Both rzg2l_wdt_probe() and rzg2l_wdt_start() calls reset_control_
deassert() which results in a reset control imbalance.
This patch fixes reset control imbalance by removing reset_control_
deassert() from rzg2l_wdt_start() and replaces reset_control_assert with
reset_control_reset in rzg2l_wdt_stop() as watchdog module can be stopped
only by a module reset. This change will allow us to restart WDT after
stop() by configuring WDT timeout and enable registers.
Fixes: 2cbc5cd0b5 ("watchdog: Add Watchdog Timer driver for RZ/G2L")
Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220225175320.11041-5-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org>
Parse compatible as expected for modern QCOMs.
Fixes warnings as:
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-oneplus-fajita.dt.yaml: watchdog@17980000: compatible: ['qcom,apss-wdt-sdm845', 'qcom,kpss-wdt'] is too long
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/watchdog/qcom-wdt.yaml
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sdm845-oneplus-fajita.dt.yaml: watchdog@17980000: compatible: Additional items are not allowed ('qcom,kpss-wdt' was unexpected)
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/watchdog/qcom-wdt.yaml
Signed-off-by: David Heidelberg <david@ixit.cz>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220111212310.97566-1-david@ixit.cz
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org>
Recent rework broke building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n.
This patch fixes that breakage.
Prior to recent stackleak rework, the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING code could
be built when the kernel was not built with stackleak support, and would
run a test that would almost certainly fail (or pass by sheer cosmic
coincidence), e.g.
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: checking unused part of the thread stack (15560 bytes)...
| lkdtm: FAIL: the erased part is not found (checked 15560 bytes)
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: This is probably expected, since this kernel (5.18.0-rc2 aarch64) was built *without* CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
The recent rework to the test made it more accurate by using helpers
which are only defined when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y, and so when
building LKDTM when CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, we get a build
failure:
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c: In function 'check_stackleak_irqoff':
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:30:46: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_low_bound' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
| 30 | const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current);
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:31:47: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_task_high_bound'; did you mean 'stackleak_task_init'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
| 31 | const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current);
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| | stackleak_task_init
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:33:48: error: 'struct task_struct' has no member named 'lowest_stack'
| 33 | const unsigned long lowest_sp = current->lowest_stack;
| | ^~
| drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c:74:23: error: implicit declaration of function 'stackleak_find_top_of_poison' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
| 74 | poison_high = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, untracked_high);
| | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This patch fixes the issue by not compiling the body of the test when
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n, and replacing this with an unconditional
XFAIL message. This means the pr_expected_config() in
check_stackleak_irqoff() is redundant, and so it is removed.
Where an architecture does not support stackleak, the test will log:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)
Where an architectures does support stackleak, but this has not been
compiled in, the test will log:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)
Where stackleak has been compiled in, the test behaves as usual:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 688 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 1232 bytes
| untracked: 672 bytes
| poisoned: 14136 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Fixes: f4cfacd92972cc44 ("lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121145.1162908-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
The stackleak_erase() code dynamically handles being on a task stack or
another stack. In most cases, this is a fixed property of the caller,
which the caller is aware of, as an architecture might always return
using the task stack, or might always return using a trampoline stack.
This patch adds stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() and
stackleak_erase_off_task_stack() functions which callers can use to
avoid on_thread_stack() check and associated redundant work when the
calling stack is known. The existing stackleak_erase() is retained as a
safe default.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-13-mark.rutland@arm.com
There are a few problems with the way the LKDTM STACKLEAK_ERASING test
manipulates the stack pointer and boundary values:
* It uses the address of a local variable to determine the current stack
pointer, rather than using current_stack_pointer directly. As the
local variable could be placed anywhere within the stack frame, this
can be an over-estimate of the true stack pointer value.
* Is uses an estimate of the current stack pointer as the upper boundary
when scanning for poison, even though prior functions could have used
more stack (and may have updated current->lowest stack accordingly).
* A pr_info() call is made in the middle of the test. As the printk()
code is out-of-line and will make use of the stack, this could clobber
poison and/or adjust current->lowest_stack. It would be better to log
the metadata after the body of the test to avoid such problems.
These have been observed to result in spurious test failures on arm64.
In addition to this there are a couple of things which are sub-optimal:
* To avoid the STACK_END_MAGIC value, it conditionally modifies 'left'
if this contains more than a single element, when it could instead
calculate the bound unconditionally using stackleak_task_low_bound().
* It open-codes the poison scanning. It would be better if this used the
same helper code as used by erasing function so that the two cannot
diverge.
This patch reworks the test to avoid these issues, making use of the
recently introduced helpers to ensure this is aligned with the regular
stackleak code.
As the new code tests stack boundaries before accessing the stack, there
is no need to fail early when the tracked or untracked portions of the
stack extend all the way to the low stack boundary.
As stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is now used to find the top of the
poisoned region of the stack, the subsequent poison checking starts at
this boundary and verifies that stackleak_find_top_of_poison() is
working correctly.
The pr_info() which logged the untracked portion of stack is now moved
to the end of the function, and logs the size of all the portions of the
stack relevant to the test, including the portions at the top and bottom
of the stack which are not erased or scanned, and the current / lowest
recorded stack usage.
Tested on x86_64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 168 bytes
| current: 336 bytes
| lowest: 656 bytes
| tracked: 656 bytes
| untracked: 400 bytes
| poisoned: 15152 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 656 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 1232 bytes
| untracked: 672 bytes
| poisoned: 14136 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased
Tested on arm64 with deliberate breakage to the starting stack value and
poison scanning:
| # echo STACKLEAK_ERASING > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
| lkdtm: Performing direct entry STACKLEAK_ERASING
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 24 bytes below poison boundary: 0x0
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 32 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083dbc00
...
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1912 bytes below poison boundary: 0x78b4b9999e8cb15
| lkdtm: FAIL: non-poison value 1920 bytes below poison boundary: 0xffff8000083db400
| lkdtm: stackleak stack usage:
| high offset: 336 bytes
| current: 688 bytes
| lowest: 1232 bytes
| tracked: 576 bytes
| untracked: 288 bytes
| poisoned: 15176 bytes
| low offset: 8 bytes
| lkdtm: FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!
| lkdtm: Unexpected! This kernel (5.18.0-rc1-00013-g1f7b1f1e29e0-dirty aarch64) was built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-10-mark.rutland@arm.com
The lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() test scans for a contiguous block of
poison values between the low stack bound and the stack pointer, and
fails if it does not find a sufficiently large block.
This can happen legitimately if the scan the low stack bound, which
could occur if functions called prior to lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING() used
a large amount of stack. If this were to occur, it means that the erased
portion of the stack is smaller than the size used by the scan, but does
not cause a functional problem
In practice this is unlikely to happen, but as this is legitimate and
would not result in a functional problem, the test should not fail in
this case.
Remove the spurious failure case.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-9-mark.rutland@arm.com
Currently we over-estimate the region of stack which must be erased.
To determine the region to be erased, we scan downwards for a contiguous
block of poison values (or the low bound of the stack). There are a few
minor problems with this today:
* When we find a block of poison values, we include this block within
the region to erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite 'STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH' (128) bytes with
poison.
* As the loop condition checks 'poison_count <= depth', it will run an
additional iteration after finding the contiguous block of poison,
decrementing 'erase_low' once more than necessary.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
* As we always decrement 'erase_low' after checking an element on the
stack, we always include the element below this within the region to
erase.
As this is included within the region to erase, this causes us to
redundantly overwrite an additional unsigned long with poison.
Note that this is not a functional problem. As the loop condition
checks 'erase_low > task_stack_low', we'll never clobber the
STACK_END_MAGIC. As we always decrement 'erase_low' after this, we'll
never fail to erase the element immediately above the STACK_END_MAGIC.
In total, this can cause us to erase `128 + 2 * sizeof(unsigned long)`
bytes more than necessary, which is unfortunate.
This patch reworks the logic to find the address immediately above the
poisoned region, by finding the lowest non-poisoned address. This is
factored into a stackleak_find_top_of_poison() helper both for clarity
and so that this can be shared with the LKDTM test in subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-8-mark.rutland@arm.com
Prior to returning to userspace, we reset current->lowest_stack to a
reasonable high bound. Currently we do this by subtracting the arbitrary
value `THREAD_SIZE/64` from the top of the stack, for reasons lost to
history.
Looking at configurations today:
* On i386 where THREAD_SIZE is 8K, the bound will be 128 bytes. The
pt_regs at the top of the stack is 68 bytes (with 0 to 16 bytes of
padding above), and so this covers an additional portion of 44 to 60
bytes.
* On x86_64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 32K with KASAN) the
bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 512 with KASAN). The pt_regs
at the top of the stack is 168 bytes, and so this cover an additional
88 bytes of stack (up to 344 with KASAN).
* On arm64 where THREAD_SIZE is at least 16K (up to 64K with 64K pages
and VMAP_STACK), the bound will be at least 256 bytes (up to 1024 with
KASAN). The pt_regs at the top of the stack is 336 bytes, so this can
fall within the pt_regs, or can cover an additional 688 bytes of
stack.
Clearly the `THREAD_SIZE/64` value doesn't make much sense -- in the
worst case, this will cause more than 600 bytes of stack to be erased
for every syscall, even if actual stack usage were substantially
smaller.
This patches makes this slightly less nonsensical by consistently
resetting current->lowest_stack to the base of the task pt_regs. For
clarity and for consistency with the handling of the low bound, the
generation of the high bound is split into a helper with commentary
explaining why.
Since the pt_regs at the top of the stack will be clobbered upon the
next exception entry, we don't need to poison these at exception exit.
By using task_pt_regs() as the high stack boundary instead of
current_top_of_stack() we avoid some redundant poisoning, and the
compiler can share the address generation between the poisoning and
resetting of `current->lowest_stack`, making the generated code more
optimal.
It's not clear to me whether the existing `THREAD_SIZE/64` offset was a
dodgy heuristic to skip the pt_regs, or whether it was attempting to
minimize the number of times stackleak_check_stack() would have to
update `current->lowest_stack` when stack usage was shallow at the cost
of unconditionally poisoning a small portion of the stack for every exit
to userspace.
For now I've simply removed the offset, and if we need/want to minimize
updates for shallow stack usage it should be easy to add a better
heuristic atop, with appropriate commentary so we know what's going on.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-7-mark.rutland@arm.com
The logic within __stackleak_erase() can be a little hard to follow, as
`boundary` switches from being the low bound to the high bound mid way
through the function, and `kstack_ptr` is used to represent the start of
the region to erase while `boundary` represents the end of the region to
erase.
Make this a little clearer by consistently using clearer variable names.
The `boundary` variable is removed, the bounds of the region to erase
are described by `erase_low` and `erase_high`, and bounds of the task
stack are described by `task_stack_low` and `task_stack_high`.
As the same time, remove the comment above the variables, since it is
unclear whether it's intended as rationale, a complaint, or a TODO, and
is more confusing than helpful.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and
__stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the
bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and
only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented.
In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally
add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In
stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in
stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase()
we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end
boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic.
This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in
all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the
lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses
end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this
is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the
STACK_END_MAGIC value.
In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled
into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that
`current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the
poison scan will stop immediately above this.
For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no
change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated
assembly is slightly simpler and shorter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
In stackleak_erase() we check skip_erasing() after accessing some fields
from current. As generating the address of current uses asm which
hazards with the static branch asm, this work is always performed, even
when the static branch is patched to jump to the return at the end of the
function.
This patch avoids this redundant work by moving the skip_erasing() check
earlier.
To avoid complicating initialization within stackleak_erase(), the body
of the function is split out into a __stackleak_erase() helper, with the
check left in a wrapper function. The __stackleak_erase() helper is
marked __always_inline to ensure that this is inlined into
stackleak_erase() and not instrumented.
Before this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
66 90 xchg %ax,%ax <------------ static branch
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
After this patch, on x86-64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <--- static branch
65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
00 00
48 8b 48 20 mov 0x20(%rax),%rcx
48 8b 80 98 0a 00 00 mov 0xa98(%rax),%rax
48 89 c2 mov %rax,%rdx
48 29 ca sub %rcx,%rdx
48 81 fa ff 3f 00 00 cmp $0x3fff,%rdx
Before this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
After this patch, on arm64 w/ GCC 11.1.0 the start of the function is:
<stackleak_erase>:
d503245f bti c
d503201f nop <------------------------------- static branch
d503233f paciasp
d5384100 mrs x0, sp_el0
f9401003 ldr x3, [x0, #32]
d287ffe1 mov x1, #0x3fff
f9451000 ldr x0, [x0, #2592]
cb030002 sub x2, x0, x3
eb01005f cmp x2, x1
While this may not be a huge win on its own, moving the static branch
will permit further optimization of the body of the function in
subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Due to some historical confusion, arm64's current_top_of_stack() isn't
what the stackleak code expects. This could in theory result in a number
of problems, and practically results in an unnecessary performance hit.
We can avoid this by aligning the arm64 implementation with the x86
implementation.
The arm64 implementation of current_top_of_stack() was added
specifically for stackleak in commit:
0b3e336601 ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
This was intended to be equivalent to the x86 implementation, but the
implementation, semantics, and performance characteristics differ
wildly:
* On x86, current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the current task's
task stack, regardless of which stack is in active use.
The implementation accesses a percpu variable which the x86 entry code
maintains, and returns the location immediately above the pt_regs on
the task stack (above which x86 has some padding).
* On arm64 current_top_of_stack() returns the top of the stack in active
use (i.e. the one which is currently being used).
The implementation checks the SP against a number of
potentially-accessible stacks, and will BUG() if no stack is found.
The core stackleak_erase() code determines the upper bound of stack to
erase with:
| if (on_thread_stack())
| boundary = current_stack_pointer;
| else
| boundary = current_top_of_stack();
On arm64 stackleak_erase() is always called on a task stack, and
on_thread_stack() should always be true. On x86, stackleak_erase() is
mostly called on a trampoline stack, and is sometimes called on a task
stack.
Currently, this results in a lot of unnecessary code being generated for
arm64 for the impossible !on_thread_stack() case. Some of this is
inlined, bloating stackleak_erase(), while portions of this are left
out-of-line and permitted to be instrumented (which would be a
functional problem if that code were reachable).
As a first step towards improving this, this patch aligns arm64's
implementation of current_top_of_stack() with x86's, always returning
the top of the current task's stack. With GCC 11.1.0 this results in the
bulk of the unnecessary code being removed, including all of the
out-of-line instrumentable code.
While I don't believe there's a functional problem in practice I've
marked this as a fix since the semantic was clearly wrong, the fix
itself is simple, and other code might rely upon this in future.
Fixes: 0b3e336601 ("arm64: Add support for STACKLEAK gcc plugin")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Clang's structure layout randomization feature gets upset when it sees
struct inode (which is randomized) cast to struct netfs_i_context. This
is due to seeing the inode pointer as being treated as an array of inodes,
rather than "something else, following struct inode".
Since netfs can't use container_of() (since it doesn't know what the
true containing struct is), it uses this direct offset instead. Adjust
the code to better reflect what is happening: an arbitrary pointer is
being adjusted and cast to something else: use a "void *" for the math.
The resulting binary output is the same, but Clang no longer sees an
unexpected cross-structure cast:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/inode.c:50:
In file included from ../fs/nfs/fscache.h:15:
In file included from ../include/linux/fscache.h:18:
../include/linux/netfs.h:298:9: error: casting from randomized structure pointer type 'struct inode *' to 'struct netfs_i_context *'
return (struct netfs_i_context *)(inode + 1);
^
1 error generated.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503205503.3054173-2-keescook@chromium.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7562f8eccd7cc0e447becfe9912179088784e3b9.camel@kernel.org
This patch aims to add UVC_GUID_FORMAT_H265
High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC), also known as H.265 and MPEG-H Part 2.
They describe the same video encoding method.
So for handling their behavior is the same.
However, when external camera device describes this encoding method,
some use hevc, some use h265.
There is no uniform specification to describe this encoding method.
So if an external camera device use h265 to describe this encoding method,
driver will not recognize it.
Therefore, this patch is to enable driver to read HEVC/H265
and convert it to V4L2_PIX_FMT_HEVC.
Signed-off-by: James_Lin <Ping-lei.Lin@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Replace manual decoding of psize in uvc_parse_streaming(), with the code
from uvc_endpoint_max_bpi(). It also handles usb3 devices.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
The case USB_SPEED_WIRELESS and the default one were doing the same.
Also, make always use of usb_endpoint_maxp_mult, as it should have a
sane value, even for LOW speed and WIRELESS.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Move all the life cycle of the name to add_mapping. This simplifies
the error handling inside uvc_ioctl_ctrl_map and solves a memory leak
when kemmdup fails.
Also make sure that for custom controls, the user provides a valid name.
Fixes: 07adedb5c606 ("media: uvcvideo: Use control names from framework")
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
probe->dwMaxPayloadTransferSize is a 32bit value, but bandwidth is 16bit. This
may lead to a bit overflow.
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
The list iterator will point to a bogus position containing HEAD if
the list is empty or the element is not found in list. This case
should be checked before any use of the iterator, otherwise it will
lead to a invalid memory access. The missing check here is before
"pin = iterm->id;", just add check here to fix the security bug.
In addition, the list iterator value will *always* be set and non-NULL
by list_for_each_entry(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator
value will be NULL if the element is not found in list, considering
the (mis)use here: "if (iterm == NULL".
Use a new value 'it' as the list iterator, while use the old value
'iterm' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element, which
1. can fix this bug, due to 'iterm' is NULL only if it's not found.
2. do not need to change all the uses of 'iterm' after the loop.
3. can also limit the scope of the list iterator 'it' *only inside*
the traversal loop by simply declaring 'it' inside the loop in the
future, as usage of the iterator outside of the list_for_each_entry
is considered harmful. https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/2/17/1032
Fixes: d5e90b7a6c ("[media] uvcvideo: Move to video_ioctl2")
Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong <xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
As discussed with other developers, the linux-uvc-devel mailing list is
not very useful anymore, and it's better to send people to the general
linux-media mailing list.
Replace/remove the old mailing list address in uvcvideo.rst and
MAINTAINERS.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Neuschäfer <j.neuschaefer@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Returning an error value from an i2c remove callback results in an error
message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make a
difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
As stk3310_set_state() already emits an error message on failure and the
additional error message by the i2c core doesn't add any useful
information, don't pass the error value up the stack. Instead continue
to clean up and return 0.
This patch is a preparation for making i2c remove callbacks return void.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
The Qualcomm LPG driver fails to probe unless PWM support is enabled so
add the missing Kconfig dependency.
Fixes: 24e2d05d1b ("leds: Add driver for Qualcomm LPG")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan+linaro@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Make the AUX pin optional, since it isn't a core part of functionality,
and the device is designed to be operational with only one CTRL pin.
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Markuss Broks <markuss.broks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
This patch converts the leds-ktd2692.txt bindings to modern yaml
style device-tree bindings.
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Markuss Broks <markuss.broks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Use dev_err_probe instead of dev_err to avoid duplicate error
messages if the GPIO allocation makes the probe defer.
Signed-off-by: Markuss Broks <markuss.broks@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Returning an error value in an i2c remove callback results in a generic
error message being emitted by the i2c core, but otherwise it doesn't make
a difference. The device goes away anyhow and the devm cleanups are
called.
So instead of triggering the generic i2c error message, emit a more helpful
message if a problem occurs and return 0 to suppress the generic message.
This patch is a preparation for making i2c remove callbacks return void.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
The drivers/leds/rgb subdirectory is relatively fresh, so we move this
new PWM multi-color driver into it.
Signed-off-by: Sven Schwermer <sven.schwermer@disruptive-technologies.com>
Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
PXA is now ready to be built into a single kernel with all the
other ARMv5 platforms, so change the Kconfig bit to finish it
off. The mach/uncompress.h support is the last bit that goes away,
getting replaced with the normal DEBUG_LL based approach.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
PXA and StrongARM1100 traditionally map their I/O space 1:1 into virtual
memory, using a per-bus io_offset that matches the base address of the
ioremap mapping.
In order for PXA to work in a multiplatform config, this needs to
change so I/O space starts at PCI_IOBASE (0xfee00000). Since the pcmcia
soc_common support is shared with StrongARM1100, both have to change at
the same time. The affected machines are:
- Anything with a PCMCIA slot now uses pci_remap_iospace, which
is made available to PCMCIA configurations as well, rather than
just PCI. The first PCMCIA slot now starts at port number 0x10000.
- The Zeus and Viper platforms have PC/104-style ISA buses,
which have a static mapping for both I/O and memory space at
0xf1000000, which can no longer work. It does not appear to have
any in-tree users, so moving it to port number 0 makes them
behave like a traditional PC.
- SA1100 does support ISA slots in theory, but all machines that
originally enabled this appear to have been removed from the tree
ages ago, and the I/O space is never mapped anywhere.
- The Nanoengine machine has support for PCI slots, but looks
like this never included I/O space, the resources only define the
location for memory and config space.
With this, the definitions of __io() and IO_SPACE_LIMIT can be simplified,
as the only remaining cases are the generic PCI_IOBASE and the custom
inb()/outb() macros on RiscPC. S3C24xx still has a custom inb()/outb()
in this here, but this is already removed in another branch.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Using MTD-XIP does not work on multiplatform kernels because
it requires SoC specific register accesses to be done from
low-level flash handling functions in RAM while the rest of the
kernel sits in flash.
I found no evidence of anyone still actually using this feature,
so remove it from PXA to avoid spending a lot of time on
actually making it work.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
