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test/py: efi_secboot: add a test for a forged signed image

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In this test case, a image binary, helloworld.efi.signed, is willfully
modified to print a corrupted message while the signature itself is
unchanged.

This binary must be rejected under secure boot mode.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
AKASHI Takahiro 2022-07-05 14:48:15 +09:00 committed by Heinrich Schuchardt
parent 634f6b2fb1
commit 8fb9dbdea7
3 changed files with 43 additions and 0 deletions
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3
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/conftest.py
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@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ def efi_boot_env(request, u_boot_config):
# Sign already-signed image with another key
check_call('cd %s; sbsign --key db1.key --cert db1.crt --output helloworld.efi.signed_2sigs helloworld.efi.signed'
% mnt_point, shell=True)
# Create a corrupted signed image
check_call('cd %s; sh %s/test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/forge_image.sh helloworld.efi.signed helloworld_forged.efi.signed'
% (mnt_point, u_boot_config.source_dir), shell=True)
# Digest image
check_call('cd %s; %shash-to-efi-sig-list helloworld.efi db_hello.hash; %ssign-efi-sig-list -t "2020-04-07" -c KEK.crt -k KEK.key db db_hello.hash db_hello.auth'
% (mnt_point, EFITOOLS_PATH, EFITOOLS_PATH),

5
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/forge_image.sh Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
#!/bin/sh
replace_exp="s/H\0e\0l\0l\0o\0/h\0E\0L\0L\0O\0/g"
perl -p -e ${replace_exp} < $1 > $2

35
test/py/tests/test_efi_secboot/test_signed.py
View File

@ -334,3 +334,38 @@ class TestEfiSignedImage(object):
'efidebug test bootmgr'])
assert '\'HELLO\' failed' in ''.join(output)
assert 'efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output)
def test_efi_signed_image_auth8(self, u_boot_console, efi_boot_env):
"""
Test Case 8 - Secure boot is in force,
Same as Test Case 2 but the image binary to be loaded
was willfully modified (forged)
Must be rejected.
"""
u_boot_console.restart_uboot()
disk_img = efi_boot_env
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 8a'):
# Test Case 8a, Secure boot is not yet forced
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'host bind 0 %s' % disk_img,
'efidebug boot add -b 1 HELLO1 host 0:1 /helloworld_forged.efi.signed -s ""',
'efidebug boot next 1',
'efidebug test bootmgr'])
assert('hELLO, world!' in ''.join(output))
with u_boot_console.log.section('Test Case 8b'):
# Test Case 8b, Install signature database and verify the image
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'fatload host 0:1 4000000 db.auth',
'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize db',
'fatload host 0:1 4000000 KEK.auth',
'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize KEK',
'fatload host 0:1 4000000 PK.auth',
'setenv -e -nv -bs -rt -at -i 4000000:$filesize PK'])
assert 'Failed to set EFI variable' not in ''.join(output)
output = u_boot_console.run_command_list([
'efidebug boot next 1',
'efidebug test bootmgr'])
assert(not 'hELLO, world!' in ''.join(output))
assert('\'HELLO1\' failed' in ''.join(output))
assert('efi_start_image() returned: 26' in ''.join(output))