forked from Minki/linux
16e617d05e
Place the anonymous .fixup code at the tail of the regular functions. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211110101325.186049322@infradead.org
1442 lines
41 KiB
ArmAsm
1442 lines
41 KiB
ArmAsm
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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/*
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* linux/arch/x86_64/entry.S
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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* Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002 Andi Kleen SuSE Labs
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* Copyright (C) 2000 Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
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*
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* entry.S contains the system-call and fault low-level handling routines.
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*
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* Some of this is documented in Documentation/x86/entry_64.rst
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*
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* A note on terminology:
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* - iret frame: Architecture defined interrupt frame from SS to RIP
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* at the top of the kernel process stack.
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*
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* Some macro usage:
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* - SYM_FUNC_START/END:Define functions in the symbol table.
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* - idtentry: Define exception entry points.
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*/
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <asm/segment.h>
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#include <asm/cache.h>
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#include <asm/errno.h>
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#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
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#include <asm/msr.h>
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#include <asm/unistd.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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#include <asm/hw_irq.h>
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#include <asm/page_types.h>
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#include <asm/irqflags.h>
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#include <asm/paravirt.h>
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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#include <asm/asm.h>
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#include <asm/smap.h>
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#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
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#include <asm/export.h>
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#include <asm/frame.h>
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#include <asm/trapnr.h>
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#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
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#include <asm/fsgsbase.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include "calling.h"
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.code64
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.section .entry.text, "ax"
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/*
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* 64-bit SYSCALL instruction entry. Up to 6 arguments in registers.
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*
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* This is the only entry point used for 64-bit system calls. The
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* hardware interface is reasonably well designed and the register to
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* argument mapping Linux uses fits well with the registers that are
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* available when SYSCALL is used.
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*
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* SYSCALL instructions can be found inlined in libc implementations as
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* well as some other programs and libraries. There are also a handful
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* of SYSCALL instructions in the vDSO used, for example, as a
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* clock_gettimeofday fallback.
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*
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* 64-bit SYSCALL saves rip to rcx, clears rflags.RF, then saves rflags to r11,
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* then loads new ss, cs, and rip from previously programmed MSRs.
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* rflags gets masked by a value from another MSR (so CLD and CLAC
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* are not needed). SYSCALL does not save anything on the stack
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* and does not change rsp.
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*
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* Registers on entry:
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* rax system call number
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* rcx return address
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* r11 saved rflags (note: r11 is callee-clobbered register in C ABI)
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* rdi arg0
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* rsi arg1
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* rdx arg2
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* r10 arg3 (needs to be moved to rcx to conform to C ABI)
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* r8 arg4
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* r9 arg5
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* (note: r12-r15, rbp, rbx are callee-preserved in C ABI)
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*
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* Only called from user space.
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*
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* When user can change pt_regs->foo always force IRET. That is because
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* it deals with uncanonical addresses better. SYSRET has trouble
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* with them due to bugs in both AMD and Intel CPUs.
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*/
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SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64)
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UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
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swapgs
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/* tss.sp2 is scratch space. */
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movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
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SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
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pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
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pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2) /* pt_regs->sp */
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pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
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pushq $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
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pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
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SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
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pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
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PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS
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/* IRQs are off. */
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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/* Sign extend the lower 32bit as syscall numbers are treated as int */
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movslq %eax, %rsi
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call do_syscall_64 /* returns with IRQs disabled */
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/*
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* Try to use SYSRET instead of IRET if we're returning to
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* a completely clean 64-bit userspace context. If we're not,
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* go to the slow exit path.
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* In the Xen PV case we must use iret anyway.
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*/
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ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", \
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X86_FEATURE_XENPV
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movq RCX(%rsp), %rcx
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movq RIP(%rsp), %r11
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cmpq %rcx, %r11 /* SYSRET requires RCX == RIP */
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jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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/*
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* On Intel CPUs, SYSRET with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP
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* in kernel space. This essentially lets the user take over
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* the kernel, since userspace controls RSP.
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*
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* If width of "canonical tail" ever becomes variable, this will need
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* to be updated to remain correct on both old and new CPUs.
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*
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* Change top bits to match most significant bit (47th or 56th bit
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* depending on paging mode) in the address.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
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ALTERNATIVE "shl $(64 - 48), %rcx; sar $(64 - 48), %rcx", \
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"shl $(64 - 57), %rcx; sar $(64 - 57), %rcx", X86_FEATURE_LA57
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#else
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shl $(64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT+1)), %rcx
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sar $(64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT+1)), %rcx
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#endif
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/* If this changed %rcx, it was not canonical */
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cmpq %rcx, %r11
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jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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cmpq $__USER_CS, CS(%rsp) /* CS must match SYSRET */
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jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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movq R11(%rsp), %r11
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cmpq %r11, EFLAGS(%rsp) /* R11 == RFLAGS */
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jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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/*
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* SYSCALL clears RF when it saves RFLAGS in R11 and SYSRET cannot
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* restore RF properly. If the slowpath sets it for whatever reason, we
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* need to restore it correctly.
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*
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* SYSRET can restore TF, but unlike IRET, restoring TF results in a
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* trap from userspace immediately after SYSRET. This would cause an
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* infinite loop whenever #DB happens with register state that satisfies
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* the opportunistic SYSRET conditions. For example, single-stepping
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* this user code:
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*
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* movq $stuck_here, %rcx
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* pushfq
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* popq %r11
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* stuck_here:
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*
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* would never get past 'stuck_here'.
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*/
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testq $(X86_EFLAGS_RF|X86_EFLAGS_TF), %r11
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jnz swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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/* nothing to check for RSP */
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cmpq $__USER_DS, SS(%rsp) /* SS must match SYSRET */
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jne swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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/*
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* We win! This label is here just for ease of understanding
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* perf profiles. Nothing jumps here.
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*/
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syscall_return_via_sysret:
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/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
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POP_REGS pop_rdi=0 skip_r11rcx=1
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/*
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* Now all regs are restored except RSP and RDI.
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* Save old stack pointer and switch to trampoline stack.
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*/
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %rsp
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UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
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pushq RSP-RDI(%rdi) /* RSP */
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pushq (%rdi) /* RDI */
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/*
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* We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live.
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* We can do future final exit work right here.
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*/
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STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
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SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
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popq %rdi
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popq %rsp
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swapgs
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sysretq
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SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL_64)
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/*
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* %rdi: prev task
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* %rsi: next task
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*/
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.pushsection .text, "ax"
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SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
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/*
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* Save callee-saved registers
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* This must match the order in inactive_task_frame
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*/
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pushq %rbp
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pushq %rbx
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pushq %r12
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pushq %r13
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pushq %r14
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pushq %r15
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/* switch stack */
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movq %rsp, TASK_threadsp(%rdi)
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movq TASK_threadsp(%rsi), %rsp
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
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movq TASK_stack_canary(%rsi), %rbx
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movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
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/*
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* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
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* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
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* with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
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* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
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* speculative execution to prevent attack.
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*/
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FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
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#endif
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/* restore callee-saved registers */
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popq %r15
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popq %r14
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popq %r13
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popq %r12
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popq %rbx
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popq %rbp
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jmp __switch_to
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SYM_FUNC_END(__switch_to_asm)
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.popsection
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/*
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* A newly forked process directly context switches into this address.
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*
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* rax: prev task we switched from
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* rbx: kernel thread func (NULL for user thread)
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* r12: kernel thread arg
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*/
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.pushsection .text, "ax"
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SYM_CODE_START(ret_from_fork)
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UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
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movq %rax, %rdi
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call schedule_tail /* rdi: 'prev' task parameter */
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testq %rbx, %rbx /* from kernel_thread? */
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jnz 1f /* kernel threads are uncommon */
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2:
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
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movq %rsp, %rdi
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call syscall_exit_to_user_mode /* returns with IRQs disabled */
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jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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1:
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/* kernel thread */
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UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
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movq %r12, %rdi
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CALL_NOSPEC rbx
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/*
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* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
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* calling kernel_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
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* syscall.
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*/
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movq $0, RAX(%rsp)
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jmp 2b
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SYM_CODE_END(ret_from_fork)
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.popsection
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.macro DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF
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#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
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pushq %rax
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SAVE_FLAGS
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testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, %eax
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jz .Lokay_\@
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ud2
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.Lokay_\@:
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popq %rax
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#endif
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.endm
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/**
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* idtentry_body - Macro to emit code calling the C function
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* @cfunc: C function to be called
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* @has_error_code: Hardware pushed error code on stack
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*/
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.macro idtentry_body cfunc has_error_code:req
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call error_entry
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
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movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer into 1st argument*/
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.if \has_error_code == 1
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movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/
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movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
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.endif
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call \cfunc
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jmp error_return
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.endm
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/**
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* idtentry - Macro to generate entry stubs for simple IDT entries
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* @vector: Vector number
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* @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point
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* @cfunc: C function to be called
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* @has_error_code: Hardware pushed error code on stack
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*
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* The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for straight forward
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* and simple IDT entries. No IST stack, no paranoid entry checks.
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*/
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.macro idtentry vector asmsym cfunc has_error_code:req
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SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=\has_error_code*8
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ASM_CLAC
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.if \has_error_code == 0
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pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
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.endif
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.if \vector == X86_TRAP_BP
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/*
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* If coming from kernel space, create a 6-word gap to allow the
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* int3 handler to emulate a call instruction.
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*/
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testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
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jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_gap_\@
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.rept 6
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pushq 5*8(%rsp)
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.endr
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
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.Lfrom_usermode_no_gap_\@:
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.endif
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idtentry_body \cfunc \has_error_code
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_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
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SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
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.endm
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/*
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* Interrupt entry/exit.
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*
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+ The interrupt stubs push (vector) onto the stack, which is the error_code
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* position of idtentry exceptions, and jump to one of the two idtentry points
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* (common/spurious).
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*
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* common_interrupt is a hotpath, align it to a cache line
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*/
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.macro idtentry_irq vector cfunc
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.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
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idtentry \vector asm_\cfunc \cfunc has_error_code=1
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.endm
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/*
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* System vectors which invoke their handlers directly and are not
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* going through the regular common device interrupt handling code.
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*/
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.macro idtentry_sysvec vector cfunc
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idtentry \vector asm_\cfunc \cfunc has_error_code=0
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.endm
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/**
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* idtentry_mce_db - Macro to generate entry stubs for #MC and #DB
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* @vector: Vector number
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* @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point
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* @cfunc: C function to be called
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*
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* The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for #MC and #DB
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*
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* If the entry comes from user space it uses the normal entry path
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* including the return to user space work and preemption checks on
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* exit.
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*
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* If hits in kernel mode then it needs to go through the paranoid
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* entry as the exception can hit any random state. No preemption
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* check on exit to keep the paranoid path simple.
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*/
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.macro idtentry_mce_db vector asmsym cfunc
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SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
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ASM_CLAC
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pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
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/*
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* If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as
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* a normal entry.
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*/
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testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
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jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
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/* paranoid_entry returns GS information for paranoid_exit in EBX. */
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call paranoid_entry
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
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movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
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call \cfunc
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jmp paranoid_exit
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/* Switch to the regular task stack and use the noist entry point */
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.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
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idtentry_body noist_\cfunc, has_error_code=0
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_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
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SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
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.endm
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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/**
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* idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC
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* @vector: Vector number
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* @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point
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* @cfunc: C function to be called
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*
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* The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for #VC. The #VC handler
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* runs on an IST stack and needs to be able to cause nested #VC exceptions.
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*
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* To make this work the #VC entry code tries its best to pretend it doesn't use
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* an IST stack by switching to the task stack if coming from user-space (which
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* includes early SYSCALL entry path) or back to the stack in the IRET frame if
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* entered from kernel-mode.
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*
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* If entered from kernel-mode the return stack is validated first, and if it is
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* not safe to use (e.g. because it points to the entry stack) the #VC handler
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* will switch to a fall-back stack (VC2) and call a special handler function.
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*
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* The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to be extended in
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* the future for the #HV exception.
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*/
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.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc
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SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
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UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
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ASM_CLAC
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/*
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* If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as
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* a normal entry.
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*/
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testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp)
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jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@
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/*
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* paranoid_entry returns SWAPGS flag for paranoid_exit in EBX.
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* EBX == 0 -> SWAPGS, EBX == 1 -> no SWAPGS
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*/
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call paranoid_entry
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UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Switch off the IST stack to make it free for nested exceptions. The
|
|
* vc_switch_off_ist() function will switch back to the interrupted
|
|
* stack if it is safe to do so. If not it switches to the VC fall-back
|
|
* stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
|
|
call vc_switch_off_ist
|
|
movq %rax, %rsp /* Switch to new stack */
|
|
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Update pt_regs */
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/
|
|
movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */
|
|
|
|
call kernel_\cfunc
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No need to switch back to the IST stack. The current stack is either
|
|
* identical to the stack in the IRET frame or the VC fall-back stack,
|
|
* so it is definitely mapped even with PTI enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
jmp paranoid_exit
|
|
|
|
/* Switch to the regular task stack */
|
|
.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
|
|
idtentry_body user_\cfunc, has_error_code=1
|
|
|
|
_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
|
|
.endm
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Double fault entry. Straight paranoid. No checks from which context
|
|
* this comes because for the espfix induced #DF this would do the wrong
|
|
* thing.
|
|
*/
|
|
.macro idtentry_df vector asmsym cfunc
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
ASM_CLAC
|
|
|
|
/* paranoid_entry returns GS information for paranoid_exit in EBX. */
|
|
call paranoid_entry
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer into first argument */
|
|
movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/
|
|
movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */
|
|
call \cfunc
|
|
|
|
jmp paranoid_exit
|
|
|
|
_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Include the defines which emit the idt entries which are shared
|
|
* shared between 32 and 64 bit and emit the __irqentry_text_* markers
|
|
* so the stacktrace boundary checks work.
|
|
*/
|
|
.align 16
|
|
.globl __irqentry_text_start
|
|
__irqentry_text_start:
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/idtentry.h>
|
|
|
|
.align 16
|
|
.globl __irqentry_text_end
|
|
__irqentry_text_end:
|
|
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(common_interrupt_return)
|
|
SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
|
|
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
|
|
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
|
|
jnz 1f
|
|
ud2
|
|
1:
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
|
|
ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp xenpv_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
POP_REGS pop_rdi=0
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The stack is now user RDI, orig_ax, RIP, CS, EFLAGS, RSP, SS.
|
|
* Save old stack pointer and switch to trampoline stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %rsp
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the IRET frame to the trampoline stack. */
|
|
pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* SS */
|
|
pushq 5*8(%rdi) /* RSP */
|
|
pushq 4*8(%rdi) /* EFLAGS */
|
|
pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* CS */
|
|
pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* RIP */
|
|
|
|
/* Push user RDI on the trampoline stack. */
|
|
pushq (%rdi)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are on the trampoline stack. All regs except RDI are live.
|
|
* We can do future final exit work right here.
|
|
*/
|
|
STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
|
|
|
|
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
|
|
|
|
/* Restore RDI. */
|
|
popq %rdi
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
INTERRUPT_RETURN
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYM_INNER_LABEL(restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
|
|
/* Assert that pt_regs indicates kernel mode. */
|
|
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
|
|
jz 1f
|
|
ud2
|
|
1:
|
|
#endif
|
|
POP_REGS
|
|
addq $8, %rsp /* skip regs->orig_ax */
|
|
/*
|
|
* ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization
|
|
* when returning from IPI handler.
|
|
*/
|
|
INTERRUPT_RETURN
|
|
|
|
SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN(native_iret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
/*
|
|
* Are we returning to a stack segment from the LDT? Note: in
|
|
* 64-bit mode SS:RSP on the exception stack is always valid.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
|
|
testb $4, (SS-RIP)(%rsp)
|
|
jnz native_irq_return_ldt
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SYM_INNER_LABEL(native_irq_return_iret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
|
|
/*
|
|
* This may fault. Non-paranoid faults on return to userspace are
|
|
* handled by fixup_bad_iret. These include #SS, #GP, and #NP.
|
|
* Double-faults due to espfix64 are handled in exc_double_fault.
|
|
* Other faults here are fatal.
|
|
*/
|
|
iretq
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
|
|
native_irq_return_ldt:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are running with user GSBASE. All GPRs contain their user
|
|
* values. We have a percpu ESPFIX stack that is eight slots
|
|
* long (see ESPFIX_STACK_SIZE). espfix_waddr points to the bottom
|
|
* of the ESPFIX stack.
|
|
*
|
|
* We clobber RAX and RDI in this code. We stash RDI on the
|
|
* normal stack and RAX on the ESPFIX stack.
|
|
*
|
|
* The ESPFIX stack layout we set up looks like this:
|
|
*
|
|
* --- top of ESPFIX stack ---
|
|
* SS
|
|
* RSP
|
|
* RFLAGS
|
|
* CS
|
|
* RIP <-- RSP points here when we're done
|
|
* RAX <-- espfix_waddr points here
|
|
* --- bottom of ESPFIX stack ---
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pushq %rdi /* Stash user RDI */
|
|
swapgs /* to kernel GS */
|
|
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi /* to kernel CR3 */
|
|
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_waddr), %rdi
|
|
movq %rax, (0*8)(%rdi) /* user RAX */
|
|
movq (1*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user RIP */
|
|
movq %rax, (1*8)(%rdi)
|
|
movq (2*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user CS */
|
|
movq %rax, (2*8)(%rdi)
|
|
movq (3*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user RFLAGS */
|
|
movq %rax, (3*8)(%rdi)
|
|
movq (5*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user SS */
|
|
movq %rax, (5*8)(%rdi)
|
|
movq (4*8)(%rsp), %rax /* user RSP */
|
|
movq %rax, (4*8)(%rdi)
|
|
/* Now RAX == RSP. */
|
|
|
|
andl $0xffff0000, %eax /* RAX = (RSP & 0xffff0000) */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* espfix_stack[31:16] == 0. The page tables are set up such that
|
|
* (espfix_stack | (X & 0xffff0000)) points to a read-only alias of
|
|
* espfix_waddr for any X. That is, there are 65536 RO aliases of
|
|
* the same page. Set up RSP so that RSP[31:16] contains the
|
|
* respective 16 bits of the /userspace/ RSP and RSP nonetheless
|
|
* still points to an RO alias of the ESPFIX stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
orq PER_CPU_VAR(espfix_stack), %rax
|
|
|
|
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3_STACK scratch_reg=%rdi
|
|
swapgs /* to user GS */
|
|
popq %rdi /* Restore user RDI */
|
|
|
|
movq %rax, %rsp
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we cannot write to the stack any more, but we can
|
|
* still read.
|
|
*/
|
|
popq %rax /* Restore user RAX */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page
|
|
* is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace
|
|
* values. We can now IRET back to userspace.
|
|
*/
|
|
jmp native_irq_return_iret
|
|
#endif
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(common_interrupt_return)
|
|
_ASM_NOKPROBE(common_interrupt_return)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reload gs selector with exception handling
|
|
* edi: new selector
|
|
*
|
|
* Is in entry.text as it shouldn't be instrumented.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_FUNC_START(asm_load_gs_index)
|
|
FRAME_BEGIN
|
|
swapgs
|
|
.Lgs_change:
|
|
movl %edi, %gs
|
|
2: ALTERNATIVE "", "mfence", X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE
|
|
swapgs
|
|
FRAME_END
|
|
RET
|
|
|
|
/* running with kernelgs */
|
|
.Lbad_gs:
|
|
swapgs /* switch back to user gs */
|
|
.macro ZAP_GS
|
|
/* This can't be a string because the preprocessor needs to see it. */
|
|
movl $__USER_DS, %eax
|
|
movl %eax, %gs
|
|
.endm
|
|
ALTERNATIVE "", "ZAP_GS", X86_BUG_NULL_SEG
|
|
xorl %eax, %eax
|
|
movl %eax, %gs
|
|
jmp 2b
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lgs_change, .Lbad_gs)
|
|
|
|
SYM_FUNC_END(asm_load_gs_index)
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(asm_load_gs_index)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
|
|
/*
|
|
* A note on the "critical region" in our callback handler.
|
|
* We want to avoid stacking callback handlers due to events occurring
|
|
* during handling of the last event. To do this, we keep events disabled
|
|
* until we've done all processing. HOWEVER, we must enable events before
|
|
* popping the stack frame (can't be done atomically) and so it would still
|
|
* be possible to get enough handler activations to overflow the stack.
|
|
* Although unlikely, bugs of that kind are hard to track down, so we'd
|
|
* like to avoid the possibility.
|
|
* So, on entry to the handler we detect whether we interrupted an
|
|
* existing activation in its critical region -- if so, we pop the current
|
|
* activation and restart the handler using the previous one.
|
|
*
|
|
* C calling convention: exc_xen_hypervisor_callback(struct *pt_regs)
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(exc_xen_hypervisor_callback)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since we don't modify %rdi, evtchn_do_upall(struct *pt_regs) will
|
|
* see the correct pointer to the pt_regs
|
|
*/
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
|
|
movq %rdi, %rsp /* we don't return, adjust the stack frame */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
call xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall
|
|
|
|
jmp error_return
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(exc_xen_hypervisor_callback)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Hypervisor uses this for application faults while it executes.
|
|
* We get here for two reasons:
|
|
* 1. Fault while reloading DS, ES, FS or GS
|
|
* 2. Fault while executing IRET
|
|
* Category 1 we do not need to fix up as Xen has already reloaded all segment
|
|
* registers that could be reloaded and zeroed the others.
|
|
* Category 2 we fix up by killing the current process. We cannot use the
|
|
* normal Linux return path in this case because if we use the IRET hypercall
|
|
* to pop the stack frame we end up in an infinite loop of failsafe callbacks.
|
|
* We distinguish between categories by comparing each saved segment register
|
|
* with its current contents: any discrepancy means we in category 1.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(xen_failsafe_callback)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
|
|
movl %ds, %ecx
|
|
cmpw %cx, 0x10(%rsp)
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
movl %es, %ecx
|
|
cmpw %cx, 0x18(%rsp)
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
movl %fs, %ecx
|
|
cmpw %cx, 0x20(%rsp)
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
movl %gs, %ecx
|
|
cmpw %cx, 0x28(%rsp)
|
|
jne 1f
|
|
/* All segments match their saved values => Category 2 (Bad IRET). */
|
|
movq (%rsp), %rcx
|
|
movq 8(%rsp), %r11
|
|
addq $0x30, %rsp
|
|
pushq $0 /* RIP */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=8
|
|
jmp asm_exc_general_protection
|
|
1: /* Segment mismatch => Category 1 (Bad segment). Retry the IRET. */
|
|
movq (%rsp), %rcx
|
|
movq 8(%rsp), %r11
|
|
addq $0x30, %rsp
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
pushq $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
|
|
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
|
|
jmp error_return
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback)
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_PV */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save all registers in pt_regs. Return GSBASE related information
|
|
* in EBX depending on the availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
|
|
*
|
|
* FSGSBASE R/EBX
|
|
* N 0 -> SWAPGS on exit
|
|
* 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
|
|
*
|
|
* Y GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
|
|
cld
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
|
|
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Always stash CR3 in %r14. This value will be restored,
|
|
* verbatim, at exit. Needed if paranoid_entry interrupted
|
|
* another entry that already switched to the user CR3 value
|
|
* but has not yet returned to userspace.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is also why CS (stashed in the "iret frame" by the
|
|
* hardware at entry) can not be used: this may be a return
|
|
* to kernel code, but with a user CR3 value.
|
|
*
|
|
* Switching CR3 does not depend on kernel GSBASE so it can
|
|
* be done before switching to the kernel GSBASE. This is
|
|
* required for FSGSBASE because the kernel GSBASE has to
|
|
* be retrieved from a kernel internal table.
|
|
*/
|
|
SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
|
|
*
|
|
* Without FSGSBASE the kernel enforces that negative GSBASE
|
|
* values indicate kernel GSBASE. With FSGSBASE no assumptions
|
|
* can be made about the GSBASE value when entering from user
|
|
* space.
|
|
*/
|
|
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read the current GSBASE and store it in %rbx unconditionally,
|
|
* retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GSBASE. The stored value
|
|
* has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally.
|
|
*
|
|
* The unconditional write to GS base below ensures that no subsequent
|
|
* loads based on a mispredicted GS base can happen, therefore no LFENCE
|
|
* is needed here.
|
|
*/
|
|
SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
|
|
RET
|
|
|
|
.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
|
|
/* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
|
|
movl $1, %ebx
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The kernel-enforced convention is a negative GSBASE indicates
|
|
* a kernel value. No SWAPGS needed on entry and exit.
|
|
*/
|
|
movl $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
|
|
rdmsr
|
|
testl %edx, %edx
|
|
js .Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase
|
|
|
|
/* EBX = 0 -> SWAPGS required on exit */
|
|
xorl %ebx, %ebx
|
|
swapgs
|
|
.Lparanoid_kernel_gsbase:
|
|
|
|
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
|
|
RET
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* "Paranoid" exit path from exception stack. This is invoked
|
|
* only on return from non-NMI IST interrupts that came
|
|
* from kernel space.
|
|
*
|
|
* We may be returning to very strange contexts (e.g. very early
|
|
* in syscall entry), so checking for preemption here would
|
|
* be complicated. Fortunately, there's no good reason to try
|
|
* to handle preemption here.
|
|
*
|
|
* R/EBX contains the GSBASE related information depending on the
|
|
* availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
|
|
*
|
|
* FSGSBASE R/EBX
|
|
* N 0 -> SWAPGS on exit
|
|
* 1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
|
|
*
|
|
* Y User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
/*
|
|
* The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires
|
|
* kernel GSBASE.
|
|
*
|
|
* NB to anyone to try to optimize this code: this code does
|
|
* not execute at all for exceptions from user mode. Those
|
|
* exceptions go through error_exit instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
|
|
|
|
/* Handle the three GSBASE cases */
|
|
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_exit_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
|
|
|
|
/* With FSGSBASE enabled, unconditionally restore GSBASE */
|
|
wrgsbase %rbx
|
|
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
|
|
.Lparanoid_exit_checkgs:
|
|
/* On non-FSGSBASE systems, conditionally do SWAPGS */
|
|
testl %ebx, %ebx
|
|
jnz restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
|
|
/* We are returning to a context with user GSBASE */
|
|
swapgs
|
|
jmp restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
|
|
cld
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
|
|
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
|
|
testb $3, CS+8(%rsp)
|
|
jz .Lerror_kernelspace
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We entered from user mode or we're pretending to have entered
|
|
* from user mode due to an IRET fault.
|
|
*/
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
|
|
/* We have user CR3. Change to kernel CR3. */
|
|
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
|
|
|
|
.Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs:
|
|
/* Put us onto the real thread stack. */
|
|
popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
|
|
call sync_regs
|
|
movq %rax, %rsp /* switch stack */
|
|
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
|
|
pushq %r12
|
|
RET
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There are two places in the kernel that can potentially fault with
|
|
* usergs. Handle them here. B stepping K8s sometimes report a
|
|
* truncated RIP for IRET exceptions returning to compat mode. Check
|
|
* for these here too.
|
|
*/
|
|
.Lerror_kernelspace:
|
|
leaq native_irq_return_iret(%rip), %rcx
|
|
cmpq %rcx, RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
je .Lerror_bad_iret
|
|
movl %ecx, %eax /* zero extend */
|
|
cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
je .Lbstep_iret
|
|
cmpq $.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* hack: .Lgs_change can fail with user gsbase. If this happens, fix up
|
|
* gsbase and proceed. We'll fix up the exception and land in
|
|
* .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
|
|
*/
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Issue an LFENCE to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether it is a
|
|
* kernel or user gsbase.
|
|
*/
|
|
.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
|
|
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
|
|
RET
|
|
|
|
.Lbstep_iret:
|
|
/* Fix truncated RIP */
|
|
movq %rcx, RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
/* fall through */
|
|
|
|
.Lerror_bad_iret:
|
|
/*
|
|
* We came from an IRET to user mode, so we have user
|
|
* gsbase and CR3. Switch to kernel gsbase and CR3:
|
|
*/
|
|
SWAPGS
|
|
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
|
|
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
|
|
* as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
|
|
*/
|
|
mov %rsp, %rdi
|
|
call fixup_bad_iret
|
|
mov %rax, %rsp
|
|
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
|
|
|
|
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF
|
|
testb $3, CS(%rsp)
|
|
jz restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
|
|
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(error_return)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Runs on exception stack. Xen PV does not go through this path at all,
|
|
* so we can use real assembly here.
|
|
*
|
|
* Registers:
|
|
* %r14: Used to save/restore the CR3 of the interrupted context
|
|
* when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use. Do not clobber.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We allow breakpoints in NMIs. If a breakpoint occurs, then
|
|
* the iretq it performs will take us out of NMI context.
|
|
* This means that we can have nested NMIs where the next
|
|
* NMI is using the top of the stack of the previous NMI. We
|
|
* can't let it execute because the nested NMI will corrupt the
|
|
* stack of the previous NMI. NMI handlers are not re-entrant
|
|
* anyway.
|
|
*
|
|
* To handle this case we do the following:
|
|
* Check the a special location on the stack that contains
|
|
* a variable that is set when NMIs are executing.
|
|
* The interrupted task's stack is also checked to see if it
|
|
* is an NMI stack.
|
|
* If the variable is not set and the stack is not the NMI
|
|
* stack then:
|
|
* o Set the special variable on the stack
|
|
* o Copy the interrupt frame into an "outermost" location on the
|
|
* stack
|
|
* o Copy the interrupt frame into an "iret" location on the stack
|
|
* o Continue processing the NMI
|
|
* If the variable is set or the previous stack is the NMI stack:
|
|
* o Modify the "iret" location to jump to the repeat_nmi
|
|
* o return back to the first NMI
|
|
*
|
|
* Now on exit of the first NMI, we first clear the stack variable
|
|
* The NMI stack will tell any nested NMIs at that point that it is
|
|
* nested. Then we pop the stack normally with iret, and if there was
|
|
* a nested NMI that updated the copy interrupt stack frame, a
|
|
* jump will be made to the repeat_nmi code that will handle the second
|
|
* NMI.
|
|
*
|
|
* However, espfix prevents us from directly returning to userspace
|
|
* with a single IRET instruction. Similarly, IRET to user mode
|
|
* can fault. We therefore handle NMIs from user space like
|
|
* other IST entries.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ASM_CLAC
|
|
|
|
/* Use %rdx as our temp variable throughout */
|
|
pushq %rdx
|
|
|
|
testb $3, CS-RIP+8(%rsp)
|
|
jz .Lnmi_from_kernel
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NMI from user mode. We need to run on the thread stack, but we
|
|
* can't go through the normal entry paths: NMIs are masked, and
|
|
* we don't want to enable interrupts, because then we'll end
|
|
* up in an awkward situation in which IRQs are on but NMIs
|
|
* are off.
|
|
*
|
|
* We also must not push anything to the stack before switching
|
|
* stacks lest we corrupt the "NMI executing" variable.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
swapgs
|
|
cld
|
|
FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
|
|
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdx
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdx
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS base=%rdx offset=8
|
|
pushq 5*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->ss */
|
|
pushq 4*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rsp */
|
|
pushq 3*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->flags */
|
|
pushq 2*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->cs */
|
|
pushq 1*8(%rdx) /* pt_regs->rip */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
pushq $-1 /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
|
|
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rdx=(%rdx)
|
|
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
|
|
* due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
|
|
* done with the NMI stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
movq $-1, %rsi
|
|
call exc_nmi
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return back to user mode. We must *not* do the normal exit
|
|
* work, because we don't want to enable interrupts.
|
|
*/
|
|
jmp swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
|
|
|
|
.Lnmi_from_kernel:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Here's what our stack frame will look like:
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | original SS |
|
|
* | original Return RSP |
|
|
* | original RFLAGS |
|
|
* | original CS |
|
|
* | original RIP |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | temp storage for rdx |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | "NMI executing" variable |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | iret SS } Copied from "outermost" frame |
|
|
* | iret Return RSP } on each loop iteration; overwritten |
|
|
* | iret RFLAGS } by a nested NMI to force another |
|
|
* | iret CS } iteration if needed. |
|
|
* | iret RIP } |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | outermost SS } initialized in first_nmi; |
|
|
* | outermost Return RSP } will not be changed before |
|
|
* | outermost RFLAGS } NMI processing is done. |
|
|
* | outermost CS } Copied to "iret" frame on each |
|
|
* | outermost RIP } iteration. |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
* | pt_regs |
|
|
* +---------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
*
|
|
* The "original" frame is used by hardware. Before re-enabling
|
|
* NMIs, we need to be done with it, and we need to leave enough
|
|
* space for the asm code here.
|
|
*
|
|
* We return by executing IRET while RSP points to the "iret" frame.
|
|
* That will either return for real or it will loop back into NMI
|
|
* processing.
|
|
*
|
|
* The "outermost" frame is copied to the "iret" frame on each
|
|
* iteration of the loop, so each iteration starts with the "iret"
|
|
* frame pointing to the final return target.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine whether we're a nested NMI.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we interrupted kernel code between repeat_nmi and
|
|
* end_repeat_nmi, then we are a nested NMI. We must not
|
|
* modify the "iret" frame because it's being written by
|
|
* the outer NMI. That's okay; the outer NMI handler is
|
|
* about to about to call exc_nmi() anyway, so we can just
|
|
* resume the outer NMI.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
movq $repeat_nmi, %rdx
|
|
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
ja 1f
|
|
movq $end_repeat_nmi, %rdx
|
|
cmpq 8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
ja nested_nmi_out
|
|
1:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now check "NMI executing". If it's set, then we're nested.
|
|
* This will not detect if we interrupted an outer NMI just
|
|
* before IRET.
|
|
*/
|
|
cmpl $1, -8(%rsp)
|
|
je nested_nmi
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now test if the previous stack was an NMI stack. This covers
|
|
* the case where we interrupt an outer NMI after it clears
|
|
* "NMI executing" but before IRET. We need to be careful, though:
|
|
* there is one case in which RSP could point to the NMI stack
|
|
* despite there being no NMI active: naughty userspace controls
|
|
* RSP at the very beginning of the SYSCALL targets. We can
|
|
* pull a fast one on naughty userspace, though: we program
|
|
* SYSCALL to mask DF, so userspace cannot cause DF to be set
|
|
* if it controls the kernel's RSP. We set DF before we clear
|
|
* "NMI executing".
|
|
*/
|
|
lea 6*8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
/* Compare the NMI stack (rdx) with the stack we came from (4*8(%rsp)) */
|
|
cmpq %rdx, 4*8(%rsp)
|
|
/* If the stack pointer is above the NMI stack, this is a normal NMI */
|
|
ja first_nmi
|
|
|
|
subq $EXCEPTION_STKSZ, %rdx
|
|
cmpq %rdx, 4*8(%rsp)
|
|
/* If it is below the NMI stack, it is a normal NMI */
|
|
jb first_nmi
|
|
|
|
/* Ah, it is within the NMI stack. */
|
|
|
|
testb $(X86_EFLAGS_DF >> 8), (3*8 + 1)(%rsp)
|
|
jz first_nmi /* RSP was user controlled. */
|
|
|
|
/* This is a nested NMI. */
|
|
|
|
nested_nmi:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Modify the "iret" frame to point to repeat_nmi, forcing another
|
|
* iteration of NMI handling.
|
|
*/
|
|
subq $8, %rsp
|
|
leaq -10*8(%rsp), %rdx
|
|
pushq $__KERNEL_DS
|
|
pushq %rdx
|
|
pushfq
|
|
pushq $__KERNEL_CS
|
|
pushq $repeat_nmi
|
|
|
|
/* Put stack back */
|
|
addq $(6*8), %rsp
|
|
|
|
nested_nmi_out:
|
|
popq %rdx
|
|
|
|
/* We are returning to kernel mode, so this cannot result in a fault. */
|
|
iretq
|
|
|
|
first_nmi:
|
|
/* Restore rdx. */
|
|
movq (%rsp), %rdx
|
|
|
|
/* Make room for "NMI executing". */
|
|
pushq $0
|
|
|
|
/* Leave room for the "iret" frame */
|
|
subq $(5*8), %rsp
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the "original" frame to the "outermost" frame */
|
|
.rept 5
|
|
pushq 11*8(%rsp)
|
|
.endr
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
|
|
/* Everything up to here is safe from nested NMIs */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
|
|
/*
|
|
* For ease of testing, unmask NMIs right away. Disabled by
|
|
* default because IRET is very expensive.
|
|
*/
|
|
pushq $0 /* SS */
|
|
pushq %rsp /* RSP (minus 8 because of the previous push) */
|
|
addq $8, (%rsp) /* Fix up RSP */
|
|
pushfq /* RFLAGS */
|
|
pushq $__KERNEL_CS /* CS */
|
|
pushq $1f /* RIP */
|
|
iretq /* continues at repeat_nmi below */
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS
|
|
1:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
repeat_nmi:
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there was a nested NMI, the first NMI's iret will return
|
|
* here. But NMIs are still enabled and we can take another
|
|
* nested NMI. The nested NMI checks the interrupted RIP to see
|
|
* if it is between repeat_nmi and end_repeat_nmi, and if so
|
|
* it will just return, as we are about to repeat an NMI anyway.
|
|
* This makes it safe to copy to the stack frame that a nested
|
|
* NMI will update.
|
|
*
|
|
* RSP is pointing to "outermost RIP". gsbase is unknown, but, if
|
|
* we're repeating an NMI, gsbase has the same value that it had on
|
|
* the first iteration. paranoid_entry will load the kernel
|
|
* gsbase if needed before we call exc_nmi(). "NMI executing"
|
|
* is zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
movq $1, 10*8(%rsp) /* Set "NMI executing". */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the "outermost" frame to the "iret" frame. NMIs that nest
|
|
* here must not modify the "iret" frame while we're writing to
|
|
* it or it will end up containing garbage.
|
|
*/
|
|
addq $(10*8), %rsp
|
|
.rept 5
|
|
pushq -6*8(%rsp)
|
|
.endr
|
|
subq $(5*8), %rsp
|
|
end_repeat_nmi:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Everything below this point can be preempted by a nested NMI.
|
|
* If this happens, then the inner NMI will change the "iret"
|
|
* frame to point back to repeat_nmi.
|
|
*/
|
|
pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall to restart */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use paranoid_entry to handle SWAPGS, but no need to use paranoid_exit
|
|
* as we should not be calling schedule in NMI context.
|
|
* Even with normal interrupts enabled. An NMI should not be
|
|
* setting NEED_RESCHED or anything that normal interrupts and
|
|
* exceptions might do.
|
|
*/
|
|
call paranoid_entry
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
movq %rsp, %rdi
|
|
movq $-1, %rsi
|
|
call exc_nmi
|
|
|
|
/* Always restore stashed CR3 value (see paranoid_entry) */
|
|
RESTORE_CR3 scratch_reg=%r15 save_reg=%r14
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The above invocation of paranoid_entry stored the GSBASE
|
|
* related information in R/EBX depending on the availability
|
|
* of FSGSBASE.
|
|
*
|
|
* If FSGSBASE is enabled, restore the saved GSBASE value
|
|
* unconditionally, otherwise take the conditional SWAPGS path.
|
|
*/
|
|
ALTERNATIVE "jmp nmi_no_fsgsbase", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
|
|
|
|
wrgsbase %rbx
|
|
jmp nmi_restore
|
|
|
|
nmi_no_fsgsbase:
|
|
/* EBX == 0 -> invoke SWAPGS */
|
|
testl %ebx, %ebx
|
|
jnz nmi_restore
|
|
|
|
nmi_swapgs:
|
|
swapgs
|
|
|
|
nmi_restore:
|
|
POP_REGS
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Skip orig_ax and the "outermost" frame to point RSP at the "iret"
|
|
* at the "iret" frame.
|
|
*/
|
|
addq $6*8, %rsp
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Clear "NMI executing". Set DF first so that we can easily
|
|
* distinguish the remaining code between here and IRET from
|
|
* the SYSCALL entry and exit paths.
|
|
*
|
|
* We arguably should just inspect RIP instead, but I (Andy) wrote
|
|
* this code when I had the misapprehension that Xen PV supported
|
|
* NMIs, and Xen PV would break that approach.
|
|
*/
|
|
std
|
|
movq $0, 5*8(%rsp) /* clear "NMI executing" */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a
|
|
* single instruction. We are returning to kernel mode, so this
|
|
* cannot result in a fault. Similarly, we don't need to worry
|
|
* about espfix64 on the way back to kernel mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
iretq
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(asm_exc_nmi)
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
|
|
/*
|
|
* This handles SYSCALL from 32-bit code. There is no way to program
|
|
* MSRs to fully disable 32-bit SYSCALL.
|
|
*/
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(ignore_sysret)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
|
|
mov $-ENOSYS, %eax
|
|
sysretl
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(ignore_sysret)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
.pushsection .text, "ax"
|
|
SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_do_exit)
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
|
|
/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
|
|
xorl %ebp, %ebp
|
|
|
|
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rax
|
|
leaq -PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp
|
|
UNWIND_HINT_REGS
|
|
|
|
call do_exit
|
|
SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
|
|
.popsection
|