linux/net/ipv4/esp4.c
Herbert Xu e695633e21 [IPSEC]: Kill unused decap state argument
This patch removes the decap_state argument from the xfrm input hook.
Previously this function allowed the input hook to share state with
the post_input hook.  The latter has since been removed.

The only purpose for it now is to check the encap type.  However, it
is easier and better to move the encap type check to the generic
xfrm_rcv function.  This allows us to get rid of the decap state
argument altogether.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-04-01 00:52:46 -08:00

450 lines
11 KiB
C

#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/esp.h>
#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
static int esp_output(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
struct iphdr *top_iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
struct esp_data *esp;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize;
int clen;
int alen;
int nfrags;
/* Strip IP+ESP header. */
__skb_pull(skb, skb->h.raw - skb->data);
/* Now skb is pure payload to encrypt */
err = -ENOMEM;
/* Round to block size */
clen = skb->len;
esp = x->data;
alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
tfm = esp->conf.tfm;
blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(tfm), 4);
clen = ALIGN(clen + 2, blksize);
if (esp->conf.padlen)
clen = ALIGN(clen, esp->conf.padlen);
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, clen-skb->len+alen, &trailer)) < 0)
goto error;
/* Fill padding... */
do {
int i;
for (i=0; i<clen-skb->len - 2; i++)
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + i) = i+1;
} while (0);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail + clen-skb->len - 2) = (clen - skb->len)-2;
pskb_put(skb, trailer, clen - skb->len);
__skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb->nh.raw);
top_iph = skb->nh.iph;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(skb->nh.raw + top_iph->ihl*4);
top_iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len + alen);
*(u8*)(trailer->tail - 1) = top_iph->protocol;
/* this is non-NULL only with UDP Encapsulation */
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
u32 *udpdata32;
uh = (struct udphdr *)esph;
uh->source = encap->encap_sport;
uh->dest = encap->encap_dport;
uh->len = htons(skb->len + alen - top_iph->ihl*4);
uh->check = 0;
switch (encap->encap_type) {
default:
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(uh + 1);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
udpdata32 = (u32 *)(uh + 1);
udpdata32[0] = udpdata32[1] = 0;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(udpdata32 + 2);
break;
}
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
} else
top_iph->protocol = IPPROTO_ESP;
esph->spi = x->id.spi;
esph->seq_no = htonl(++x->replay.oseq);
xfrm_aevent_doreplay(x);
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
do {
struct scatterlist *sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto error;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, esph->enc_data+esp->conf.ivlen-skb->data, clen);
crypto_cipher_encrypt(tfm, sg, sg, clen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
} while (0);
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
memcpy(esph->enc_data, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
crypto_cipher_get_iv(tfm, esp->conf.ivec, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(tfm));
}
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, (u8*)esph-skb->data,
sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen+clen, trailer->tail);
pskb_put(skb, trailer, alen);
}
ip_send_check(top_iph);
err = 0;
error:
return err;
}
/*
* Note: detecting truncated vs. non-truncated authentication data is very
* expensive, so we only support truncated data, which is the recommended
* and common case.
*/
static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *iph;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
int blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
int alen = esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
int elen = skb->len - sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) - esp->conf.ivlen - alen;
int nfrags;
int encap_len = 0;
u8 nexthdr[2];
struct scatterlist *sg;
u8 workbuf[60];
int padlen;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr)))
goto out;
if (elen <= 0 || (elen & (blksize-1)))
goto out;
/* If integrity check is required, do this. */
if (esp->auth.icv_full_len) {
u8 sum[esp->auth.icv_full_len];
u8 sum1[alen];
esp->auth.icv(esp, skb, 0, skb->len-alen, sum);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen, sum1, alen))
BUG();
if (unlikely(memcmp(sum, sum1, alen))) {
x->stats.integrity_failed++;
goto out;
}
}
if ((nfrags = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer)) < 0)
goto out;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)skb->data;
iph = skb->nh.iph;
/* Get ivec. This can be wrong, check against another impls. */
if (esp->conf.ivlen)
crypto_cipher_set_iv(esp->conf.tfm, esph->enc_data, crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm));
sg = &esp->sgbuf[0];
if (unlikely(nfrags > ESP_NUM_FAST_SG)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scatterlist)*nfrags, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sg)
goto out;
}
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen, elen);
crypto_cipher_decrypt(esp->conf.tfm, sg, sg, elen);
if (unlikely(sg != &esp->sgbuf[0]))
kfree(sg);
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->len-alen-2, nexthdr, 2))
BUG();
padlen = nexthdr[0];
if (padlen+2 >= elen)
goto out;
/* ... check padding bits here. Silly. :-) */
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
struct udphdr *uh;
uh = (struct udphdr *)(iph + 1);
encap_len = (void*)esph - (void*)uh;
/*
* 1) if the NAT-T peer's IP or port changed then
* advertize the change to the keying daemon.
* This is an inbound SA, so just compare
* SRC ports.
*/
if (iph->saddr != x->props.saddr.a4 ||
uh->source != encap->encap_sport) {
xfrm_address_t ipaddr;
ipaddr.a4 = iph->saddr;
km_new_mapping(x, &ipaddr, uh->source);
/* XXX: perhaps add an extra
* policy check here, to see
* if we should allow or
* reject a packet from a
* different source
* address/port.
*/
}
/*
* 2) ignore UDP/TCP checksums in case
* of NAT-T in Transport Mode, or
* perform other post-processing fixes
* as per draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-06,
* section 3.1.2
*/
if (!x->props.mode)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
}
iph->protocol = nexthdr[1];
pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - alen - padlen - 2);
memcpy(workbuf, skb->nh.raw, iph->ihl*4);
skb->h.raw = skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen);
skb->nh.raw += encap_len + sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
memcpy(skb->nh.raw, workbuf, iph->ihl*4);
skb->nh.iph->tot_len = htons(skb->len);
return 0;
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
static u32 esp4_get_max_size(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu)
{
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
u32 blksize = ALIGN(crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(esp->conf.tfm), 4);
if (x->props.mode) {
mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, blksize);
} else {
/* The worst case. */
mtu = ALIGN(mtu + 2, 4) + blksize - 4;
}
if (esp->conf.padlen)
mtu = ALIGN(mtu, esp->conf.padlen);
return mtu + x->props.header_len + esp->auth.icv_trunc_len;
}
static void esp4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr*)skb->data;
struct ip_esp_hdr *esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
struct xfrm_state *x;
if (skb->h.icmph->type != ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ||
skb->h.icmph->code != ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED)
return;
x = xfrm_state_lookup((xfrm_address_t *)&iph->daddr, esph->spi, IPPROTO_ESP, AF_INET);
if (!x)
return;
NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG "pmtu discovery on SA ESP/%08x/%08x\n",
ntohl(esph->spi), ntohl(iph->daddr));
xfrm_state_put(x);
}
static void esp_destroy(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct esp_data *esp = x->data;
if (!esp)
return;
crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
kfree(esp);
}
static int esp_init_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
struct esp_data *esp = NULL;
/* null auth and encryption can have zero length keys */
if (x->aalg) {
if (x->aalg->alg_key_len > 512)
goto error;
}
if (x->ealg == NULL)
goto error;
esp = kmalloc(sizeof(*esp), GFP_KERNEL);
if (esp == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(esp, 0, sizeof(*esp));
if (x->aalg) {
struct xfrm_algo_desc *aalg_desc;
esp->auth.key = x->aalg->alg_key;
esp->auth.key_len = (x->aalg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
esp->auth.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
if (esp->auth.tfm == NULL)
goto error;
esp->auth.icv = esp_hmac_digest;
aalg_desc = xfrm_aalg_get_byname(x->aalg->alg_name, 0);
BUG_ON(!aalg_desc);
if (aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8 !=
crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm)) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ESP: %s digestsize %u != %hu\n",
x->aalg->alg_name,
crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(esp->auth.tfm),
aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8);
goto error;
}
esp->auth.icv_full_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_fullbits/8;
esp->auth.icv_trunc_len = aalg_desc->uinfo.auth.icv_truncbits/8;
esp->auth.work_icv = kmalloc(esp->auth.icv_full_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!esp->auth.work_icv)
goto error;
}
esp->conf.key = x->ealg->alg_key;
esp->conf.key_len = (x->ealg->alg_key_len+7)/8;
if (x->props.ealgo == SADB_EALG_NULL)
esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
else
esp->conf.tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(x->ealg->alg_name, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC);
if (esp->conf.tfm == NULL)
goto error;
esp->conf.ivlen = crypto_tfm_alg_ivsize(esp->conf.tfm);
esp->conf.padlen = 0;
if (esp->conf.ivlen) {
esp->conf.ivec = kmalloc(esp->conf.ivlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(esp->conf.ivec == NULL))
goto error;
get_random_bytes(esp->conf.ivec, esp->conf.ivlen);
}
if (crypto_cipher_setkey(esp->conf.tfm, esp->conf.key, esp->conf.key_len))
goto error;
x->props.header_len = sizeof(struct ip_esp_hdr) + esp->conf.ivlen;
if (x->props.mode)
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct iphdr);
if (x->encap) {
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap;
switch (encap->encap_type) {
default:
goto error;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr);
break;
case UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE:
x->props.header_len += sizeof(struct udphdr) + 2 * sizeof(u32);
break;
}
}
x->data = esp;
x->props.trailer_len = esp4_get_max_size(x, 0) - x->props.header_len;
return 0;
error:
x->data = esp;
esp_destroy(x);
x->data = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
static struct xfrm_type esp_type =
{
.description = "ESP4",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.proto = IPPROTO_ESP,
.init_state = esp_init_state,
.destructor = esp_destroy,
.get_max_size = esp4_get_max_size,
.input = esp_input,
.output = esp_output
};
static struct net_protocol esp4_protocol = {
.handler = xfrm4_rcv,
.err_handler = esp4_err,
.no_policy = 1,
};
static int __init esp4_init(void)
{
if (xfrm_register_type(&esp_type, AF_INET) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp init: can't add xfrm type\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (inet_add_protocol(&esp4_protocol, IPPROTO_ESP) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp init: can't add protocol\n");
xfrm_unregister_type(&esp_type, AF_INET);
return -EAGAIN;
}
return 0;
}
static void __exit esp4_fini(void)
{
if (inet_del_protocol(&esp4_protocol, IPPROTO_ESP) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp close: can't remove protocol\n");
if (xfrm_unregister_type(&esp_type, AF_INET) < 0)
printk(KERN_INFO "ip esp close: can't remove xfrm type\n");
}
module_init(esp4_init);
module_exit(esp4_fini);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");