forked from Minki/linux
77f68bac94
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure. Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to restrict_link(). Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
190 lines
5.0 KiB
C
190 lines
5.0 KiB
C
/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
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* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/cred.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
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#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
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#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
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static struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
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extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
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extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
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/**
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* restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by system CA
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*
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* Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
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* being vouched for by a key in the system keyring.
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*/
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int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
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const struct key_type *type,
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const union key_payload *payload)
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{
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return restrict_link_by_signature(system_trusted_keyring,
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type, payload);
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}
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/*
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* Load the compiled-in keys
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*/
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static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
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{
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pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyring\n");
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system_trusted_keyring =
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keyring_alloc(".system_keyring",
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KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
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((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
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KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
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restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(system_trusted_keyring))
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panic("Can't allocate system trusted keyring\n");
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
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*/
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device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
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/*
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* Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
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*/
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static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
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{
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key_ref_t key;
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const u8 *p, *end;
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size_t plen;
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pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
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p = system_certificate_list;
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end = p + system_certificate_list_size;
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while (p < end) {
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/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
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* than 256 bytes in size.
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*/
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if (end - p < 4)
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goto dodgy_cert;
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if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
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p[1] != 0x82)
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goto dodgy_cert;
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plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
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plen += 4;
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if (plen > end - p)
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goto dodgy_cert;
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key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
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"asymmetric",
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NULL,
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p,
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plen,
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((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
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KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
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KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
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KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
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PTR_ERR(key));
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} else {
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pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
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key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
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key_ref_put(key);
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}
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p += plen;
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}
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return 0;
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dodgy_cert:
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pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
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/**
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* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
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* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
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* @len: Size of @data.
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* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
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* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
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* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for system_trusted_keyring).
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* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
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* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
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* @ctx: Context for callback.
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*/
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int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
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const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
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struct key *trusted_keys,
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enum key_being_used_for usage,
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int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
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const void *data, size_t len,
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size_t asn1hdrlen),
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void *ctx)
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{
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struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
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int ret;
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pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
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if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
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return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
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/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
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if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
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pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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goto error;
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}
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ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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if (!trusted_keys)
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trusted_keys = system_trusted_keyring;
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ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
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if (ret < 0) {
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if (ret == -ENOKEY)
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pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
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goto error;
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}
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if (view_content) {
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size_t asn1hdrlen;
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ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &len, &asn1hdrlen);
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if (ret < 0) {
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if (ret == -ENODATA)
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pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
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goto error;
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}
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ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, asn1hdrlen);
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}
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error:
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pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
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pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
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#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
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