d6a8b72edc
Global GTT doesn't have pat_sel[2:0] so it always point to pat_sel = 000; So the only way to avoid screen corruptions is setting PAT 0 to Uncached. MOCS can still be used though. But if userspace is trusting PTE for cache selection the safest thing to do is to let caches disabled. BSpec: "For GGTT, there is NO pat_sel[2:0] from the entry, so RTL will always use the value corresponding to pat_sel = 000" - System agent ggtt writes (i.e. cpu gtt mmaps) already work before this patch, i.e. the same uncached + snooping access like on gen6/7 seems to be in effect. - So this just fixes blitter/render access. Again it looks like it's not just uncached access, but uncached + snooping. So we can still hold onto all our assumptions wrt cpu clflushing on LLC machines. v2: Cleaner patch as suggested by Chris. v3: Add Daniel's comment Reference: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85576 Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: James Ausmus <james.ausmus@intel.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: James Ausmus <james.ausmus@intel.com> Reviewed-by: James Ausmus <james.ausmus@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> |
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.. | ||
armada | ||
ast | ||
bochs | ||
bridge | ||
cirrus | ||
exynos | ||
gma500 | ||
i2c | ||
i810 | ||
i915 | ||
mga | ||
mgag200 | ||
msm | ||
nouveau | ||
omapdrm | ||
panel | ||
qxl | ||
r128 | ||
radeon | ||
rcar-du | ||
savage | ||
shmobile | ||
sis | ||
sti | ||
tdfx | ||
tegra | ||
tilcdc | ||
ttm | ||
udl | ||
via | ||
vmwgfx | ||
ati_pcigart.c | ||
drm_agpsupport.c | ||
drm_auth.c | ||
drm_bufs.c | ||
drm_cache.c | ||
drm_context.c | ||
drm_crtc_helper.c | ||
drm_crtc_internal.h | ||
drm_crtc.c | ||
drm_debugfs.c | ||
drm_dma.c | ||
drm_dp_helper.c | ||
drm_dp_mst_topology.c | ||
drm_drv.c | ||
drm_edid_load.c | ||
drm_edid.c | ||
drm_encoder_slave.c | ||
drm_fb_cma_helper.c | ||
drm_fb_helper.c | ||
drm_flip_work.c | ||
drm_fops.c | ||
drm_gem_cma_helper.c | ||
drm_gem.c | ||
drm_global.c | ||
drm_hashtab.c | ||
drm_info.c | ||
drm_internal.h | ||
drm_ioc32.c | ||
drm_ioctl.c | ||
drm_irq.c | ||
drm_legacy.h | ||
drm_lock.c | ||
drm_memory.c | ||
drm_mipi_dsi.c | ||
drm_mm.c | ||
drm_modes.c | ||
drm_modeset_lock.c | ||
drm_of.c | ||
drm_panel.c | ||
drm_pci.c | ||
drm_plane_helper.c | ||
drm_platform.c | ||
drm_prime.c | ||
drm_probe_helper.c | ||
drm_rect.c | ||
drm_scatter.c | ||
drm_sysfs.c | ||
drm_trace_points.c | ||
drm_trace.h | ||
drm_vm.c | ||
drm_vma_manager.c | ||
Kconfig | ||
Makefile | ||
README.drm |
************************************************************ * For the very latest on DRI development, please see: * * http://dri.freedesktop.org/ * ************************************************************ The Direct Rendering Manager (drm) is a device-independent kernel-level device driver that provides support for the XFree86 Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI). The DRM supports the Direct Rendering Infrastructure (DRI) in four major ways: 1. The DRM provides synchronized access to the graphics hardware via the use of an optimized two-tiered lock. 2. The DRM enforces the DRI security policy for access to the graphics hardware by only allowing authenticated X11 clients access to restricted regions of memory. 3. The DRM provides a generic DMA engine, complete with multiple queues and the ability to detect the need for an OpenGL context switch. 4. The DRM is extensible via the use of small device-specific modules that rely extensively on the API exported by the DRM module. Documentation on the DRI is available from: http://dri.freedesktop.org/wiki/Documentation http://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=387 http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/ For specific information about kernel-level support, see: The Direct Rendering Manager, Kernel Support for the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/drm_low_level.html Hardware Locking for the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/hardware_locking_low_level.html A Security Analysis of the Direct Rendering Infrastructure http://dri.sourceforge.net/doc/security_low_level.html