u-boot/include/fsl_validate.h
Sumit Garg 8f01397ba7 powerpc/mpc85xx: SECURE BOOT- Enable chain of trust in SPL
As part of Chain of Trust for Secure boot, the SPL U-Boot will validate
the next level U-boot image. Add a new function spl_validate_uboot to
perform the validation.

Enable hardware crypto operations in SPL using SEC block.
In case of Secure Boot, PAMU is not bypassed. For allowing SEC block
access to CPC configured as SRAM, configure PAMU.

Reviewed-by: Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Bansal <aneesh.bansal@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: York Sun <york.sun@nxp.com>
2016-07-21 11:09:23 -07:00

265 lines
5.8 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2015 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
*/
#ifndef _FSL_VALIDATE_H_
#define _FSL_VALIDATE_H_
#include <fsl_sec.h>
#include <fsl_sec_mon.h>
#include <command.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#define WORD_SIZE 4
/* Minimum and maximum size of RSA signature length in bits */
#define KEY_SIZE 4096
#define KEY_SIZE_BYTES (KEY_SIZE/8)
#define KEY_SIZE_WORDS (KEY_SIZE_BYTES/(WORD_SIZE))
extern struct jobring jr;
/* Barker code size in bytes */
#define ESBC_BARKER_LEN 4 /* barker code length in ESBC uboot client */
/* header */
/* No-error return values */
#define ESBC_VALID_HDR 0 /* header is valid */
/* Maximum number of SG entries allowed */
#define MAX_SG_ENTRIES 8
/* Different Header Struct for LS-CH3 */
#ifdef CONFIG_ESBC_HDR_LS
struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr {
u8 barker[ESBC_BARKER_LEN]; /* barker code */
u32 srk_tbl_off;
struct {
u8 num_srk;
u8 srk_sel;
u8 reserve;
u8 ie_flag;
} len_kr;
u32 uid_flag;
u32 psign; /* signature offset */
u32 sign_len; /* length of the signature in bytes */
u64 pimg64; /* 64 bit pointer to ESBC Image */
u32 img_size; /* ESBC client image size in bytes */
u32 ie_key_sel;
u32 fsl_uid_0;
u32 fsl_uid_1;
u32 oem_uid_0;
u32 oem_uid_1;
u32 oem_uid_2;
u32 oem_uid_3;
u32 oem_uid_4;
u32 reserved1[3];
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
/* Srk table and key revocation check */
#define UNREVOCABLE_KEY 8
#define ALIGN_REVOC_KEY 7
#define MAX_KEY_ENTRIES 8
#endif
#else /* CONFIG_ESBC_HDR_LS */
/*
* ESBC uboot client header structure.
* The struct contain the following fields
* barker code
* public key offset
* pub key length
* signature offset
* length of the signature
* ptr to SG table
* no of entries in SG table
* esbc ptr
* size of esbc
* esbc entry point
* Scatter gather flag
* UID flag
* FSL UID
* OEM UID
* Here, pub key is modulus concatenated with exponent
* of equal length
*/
struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr {
u8 barker[ESBC_BARKER_LEN]; /* barker code */
union {
u32 pkey; /* public key offset */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
u32 srk_tbl_off;
#endif
};
union {
u32 key_len; /* pub key length in bytes */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
struct {
u32 srk_table_flag:8;
u32 srk_sel:8;
u32 num_srk:16;
} len_kr;
#endif
};
u32 psign; /* signature offset */
u32 sign_len; /* length of the signature in bytes */
union {
u32 psgtable; /* ptr to SG table */
#ifndef CONFIG_ESBC_ADDR_64BIT
u32 pimg; /* ptr to ESBC client image */
#endif
};
union {
u32 sg_entries; /* no of entries in SG table */
u32 img_size; /* ESBC client image size in bytes */
};
u32 img_start; /* ESBC client entry point */
u32 sg_flag; /* Scatter gather flag */
u32 uid_flag;
u32 fsl_uid_0;
u32 oem_uid_0;
u32 reserved1[2];
u32 fsl_uid_1;
u32 oem_uid_1;
union {
u32 reserved2[2];
#ifdef CONFIG_ESBC_ADDR_64BIT
u64 pimg64; /* 64 bit pointer to ESBC Image */
#endif
};
u32 ie_flag;
u32 ie_key_sel;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
/* Srk table and key revocation check */
#define SRK_FLAG 0x01
#define UNREVOCABLE_KEY 4
#define ALIGN_REVOC_KEY 3
#define MAX_KEY_ENTRIES 4
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ESBC_HDR_LS */
#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
struct ie_key_table {
u32 key_len;
u8 pkey[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
};
struct ie_key_info {
uint32_t key_revok;
uint32_t num_keys;
struct ie_key_table ie_key_tbl[32];
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
struct srk_table {
u32 key_len;
u8 pkey[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
};
#endif
/*
* SG table.
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_TRUST_ARCH_v1) && defined(CONFIG_FSL_CORENET)
/*
* This struct contains the following fields
* length of the segment
* source address
*/
struct fsl_secboot_sg_table {
u32 len; /* length of the segment in bytes */
u32 src_addr; /* ptr to the data segment */
};
#else
/*
* This struct contains the following fields
* length of the segment
* Destination Target ID
* source address
* destination address
*/
struct fsl_secboot_sg_table {
u32 len;
u32 trgt_id;
u32 src_addr;
u32 dst_addr;
};
#endif
/*
* ESBC private structure.
* Private structure used by ESBC to store following fields
* ESBC client key
* ESBC client key hash
* ESBC client Signature
* Encoded hash recovered from signature
* Encoded hash of ESBC client header plus ESBC client image
*/
struct fsl_secboot_img_priv {
uint32_t hdr_location;
u32 ie_addr;
u32 key_len;
struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr hdr;
u8 img_key[2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* ESBC client key */
u8 img_key_hash[32]; /* ESBC client key hash */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
struct srk_table srk_tbl[MAX_KEY_ENTRIES];
#endif
u8 img_sign[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* ESBC client signature */
u8 img_encoded_hash[KEY_SIZE_BYTES]; /* EM wrt RSA PKCSv1.5 */
/* Includes hash recovered after
* signature verification
*/
u8 img_encoded_hash_second[KEY_SIZE_BYTES];/* EM' wrt RSA PKCSv1.5 */
/* Includes hash of
* ESBC client header plus
* ESBC client image
*/
struct fsl_secboot_sg_table sgtbl[MAX_SG_ENTRIES]; /* SG table */
uintptr_t ehdrloc; /* ESBC Header location */
uintptr_t *img_addr_ptr; /* ESBC Image Location */
uint32_t img_size; /* ESBC Image Size */
};
int do_esbc_halt(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[]);
int fsl_secboot_validate(uintptr_t haddr, char *arg_hash_str,
uintptr_t *img_addr_ptr);
int fsl_secboot_blob_encap(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[]);
int fsl_secboot_blob_decap(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
char * const argv[]);
int fsl_check_boot_mode_secure(void);
int fsl_setenv_chain_of_trust(void);
/*
* This function is used to validate the main U-boot binary from
* SPL just before passing control to it using QorIQ Trust
* Architecture header (appended to U-boot image).
*/
void spl_validate_uboot(uint32_t hdr_addr, uintptr_t img_addr);
#endif