forked from Minki/linux
b112fb913b
Make our stack-walking code KASAN-safe by using __no_sanitize_address. Generic code, arm64, s390 and x86 all make accesses unchecked for similar sorts of reasons: when unwinding a stack, we might touch memory that KASAN has marked as being out-of-bounds. In ppc64 KASAN development, I hit this sometimes when checking for an exception frame - because we're checking an arbitrary offset into the stack frame. See commit2095574632("s390/kasan: avoid false positives during stack unwind"), commitbcaf669b4b("arm64: disable kasan when accessing frame->fp in unwind_frame"), commit91e08ab0c8("x86/dumpstack: Prevent KASAN false positive warnings") and commit6e22c83664("tracing, kasan: Silence Kasan warning in check_stack of stack_tracer"). Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210614120907.1952321-1-dja@axtens.net
110 lines
2.7 KiB
C
110 lines
2.7 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* Performance counter callchain support - powerpc architecture code
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*
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* Copyright © 2009 Paul Mackerras, IBM Corporation.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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#include <linux/percpu.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <asm/ptrace.h>
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#include <asm/sigcontext.h>
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#include <asm/ucontext.h>
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#include <asm/vdso.h>
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#include <asm/pte-walk.h>
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#include "callchain.h"
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/*
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* Is sp valid as the address of the next kernel stack frame after prev_sp?
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* The next frame may be in a different stack area but should not go
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* back down in the same stack area.
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*/
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static int valid_next_sp(unsigned long sp, unsigned long prev_sp)
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{
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if (sp & 0xf)
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return 0; /* must be 16-byte aligned */
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if (!validate_sp(sp, current, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD))
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return 0;
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if (sp >= prev_sp + STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE)
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return 1;
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/*
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* sp could decrease when we jump off an interrupt stack
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* back to the regular process stack.
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*/
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if ((sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)) != (prev_sp & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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void __no_sanitize_address
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perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long sp, next_sp;
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unsigned long next_ip;
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unsigned long lr;
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long level = 0;
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unsigned long *fp;
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lr = regs->link;
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sp = regs->gpr[1];
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perf_callchain_store(entry, perf_instruction_pointer(regs));
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if (!validate_sp(sp, current, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD))
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return;
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for (;;) {
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fp = (unsigned long *) sp;
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next_sp = fp[0];
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if (next_sp == sp + STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE &&
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fp[STACK_FRAME_MARKER] == STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER) {
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/*
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* This looks like an interrupt frame for an
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* interrupt that occurred in the kernel
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*/
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regs = (struct pt_regs *)(sp + STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD);
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next_ip = regs->nip;
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lr = regs->link;
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level = 0;
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perf_callchain_store_context(entry, PERF_CONTEXT_KERNEL);
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} else {
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if (level == 0)
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next_ip = lr;
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else
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next_ip = fp[STACK_FRAME_LR_SAVE];
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/*
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* We can't tell which of the first two addresses
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* we get are valid, but we can filter out the
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* obviously bogus ones here. We replace them
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* with 0 rather than removing them entirely so
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* that userspace can tell which is which.
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*/
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if ((level == 1 && next_ip == lr) ||
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(level <= 1 && !kernel_text_address(next_ip)))
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next_ip = 0;
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++level;
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}
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perf_callchain_store(entry, next_ip);
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if (!valid_next_sp(next_sp, sp))
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return;
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sp = next_sp;
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}
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}
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void
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perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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if (!is_32bit_task())
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perf_callchain_user_64(entry, regs);
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else
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perf_callchain_user_32(entry, regs);
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}
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