user *)hva, &old, *old_addr, new, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
*success = !ret && old == *old_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
*old_addr = old;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
case 8: {
|
|
|
|
|
u64 old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_user_key((u64 __user *)hva, &old, *old_addr, new, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
*success = !ret && old == *old_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
*old_addr = old;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
case 16: {
|
|
|
|
|
__uint128_t old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_user_key((__uint128_t __user *)hva, &old, *old_addr, new, access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
*success = !ret && old == *old_addr;
|
|
|
|
|
*old_addr = old;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (*success)
|
|
|
|
|
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, slot, gfn);
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Assume that the fault is caused by protection, either key protection
|
|
|
|
|
* or user page write protection.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -EFAULT)
|
|
|
|
|
ret = PGM_PROTECTION;
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-04 13:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* guest_translate_address_with_key - translate guest logical into guest absolute address
|
2021-09-10 08:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
|
|
|
|
* @gva: Guest virtual address
|
|
|
|
|
* @ar: Access register
|
|
|
|
|
* @gpa: Guest physical address
|
|
|
|
|
* @mode: Translation access mode
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* @access_key: access key to mach the storage key with
|
2014-02-04 13:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Parameter semantics are the same as the ones from guest_translate.
|
|
|
|
|
* The memory contents at the guest address are not changed.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Note: The IPTE lock is not taken during this function, so the caller
|
|
|
|
|
* has to take care of this.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
int guest_translate_address_with_key(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, u8 ar,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long *gpa, enum gacc_mode mode,
|
|
|
|
|
u8 access_key)
|
2014-02-04 13:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union asce asce;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gva = kvm_s390_logical_to_effective(vcpu, gva);
|
2016-05-31 17:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = get_vcpu_asce(vcpu, &asce, gva, ar, mode);
|
2015-03-09 11:17:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return guest_range_to_gpas(vcpu, gva, ar, gpa, 1, asce, mode,
|
|
|
|
|
access_key);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-02-06 14:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* check_gva_range - test a range of guest virtual addresses for accessibility
|
2021-09-10 08:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
|
|
|
|
* @gva: Guest virtual address
|
|
|
|
|
* @ar: Access register
|
|
|
|
|
* @length: Length of test range
|
|
|
|
|
* @mode: Translation access mode
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* @access_key: access key to mach the storage keys with
|
2015-02-06 14:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-12-09 11:44:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int check_gva_range(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gva, u8 ar,
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long length, enum gacc_mode mode, u8 access_key)
|
2015-02-06 14:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
union asce asce;
|
2015-02-06 14:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-26 16:45:48 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = get_vcpu_asce(vcpu, &asce, gva, ar, mode);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_lock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2022-02-11 18:22:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = guest_range_to_gpas(vcpu, gva, ar, NULL, length, asce, mode,
|
|
|
|
|
access_key);
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_unlock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2015-02-06 14:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-11 18:22:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* check_gpa_range - test a range of guest physical addresses for accessibility
|
|
|
|
|
* @kvm: virtual machine instance
|
|
|
|
|
* @gpa: guest physical address
|
|
|
|
|
* @length: length of test range
|
|
|
|
|
* @mode: access mode to test, relevant for storage keys
|
|
|
|
|
* @access_key: access key to mach the storage keys with
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int check_gpa_range(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, unsigned long length,
|
|
|
|
|
enum gacc_mode mode, u8 access_key)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (length && !rc) {
|
|
|
|
|
fragment_len = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(gpa), length);
|
|
|
|
|
rc = vm_check_access_key(kvm, access_key, mode, gpa);
|
|
|
|
|
length -= fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
gpa += fragment_len;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2015-03-03 11:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* kvm_s390_check_low_addr_prot_real - check for low-address protection
|
2021-09-10 08:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
2015-03-03 11:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* @gra: Guest real address
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Checks whether an address is subject to low-address protection and set
|
|
|
|
|
* up vcpu->arch.pgm accordingly if necessary.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Return: 0 if no protection exception, or PGM_PROTECTION if protected.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-03-03 11:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int kvm_s390_check_low_addr_prot_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long gra)
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2015-03-03 11:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
union ctlreg0 ctlreg0 = {.val = vcpu->arch.sie_block->gcr[0]};
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-03-03 11:26:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ctlreg0.lap || !is_low_address(gra))
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2016-05-31 18:00:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return trans_exc(vcpu, PGM_PROTECTION, gra, 0, GACC_STORE, PROT_TYPE_LA);
|
2014-03-03 22:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* kvm_s390_shadow_tables - walk the guest page table and create shadow tables
|
|
|
|
|
* @sg: pointer to the shadow guest address space structure
|
|
|
|
|
* @saddr: faulting address in the shadow gmap
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* @pgt: pointer to the beginning of the page table for the given address if
|
|
|
|
|
* successful (return value 0), or to the first invalid DAT entry in
|
|
|
|
|
* case of exceptions (return value > 0)
|
2021-09-10 08:04:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* @dat_protection: referenced memory is write protected
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* @fake: pgt references contiguous guest memory block, not a pgtable
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int kvm_s390_shadow_tables(struct gmap *sg, unsigned long saddr,
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long *pgt, int *dat_protection,
|
|
|
|
|
int *fake)
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
struct kvm *kvm;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
struct gmap *parent;
|
|
|
|
|
union asce asce;
|
|
|
|
|
union vaddress vaddr;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*fake = 0;
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*dat_protection = 0;
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm = sg->private;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
parent = sg->parent;
|
|
|
|
|
vaddr.addr = saddr;
|
|
|
|
|
asce.val = sg->orig_asce;
|
2024-07-03 15:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = asce.rsto * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (asce.r) {
|
|
|
|
|
*fake = 1;
|
2017-06-19 06:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = 0;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
asce.dt = ASCE_TYPE_REGION1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (asce.dt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION1:
|
2017-06-19 06:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx01 > asce.tl && !*fake)
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rsx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx || vaddr.rsx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rtx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT:
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rfx || vaddr.rsx || vaddr.rtx)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_ASCE_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.sx01 > asce.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (asce.dt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION1: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region1_table_entry rfte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*fake) {
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rfx * _REGION1_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
rfte.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_r2t;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*pgt = ptr + vaddr.rfx * 8;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_read_table(parent, ptr + vaddr.rfx * 8, &rfte.val);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rfte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rfte.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION1)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rsx01 < rfte.tf || vaddr.rsx01 > rfte.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sg->edat_level >= 1)
|
|
|
|
|
*dat_protection |= rfte.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rfte.rto * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
shadow_r2t:
|
|
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_r2t(sg, saddr, rfte.val, *fake);
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r1_entry++;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION2: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region2_table_entry rste;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*fake) {
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rsx * _REGION2_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
rste.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_r3t;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*pgt = ptr + vaddr.rsx * 8;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_read_table(parent, ptr + vaddr.rsx * 8, &rste.val);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rste.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rste.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION2)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (vaddr.rtx01 < rste.tf || vaddr.rtx01 > rste.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sg->edat_level >= 1)
|
|
|
|
|
*dat_protection |= rste.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rste.rto * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
shadow_r3t:
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
rste.p |= *dat_protection;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_r3t(sg, saddr, rste.val, *fake);
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r2_entry++;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_REGION3: {
|
|
|
|
|
union region3_table_entry rtte;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*fake) {
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.rtx * _REGION3_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 14:22:24 +00:00
|
|
|
rtte.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_sgt;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*pgt = ptr + vaddr.rtx * 8;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_read_table(parent, ptr + vaddr.rtx * 8, &rtte.val);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.tt != TABLE_TYPE_REGION3)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rtte.cr && asce.p && sg->edat_level >= 2)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rtte.fc && sg->edat_level >= 2) {
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*dat_protection |= rtte.fc0.p;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
*fake = 1;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rtte.fc1.rfaa * _REGION3_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
rtte.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_sgt;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vaddr.sx01 < rtte.fc0.tf || vaddr.sx01 > rtte.fc0.tl)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sg->edat_level >= 1)
|
|
|
|
|
*dat_protection |= rtte.fc0.p;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = rtte.fc0.sto * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
shadow_sgt:
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
rtte.fc0.p |= *dat_protection;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_sgt(sg, saddr, rtte.val, *fake);
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_r3_entry++;
|
2020-03-11 04:51:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
case ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT: {
|
|
|
|
|
union segment_table_entry ste;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*fake) {
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr += vaddr.sx * _SEGMENT_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 11:42:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ste.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_pgt;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
*pgt = ptr + vaddr.sx * 8;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_read_table(parent, ptr + vaddr.sx * 8, &ste.val);
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.i)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.tt != TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
|
if (ste.cs && asce.p)
|
|
|
|
|
return PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
*dat_protection |= ste.fc0.p;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ste.fc && sg->edat_level >= 1) {
|
|
|
|
|
*fake = 1;
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = ste.fc1.sfaa * _SEGMENT_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ste.val = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
goto shadow_pgt;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
ptr = ste.fc0.pto * (PAGE_SIZE / 2);
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
shadow_pgt:
|
2016-04-18 15:46:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ste.fc0.p |= *dat_protection;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_pgt(sg, saddr, ste.val, *fake);
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_sg_entry++;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return the parent address of the page table */
|
|
|
|
|
*pgt = ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* kvm_s390_shadow_fault - handle fault on a shadow page table
|
2016-01-27 16:24:03 +00:00
|
|
|
* @vcpu: virtual cpu
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
* @sg: pointer to the shadow guest address space structure
|
|
|
|
|
* @saddr: faulting address in the shadow gmap
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* @datptr: will contain the address of the faulting DAT table entry, or of
|
|
|
|
|
* the valid leaf, plus some flags
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Returns: - 0 if the shadow fault was successfully resolved
|
|
|
|
|
* - > 0 (pgm exception code) on exceptions while faulting
|
|
|
|
|
* - -EAGAIN if the caller can retry immediately
|
|
|
|
|
* - -EFAULT when accessing invalid guest addresses
|
|
|
|
|
* - -ENOMEM if out of memory
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-01-27 16:24:03 +00:00
|
|
|
int kvm_s390_shadow_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct gmap *sg,
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long saddr, unsigned long *datptr)
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
union vaddress vaddr;
|
|
|
|
|
union page_table_entry pte;
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long pgt = 0;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
int dat_protection, fake;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(sg->mm);
|
2016-01-27 16:24:03 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* We don't want any guest-2 tables to change - so the parent
|
|
|
|
|
* tables/pointers we read stay valid - unshadowing is however
|
|
|
|
|
* always possible - only guest_table_lock protects us.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_lock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_pgt_lookup(sg, saddr, &pgt, &dat_protection, &fake);
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = kvm_s390_shadow_tables(sg, saddr, &pgt, &dat_protection,
|
|
|
|
|
&fake);
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vaddr.addr = saddr;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fake) {
|
2017-07-05 05:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
pte.val = pgt + vaddr.px * PAGE_SIZE;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto shadow_page;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-01 16:26:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (rc) {
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_SEGMENT_TRANSLATION:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_THIRD_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_SECOND_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
case PGM_REGION_FIRST_TRANS:
|
|
|
|
|
pgt |= PEI_NOT_PTE;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
|
pgt += vaddr.px * 8;
|
|
|
|
|
rc = gmap_read_table(sg->parent, pgt, &pte.val);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (datptr)
|
|
|
|
|
*datptr = pgt | dat_protection * PEI_DAT_PROT;
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!rc && pte.i)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = PGM_PAGE_TRANSLATION;
|
2017-03-31 10:50:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!rc && pte.z)
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
rc = PGM_TRANSLATION_SPEC;
|
2016-04-18 11:24:52 +00:00
|
|
|
shadow_page:
|
2016-04-18 15:19:59 +00:00
|
|
|
pte.p |= dat_protection;
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
|
|
|
rc = gmap_shadow_page(sg, saddr, __pte(pte.val));
|
2023-10-09 09:32:52 +00:00
|
|
|
vcpu->kvm->stat.gmap_shadow_pg_entry++;
|
2022-05-04 12:29:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ipte_unlock(vcpu->kvm);
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(sg->mm);
|
2016-02-02 11:26:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2016-03-08 11:16:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
