febebaf366
This new test ensures that fortified strscpy has the same behavior than vanilla strscpy (e.g. returning -E2BIG when src content is truncated). Finally, it generates a crash at runtime because there is a write overflow in destination string. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201122162451.27551-5-laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com Signed-off-by: Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
25 lines
743 B
Makefile
25 lines
743 B
Makefile
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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obj-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += lkdtm.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += core.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += bugs.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += heap.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += perms.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += refcount.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += rodata_objcopy.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += usercopy.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += stackleak.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += cfi.o
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lkdtm-$(CONFIG_LKDTM) += fortify.o
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KASAN_SANITIZE_rodata.o := n
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KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rodata.o := n
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OBJCOPYFLAGS :=
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OBJCOPYFLAGS_rodata_objcopy.o := \
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--rename-section .noinstr.text=.rodata,alloc,readonly,load
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targets += rodata.o rodata_objcopy.o
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$(obj)/rodata_objcopy.o: $(obj)/rodata.o FORCE
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$(call if_changed,objcopy)
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