linux/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
Linus Torvalds 7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00

1332 lines
34 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/memcontrol.h>
#include <linux/statfs.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include "../../mount.h"
#include "../fdinfo.h"
#include "fanotify.h"
#define FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS 16384
#define FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS 8192
#define FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_LISTENERS 128
/*
* All flags that may be specified in parameter event_f_flags of fanotify_init.
*
* Internal and external open flags are stored together in field f_flags of
* struct file. Only external open flags shall be allowed in event_f_flags.
* Internal flags like FMODE_NONOTIFY, FMODE_EXEC, FMODE_NOCMTIME shall be
* excluded.
*/
#define FANOTIFY_INIT_ALL_EVENT_F_BITS ( \
O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND | O_NONBLOCK | \
__O_SYNC | O_DSYNC | O_CLOEXEC | \
O_LARGEFILE | O_NOATIME )
extern const struct fsnotify_ops fanotify_fsnotify_ops;
struct kmem_cache *fanotify_mark_cache __read_mostly;
struct kmem_cache *fanotify_fid_event_cachep __read_mostly;
struct kmem_cache *fanotify_path_event_cachep __read_mostly;
struct kmem_cache *fanotify_perm_event_cachep __read_mostly;
#define FANOTIFY_EVENT_ALIGN 4
#define FANOTIFY_INFO_HDR_LEN \
(sizeof(struct fanotify_event_info_fid) + sizeof(struct file_handle))
static int fanotify_fid_info_len(int fh_len, int name_len)
{
int info_len = fh_len;
if (name_len)
info_len += name_len + 1;
return roundup(FANOTIFY_INFO_HDR_LEN + info_len, FANOTIFY_EVENT_ALIGN);
}
static int fanotify_event_info_len(unsigned int fid_mode,
struct fanotify_event *event)
{
struct fanotify_info *info = fanotify_event_info(event);
int dir_fh_len = fanotify_event_dir_fh_len(event);
int fh_len = fanotify_event_object_fh_len(event);
int info_len = 0;
int dot_len = 0;
if (dir_fh_len) {
info_len += fanotify_fid_info_len(dir_fh_len, info->name_len);
} else if ((fid_mode & FAN_REPORT_NAME) && (event->mask & FAN_ONDIR)) {
/*
* With group flag FAN_REPORT_NAME, if name was not recorded in
* event on a directory, we will report the name ".".
*/
dot_len = 1;
}
if (fh_len)
info_len += fanotify_fid_info_len(fh_len, dot_len);
return info_len;
}
/*
* Get an fanotify notification event if one exists and is small
* enough to fit in "count". Return an error pointer if the count
* is not large enough. When permission event is dequeued, its state is
* updated accordingly.
*/
static struct fanotify_event *get_one_event(struct fsnotify_group *group,
size_t count)
{
size_t event_size = FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN;
struct fanotify_event *event = NULL;
unsigned int fid_mode = FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_FID_BITS);
pr_debug("%s: group=%p count=%zd\n", __func__, group, count);
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
if (fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty(group))
goto out;
if (fid_mode) {
event_size += fanotify_event_info_len(fid_mode,
FANOTIFY_E(fsnotify_peek_first_event(group)));
}
if (event_size > count) {
event = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto out;
}
event = FANOTIFY_E(fsnotify_remove_first_event(group));
if (fanotify_is_perm_event(event->mask))
FANOTIFY_PERM(event)->state = FAN_EVENT_REPORTED;
out:
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
return event;
}
static int create_fd(struct fsnotify_group *group, struct path *path,
struct file **file)
{
int client_fd;
struct file *new_file;
client_fd = get_unused_fd_flags(group->fanotify_data.f_flags);
if (client_fd < 0)
return client_fd;
/*
* we need a new file handle for the userspace program so it can read even if it was
* originally opened O_WRONLY.
*/
new_file = dentry_open(path,
group->fanotify_data.f_flags | FMODE_NONOTIFY,
current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(new_file)) {
/*
* we still send an event even if we can't open the file. this
* can happen when say tasks are gone and we try to open their
* /proc files or we try to open a WRONLY file like in sysfs
* we just send the errno to userspace since there isn't much
* else we can do.
*/
put_unused_fd(client_fd);
client_fd = PTR_ERR(new_file);
} else {
*file = new_file;
}
return client_fd;
}
/*
* Finish processing of permission event by setting it to ANSWERED state and
* drop group->notification_lock.
*/
static void finish_permission_event(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct fanotify_perm_event *event,
unsigned int response)
__releases(&group->notification_lock)
{
bool destroy = false;
assert_spin_locked(&group->notification_lock);
event->response = response;
if (event->state == FAN_EVENT_CANCELED)
destroy = true;
else
event->state = FAN_EVENT_ANSWERED;
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
if (destroy)
fsnotify_destroy_event(group, &event->fae.fse);
}
static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct fanotify_response *response_struct)
{
struct fanotify_perm_event *event;
int fd = response_struct->fd;
int response = response_struct->response;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p fd=%d response=%d\n", __func__, group,
fd, response);
/*
* make sure the response is valid, if invalid we do nothing and either
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && !FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
list_for_each_entry(event, &group->fanotify_data.access_list,
fae.fse.list) {
if (event->fd != fd)
continue;
list_del_init(&event->fae.fse.list);
finish_permission_event(group, event, response);
wake_up(&group->fanotify_data.access_waitq);
return 0;
}
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
static int copy_info_to_user(__kernel_fsid_t *fsid, struct fanotify_fh *fh,
int info_type, const char *name, size_t name_len,
char __user *buf, size_t count)
{
struct fanotify_event_info_fid info = { };
struct file_handle handle = { };
unsigned char bounce[FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN], *fh_buf;
size_t fh_len = fh ? fh->len : 0;
size_t info_len = fanotify_fid_info_len(fh_len, name_len);
size_t len = info_len;
pr_debug("%s: fh_len=%zu name_len=%zu, info_len=%zu, count=%zu\n",
__func__, fh_len, name_len, info_len, count);
if (!fh_len)
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < sizeof(info) || len > count))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Copy event info fid header followed by variable sized file handle
* and optionally followed by variable sized filename.
*/
switch (info_type) {
case FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_FID:
case FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(name_len))
return -EFAULT;
break;
case FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID_NAME:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!name || !name_len))
return -EFAULT;
break;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
info.hdr.info_type = info_type;
info.hdr.len = len;
info.fsid = *fsid;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
buf += sizeof(info);
len -= sizeof(info);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < sizeof(handle)))
return -EFAULT;
handle.handle_type = fh->type;
handle.handle_bytes = fh_len;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &handle, sizeof(handle)))
return -EFAULT;
buf += sizeof(handle);
len -= sizeof(handle);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < fh_len))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* For an inline fh and inline file name, copy through stack to exclude
* the copy from usercopy hardening protections.
*/
fh_buf = fanotify_fh_buf(fh);
if (fh_len <= FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN) {
memcpy(bounce, fh_buf, fh_len);
fh_buf = bounce;
}
if (copy_to_user(buf, fh_buf, fh_len))
return -EFAULT;
buf += fh_len;
len -= fh_len;
if (name_len) {
/* Copy the filename with terminating null */
name_len++;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < name_len))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(buf, name, name_len))
return -EFAULT;
buf += name_len;
len -= name_len;
}
/* Pad with 0's */
WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len >= FANOTIFY_EVENT_ALIGN);
if (len > 0 && clear_user(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
return info_len;
}
static ssize_t copy_event_to_user(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct fanotify_event *event,
char __user *buf, size_t count)
{
struct fanotify_event_metadata metadata;
struct path *path = fanotify_event_path(event);
struct fanotify_info *info = fanotify_event_info(event);
unsigned int fid_mode = FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_FID_BITS);
struct file *f = NULL;
int ret, fd = FAN_NOFD;
int info_type = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p\n", __func__, group, event);
metadata.event_len = FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN +
fanotify_event_info_len(fid_mode, event);
metadata.metadata_len = FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN;
metadata.vers = FANOTIFY_METADATA_VERSION;
metadata.reserved = 0;
metadata.mask = event->mask & FANOTIFY_OUTGOING_EVENTS;
metadata.pid = pid_vnr(event->pid);
if (path && path->mnt && path->dentry) {
fd = create_fd(group, path, &f);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
}
metadata.fd = fd;
ret = -EFAULT;
/*
* Sanity check copy size in case get_one_event() and
* event_len sizes ever get out of sync.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(metadata.event_len > count))
goto out_close_fd;
if (copy_to_user(buf, &metadata, FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN))
goto out_close_fd;
buf += FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN;
count -= FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN;
if (fanotify_is_perm_event(event->mask))
FANOTIFY_PERM(event)->fd = fd;
if (f)
fd_install(fd, f);
/* Event info records order is: dir fid + name, child fid */
if (fanotify_event_dir_fh_len(event)) {
info_type = info->name_len ? FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID_NAME :
FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID;
ret = copy_info_to_user(fanotify_event_fsid(event),
fanotify_info_dir_fh(info),
info_type, fanotify_info_name(info),
info->name_len, buf, count);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf += ret;
count -= ret;
}
if (fanotify_event_object_fh_len(event)) {
const char *dot = NULL;
int dot_len = 0;
if (fid_mode == FAN_REPORT_FID || info_type) {
/*
* With only group flag FAN_REPORT_FID only type FID is
* reported. Second info record type is always FID.
*/
info_type = FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_FID;
} else if ((fid_mode & FAN_REPORT_NAME) &&
(event->mask & FAN_ONDIR)) {
/*
* With group flag FAN_REPORT_NAME, if name was not
* recorded in an event on a directory, report the
* name "." with info type DFID_NAME.
*/
info_type = FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID_NAME;
dot = ".";
dot_len = 1;
} else if ((event->mask & ALL_FSNOTIFY_DIRENT_EVENTS) ||
(event->mask & FAN_ONDIR)) {
/*
* With group flag FAN_REPORT_DIR_FID, a single info
* record has type DFID for directory entry modification
* event and for event on a directory.
*/
info_type = FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_DFID;
} else {
/*
* With group flags FAN_REPORT_DIR_FID|FAN_REPORT_FID,
* a single info record has type FID for event on a
* non-directory, when there is no directory to report.
* For example, on FAN_DELETE_SELF event.
*/
info_type = FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_FID;
}
ret = copy_info_to_user(fanotify_event_fsid(event),
fanotify_event_object_fh(event),
info_type, dot, dot_len, buf, count);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf += ret;
count -= ret;
}
return metadata.event_len;
out_close_fd:
if (fd != FAN_NOFD) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
fput(f);
}
return ret;
}
/* intofiy userspace file descriptor functions */
static __poll_t fanotify_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data;
__poll_t ret = 0;
poll_wait(file, &group->notification_waitq, wait);
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
if (!fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty(group))
ret = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
return ret;
}
static ssize_t fanotify_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct fanotify_event *event;
char __user *start;
int ret;
DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
start = buf;
group = file->private_data;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p\n", __func__, group);
add_wait_queue(&group->notification_waitq, &wait);
while (1) {
/*
* User can supply arbitrarily large buffer. Avoid softlockups
* in case there are lots of available events.
*/
cond_resched();
event = get_one_event(group, count);
if (IS_ERR(event)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(event);
break;
}
if (!event) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
break;
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
if (start != buf)
break;
wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
continue;
}
ret = copy_event_to_user(group, event, buf, count);
if (unlikely(ret == -EOPENSTALE)) {
/*
* We cannot report events with stale fd so drop it.
* Setting ret to 0 will continue the event loop and
* do the right thing if there are no more events to
* read (i.e. return bytes read, -EAGAIN or wait).
*/
ret = 0;
}
/*
* Permission events get queued to wait for response. Other
* events can be destroyed now.
*/
if (!fanotify_is_perm_event(event->mask)) {
fsnotify_destroy_event(group, &event->fse);
} else {
if (ret <= 0) {
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
finish_permission_event(group,
FANOTIFY_PERM(event), FAN_DENY);
wake_up(&group->fanotify_data.access_waitq);
} else {
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
list_add_tail(&event->fse.list,
&group->fanotify_data.access_list);
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
}
}
if (ret < 0)
break;
buf += ret;
count -= ret;
}
remove_wait_queue(&group->notification_waitq, &wait);
if (start != buf && ret != -EFAULT)
ret = buf - start;
return ret;
}
static ssize_t fanotify_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct fanotify_response response = { .fd = -1, .response = -1 };
struct fsnotify_group *group;
int ret;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS))
return -EINVAL;
group = file->private_data;
if (count < sizeof(response))
return -EINVAL;
count = sizeof(response);
pr_debug("%s: group=%p count=%zu\n", __func__, group, count);
if (copy_from_user(&response, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
ret = process_access_response(group, &response);
if (ret < 0)
count = ret;
return count;
}
static int fanotify_release(struct inode *ignored, struct file *file)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data;
/*
* Stop new events from arriving in the notification queue. since
* userspace cannot use fanotify fd anymore, no event can enter or
* leave access_list by now either.
*/
fsnotify_group_stop_queueing(group);
/*
* Process all permission events on access_list and notification queue
* and simulate reply from userspace.
*/
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
while (!list_empty(&group->fanotify_data.access_list)) {
struct fanotify_perm_event *event;
event = list_first_entry(&group->fanotify_data.access_list,
struct fanotify_perm_event, fae.fse.list);
list_del_init(&event->fae.fse.list);
finish_permission_event(group, event, FAN_ALLOW);
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
}
/*
* Destroy all non-permission events. For permission events just
* dequeue them and set the response. They will be freed once the
* response is consumed and fanotify_get_response() returns.
*/
while (!fsnotify_notify_queue_is_empty(group)) {
struct fanotify_event *event;
event = FANOTIFY_E(fsnotify_remove_first_event(group));
if (!(event->mask & FANOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS)) {
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
fsnotify_destroy_event(group, &event->fse);
} else {
finish_permission_event(group, FANOTIFY_PERM(event),
FAN_ALLOW);
}
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
/* Response for all permission events it set, wakeup waiters */
wake_up(&group->fanotify_data.access_waitq);
/* matches the fanotify_init->fsnotify_alloc_group */
fsnotify_destroy_group(group);
return 0;
}
static long fanotify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct fsnotify_event *fsn_event;
void __user *p;
int ret = -ENOTTY;
size_t send_len = 0;
group = file->private_data;
p = (void __user *) arg;
switch (cmd) {
case FIONREAD:
spin_lock(&group->notification_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fsn_event, &group->notification_list, list)
send_len += FAN_EVENT_METADATA_LEN;
spin_unlock(&group->notification_lock);
ret = put_user(send_len, (int __user *) p);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations fanotify_fops = {
.show_fdinfo = fanotify_show_fdinfo,
.poll = fanotify_poll,
.read = fanotify_read,
.write = fanotify_write,
.fasync = NULL,
.release = fanotify_release,
.unlocked_ioctl = fanotify_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
static int fanotify_find_path(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
struct path *path, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
unsigned int obj_type)
{
int ret;
pr_debug("%s: dfd=%d filename=%p flags=%x\n", __func__,
dfd, filename, flags);
if (filename == NULL) {
struct fd f = fdget(dfd);
ret = -EBADF;
if (!f.file)
goto out;
ret = -ENOTDIR;
if ((flags & FAN_MARK_ONLYDIR) &&
!(S_ISDIR(file_inode(f.file)->i_mode))) {
fdput(f);
goto out;
}
*path = f.file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fdput(f);
} else {
unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
if (!(flags & FAN_MARK_DONT_FOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (flags & FAN_MARK_ONLYDIR)
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
ret = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, path);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
ret = path_permission(path, MAY_READ);
if (ret) {
path_put(path);
goto out;
}
ret = security_path_notify(path, mask, obj_type);
if (ret)
path_put(path);
out:
return ret;
}
static __u32 fanotify_mark_remove_from_mask(struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark,
__u32 mask, unsigned int flags,
__u32 umask, int *destroy)
{
__u32 oldmask = 0;
/* umask bits cannot be removed by user */
mask &= ~umask;
spin_lock(&fsn_mark->lock);
if (!(flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_MASK)) {
oldmask = fsn_mark->mask;
fsn_mark->mask &= ~mask;
} else {
fsn_mark->ignored_mask &= ~mask;
}
/*
* We need to keep the mark around even if remaining mask cannot
* result in any events (e.g. mask == FAN_ONDIR) to support incremenal
* changes to the mask.
* Destroy mark when only umask bits remain.
*/
*destroy = !((fsn_mark->mask | fsn_mark->ignored_mask) & ~umask);
spin_unlock(&fsn_mark->lock);
return mask & oldmask;
}
static int fanotify_remove_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_connp_t *connp, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __u32 umask)
{
struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark = NULL;
__u32 removed;
int destroy_mark;
mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex);
fsn_mark = fsnotify_find_mark(connp, group);
if (!fsn_mark) {
mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex);
return -ENOENT;
}
removed = fanotify_mark_remove_from_mask(fsn_mark, mask, flags,
umask, &destroy_mark);
if (removed & fsnotify_conn_mask(fsn_mark->connector))
fsnotify_recalc_mask(fsn_mark->connector);
if (destroy_mark)
fsnotify_detach_mark(fsn_mark);
mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex);
if (destroy_mark)
fsnotify_free_mark(fsn_mark);
/* matches the fsnotify_find_mark() */
fsnotify_put_mark(fsn_mark);
return 0;
}
static int fanotify_remove_vfsmount_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __u32 umask)
{
return fanotify_remove_mark(group, &real_mount(mnt)->mnt_fsnotify_marks,
mask, flags, umask);
}
static int fanotify_remove_sb_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct super_block *sb, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __u32 umask)
{
return fanotify_remove_mark(group, &sb->s_fsnotify_marks, mask,
flags, umask);
}
static int fanotify_remove_inode_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct inode *inode, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __u32 umask)
{
return fanotify_remove_mark(group, &inode->i_fsnotify_marks, mask,
flags, umask);
}
static __u32 fanotify_mark_add_to_mask(struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark,
__u32 mask,
unsigned int flags)
{
__u32 oldmask = -1;
spin_lock(&fsn_mark->lock);
if (!(flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_MASK)) {
oldmask = fsn_mark->mask;
fsn_mark->mask |= mask;
} else {
fsn_mark->ignored_mask |= mask;
if (flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_SURV_MODIFY)
fsn_mark->flags |= FSNOTIFY_MARK_FLAG_IGNORED_SURV_MODIFY;
}
spin_unlock(&fsn_mark->lock);
return mask & ~oldmask;
}
static struct fsnotify_mark *fanotify_add_new_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_connp_t *connp,
unsigned int type,
__kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
struct fsnotify_mark *mark;
int ret;
if (atomic_read(&group->num_marks) > group->fanotify_data.max_marks)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
mark = kmem_cache_alloc(fanotify_mark_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mark)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
fsnotify_init_mark(mark, group);
ret = fsnotify_add_mark_locked(mark, connp, type, 0, fsid);
if (ret) {
fsnotify_put_mark(mark);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
return mark;
}
static int fanotify_add_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_connp_t *connp, unsigned int type,
__u32 mask, unsigned int flags,
__kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
struct fsnotify_mark *fsn_mark;
__u32 added;
mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex);
fsn_mark = fsnotify_find_mark(connp, group);
if (!fsn_mark) {
fsn_mark = fanotify_add_new_mark(group, connp, type, fsid);
if (IS_ERR(fsn_mark)) {
mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex);
return PTR_ERR(fsn_mark);
}
}
added = fanotify_mark_add_to_mask(fsn_mark, mask, flags);
if (added & ~fsnotify_conn_mask(fsn_mark->connector))
fsnotify_recalc_mask(fsn_mark->connector);
mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex);
fsnotify_put_mark(fsn_mark);
return 0;
}
static int fanotify_add_vfsmount_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
return fanotify_add_mark(group, &real_mount(mnt)->mnt_fsnotify_marks,
FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT, mask, flags, fsid);
}
static int fanotify_add_sb_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct super_block *sb, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
return fanotify_add_mark(group, &sb->s_fsnotify_marks,
FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB, mask, flags, fsid);
}
static int fanotify_add_inode_mark(struct fsnotify_group *group,
struct inode *inode, __u32 mask,
unsigned int flags, __kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
pr_debug("%s: group=%p inode=%p\n", __func__, group, inode);
/*
* If some other task has this inode open for write we should not add
* an ignored mark, unless that ignored mark is supposed to survive
* modification changes anyway.
*/
if ((flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_MASK) &&
!(flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_SURV_MODIFY) &&
inode_is_open_for_write(inode))
return 0;
return fanotify_add_mark(group, &inode->i_fsnotify_marks,
FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE, mask, flags, fsid);
}
static struct fsnotify_event *fanotify_alloc_overflow_event(void)
{
struct fanotify_event *oevent;
oevent = kmalloc(sizeof(*oevent), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!oevent)
return NULL;
fanotify_init_event(oevent, 0, FS_Q_OVERFLOW);
oevent->type = FANOTIFY_EVENT_TYPE_OVERFLOW;
return &oevent->fse;
}
/* fanotify syscalls */
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
int f_flags, fd;
struct user_struct *user;
unsigned int fid_mode = flags & FANOTIFY_FID_BITS;
unsigned int class = flags & FANOTIFY_CLASS_BITS;
pr_debug("%s: flags=%x event_f_flags=%x\n",
__func__, flags, event_f_flags);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
if (flags & ~(FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT))
#else
if (flags & ~FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS)
#endif
return -EINVAL;
if (event_f_flags & ~FANOTIFY_INIT_ALL_EVENT_F_BITS)
return -EINVAL;
switch (event_f_flags & O_ACCMODE) {
case O_RDONLY:
case O_RDWR:
case O_WRONLY:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (fid_mode && class != FAN_CLASS_NOTIF)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Child name is reported with parent fid so requires dir fid.
* We can report both child fid and dir fid with or without name.
*/
if ((fid_mode & FAN_REPORT_NAME) && !(fid_mode & FAN_REPORT_DIR_FID))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (atomic_read(&user->fanotify_listeners) > FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_LISTENERS) {
free_uid(user);
return -EMFILE;
}
f_flags = O_RDWR | FMODE_NONOTIFY;
if (flags & FAN_CLOEXEC)
f_flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
if (flags & FAN_NONBLOCK)
f_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
/* fsnotify_alloc_group takes a ref. Dropped in fanotify_release */
group = fsnotify_alloc_user_group(&fanotify_fsnotify_ops);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
free_uid(user);
return PTR_ERR(group);
}
group->fanotify_data.user = user;
group->fanotify_data.flags = flags;
atomic_inc(&user->fanotify_listeners);
group->memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
group->overflow_event = fanotify_alloc_overflow_event();
if (unlikely(!group->overflow_event)) {
fd = -ENOMEM;
goto out_destroy_group;
}
if (force_o_largefile())
event_f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
group->fanotify_data.f_flags = event_f_flags;
init_waitqueue_head(&group->fanotify_data.access_waitq);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&group->fanotify_data.access_list);
switch (class) {
case FAN_CLASS_NOTIF:
group->priority = FS_PRIO_0;
break;
case FAN_CLASS_CONTENT:
group->priority = FS_PRIO_1;
break;
case FAN_CLASS_PRE_CONTENT:
group->priority = FS_PRIO_2;
break;
default:
fd = -EINVAL;
goto out_destroy_group;
}
if (flags & FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE) {
fd = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out_destroy_group;
group->max_events = UINT_MAX;
} else {
group->max_events = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_EVENTS;
}
if (flags & FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS) {
fd = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto out_destroy_group;
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = UINT_MAX;
} else {
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
fd = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
goto out_destroy_group;
}
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
return fd;
out_destroy_group:
fsnotify_destroy_group(group);
return fd;
}
/* Check if filesystem can encode a unique fid */
static int fanotify_test_fid(struct path *path, __kernel_fsid_t *fsid)
{
__kernel_fsid_t root_fsid;
int err;
/*
* Make sure path is not in filesystem with zero fsid (e.g. tmpfs).
*/
err = vfs_get_fsid(path->dentry, fsid);
if (err)
return err;
if (!fsid->val[0] && !fsid->val[1])
return -ENODEV;
/*
* Make sure path is not inside a filesystem subvolume (e.g. btrfs)
* which uses a different fsid than sb root.
*/
err = vfs_get_fsid(path->dentry->d_sb->s_root, &root_fsid);
if (err)
return err;
if (root_fsid.val[0] != fsid->val[0] ||
root_fsid.val[1] != fsid->val[1])
return -EXDEV;
/*
* We need to make sure that the file system supports at least
* encoding a file handle so user can use name_to_handle_at() to
* compare fid returned with event to the file handle of watched
* objects. However, name_to_handle_at() requires that the
* filesystem also supports decoding file handles.
*/
if (!path->dentry->d_sb->s_export_op ||
!path->dentry->d_sb->s_export_op->fh_to_dentry)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
static int fanotify_events_supported(struct path *path, __u64 mask)
{
/*
* Some filesystems such as 'proc' acquire unusual locks when opening
* files. For them fanotify permission events have high chances of
* deadlocking the system - open done when reporting fanotify event
* blocks on this "unusual" lock while another process holding the lock
* waits for fanotify permission event to be answered. Just disallow
* permission events for such filesystems.
*/
if (mask & FANOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS &&
path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_DISALLOW_NOTIFY_PERM)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
int dfd, const char __user *pathname)
{
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct fd f;
struct path path;
__kernel_fsid_t __fsid, *fsid = NULL;
u32 valid_mask = FANOTIFY_EVENTS | FANOTIFY_EVENT_FLAGS;
unsigned int mark_type = flags & FANOTIFY_MARK_TYPE_BITS;
bool ignored = flags & FAN_MARK_IGNORED_MASK;
unsigned int obj_type, fid_mode;
u32 umask = 0;
int ret;
pr_debug("%s: fanotify_fd=%d flags=%x dfd=%d pathname=%p mask=%llx\n",
__func__, fanotify_fd, flags, dfd, pathname, mask);
/* we only use the lower 32 bits as of right now. */
if (mask & ((__u64)0xffffffff << 32))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~FANOTIFY_MARK_FLAGS)
return -EINVAL;
switch (mark_type) {
case FAN_MARK_INODE:
obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE;
break;
case FAN_MARK_MOUNT:
obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT;
break;
case FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM:
obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (flags & (FAN_MARK_ADD | FAN_MARK_REMOVE | FAN_MARK_FLUSH)) {
case FAN_MARK_ADD:
case FAN_MARK_REMOVE:
if (!mask)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case FAN_MARK_FLUSH:
if (flags & ~(FANOTIFY_MARK_TYPE_BITS | FAN_MARK_FLUSH))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS))
valid_mask |= FANOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS;
if (mask & ~valid_mask)
return -EINVAL;
/* Event flags (ONDIR, ON_CHILD) are meaningless in ignored mask */
if (ignored)
mask &= ~FANOTIFY_EVENT_FLAGS;
f = fdget(fanotify_fd);
if (unlikely(!f.file))
return -EBADF;
/* verify that this is indeed an fanotify instance */
ret = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(f.file->f_op != &fanotify_fops))
goto fput_and_out;
group = f.file->private_data;
/*
* group->priority == FS_PRIO_0 == FAN_CLASS_NOTIF. These are not
* allowed to set permissions events.
*/
ret = -EINVAL;
if (mask & FANOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS &&
group->priority == FS_PRIO_0)
goto fput_and_out;
/*
* Events with data type inode do not carry enough information to report
* event->fd, so we do not allow setting a mask for inode events unless
* group supports reporting fid.
* inode events are not supported on a mount mark, because they do not
* carry enough information (i.e. path) to be filtered by mount point.
*/
fid_mode = FAN_GROUP_FLAG(group, FANOTIFY_FID_BITS);
if (mask & FANOTIFY_INODE_EVENTS &&
(!fid_mode || mark_type == FAN_MARK_MOUNT))
goto fput_and_out;
if (flags & FAN_MARK_FLUSH) {
ret = 0;
if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_MOUNT)
fsnotify_clear_vfsmount_marks_by_group(group);
else if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM)
fsnotify_clear_sb_marks_by_group(group);
else
fsnotify_clear_inode_marks_by_group(group);
goto fput_and_out;
}
ret = fanotify_find_path(dfd, pathname, &path, flags,
(mask & ALL_FSNOTIFY_EVENTS), obj_type);
if (ret)
goto fput_and_out;
if (flags & FAN_MARK_ADD) {
ret = fanotify_events_supported(&path, mask);
if (ret)
goto path_put_and_out;
}
if (fid_mode) {
ret = fanotify_test_fid(&path, &__fsid);
if (ret)
goto path_put_and_out;
fsid = &__fsid;
}
/* inode held in place by reference to path; group by fget on fd */
if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_INODE)
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
else
mnt = path.mnt;
/* Mask out FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD flag for sb/mount/non-dir marks */
if (mnt || !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
mask &= ~FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
umask = FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
/*
* If group needs to report parent fid, register for getting
* events with parent/name info for non-directory.
*/
if ((fid_mode & FAN_REPORT_DIR_FID) &&
(flags & FAN_MARK_ADD) && !ignored)
mask |= FAN_EVENT_ON_CHILD;
}
/* create/update an inode mark */
switch (flags & (FAN_MARK_ADD | FAN_MARK_REMOVE)) {
case FAN_MARK_ADD:
if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_MOUNT)
ret = fanotify_add_vfsmount_mark(group, mnt, mask,
flags, fsid);
else if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM)
ret = fanotify_add_sb_mark(group, mnt->mnt_sb, mask,
flags, fsid);
else
ret = fanotify_add_inode_mark(group, inode, mask,
flags, fsid);
break;
case FAN_MARK_REMOVE:
if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_MOUNT)
ret = fanotify_remove_vfsmount_mark(group, mnt, mask,
flags, umask);
else if (mark_type == FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM)
ret = fanotify_remove_sb_mark(group, mnt->mnt_sb, mask,
flags, umask);
else
ret = fanotify_remove_inode_mark(group, inode, mask,
flags, umask);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
path_put_and_out:
path_put(&path);
fput_and_out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(fanotify_mark, int, fanotify_fd, unsigned int, flags,
__u64, mask, int, dfd,
const char __user *, pathname)
{
return do_fanotify_mark(fanotify_fd, flags, mask, dfd, pathname);
}
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_SPLIT_ARG64) || defined(CONFIG_COMPAT)
SYSCALL32_DEFINE6(fanotify_mark,
int, fanotify_fd, unsigned int, flags,
SC_ARG64(mask), int, dfd,
const char __user *, pathname)
{
return do_fanotify_mark(fanotify_fd, flags, SC_VAL64(__u64, mask),
dfd, pathname);
}
#endif
/*
* fanotify_user_setup - Our initialization function. Note that we cannot return
* error because we have compiled-in VFS hooks. So an (unlikely) failure here
* must result in panic().
*/
static int __init fanotify_user_setup(void)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(HWEIGHT32(FANOTIFY_INIT_FLAGS) != 10);
BUILD_BUG_ON(HWEIGHT32(FANOTIFY_MARK_FLAGS) != 9);
fanotify_mark_cache = KMEM_CACHE(fsnotify_mark,
SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT);
fanotify_fid_event_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fanotify_fid_event,
SLAB_PANIC);
fanotify_path_event_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fanotify_path_event,
SLAB_PANIC);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS)) {
fanotify_perm_event_cachep =
KMEM_CACHE(fanotify_perm_event, SLAB_PANIC);
}
return 0;
}
device_initcall(fanotify_user_setup);