forked from Minki/linux
06eb8a56af
Running a multi-threaded 8KB fio test (70/30 mix), three or four out of twelve of the jobs fail when using krb5i. The failure is an EIO on a read. Troubleshooting confirmed the EIO results when the client fails to verify the MIC of an NFS READ reply. Bruce suggested the problem could be due to the data payload changing between the time the reply's MIC was computed on the server and the time the reply was actually sent. krb5p gets around this problem by disabling RQ_SPLICE_OK. Use the same mechanism for krb5i RPCs. "iozone -i0 -i1 -s128m -y1k -az -I", export is tmpfs, mount is sec=krb5i,vers=3,proto=rdma. The important numbers are the read / reread column. Here's without the RQ_SPLICE_OK patch: kB reclen write rewrite read reread 131072 1 7546 7929 8396 8267 131072 2 14375 14600 15843 15639 131072 4 19280 19248 21303 21410 131072 8 32350 31772 35199 34883 131072 16 36748 37477 49365 51706 131072 32 55669 56059 57475 57389 131072 64 74599 75190 74903 75550 131072 128 99810 101446 102828 102724 131072 256 122042 122612 124806 125026 131072 512 137614 138004 141412 141267 131072 1024 146601 148774 151356 151409 131072 2048 180684 181727 293140 292840 131072 4096 206907 207658 552964 549029 131072 8192 223982 224360 454493 473469 131072 16384 228927 228390 654734 632607 And here's with it: kB reclen write rewrite read reread 131072 1 7700 7365 7958 8011 131072 2 13211 13303 14937 14414 131072 4 19001 19265 20544 20657 131072 8 30883 31097 34255 33566 131072 16 36868 34908 51499 49944 131072 32 56428 55535 58710 56952 131072 64 73507 74676 75619 74378 131072 128 100324 101442 103276 102736 131072 256 122517 122995 124639 124150 131072 512 137317 139007 140530 140830 131072 1024 146807 148923 151246 151072 131072 2048 179656 180732 292631 292034 131072 4096 206216 208583 543355 541951 131072 8192 223738 224273 494201 489372 131072 16384 229313 229840 691719 668427 I would say that there is not much difference in this test. For good measure, here's the same test with sec=krb5p: kB reclen write rewrite read reread 131072 1 5982 5881 6137 6218 131072 2 10216 10252 10850 10932 131072 4 12236 12575 15375 15526 131072 8 15461 15462 23821 22351 131072 16 25677 25811 27529 27640 131072 32 31903 32354 34063 33857 131072 64 42989 43188 45635 45561 131072 128 52848 53210 56144 56141 131072 256 59123 59214 62691 62933 131072 512 63140 63277 66887 67025 131072 1024 65255 65299 69213 69140 131072 2048 76454 76555 133767 133862 131072 4096 84726 84883 251925 250702 131072 8192 89491 89482 270821 276085 131072 16384 91572 91597 361768 336868 BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=307 Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
1879 lines
46 KiB
C
1879 lines
46 KiB
C
/*
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* Neil Brown <neilb@cse.unsw.edu.au>
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* J. Bruce Fields <bfields@umich.edu>
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* Andy Adamson <andros@umich.edu>
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* Dug Song <dugsong@monkey.org>
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*
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* RPCSEC_GSS server authentication.
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* This implements RPCSEC_GSS as defined in rfc2203 (rpcsec_gss) and rfc2078
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* (gssapi)
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*
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* The RPCSEC_GSS involves three stages:
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* 1/ context creation
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* 2/ data exchange
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* 3/ context destruction
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*
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* Context creation is handled largely by upcalls to user-space.
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* In particular, GSS_Accept_sec_context is handled by an upcall
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* Data exchange is handled entirely within the kernel
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* In particular, GSS_GetMIC, GSS_VerifyMIC, GSS_Seal, GSS_Unseal are in-kernel.
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* Context destruction is handled in-kernel
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* GSS_Delete_sec_context is in-kernel
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*
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* Context creation is initiated by a RPCSEC_GSS_INIT request arriving.
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* The context handle and gss_token are used as a key into the rpcsec_init cache.
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* The content of this cache includes some of the outputs of GSS_Accept_sec_context,
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* being major_status, minor_status, context_handle, reply_token.
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* These are sent back to the client.
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* Sequence window management is handled by the kernel. The window size if currently
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* a compile time constant.
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*
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* When user-space is happy that a context is established, it places an entry
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* in the rpcsec_context cache. The key for this cache is the context_handle.
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* The content includes:
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* uid/gidlist - for determining access rights
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* mechanism type
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* mechanism specific information, such as a key
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth_gss.h>
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#include <linux/sunrpc/cache.h>
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#include "gss_rpc_upcall.h"
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG)
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# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
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#endif
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/* The rpcsec_init cache is used for mapping RPCSEC_GSS_{,CONT_}INIT requests
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* into replies.
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*
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* Key is context handle (\x if empty) and gss_token.
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* Content is major_status minor_status (integers) context_handle, reply_token.
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*
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*/
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static int netobj_equal(struct xdr_netobj *a, struct xdr_netobj *b)
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{
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return a->len == b->len && 0 == memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->len);
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}
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#define RSI_HASHBITS 6
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#define RSI_HASHMAX (1<<RSI_HASHBITS)
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struct rsi {
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struct cache_head h;
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struct xdr_netobj in_handle, in_token;
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struct xdr_netobj out_handle, out_token;
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int major_status, minor_status;
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};
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static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old);
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static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item);
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static void rsi_free(struct rsi *rsii)
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{
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kfree(rsii->in_handle.data);
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kfree(rsii->in_token.data);
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kfree(rsii->out_handle.data);
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kfree(rsii->out_token.data);
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}
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static void rsi_put(struct kref *ref)
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{
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struct rsi *rsii = container_of(ref, struct rsi, h.ref);
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rsi_free(rsii);
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kfree(rsii);
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}
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static inline int rsi_hash(struct rsi *item)
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{
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return hash_mem(item->in_handle.data, item->in_handle.len, RSI_HASHBITS)
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^ hash_mem(item->in_token.data, item->in_token.len, RSI_HASHBITS);
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}
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static int rsi_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
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{
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struct rsi *item = container_of(a, struct rsi, h);
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struct rsi *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsi, h);
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return netobj_equal(&item->in_handle, &tmp->in_handle) &&
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netobj_equal(&item->in_token, &tmp->in_token);
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}
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static int dup_to_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, char *src, int len)
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{
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dst->len = len;
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dst->data = (len ? kmemdup(src, len, GFP_KERNEL) : NULL);
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if (len && !dst->data)
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return -ENOMEM;
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int dup_netobj(struct xdr_netobj *dst, struct xdr_netobj *src)
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{
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return dup_to_netobj(dst, src->data, src->len);
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}
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static void rsi_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
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{
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struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
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struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
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new->out_handle.data = NULL;
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new->out_handle.len = 0;
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new->out_token.data = NULL;
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new->out_token.len = 0;
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new->in_handle.len = item->in_handle.len;
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item->in_handle.len = 0;
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new->in_token.len = item->in_token.len;
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item->in_token.len = 0;
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new->in_handle.data = item->in_handle.data;
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item->in_handle.data = NULL;
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new->in_token.data = item->in_token.data;
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item->in_token.data = NULL;
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}
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static void update_rsi(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
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{
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struct rsi *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsi, h);
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struct rsi *item = container_of(citem, struct rsi, h);
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BUG_ON(new->out_handle.data || new->out_token.data);
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new->out_handle.len = item->out_handle.len;
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item->out_handle.len = 0;
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new->out_token.len = item->out_token.len;
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item->out_token.len = 0;
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new->out_handle.data = item->out_handle.data;
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item->out_handle.data = NULL;
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new->out_token.data = item->out_token.data;
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item->out_token.data = NULL;
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new->major_status = item->major_status;
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new->minor_status = item->minor_status;
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}
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static struct cache_head *rsi_alloc(void)
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{
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struct rsi *rsii = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsii), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (rsii)
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return &rsii->h;
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else
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return NULL;
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}
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static void rsi_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
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struct cache_head *h,
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char **bpp, int *blen)
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{
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struct rsi *rsii = container_of(h, struct rsi, h);
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qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_handle.data, rsii->in_handle.len);
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qword_addhex(bpp, blen, rsii->in_token.data, rsii->in_token.len);
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(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
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}
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static int rsi_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
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char *mesg, int mlen)
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{
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/* context token expiry major minor context token */
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char *buf = mesg;
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char *ep;
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int len;
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struct rsi rsii, *rsip = NULL;
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time_t expiry;
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int status = -EINVAL;
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memset(&rsii, 0, sizeof(rsii));
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/* handle */
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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if (len < 0)
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goto out;
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status = -ENOMEM;
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if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_handle, buf, len))
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goto out;
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/* token */
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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status = -EINVAL;
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if (len < 0)
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goto out;
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status = -ENOMEM;
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if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.in_token, buf, len))
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goto out;
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rsip = rsi_lookup(cd, &rsii);
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if (!rsip)
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goto out;
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rsii.h.flags = 0;
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/* expiry */
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expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
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status = -EINVAL;
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if (expiry == 0)
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goto out;
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/* major/minor */
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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if (len <= 0)
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goto out;
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rsii.major_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
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if (*ep)
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goto out;
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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if (len <= 0)
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goto out;
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rsii.minor_status = simple_strtoul(buf, &ep, 10);
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if (*ep)
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goto out;
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/* out_handle */
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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if (len < 0)
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goto out;
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status = -ENOMEM;
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if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_handle, buf, len))
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goto out;
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/* out_token */
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len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
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status = -EINVAL;
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if (len < 0)
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goto out;
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status = -ENOMEM;
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if (dup_to_netobj(&rsii.out_token, buf, len))
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goto out;
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rsii.h.expiry_time = expiry;
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rsip = rsi_update(cd, &rsii, rsip);
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status = 0;
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out:
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rsi_free(&rsii);
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if (rsip)
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cache_put(&rsip->h, cd);
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else
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status = -ENOMEM;
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return status;
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}
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static struct cache_detail rsi_cache_template = {
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.owner = THIS_MODULE,
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.hash_size = RSI_HASHMAX,
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.name = "auth.rpcsec.init",
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.cache_put = rsi_put,
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.cache_request = rsi_request,
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.cache_parse = rsi_parse,
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.match = rsi_match,
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.init = rsi_init,
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.update = update_rsi,
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.alloc = rsi_alloc,
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};
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static struct rsi *rsi_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *item)
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{
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struct cache_head *ch;
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int hash = rsi_hash(item);
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ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(cd, &item->h, hash);
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if (ch)
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return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
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else
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct rsi *rsi_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsi *new, struct rsi *old)
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{
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struct cache_head *ch;
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int hash = rsi_hash(new);
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ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
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&old->h, hash);
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if (ch)
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return container_of(ch, struct rsi, h);
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else
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return NULL;
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
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* The rpcsec_context cache is used to store a context that is
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* used in data exchange.
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* The key is a context handle. The content is:
|
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* uid, gidlist, mechanism, service-set, mech-specific-data
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|
*/
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|
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#define RSC_HASHBITS 10
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#define RSC_HASHMAX (1<<RSC_HASHBITS)
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#define GSS_SEQ_WIN 128
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struct gss_svc_seq_data {
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/* highest seq number seen so far: */
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int sd_max;
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/* for i such that sd_max-GSS_SEQ_WIN < i <= sd_max, the i-th bit of
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* sd_win is nonzero iff sequence number i has been seen already: */
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unsigned long sd_win[GSS_SEQ_WIN/BITS_PER_LONG];
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spinlock_t sd_lock;
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|
};
|
|
|
|
struct rsc {
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|
struct cache_head h;
|
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struct xdr_netobj handle;
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|
struct svc_cred cred;
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struct gss_svc_seq_data seqdata;
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struct gss_ctx *mechctx;
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};
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|
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static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old);
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static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item);
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static void rsc_free(struct rsc *rsci)
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{
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|
kfree(rsci->handle.data);
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if (rsci->mechctx)
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|
gss_delete_sec_context(&rsci->mechctx);
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free_svc_cred(&rsci->cred);
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}
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static void rsc_put(struct kref *ref)
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{
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struct rsc *rsci = container_of(ref, struct rsc, h.ref);
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rsc_free(rsci);
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kfree(rsci);
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}
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static inline int
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rsc_hash(struct rsc *rsci)
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|
{
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|
return hash_mem(rsci->handle.data, rsci->handle.len, RSC_HASHBITS);
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|
}
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|
|
|
static int
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rsc_match(struct cache_head *a, struct cache_head *b)
|
|
{
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struct rsc *new = container_of(a, struct rsc, h);
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struct rsc *tmp = container_of(b, struct rsc, h);
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|
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return netobj_equal(&new->handle, &tmp->handle);
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}
|
|
|
|
static void
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rsc_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
|
|
{
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|
struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
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|
struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
|
|
|
|
new->handle.len = tmp->handle.len;
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tmp->handle.len = 0;
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new->handle.data = tmp->handle.data;
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tmp->handle.data = NULL;
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new->mechctx = NULL;
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init_svc_cred(&new->cred);
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}
|
|
|
|
static void
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update_rsc(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *ctmp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *new = container_of(cnew, struct rsc, h);
|
|
struct rsc *tmp = container_of(ctmp, struct rsc, h);
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|
|
|
new->mechctx = tmp->mechctx;
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tmp->mechctx = NULL;
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memset(&new->seqdata, 0, sizeof(new->seqdata));
|
|
spin_lock_init(&new->seqdata.sd_lock);
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|
new->cred = tmp->cred;
|
|
init_svc_cred(&tmp->cred);
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|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *
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rsc_alloc(void)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = kmalloc(sizeof(*rsci), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (rsci)
|
|
return &rsci->h;
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
char *mesg, int mlen)
|
|
{
|
|
/* contexthandle expiry [ uid gid N <n gids> mechname ...mechdata... ] */
|
|
char *buf = mesg;
|
|
int id;
|
|
int len, rv;
|
|
struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
|
|
time_t expiry;
|
|
int status = -EINVAL;
|
|
struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
|
|
/* context handle */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0) goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, buf, len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rsci.h.flags = 0;
|
|
/* expiry */
|
|
expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
if (expiry == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
|
|
if (!rscp)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* uid, or NEGATIVE */
|
|
rv = get_int(&mesg, &id);
|
|
if (rv == -EINVAL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (rv == -ENOENT)
|
|
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &rsci.h.flags);
|
|
else {
|
|
int N, i;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NOTE: we skip uid_valid()/gid_valid() checks here:
|
|
* instead, * -1 id's are later mapped to the
|
|
* (export-specific) anonymous id by nfsd_setuser.
|
|
*
|
|
* (But supplementary gid's get no such special
|
|
* treatment so are checked for validity here.)
|
|
*/
|
|
/* uid */
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, id);
|
|
|
|
/* gid */
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id);
|
|
|
|
/* number of additional gid's */
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &N))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (N < 0 || N > NGROUPS_MAX)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(N);
|
|
if (rsci.cred.cr_group_info == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* gid's */
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
|
|
kgid_t kgid;
|
|
if (get_int(&mesg, &id))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id);
|
|
if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* mech name */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
gm = rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gss_mech_get_by_name(buf);
|
|
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
if (!gm)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
/* mech-specific data: */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
status = gss_import_sec_context(buf, len, gm, &rsci.mechctx,
|
|
NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (status)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* get client name */
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
if (len > 0) {
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_principal = kstrdup(buf, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!rsci.cred.cr_principal) {
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
|
rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
rsc_free(&rsci);
|
|
if (rscp)
|
|
cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
|
|
else
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_detail rsc_cache_template = {
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.hash_size = RSC_HASHMAX,
|
|
.name = "auth.rpcsec.context",
|
|
.cache_put = rsc_put,
|
|
.cache_parse = rsc_parse,
|
|
.match = rsc_match,
|
|
.init = rsc_init,
|
|
.update = update_rsc,
|
|
.alloc = rsc_alloc,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *item)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsc_hash(item);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup(cd, &item->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *rsc_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct rsc *new, struct rsc *old)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
int hash = rsc_hash(new);
|
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &new->h,
|
|
&old->h, hash);
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct rsc, h);
|
|
else
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct rsc *
|
|
gss_svc_searchbyctx(struct cache_detail *cd, struct xdr_netobj *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc rsci;
|
|
struct rsc *found;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, handle->data, handle->len))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
found = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
|
|
rsc_free(&rsci);
|
|
if (!found)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (cache_check(cd, &found->h, NULL))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return found;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Implements sequence number algorithm as specified in RFC 2203. */
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_check_seq_num(struct rsc *rsci, int seq_num)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_seq_data *sd = &rsci->seqdata;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
if (seq_num > sd->sd_max) {
|
|
if (seq_num >= sd->sd_max + GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
|
|
memset(sd->sd_win,0,sizeof(sd->sd_win));
|
|
sd->sd_max = seq_num;
|
|
} else while (sd->sd_max < seq_num) {
|
|
sd->sd_max++;
|
|
__clear_bit(sd->sd_max % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
|
|
}
|
|
__set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win);
|
|
goto ok;
|
|
} else if (seq_num <= sd->sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN) {
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
/* sd_max - GSS_SEQ_WIN < seq_num <= sd_max */
|
|
if (__test_and_set_bit(seq_num % GSS_SEQ_WIN, sd->sd_win))
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
ok:
|
|
spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
drop:
|
|
spin_unlock(&sd->sd_lock);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline u32 round_up_to_quad(u32 i)
|
|
{
|
|
return (i + 3 ) & ~3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svc_safe_getnetobj(struct kvec *argv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
|
|
{
|
|
int l;
|
|
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 4)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
o->len = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
l = round_up_to_quad(o->len);
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < l)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
o->data = argv->iov_base;
|
|
argv->iov_base += l;
|
|
argv->iov_len -= l;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *p;
|
|
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, o->len);
|
|
p = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
resv->iov_len += round_up_to_quad(o->len);
|
|
if (resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
memcpy(p, o->data, o->len);
|
|
memset(p + o->len, 0, round_up_to_quad(o->len) - o->len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success.
|
|
* Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number)
|
|
* or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_verify_header(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsc *rsci,
|
|
__be32 *rpcstart, struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_ctx *ctx_id = rsci->mechctx;
|
|
struct xdr_buf rpchdr;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj checksum;
|
|
u32 flavor = 0;
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
struct kvec iov;
|
|
|
|
/* data to compute the checksum over: */
|
|
iov.iov_base = rpcstart;
|
|
iov.iov_len = (u8 *)argv->iov_base - (u8 *)rpcstart;
|
|
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &rpchdr);
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 4)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
flavor = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (flavor != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &checksum))
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) /* skip verification of revisited request */
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
if (gss_verify_mic(ctx_id, &rpchdr, &checksum) != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (gc->gc_seq > MAXSEQ) {
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
|
|
"large sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!gss_check_seq_num(rsci, gc->gc_seq)) {
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: discarding request with "
|
|
"old sequence number %d\n", gc->gc_seq);
|
|
return SVC_DROP;
|
|
}
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
|
|
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
|
|
/* don't really need to check if head->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE ... */
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *xdr_seq;
|
|
u32 maj_stat;
|
|
struct xdr_buf verf_data;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
struct kvec iov;
|
|
int err = -1;
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
|
|
xdr_seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!xdr_seq)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
*xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
|
|
|
|
iov.iov_base = xdr_seq;
|
|
iov.iov_len = 4;
|
|
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
|
|
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
|
|
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
|
|
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
*p++ = htonl(mic.len);
|
|
memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
|
|
p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
|
|
if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree(xdr_seq);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct gss_domain {
|
|
struct auth_domain h;
|
|
u32 pseudoflavor;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_domain *
|
|
find_gss_auth_domain(struct gss_ctx *ctx, u32 svc)
|
|
{
|
|
char *name;
|
|
|
|
name = gss_service_to_auth_domain_name(ctx->mech_type, svc);
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return auth_domain_find(name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss;
|
|
|
|
u32 svcauth_gss_flavor(struct auth_domain *dom)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
|
|
|
|
return gd->pseudoflavor;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_flavor);
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor(u32 pseudoflavor, char * name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_domain *new;
|
|
struct auth_domain *test;
|
|
int stat = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
kref_init(&new->h.ref);
|
|
new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!new->h.name)
|
|
goto out_free_dom;
|
|
new->h.flavour = &svcauthops_gss;
|
|
new->pseudoflavor = pseudoflavor;
|
|
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
test = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
|
|
if (test != &new->h) { /* Duplicate registration */
|
|
auth_domain_put(test);
|
|
kfree(new->h.name);
|
|
goto out_free_dom;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
out_free_dom:
|
|
kfree(new);
|
|
out:
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor);
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
read_u32_from_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, int base, u32 *obj)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 raw;
|
|
int status;
|
|
|
|
status = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, &raw, sizeof(*obj));
|
|
if (status)
|
|
return status;
|
|
*obj = ntohl(raw);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* It would be nice if this bit of code could be shared with the client.
|
|
* Obstacles:
|
|
* The client shouldn't malloc(), would have to pass in own memory.
|
|
* The server uses base of head iovec as read pointer, while the
|
|
* client uses separate pointer. */
|
|
static int
|
|
unwrap_integ_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
u32 integ_len, maj_stat;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
|
|
|
|
/* NFS READ normally uses splice to send data in-place. However
|
|
* the data in cache can change after the reply's MIC is computed
|
|
* but before the RPC reply is sent. To prevent the client from
|
|
* rejecting the server-computed MIC in this somewhat rare case,
|
|
* do not use splice with the GSS integrity service.
|
|
*/
|
|
clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
|
|
|
|
/* Did we already verify the signature on the original pass through? */
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_deferred)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
integ_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
|
|
if (integ_len & 3)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (integ_len > buf->len)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &integ_buf, 0, integ_len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
/* copy out mic... */
|
|
if (read_u32_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len, &mic.len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
if (mic.len > RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
mic.data = kmalloc(mic.len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!mic.data)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, integ_len + 4, mic.data, mic.len))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(ctx, &integ_buf, &mic);
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* trim off the mic and padding at the end before returning */
|
|
xdr_buf_trim(buf, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) + 4);
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
kfree(mic.data);
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
total_buf_len(struct xdr_buf *buf)
|
|
{
|
|
return buf->head[0].iov_len + buf->page_len + buf->tail[0].iov_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
fix_priv_head(struct xdr_buf *buf, int pad)
|
|
{
|
|
if (buf->page_len == 0) {
|
|
/* We need to adjust head and buf->len in tandem in this
|
|
* case to make svc_defer() work--it finds the original
|
|
* buffer start using buf->len - buf->head[0].iov_len. */
|
|
buf->head[0].iov_len -= pad;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
unwrap_priv_data(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 seq, struct gss_ctx *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 priv_len, maj_stat;
|
|
int pad, saved_len, remaining_len, offset;
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(RQ_SPLICE_OK, &rqstp->rq_flags);
|
|
|
|
priv_len = svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]);
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_deferred) {
|
|
/* Already decrypted last time through! The sequence number
|
|
* check at out_seq is unnecessary but harmless: */
|
|
goto out_seq;
|
|
}
|
|
/* buf->len is the number of bytes from the original start of the
|
|
* request to the end, where head[0].iov_len is just the bytes
|
|
* not yet read from the head, so these two values are different: */
|
|
remaining_len = total_buf_len(buf);
|
|
if (priv_len > remaining_len)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
pad = remaining_len - priv_len;
|
|
buf->len -= pad;
|
|
fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
|
|
|
|
/* Maybe it would be better to give gss_unwrap a length parameter: */
|
|
saved_len = buf->len;
|
|
buf->len = priv_len;
|
|
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, 0, buf);
|
|
pad = priv_len - buf->len;
|
|
buf->len = saved_len;
|
|
buf->len -= pad;
|
|
/* The upper layers assume the buffer is aligned on 4-byte boundaries.
|
|
* In the krb5p case, at least, the data ends up offset, so we need to
|
|
* move it around. */
|
|
/* XXX: This is very inefficient. It would be better to either do
|
|
* this while we encrypt, or maybe in the receive code, if we can peak
|
|
* ahead and work out the service and mechanism there. */
|
|
offset = buf->head[0].iov_len % 4;
|
|
if (offset) {
|
|
buf->buflen = RPCSVC_MAXPAYLOAD;
|
|
xdr_shift_buf(buf, offset);
|
|
fix_priv_head(buf, pad);
|
|
}
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
out_seq:
|
|
if (svc_getnl(&buf->head[0]) != seq)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct gss_svc_data {
|
|
/* decoded gss client cred: */
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred clcred;
|
|
/* save a pointer to the beginning of the encoded verifier,
|
|
* for use in encryption/checksumming in svcauth_gss_release: */
|
|
__be32 *verf_start;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = svcdata->rsci;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &svcdata->clcred;
|
|
int stat;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A gss export can be specified either by:
|
|
* export *(sec=krb5,rw)
|
|
* or by
|
|
* export gss/krb5(rw)
|
|
* The latter is deprecated; but for backwards compatibility reasons
|
|
* the nfsd code will still fall back on trying it if the former
|
|
* doesn't work; so we try to make both available to nfsd, below.
|
|
*/
|
|
rqstp->rq_gssclient = find_gss_auth_domain(rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_svc);
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_gssclient == NULL)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
stat = svcauth_unix_set_client(rqstp);
|
|
if (stat == SVC_DROP || stat == SVC_CLOSE)
|
|
return stat;
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_write_init_verf(struct cache_detail *cd, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, int *major_status)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc *rsci;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if (*major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
|
|
rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(cd, out_handle);
|
|
if (rsci == NULL) {
|
|
*major_status = GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
|
|
return gss_write_null_verf(rqstp);
|
|
}
|
|
rc = gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
|
|
cache_put(&rsci->h, cd);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_read_common_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
|
|
struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *in_handle)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Read the verifier; should be NULL: */
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
/* Martial context handle and token for upcall: */
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0)
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
if (dup_netobj(in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx))
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_read_verf(struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc,
|
|
struct kvec *argv, __be32 *authp,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *in_token)
|
|
{
|
|
struct xdr_netobj tmpobj;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) {
|
|
kfree(in_handle->data);
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (dup_netobj(in_token, &tmpobj)) {
|
|
kfree(in_handle->data);
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ok this is really heavily depending on a set of semantics in
|
|
* how rqstp is set up by svc_recv and pages laid down by the
|
|
* server when reading a request. We are basically guaranteed that
|
|
* the token lays all down linearly across a set of pages, starting
|
|
* at iov_base in rq_arg.head[0] which happens to be the first of a
|
|
* set of pages stored in rq_pages[].
|
|
* rq_arg.head[0].iov_base will provide us the page_base to pass
|
|
* to the upcall.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *in_handle,
|
|
struct gssp_in_token *in_token)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
u32 inlen;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
res = gss_read_common_verf(gc, argv, authp, in_handle);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
inlen = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len))
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
in_token->pages = rqstp->rq_pages;
|
|
in_token->page_base = (ulong)argv->iov_base & ~PAGE_MASK;
|
|
in_token->page_len = inlen;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
gss_write_resv(struct kvec *resv, size_t size_limit,
|
|
struct xdr_netobj *out_handle, struct xdr_netobj *out_token,
|
|
int major_status, int minor_status)
|
|
{
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > size_limit)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
|
|
if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_handle))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > size_limit)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, major_status);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, minor_status);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN);
|
|
if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, out_token))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Having read the cred already and found we're in the context
|
|
* initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results
|
|
* of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation. If
|
|
* the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result.
|
|
* Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int svcauth_gss_legacy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
struct rsi *rsip, rsikey;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey));
|
|
ret = gss_read_verf(gc, argv, authp,
|
|
&rsikey.in_handle, &rsikey.in_token);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */
|
|
rsip = rsi_lookup(sn->rsi_cache, &rsikey);
|
|
rsi_free(&rsikey);
|
|
if (!rsip)
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
if (cache_check(sn->rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle) < 0)
|
|
/* No upcall result: */
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
|
|
ret = SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
/* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */
|
|
if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp,
|
|
&rsip->out_handle, &rsip->major_status))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
&rsip->out_handle, &rsip->out_token,
|
|
rsip->major_status, rsip->minor_status))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
|
|
out:
|
|
cache_put(&rsip->h, sn->rsi_cache);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int gss_proxy_save_rsc(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
struct gssp_upcall_data *ud,
|
|
uint64_t *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rsc rsci, *rscp = NULL;
|
|
static atomic64_t ctxhctr;
|
|
long long ctxh;
|
|
struct gss_api_mech *gm = NULL;
|
|
time_t expiry;
|
|
int status = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memset(&rsci, 0, sizeof(rsci));
|
|
/* context handle */
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
/* the handle needs to be just a unique id,
|
|
* use a static counter */
|
|
ctxh = atomic64_inc_return(&ctxhctr);
|
|
|
|
/* make a copy for the caller */
|
|
*handle = ctxh;
|
|
|
|
/* make a copy for the rsc cache */
|
|
if (dup_to_netobj(&rsci.handle, (char *)handle, sizeof(uint64_t)))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rscp = rsc_lookup(cd, &rsci);
|
|
if (!rscp)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* creds */
|
|
if (!ud->found_creds) {
|
|
/* userspace seem buggy, we should always get at least a
|
|
* mapping to nobody */
|
|
dprintk("RPC: No creds found!\n");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* steal creds */
|
|
rsci.cred = ud->creds;
|
|
memset(&ud->creds, 0, sizeof(struct svc_cred));
|
|
|
|
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
/* get mech handle from OID */
|
|
gm = gss_mech_get_by_OID(&ud->mech_oid);
|
|
if (!gm)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
rsci.cred.cr_gss_mech = gm;
|
|
|
|
status = -EINVAL;
|
|
/* mech-specific data: */
|
|
status = gss_import_sec_context(ud->out_handle.data,
|
|
ud->out_handle.len,
|
|
gm, &rsci.mechctx,
|
|
&expiry, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (status)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsci.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
|
rscp = rsc_update(cd, &rsci, rscp);
|
|
status = 0;
|
|
out:
|
|
rsc_free(&rsci);
|
|
if (rscp)
|
|
cache_put(&rscp->h, cd);
|
|
else
|
|
status = -ENOMEM;
|
|
return status;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int svcauth_gss_proxy_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
struct xdr_netobj cli_handle;
|
|
struct gssp_upcall_data ud;
|
|
uint64_t handle;
|
|
int status;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct net *net = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net;
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud));
|
|
ret = gss_read_proxy_verf(rqstp, gc, authp,
|
|
&ud.in_handle, &ud.in_token);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform synchronous upcall to gss-proxy */
|
|
status = gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall(net, &ud);
|
|
if (status)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: gss major status = %d "
|
|
"minor status = %d\n",
|
|
ud.major_status, ud.minor_status);
|
|
|
|
switch (ud.major_status) {
|
|
case GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED:
|
|
cli_handle = ud.out_handle;
|
|
break;
|
|
case GSS_S_COMPLETE:
|
|
status = gss_proxy_save_rsc(sn->rsc_cache, &ud, &handle);
|
|
if (status)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
cli_handle.data = (u8 *)&handle;
|
|
cli_handle.len = sizeof(handle);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
ret = SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */
|
|
if (gss_write_init_verf(sn->rsc_cache, rqstp,
|
|
&cli_handle, &ud.major_status))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
if (gss_write_resv(resv, PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
&cli_handle, &ud.out_token,
|
|
ud.major_status, ud.minor_status))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
|
|
out:
|
|
gssp_free_upcall_data(&ud);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Try to set the sn->use_gss_proxy variable to a new value. We only allow
|
|
* it to be changed if it's currently undefined (-1). If it's any other value
|
|
* then return -EBUSY unless the type wouldn't have changed anyway.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int set_gss_proxy(struct net *net, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(type != 0 && type != 1);
|
|
ret = cmpxchg(&sn->use_gss_proxy, -1, type);
|
|
if (ret != -1 && ret != type)
|
|
return -EBUSY;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool use_gss_proxy(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
/* If use_gss_proxy is still undefined, then try to disable it */
|
|
if (sn->use_gss_proxy == -1)
|
|
set_gss_proxy(net, 0);
|
|
return sn->use_gss_proxy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t write_gssp(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file));
|
|
char tbuf[20];
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (*ppos || count > sizeof(tbuf)-1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (copy_from_user(tbuf, buf, count))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
tbuf[count] = 0;
|
|
res = kstrtoul(tbuf, 0, &i);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
if (i != 1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
res = set_gssp_clnt(net);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
res = set_gss_proxy(net, 1);
|
|
if (res)
|
|
return res;
|
|
return count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t read_gssp(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
{
|
|
struct net *net = PDE_DATA(file_inode(file));
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
unsigned long p = *ppos;
|
|
char tbuf[10];
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d\n", sn->use_gss_proxy);
|
|
len = strlen(tbuf);
|
|
if (p >= len)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
len -= p;
|
|
if (len > count)
|
|
len = count;
|
|
if (copy_to_user(buf, (void *)(tbuf+p), len))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
*ppos += len;
|
|
return len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations use_gss_proxy_ops = {
|
|
.open = nonseekable_open,
|
|
.write = write_gssp,
|
|
.read = read_gssp,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
struct proc_dir_entry **p = &sn->use_gssp_proc;
|
|
|
|
sn->use_gss_proxy = -1;
|
|
*p = proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR,
|
|
sn->proc_net_rpc,
|
|
&use_gss_proxy_ops, net);
|
|
if (!*p)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
init_gssp_clnt(sn);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
if (sn->use_gssp_proc) {
|
|
remove_proc_entry("use-gss-proxy", sn->proc_net_rpc);
|
|
clear_gssp_clnt(sn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
|
|
|
|
static int create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(struct net *net) {}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Accept an rpcsec packet.
|
|
* If context establishment, punt to user space
|
|
* If data exchange, verify/decrypt
|
|
* If context destruction, handle here
|
|
* In the context establishment and destruction case we encode
|
|
* response here and return SVC_COMPLETE.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
u32 crlen;
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc;
|
|
struct rsc *rsci = NULL;
|
|
__be32 *rpcstart;
|
|
__be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
dprintk("RPC: svcauth_gss: argv->iov_len = %zd\n",
|
|
argv->iov_len);
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
if (!svcdata)
|
|
svcdata = kmalloc(sizeof(*svcdata), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
if (!svcdata)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
rqstp->rq_auth_data = svcdata;
|
|
svcdata->verf_start = NULL;
|
|
svcdata->rsci = NULL;
|
|
gc = &svcdata->clcred;
|
|
|
|
/* start of rpc packet is 7 u32's back from here:
|
|
* xid direction rpcversion prog vers proc flavour
|
|
*/
|
|
rpcstart = argv->iov_base;
|
|
rpcstart -= 7;
|
|
|
|
/* credential is:
|
|
* version(==1), proc(0,1,2,3), seq, service (1,2,3), handle
|
|
* at least 5 u32s, and is preceded by length, so that makes 6.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 5 * 4)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
crlen = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_GSS_VERSION)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
gc->gc_proc = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
gc->gc_seq = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
gc->gc_svc = svc_getnl(argv);
|
|
if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &gc->gc_ctx))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
if (crlen != round_up_to_quad(gc->gc_ctx.len) + 5 * 4)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
|
|
if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
switch (gc->gc_proc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT:
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT:
|
|
if (use_gss_proxy(SVC_NET(rqstp)))
|
|
return svcauth_gss_proxy_init(rqstp, gc, authp);
|
|
else
|
|
return svcauth_gss_legacy_init(rqstp, gc, authp);
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
|
|
/* Look up the context, and check the verifier: */
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem;
|
|
rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(sn->rsc_cache, &gc->gc_ctx);
|
|
if (!rsci)
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
switch (gss_verify_header(rqstp, rsci, rpcstart, gc, authp)) {
|
|
case SVC_OK:
|
|
break;
|
|
case SVC_DENIED:
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
case SVC_DROP:
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_rejectedcred;
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* now act upon the command: */
|
|
switch (gc->gc_proc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY:
|
|
if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
/* Delete the entry from the cache_list and call cache_put */
|
|
sunrpc_cache_unhash(sn->rsc_cache, &rsci->h);
|
|
if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto drop;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS);
|
|
goto complete;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA:
|
|
*authp = rpcsec_gsserr_ctxproblem;
|
|
svcdata->verf_start = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len;
|
|
if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq))
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred = rsci->cred;
|
|
get_group_info(rsci->cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
switch (gc->gc_svc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
|
|
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
if (unwrap_integ_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
|
|
gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
|
|
goto garbage_args;
|
|
rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
|
|
/* placeholders for length and seq. number: */
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
|
if (unwrap_priv_data(rqstp, &rqstp->rq_arg,
|
|
gc->gc_seq, rsci->mechctx))
|
|
goto garbage_args;
|
|
rqstp->rq_auth_slack = RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE * 2;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
goto auth_err;
|
|
}
|
|
svcdata->rsci = rsci;
|
|
cache_get(&rsci->h);
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = gss_svc_to_pseudoflavor(
|
|
rsci->mechctx->mech_type,
|
|
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
|
|
gc->gc_svc);
|
|
ret = SVC_OK;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
garbage_args:
|
|
ret = SVC_GARBAGE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
auth_err:
|
|
/* Restore write pointer to its original value: */
|
|
xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat);
|
|
ret = SVC_DENIED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
complete:
|
|
ret = SVC_COMPLETE;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
drop:
|
|
ret = SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
out:
|
|
if (rsci)
|
|
cache_put(&rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __be32 *
|
|
svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(struct xdr_buf *resbuf, struct gss_svc_data *gsd)
|
|
{
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
u32 verf_len;
|
|
|
|
p = gsd->verf_start;
|
|
gsd->verf_start = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* If the reply stat is nonzero, don't wrap: */
|
|
if (*(p-1) != rpc_success)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Skip the verifier: */
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
verf_len = ntohl(*p++);
|
|
p += XDR_QUADLEN(verf_len);
|
|
/* move accept_stat to right place: */
|
|
memcpy(p, p + 2, 4);
|
|
/* Also don't wrap if the accept stat is nonzero: */
|
|
if (*p != rpc_success) {
|
|
resbuf->head[0].iov_len -= 2 * 4;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
p++;
|
|
return p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
struct xdr_buf integ_buf;
|
|
struct xdr_netobj mic;
|
|
struct kvec *resv;
|
|
__be32 *p;
|
|
int integ_offset, integ_len;
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
integ_offset = (u8 *)(p + 1) - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
|
|
integ_len = resbuf->len - integ_offset;
|
|
BUG_ON(integ_len % 4);
|
|
*p++ = htonl(integ_len);
|
|
*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
|
|
if (xdr_buf_subsegment(resbuf, &integ_buf, integ_offset, integ_len))
|
|
BUG();
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
|
|
if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
resv = &resbuf->tail[0];
|
|
mic.data = (u8 *)resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len + 4;
|
|
if (gss_get_mic(gsd->rsci->mechctx, &integ_buf, &mic))
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, mic.len);
|
|
memset(mic.data + mic.len, 0,
|
|
round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
|
|
resv->iov_len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
|
|
/* not strictly required: */
|
|
resbuf->len += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len) << 2;
|
|
BUG_ON(resv->iov_len > PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
out:
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out_err:
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
struct page **inpages = NULL;
|
|
__be32 *p, *len;
|
|
int offset;
|
|
int pad;
|
|
|
|
p = svcauth_gss_prepare_to_wrap(resbuf, gsd);
|
|
if (p == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
len = p++;
|
|
offset = (u8 *)p - (u8 *)resbuf->head[0].iov_base;
|
|
*p++ = htonl(gc->gc_seq);
|
|
inpages = resbuf->pages;
|
|
/* XXX: Would be better to write some xdr helper functions for
|
|
* nfs{2,3,4}xdr.c that place the data right, instead of copying: */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there is currently tail data, make sure there is
|
|
* room for the head, tail, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in
|
|
* the page, and move the current tail data such that
|
|
* there is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in
|
|
* both the head and tail.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base) {
|
|
BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base >= resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
BUG_ON(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base < resbuf->head[0].iov_base);
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_len + resbuf->head[0].iov_len
|
|
+ 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
memmove(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE,
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base,
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base += RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there is no current tail data, make sure there is
|
|
* room for the head data, and 2 * RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE in the
|
|
* allotted page, and set up tail information such that there
|
|
* is RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE slack space available in both the
|
|
* head and tail.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (resbuf->tail[0].iov_base == NULL) {
|
|
if (resbuf->head[0].iov_len + 2*RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE > PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_base = resbuf->head[0].iov_base
|
|
+ resbuf->head[0].iov_len + RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE;
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (gss_wrap(gsd->rsci->mechctx, offset, resbuf, inpages))
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
*len = htonl(resbuf->len - offset);
|
|
pad = 3 - ((resbuf->len - offset - 1)&3);
|
|
p = (__be32 *)(resbuf->tail[0].iov_base + resbuf->tail[0].iov_len);
|
|
memset(p, 0, pad);
|
|
resbuf->tail[0].iov_len += pad;
|
|
resbuf->len += pad;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
svcauth_gss_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_svc_data *gsd = (struct gss_svc_data *)rqstp->rq_auth_data;
|
|
struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc = &gsd->clcred;
|
|
struct xdr_buf *resbuf = &rqstp->rq_res;
|
|
int stat = -EINVAL;
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
if (gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* Release can be called twice, but we only wrap once. */
|
|
if (gsd->verf_start == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
/* normally not set till svc_send, but we need it here: */
|
|
/* XXX: what for? Do we mess it up the moment we call svc_putu32
|
|
* or whatever? */
|
|
resbuf->len = total_buf_len(resbuf);
|
|
switch (gc->gc_svc) {
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_NONE:
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY:
|
|
stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_integ(rqstp);
|
|
if (stat)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
case RPC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY:
|
|
stat = svcauth_gss_wrap_resp_priv(rqstp);
|
|
if (stat)
|
|
goto out_err;
|
|
break;
|
|
/*
|
|
* For any other gc_svc value, svcauth_gss_accept() already set
|
|
* the auth_error appropriately; just fall through:
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
stat = 0;
|
|
out_err:
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_client)
|
|
auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_gssclient)
|
|
auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_gssclient);
|
|
rqstp->rq_gssclient = NULL;
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
|
|
put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
if (gsd->rsci)
|
|
cache_put(&gsd->rsci->h, sn->rsc_cache);
|
|
gsd->rsci = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return stat;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
svcauth_gss_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
|
|
{
|
|
struct gss_domain *gd = container_of(dom, struct gss_domain, h);
|
|
|
|
kfree(dom->name);
|
|
kfree(gd);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct auth_ops svcauthops_gss = {
|
|
.name = "rpcsec_gss",
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
.flavour = RPC_AUTH_GSS,
|
|
.accept = svcauth_gss_accept,
|
|
.release = svcauth_gss_release,
|
|
.domain_release = svcauth_gss_domain_release,
|
|
.set_client = svcauth_gss_set_client,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int rsi_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
cd = cache_create_net(&rsi_cache_template, net);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cd))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(cd);
|
|
err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
sn->rsi_cache = cd;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsi_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsi_cache;
|
|
|
|
sn->rsi_cache = NULL;
|
|
cache_purge(cd);
|
|
cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int rsc_cache_create_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
cd = cache_create_net(&rsc_cache_template, net);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cd))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(cd);
|
|
err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
sn->rsc_cache = cd;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void rsc_cache_destroy_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd = sn->rsc_cache;
|
|
|
|
sn->rsc_cache = NULL;
|
|
cache_purge(cd);
|
|
cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
gss_svc_init_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
rv = rsc_cache_create_net(net);
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
rv = rsi_cache_create_net(net);
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
goto out1;
|
|
rv = create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
goto out2;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
out2:
|
|
destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
|
|
out1:
|
|
rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
gss_svc_shutdown_net(struct net *net)
|
|
{
|
|
destroy_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net);
|
|
rsi_cache_destroy_net(net);
|
|
rsc_cache_destroy_net(net);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
gss_svc_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return svc_auth_register(RPC_AUTH_GSS, &svcauthops_gss);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
gss_svc_shutdown(void)
|
|
{
|
|
svc_auth_unregister(RPC_AUTH_GSS);
|
|
}
|