Casey Schaufler 75a25637bf Smack: correct final mmap check comparison ... The mmap policy enforcement checks the access of the SMACK64MMAP subject against the current subject incorrectly. The check as written works correctly only if the access rules involved have the same access. This is the common case, so initial testing did not find a problem. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>		2011-02-09 19:58:42 -08:00
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apparmor	APPARMOR: Fix memory leak of apparmor_init()	2010-11-11 07:36:22 +11:00
integrity/ima	ima: fix add LSM rule bug	2011-01-03 16:36:33 -08:00
keys	Merge branch 'master' into next	2011-01-10 09:46:24 +11:00
selinux	security:selinux: kill unused MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK and ebitmap_startbit	2011-01-24 10:36:11 +11:00
smack	Smack: correct final mmap check comparison	2011-02-09 19:58:42 -08:00
tomoyo	fs: dcache scale d_unhashed	2011-01-07 17:50:21 +11:00
capability.c	af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.	2011-01-05 15:38:53 -08:00
commoncap.c	capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failure	2010-11-15 15:40:01 -08:00
device_cgroup.c	Merge branch 'master' into next	2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
inode.c	convert get_sb_single() users	2010-10-29 04:16:28 -04:00
Kconfig	keys: add new key-type encrypted	2010-11-29 08:55:29 +11:00
lsm_audit.c	Merge branch 'master' into next	2010-05-06 10:56:07 +10:00
Makefile	AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module	2010-08-02 15:38:34 +10:00
min_addr.c	mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write	2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c	CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooks	2011-01-24 10:49:45 +11:00