forked from Minki/linux
1955351da4
This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments. Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE. However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs which could use pointers in their context. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
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| .. | ||
| arraymap.c | ||
| core.c | ||
| hashtab.c | ||
| helpers.c | ||
| inode.c | ||
| Makefile | ||
| percpu_freelist.c | ||
| percpu_freelist.h | ||
| stackmap.c | ||
| syscall.c | ||
| verifier.c | ||