linux/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c
Linus Torvalds 643ad15d47 Merge branch 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 protection key support from Ingo Molnar:
 "This tree adds support for a new memory protection hardware feature
  that is available in upcoming Intel CPUs: 'protection keys' (pkeys).

  There's a background article at LWN.net:

      https://lwn.net/Articles/643797/

  The gist is that protection keys allow the encoding of
  user-controllable permission masks in the pte.  So instead of having a
  fixed protection mask in the pte (which needs a system call to change
  and works on a per page basis), the user can map a (handful of)
  protection mask variants and can change the masks runtime relatively
  cheaply, without having to change every single page in the affected
  virtual memory range.

  This allows the dynamic switching of the protection bits of large
  amounts of virtual memory, via user-space instructions.  It also
  allows more precise control of MMU permission bits: for example the
  executable bit is separate from the read bit (see more about that
  below).

  This tree adds the MM infrastructure and low level x86 glue needed for
  that, plus it adds a high level API to make use of protection keys -
  if a user-space application calls:

        mmap(..., PROT_EXEC);

  or

        mprotect(ptr, sz, PROT_EXEC);

  (note PROT_EXEC-only, without PROT_READ/WRITE), the kernel will notice
  this special case, and will set a special protection key on this
  memory range.  It also sets the appropriate bits in the Protection
  Keys User Rights (PKRU) register so that the memory becomes unreadable
  and unwritable.

  So using protection keys the kernel is able to implement 'true'
  PROT_EXEC on x86 CPUs: without protection keys PROT_EXEC implies
  PROT_READ as well.  Unreadable executable mappings have security
  advantages: they cannot be read via information leaks to figure out
  ASLR details, nor can they be scanned for ROP gadgets - and they
  cannot be used by exploits for data purposes either.

  We know about no user-space code that relies on pure PROT_EXEC
  mappings today, but binary loaders could start making use of this new
  feature to map binaries and libraries in a more secure fashion.

  There is other pending pkeys work that offers more high level system
  call APIs to manage protection keys - but those are not part of this
  pull request.

  Right now there's a Kconfig that controls this feature
  (CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) that is default enabled
  (like most x86 CPU feature enablement code that has no runtime
  overhead), but it's not user-configurable at the moment.  If there's
  any serious problem with this then we can make it configurable and/or
  flip the default"

* 'mm-pkeys-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (38 commits)
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix mismerge of protection keys CPUID bits
  mm/pkeys: Fix siginfo ABI breakage caused by new u64 field
  x86/mm/pkeys: Fix access_error() denial of writes to write-only VMA
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add execute-only protection keys support
  x86/mm/pkeys: Create an x86 arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() for VMA flags
  x86/mm/pkeys: Allow kernel to modify user pkey rights register
  x86/fpu: Allow setting of XSAVE state
  x86/mm: Factor out LDT init from context init
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Add arch_validate_pkey()
  mm/core, arch, powerpc: Pass a protection key in to calc_vm_flag_bits()
  x86/mm/pkeys: Actually enable Memory Protection Keys in the CPU
  x86/mm/pkeys: Add Kconfig prompt to existing config option
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump pkey from VMA in /proc/pid/smaps
  x86/mm/pkeys: Dump PKRU with other kernel registers
  mm/core, x86/mm/pkeys: Differentiate instruction fetches
  x86/mm/pkeys: Optimize fault handling in access_error()
  mm/core: Do not enforce PKEY permissions on remote mm access
  um, pkeys: Add UML arch_*_access_permitted() methods
  mm/gup, x86/mm/pkeys: Check VMAs and PTEs for protection keys
  x86/mm/gup: Simplify get_user_pages() PTE bit handling
  ...
2016-03-20 19:08:56 -07:00

591 lines
14 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
*
* Pentium III FXSR, SSE support
* General FPU state handling cleanups
* Gareth Hughes <gareth@valinux.com>, May 2000
*/
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
#include <asm/fpu/regset.h>
#include <asm/fpu/signal.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
/*
* Represents the initial FPU state. It's mostly (but not completely) zeroes,
* depending on the FPU hardware format:
*/
union fpregs_state init_fpstate __read_mostly;
/*
* Track whether the kernel is using the FPU state
* currently.
*
* This flag is used:
*
* - by IRQ context code to potentially use the FPU
* if it's unused.
*
* - to debug kernel_fpu_begin()/end() correctness
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, in_kernel_fpu);
/*
* Track which context is using the FPU on the CPU:
*/
DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fpu *, fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx);
static void kernel_fpu_disable(void)
{
WARN_ON_FPU(this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu));
this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, true);
}
static void kernel_fpu_enable(void)
{
WARN_ON_FPU(!this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu));
this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, false);
}
static bool kernel_fpu_disabled(void)
{
return this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu);
}
/*
* Were we in an interrupt that interrupted kernel mode?
*
* On others, we can do a kernel_fpu_begin/end() pair *ONLY* if that
* pair does nothing at all: the thread must not have fpu (so
* that we don't try to save the FPU state), and TS must
* be set (so that the clts/stts pair does nothing that is
* visible in the interrupted kernel thread).
*
* Except for the eagerfpu case when we return true; in the likely case
* the thread has FPU but we are not going to set/clear TS.
*/
static bool interrupted_kernel_fpu_idle(void)
{
if (kernel_fpu_disabled())
return false;
if (use_eager_fpu())
return true;
return !current->thread.fpu.fpregs_active && (read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS);
}
/*
* Were we in user mode (or vm86 mode) when we were
* interrupted?
*
* Doing kernel_fpu_begin/end() is ok if we are running
* in an interrupt context from user mode - we'll just
* save the FPU state as required.
*/
static bool interrupted_user_mode(void)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
return regs && user_mode(regs);
}
/*
* Can we use the FPU in kernel mode with the
* whole "kernel_fpu_begin/end()" sequence?
*
* It's always ok in process context (ie "not interrupt")
* but it is sometimes ok even from an irq.
*/
bool irq_fpu_usable(void)
{
return !in_interrupt() ||
interrupted_user_mode() ||
interrupted_kernel_fpu_idle();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_fpu_usable);
void __kernel_fpu_begin(void)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
WARN_ON_FPU(!irq_fpu_usable());
kernel_fpu_disable();
if (fpu->fpregs_active) {
/*
* Ignore return value -- we don't care if reg state
* is clobbered.
*/
copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(fpu);
} else {
this_cpu_write(fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx, NULL);
__fpregs_activate_hw();
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_fpu_begin);
void __kernel_fpu_end(void)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
if (fpu->fpregs_active)
copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&fpu->state);
else
__fpregs_deactivate_hw();
kernel_fpu_enable();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kernel_fpu_end);
void kernel_fpu_begin(void)
{
preempt_disable();
__kernel_fpu_begin();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_begin);
void kernel_fpu_end(void)
{
__kernel_fpu_end();
preempt_enable();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_end);
/*
* CR0::TS save/restore functions:
*/
int irq_ts_save(void)
{
/*
* If in process context and not atomic, we can take a spurious DNA fault.
* Otherwise, doing clts() in process context requires disabling preemption
* or some heavy lifting like kernel_fpu_begin()
*/
if (!in_atomic())
return 0;
if (read_cr0() & X86_CR0_TS) {
clts();
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_ts_save);
void irq_ts_restore(int TS_state)
{
if (TS_state)
stts();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(irq_ts_restore);
/*
* Save the FPU state (mark it for reload if necessary):
*
* This only ever gets called for the current task.
*/
void fpu__save(struct fpu *fpu)
{
WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != &current->thread.fpu);
preempt_disable();
if (fpu->fpregs_active) {
if (!copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(fpu)) {
if (use_eager_fpu())
copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&fpu->state);
else
fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
}
}
preempt_enable();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu__save);
/*
* Legacy x87 fpstate state init:
*/
static inline void fpstate_init_fstate(struct fregs_state *fp)
{
fp->cwd = 0xffff037fu;
fp->swd = 0xffff0000u;
fp->twd = 0xffffffffu;
fp->fos = 0xffff0000u;
}
void fpstate_init(union fpregs_state *state)
{
if (!cpu_has_fpu) {
fpstate_init_soft(&state->soft);
return;
}
memset(state, 0, xstate_size);
if (cpu_has_fxsr)
fpstate_init_fxstate(&state->fxsave);
else
fpstate_init_fstate(&state->fsave);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpstate_init);
int fpu__copy(struct fpu *dst_fpu, struct fpu *src_fpu)
{
dst_fpu->counter = 0;
dst_fpu->fpregs_active = 0;
dst_fpu->last_cpu = -1;
if (!src_fpu->fpstate_active || !cpu_has_fpu)
return 0;
WARN_ON_FPU(src_fpu != &current->thread.fpu);
/*
* Don't let 'init optimized' areas of the XSAVE area
* leak into the child task:
*/
if (use_eager_fpu())
memset(&dst_fpu->state.xsave, 0, xstate_size);
/*
* Save current FPU registers directly into the child
* FPU context, without any memory-to-memory copying.
* In lazy mode, if the FPU context isn't loaded into
* fpregs, CR0.TS will be set and do_device_not_available
* will load the FPU context.
*
* We have to do all this with preemption disabled,
* mostly because of the FNSAVE case, because in that
* case we must not allow preemption in the window
* between the FNSAVE and us marking the context lazy.
*
* It shouldn't be an issue as even FNSAVE is plenty
* fast in terms of critical section length.
*/
preempt_disable();
if (!copy_fpregs_to_fpstate(dst_fpu)) {
memcpy(&src_fpu->state, &dst_fpu->state, xstate_size);
if (use_eager_fpu())
copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&src_fpu->state);
else
fpregs_deactivate(src_fpu);
}
preempt_enable();
return 0;
}
/*
* Activate the current task's in-memory FPU context,
* if it has not been used before:
*/
void fpu__activate_curr(struct fpu *fpu)
{
WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != &current->thread.fpu);
if (!fpu->fpstate_active) {
fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
/* Safe to do for the current task: */
fpu->fpstate_active = 1;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu__activate_curr);
/*
* This function must be called before we read a task's fpstate.
*
* If the task has not used the FPU before then initialize its
* fpstate.
*
* If the task has used the FPU before then save it.
*/
void fpu__activate_fpstate_read(struct fpu *fpu)
{
/*
* If fpregs are active (in the current CPU), then
* copy them to the fpstate:
*/
if (fpu->fpregs_active) {
fpu__save(fpu);
} else {
if (!fpu->fpstate_active) {
fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
/* Safe to do for current and for stopped child tasks: */
fpu->fpstate_active = 1;
}
}
}
/*
* This function must be called before we write a task's fpstate.
*
* If the task has used the FPU before then unlazy it.
* If the task has not used the FPU before then initialize its fpstate.
*
* After this function call, after registers in the fpstate are
* modified and the child task has woken up, the child task will
* restore the modified FPU state from the modified context. If we
* didn't clear its lazy status here then the lazy in-registers
* state pending on its former CPU could be restored, corrupting
* the modifications.
*/
void fpu__activate_fpstate_write(struct fpu *fpu)
{
/*
* Only stopped child tasks can be used to modify the FPU
* state in the fpstate buffer:
*/
WARN_ON_FPU(fpu == &current->thread.fpu);
if (fpu->fpstate_active) {
/* Invalidate any lazy state: */
fpu->last_cpu = -1;
} else {
fpstate_init(&fpu->state);
/* Safe to do for stopped child tasks: */
fpu->fpstate_active = 1;
}
}
/*
* This function must be called before we write the current
* task's fpstate.
*
* This call gets the current FPU register state and moves
* it in to the 'fpstate'. Preemption is disabled so that
* no writes to the 'fpstate' can occur from context
* swiches.
*
* Must be followed by a fpu__current_fpstate_write_end().
*/
void fpu__current_fpstate_write_begin(void)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
/*
* Ensure that the context-switching code does not write
* over the fpstate while we are doing our update.
*/
preempt_disable();
/*
* Move the fpregs in to the fpu's 'fpstate'.
*/
fpu__activate_fpstate_read(fpu);
/*
* The caller is about to write to 'fpu'. Ensure that no
* CPU thinks that its fpregs match the fpstate. This
* ensures we will not be lazy and skip a XRSTOR in the
* future.
*/
fpu->last_cpu = -1;
}
/*
* This function must be paired with fpu__current_fpstate_write_begin()
*
* This will ensure that the modified fpstate gets placed back in
* the fpregs if necessary.
*
* Note: This function may be called whether or not an _actual_
* write to the fpstate occurred.
*/
void fpu__current_fpstate_write_end(void)
{
struct fpu *fpu = &current->thread.fpu;
/*
* 'fpu' now has an updated copy of the state, but the
* registers may still be out of date. Update them with
* an XRSTOR if they are active.
*/
if (fpregs_active())
copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&fpu->state);
/*
* Our update is done and the fpregs/fpstate are in sync
* if necessary. Context switches can happen again.
*/
preempt_enable();
}
/*
* 'fpu__restore()' is called to copy FPU registers from
* the FPU fpstate to the live hw registers and to activate
* access to the hardware registers, so that FPU instructions
* can be used afterwards.
*
* Must be called with kernel preemption disabled (for example
* with local interrupts disabled, as it is in the case of
* do_device_not_available()).
*/
void fpu__restore(struct fpu *fpu)
{
fpu__activate_curr(fpu);
/* Avoid __kernel_fpu_begin() right after fpregs_activate() */
kernel_fpu_disable();
fpregs_activate(fpu);
copy_kernel_to_fpregs(&fpu->state);
fpu->counter++;
kernel_fpu_enable();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu__restore);
/*
* Drops current FPU state: deactivates the fpregs and
* the fpstate. NOTE: it still leaves previous contents
* in the fpregs in the eager-FPU case.
*
* This function can be used in cases where we know that
* a state-restore is coming: either an explicit one,
* or a reschedule.
*/
void fpu__drop(struct fpu *fpu)
{
preempt_disable();
fpu->counter = 0;
if (fpu->fpregs_active) {
/* Ignore delayed exceptions from user space */
asm volatile("1: fwait\n"
"2:\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b));
fpregs_deactivate(fpu);
}
fpu->fpstate_active = 0;
preempt_enable();
}
/*
* Clear FPU registers by setting them up from
* the init fpstate:
*/
static inline void copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs(void)
{
if (use_xsave())
copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, -1);
else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR))
copy_kernel_to_fxregs(&init_fpstate.fxsave);
else
copy_kernel_to_fregs(&init_fpstate.fsave);
}
/*
* Clear the FPU state back to init state.
*
* Called by sys_execve(), by the signal handler code and by various
* error paths.
*/
void fpu__clear(struct fpu *fpu)
{
WARN_ON_FPU(fpu != &current->thread.fpu); /* Almost certainly an anomaly */
if (!use_eager_fpu() || !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)) {
/* FPU state will be reallocated lazily at the first use. */
fpu__drop(fpu);
} else {
if (!fpu->fpstate_active) {
fpu__activate_curr(fpu);
user_fpu_begin();
}
copy_init_fpstate_to_fpregs();
}
}
/*
* x87 math exception handling:
*/
static inline unsigned short get_fpu_cwd(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (cpu_has_fxsr) {
return fpu->state.fxsave.cwd;
} else {
return (unsigned short)fpu->state.fsave.cwd;
}
}
static inline unsigned short get_fpu_swd(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (cpu_has_fxsr) {
return fpu->state.fxsave.swd;
} else {
return (unsigned short)fpu->state.fsave.swd;
}
}
static inline unsigned short get_fpu_mxcsr(struct fpu *fpu)
{
if (cpu_has_xmm) {
return fpu->state.fxsave.mxcsr;
} else {
return MXCSR_DEFAULT;
}
}
int fpu__exception_code(struct fpu *fpu, int trap_nr)
{
int err;
if (trap_nr == X86_TRAP_MF) {
unsigned short cwd, swd;
/*
* (~cwd & swd) will mask out exceptions that are not set to unmasked
* status. 0x3f is the exception bits in these regs, 0x200 is the
* C1 reg you need in case of a stack fault, 0x040 is the stack
* fault bit. We should only be taking one exception at a time,
* so if this combination doesn't produce any single exception,
* then we have a bad program that isn't synchronizing its FPU usage
* and it will suffer the consequences since we won't be able to
* fully reproduce the context of the exception
*/
cwd = get_fpu_cwd(fpu);
swd = get_fpu_swd(fpu);
err = swd & ~cwd;
} else {
/*
* The SIMD FPU exceptions are handled a little differently, as there
* is only a single status/control register. Thus, to determine which
* unmasked exception was caught we must mask the exception mask bits
* at 0x1f80, and then use these to mask the exception bits at 0x3f.
*/
unsigned short mxcsr = get_fpu_mxcsr(fpu);
err = ~(mxcsr >> 7) & mxcsr;
}
if (err & 0x001) { /* Invalid op */
/*
* swd & 0x240 == 0x040: Stack Underflow
* swd & 0x240 == 0x240: Stack Overflow
* User must clear the SF bit (0x40) if set
*/
return FPE_FLTINV;
} else if (err & 0x004) { /* Divide by Zero */
return FPE_FLTDIV;
} else if (err & 0x008) { /* Overflow */
return FPE_FLTOVF;
} else if (err & 0x012) { /* Denormal, Underflow */
return FPE_FLTUND;
} else if (err & 0x020) { /* Precision */
return FPE_FLTRES;
}
/*
* If we're using IRQ 13, or supposedly even some trap
* X86_TRAP_MF implementations, it's possible
* we get a spurious trap, which is not an error.
*/
return 0;
}