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linux/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
Linus Torvalds 7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12 
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00

1182 lines
33 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/**
* eCryptfs: Linux filesystem encryption layer
*
* Copyright (C) 1997-2004 Erez Zadok
* Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Stony Brook University
* Copyright (C) 2004-2007 International Business Machines Corp.
* Author(s): Michael A. Halcrow <mahalcro@us.ibm.com>
* Michael C. Thompsion <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/fs_stack.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
static struct dentry *lock_parent(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct dentry *dir;
dir = dget_parent(dentry);
inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dir), I_MUTEX_PARENT);
return dir;
}
static void unlock_dir(struct dentry *dir)
{
inode_unlock(d_inode(dir));
dput(dir);
}
static int ecryptfs_inode_test(struct inode *inode, void *lower_inode)
{
return ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode) == lower_inode;
}
static int ecryptfs_inode_set(struct inode *inode, void *opaque)
{
struct inode *lower_inode = opaque;
ecryptfs_set_inode_lower(inode, lower_inode);
fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode);
/* i_size will be overwritten for encrypted regular files */
fsstack_copy_inode_size(inode, lower_inode);
inode->i_ino = lower_inode->i_ino;
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &ecryptfs_aops;
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
inode->i_op = &ecryptfs_symlink_iops;
else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
inode->i_op = &ecryptfs_dir_iops;
else
inode->i_op = &ecryptfs_main_iops;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
inode->i_fop = &ecryptfs_dir_fops;
else if (special_file(inode->i_mode))
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode, inode->i_rdev);
else
inode->i_fop = &ecryptfs_main_fops;
return 0;
}
static struct inode *__ecryptfs_get_inode(struct inode *lower_inode,
struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode;
if (lower_inode->i_sb != ecryptfs_superblock_to_lower(sb))
return ERR_PTR(-EXDEV);
if (!igrab(lower_inode))
return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
inode = iget5_locked(sb, (unsigned long)lower_inode,
ecryptfs_inode_test, ecryptfs_inode_set,
lower_inode);
if (!inode) {
iput(lower_inode);
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW))
iput(lower_inode);
return inode;
}
struct inode *ecryptfs_get_inode(struct inode *lower_inode,
struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode = __ecryptfs_get_inode(lower_inode, sb);
if (!IS_ERR(inode) && (inode->i_state & I_NEW))
unlock_new_inode(inode);
return inode;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_interpose
* @lower_dentry: Existing dentry in the lower filesystem
* @dentry: ecryptfs' dentry
* @sb: ecryptfs's super_block
*
* Interposes upper and lower dentries.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
static int ecryptfs_interpose(struct dentry *lower_dentry,
struct dentry *dentry, struct super_block *sb)
{
struct inode *inode = ecryptfs_get_inode(d_inode(lower_dentry), sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
return 0;
}
static int ecryptfs_do_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
struct inode *lower_dir_inode;
int rc;
lower_dir_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry->d_parent);
lower_dir_inode = d_inode(lower_dir_dentry);
inode_lock_nested(lower_dir_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dget(lower_dentry); // don't even try to make the lower negative
if (lower_dentry->d_parent != lower_dir_dentry)
rc = -EINVAL;
else if (d_unhashed(lower_dentry))
rc = -EINVAL;
else
rc = vfs_unlink(&init_user_ns, lower_dir_inode, lower_dentry,
NULL);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error in vfs_unlink; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out_unlock;
}
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, lower_dir_inode);
set_nlink(inode, ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode)->i_nlink);
inode->i_ctime = dir->i_ctime;
out_unlock:
dput(lower_dentry);
inode_unlock(lower_dir_inode);
if (!rc)
d_drop(dentry);
return rc;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_do_create
* @directory_inode: inode of the new file's dentry's parent in ecryptfs
* @ecryptfs_dentry: New file's dentry in ecryptfs
* @mode: The mode of the new file
*
* Creates the underlying file and the eCryptfs inode which will link to
* it. It will also update the eCryptfs directory inode to mimic the
* stat of the lower directory inode.
*
* Returns the new eCryptfs inode on success; an ERR_PTR on error condition
*/
static struct inode *
ecryptfs_do_create(struct inode *directory_inode,
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry, umode_t mode)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
struct inode *inode;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(ecryptfs_dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_dentry);
rc = vfs_create(&init_user_ns, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry), lower_dentry,
mode, true);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Failure to create dentry in lower fs; "
"rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
inode = ERR_PTR(rc);
goto out_lock;
}
inode = __ecryptfs_get_inode(d_inode(lower_dentry),
directory_inode->i_sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
vfs_unlink(&init_user_ns, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry),
lower_dentry, NULL);
goto out_lock;
}
fsstack_copy_attr_times(directory_inode, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
fsstack_copy_inode_size(directory_inode, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
out_lock:
unlock_dir(lower_dir_dentry);
return inode;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_initialize_file
*
* Cause the file to be changed from a basic empty file to an ecryptfs
* file with a header and first data page.
*
* Returns zero on success
*/
int ecryptfs_initialize_file(struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
struct inode *ecryptfs_inode)
{
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat =
&ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ecryptfs_inode)->crypt_stat;
int rc = 0;
if (S_ISDIR(ecryptfs_inode->i_mode)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This is a directory\n");
crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
goto out;
}
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing crypto context\n");
rc = ecryptfs_new_file_context(ecryptfs_inode);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error creating new file "
"context; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_file(ecryptfs_dentry, ecryptfs_inode);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to initialize "
"the lower file for the dentry with name "
"[%pd]; rc = [%d]\n", __func__,
ecryptfs_dentry, rc);
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_write_metadata(ecryptfs_dentry, ecryptfs_inode);
if (rc)
printk(KERN_ERR "Error writing headers; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(ecryptfs_inode);
out:
return rc;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_create
* @dir: The inode of the directory in which to create the file.
* @dentry: The eCryptfs dentry
* @mode: The mode of the new file.
*
* Creates a new file.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero on error condition
*/
static int
ecryptfs_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *directory_inode, struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
umode_t mode, bool excl)
{
struct inode *ecryptfs_inode;
int rc;
ecryptfs_inode = ecryptfs_do_create(directory_inode, ecryptfs_dentry,
mode);
if (IS_ERR(ecryptfs_inode)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Failed to create file in"
"lower filesystem\n");
rc = PTR_ERR(ecryptfs_inode);
goto out;
}
/* At this point, a file exists on "disk"; we need to make sure
* that this on disk file is prepared to be an ecryptfs file */
rc = ecryptfs_initialize_file(ecryptfs_dentry, ecryptfs_inode);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_do_unlink(directory_inode, ecryptfs_dentry,
ecryptfs_inode);
iget_failed(ecryptfs_inode);
goto out;
}
d_instantiate_new(ecryptfs_dentry, ecryptfs_inode);
out:
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_i_size_read(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_file(dentry, inode);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to initialize "
"the lower file for the dentry with name "
"[%pd]; rc = [%d]\n", __func__,
dentry, rc);
return rc;
}
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat;
/* TODO: lock for crypt_stat comparison */
if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED))
ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stat);
rc = ecryptfs_read_and_validate_header_region(inode);
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(inode);
if (rc) {
rc = ecryptfs_read_and_validate_xattr_region(dentry, inode);
if (!rc)
crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_METADATA_IN_XATTR;
}
/* Must return 0 to allow non-eCryptfs files to be looked up, too */
return 0;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_lookup_interpose - Dentry interposition for a lookup
*/
static struct dentry *ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(struct dentry *dentry,
struct dentry *lower_dentry)
{
struct path *path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry->d_parent);
struct inode *inode, *lower_inode;
struct ecryptfs_dentry_info *dentry_info;
int rc = 0;
dentry_info = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_dentry_info_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dentry_info) {
dput(lower_dentry);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
fsstack_copy_attr_atime(d_inode(dentry->d_parent),
d_inode(path->dentry));
BUG_ON(!d_count(lower_dentry));
ecryptfs_set_dentry_private(dentry, dentry_info);
dentry_info->lower_path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
dentry_info->lower_path.dentry = lower_dentry;
/*
* negative dentry can go positive under us here - its parent is not
* locked. That's OK and that could happen just as we return from
* ecryptfs_lookup() anyway. Just need to be careful and fetch
* ->d_inode only once - it's not stable here.
*/
lower_inode = READ_ONCE(lower_dentry->d_inode);
if (!lower_inode) {
/* We want to add because we couldn't find in lower */
d_add(dentry, NULL);
return NULL;
}
inode = __ecryptfs_get_inode(lower_inode, dentry->d_sb);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error interposing; rc = [%ld]\n",
__func__, PTR_ERR(inode));
return ERR_CAST(inode);
}
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
rc = ecryptfs_i_size_read(dentry, inode);
if (rc) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
}
if (inode->i_state & I_NEW)
unlock_new_inode(inode);
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
}
/**
* ecryptfs_lookup
* @ecryptfs_dir_inode: The eCryptfs directory inode
* @ecryptfs_dentry: The eCryptfs dentry that we are looking up
* @flags: lookup flags
*
* Find a file on disk. If the file does not exist, then we'll add it to the
* dentry cache and continue on to read it from the disk.
*/
static struct dentry *ecryptfs_lookup(struct inode *ecryptfs_dir_inode,
struct dentry *ecryptfs_dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
char *encrypted_and_encoded_name = NULL;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry, *lower_dentry;
const char *name = ecryptfs_dentry->d_name.name;
size_t len = ecryptfs_dentry->d_name.len;
struct dentry *res;
int rc = 0;
lower_dir_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(ecryptfs_dentry->d_parent);
mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
ecryptfs_dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
if (mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES) {
rc = ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename(
&encrypted_and_encoded_name, &len,
mount_crypt_stat, name, len);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error attempting to encrypt and encode "
"filename; rc = [%d]\n", __func__, rc);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
name = encrypted_and_encoded_name;
}
lower_dentry = lookup_one_len_unlocked(name, lower_dir_dentry, len);
if (IS_ERR(lower_dentry)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "%s: lookup_one_len() returned "
"[%ld] on lower_dentry = [%s]\n", __func__,
PTR_ERR(lower_dentry),
name);
res = ERR_CAST(lower_dentry);
} else {
res = ecryptfs_lookup_interpose(ecryptfs_dentry, lower_dentry);
}
kfree(encrypted_and_encoded_name);
return res;
}
static int ecryptfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
struct dentry *lower_old_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_new_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
u64 file_size_save;
int rc;
file_size_save = i_size_read(d_inode(old_dentry));
lower_old_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(old_dentry);
lower_new_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(new_dentry);
dget(lower_old_dentry);
dget(lower_new_dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_new_dentry);
rc = vfs_link(lower_old_dentry, &init_user_ns,
d_inode(lower_dir_dentry), lower_new_dentry, NULL);
if (rc || d_really_is_negative(lower_new_dentry))
goto out_lock;
rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_new_dentry, new_dentry, dir->i_sb);
if (rc)
goto out_lock;
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
fsstack_copy_inode_size(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
set_nlink(d_inode(old_dentry),
ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(d_inode(old_dentry))->i_nlink);
i_size_write(d_inode(new_dentry), file_size_save);
out_lock:
unlock_dir(lower_dir_dentry);
dput(lower_new_dentry);
dput(lower_old_dentry);
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return ecryptfs_do_unlink(dir, dentry, d_inode(dentry));
}
static int ecryptfs_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *symname)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
char *encoded_symname;
size_t encoded_symlen;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat = NULL;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
dget(lower_dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_dentry);
mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
dir->i_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
rc = ecryptfs_encrypt_and_encode_filename(&encoded_symname,
&encoded_symlen,
mount_crypt_stat, symname,
strlen(symname));
if (rc)
goto out_lock;
rc = vfs_symlink(&init_user_ns, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry), lower_dentry,
encoded_symname);
kfree(encoded_symname);
if (rc || d_really_is_negative(lower_dentry))
goto out_lock;
rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_dentry, dentry, dir->i_sb);
if (rc)
goto out_lock;
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
fsstack_copy_inode_size(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
out_lock:
unlock_dir(lower_dir_dentry);
dput(lower_dentry);
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry))
d_drop(dentry);
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_dentry);
rc = vfs_mkdir(&init_user_ns, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry), lower_dentry,
mode);
if (rc || d_really_is_negative(lower_dentry))
goto out;
rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_dentry, dentry, dir->i_sb);
if (rc)
goto out;
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
fsstack_copy_inode_size(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
set_nlink(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry)->i_nlink);
out:
unlock_dir(lower_dir_dentry);
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry))
d_drop(dentry);
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
struct inode *lower_dir_inode;
int rc;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry->d_parent);
lower_dir_inode = d_inode(lower_dir_dentry);
inode_lock_nested(lower_dir_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
dget(lower_dentry); // don't even try to make the lower negative
if (lower_dentry->d_parent != lower_dir_dentry)
rc = -EINVAL;
else if (d_unhashed(lower_dentry))
rc = -EINVAL;
else
rc = vfs_rmdir(&init_user_ns, lower_dir_inode, lower_dentry);
if (!rc) {
clear_nlink(d_inode(dentry));
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, lower_dir_inode);
set_nlink(dir, lower_dir_inode->i_nlink);
}
dput(lower_dentry);
inode_unlock(lower_dir_inode);
if (!rc)
d_drop(dentry);
return rc;
}
static int
ecryptfs_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_dir_dentry;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
lower_dir_dentry = lock_parent(lower_dentry);
rc = vfs_mknod(&init_user_ns, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry), lower_dentry,
mode, dev);
if (rc || d_really_is_negative(lower_dentry))
goto out;
rc = ecryptfs_interpose(lower_dentry, dentry, dir->i_sb);
if (rc)
goto out;
fsstack_copy_attr_times(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
fsstack_copy_inode_size(dir, d_inode(lower_dir_dentry));
out:
unlock_dir(lower_dir_dentry);
if (d_really_is_negative(dentry))
d_drop(dentry);
return rc;
}
static int
ecryptfs_rename(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *old_dir,
struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *new_dir,
struct dentry *new_dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_old_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_new_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_old_dir_dentry;
struct dentry *lower_new_dir_dentry;
struct dentry *trap;
struct inode *target_inode;
struct renamedata rd = {};
if (flags)
return -EINVAL;
lower_old_dir_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(old_dentry->d_parent);
lower_new_dir_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(new_dentry->d_parent);
lower_old_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(old_dentry);
lower_new_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(new_dentry);
target_inode = d_inode(new_dentry);
trap = lock_rename(lower_old_dir_dentry, lower_new_dir_dentry);
dget(lower_new_dentry);
rc = -EINVAL;
if (lower_old_dentry->d_parent != lower_old_dir_dentry)
goto out_lock;
if (lower_new_dentry->d_parent != lower_new_dir_dentry)
goto out_lock;
if (d_unhashed(lower_old_dentry) || d_unhashed(lower_new_dentry))
goto out_lock;
/* source should not be ancestor of target */
if (trap == lower_old_dentry)
goto out_lock;
/* target should not be ancestor of source */
if (trap == lower_new_dentry) {
rc = -ENOTEMPTY;
goto out_lock;
}
rd.old_mnt_userns = &init_user_ns;
rd.old_dir = d_inode(lower_old_dir_dentry);
rd.old_dentry = lower_old_dentry;
rd.new_mnt_userns = &init_user_ns;
rd.new_dir = d_inode(lower_new_dir_dentry);
rd.new_dentry = lower_new_dentry;
rc = vfs_rename(&rd);
if (rc)
goto out_lock;
if (target_inode)
fsstack_copy_attr_all(target_inode,
ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(target_inode));
fsstack_copy_attr_all(new_dir, d_inode(lower_new_dir_dentry));
if (new_dir != old_dir)
fsstack_copy_attr_all(old_dir, d_inode(lower_old_dir_dentry));
out_lock:
dput(lower_new_dentry);
unlock_rename(lower_old_dir_dentry, lower_new_dir_dentry);
return rc;
}
static char *ecryptfs_readlink_lower(struct dentry *dentry, size_t *bufsiz)
{
DEFINE_DELAYED_CALL(done);
struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
const char *link;
char *buf;
int rc;
link = vfs_get_link(lower_dentry, &done);
if (IS_ERR(link))
return ERR_CAST(link);
rc = ecryptfs_decode_and_decrypt_filename(&buf, bufsiz, dentry->d_sb,
link, strlen(link));
do_delayed_call(&done);
if (rc)
return ERR_PTR(rc);
return buf;
}
static const char *ecryptfs_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode,
struct delayed_call *done)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
if (!dentry)
return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
buf = ecryptfs_readlink_lower(dentry, &len);
if (IS_ERR(buf))
return buf;
fsstack_copy_attr_atime(d_inode(dentry),
d_inode(ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry)));
buf[len] = '\0';
set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, buf);
return buf;
}
/**
* upper_size_to_lower_size
* @crypt_stat: Crypt_stat associated with file
* @upper_size: Size of the upper file
*
* Calculate the required size of the lower file based on the
* specified size of the upper file. This calculation is based on the
* number of headers in the underlying file and the extent size.
*
* Returns Calculated size of the lower file.
*/
static loff_t
upper_size_to_lower_size(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
loff_t upper_size)
{
loff_t lower_size;
lower_size = ecryptfs_lower_header_size(crypt_stat);
if (upper_size != 0) {
loff_t num_extents;
num_extents = upper_size >> crypt_stat->extent_shift;
if (upper_size & ~crypt_stat->extent_mask)
num_extents++;
lower_size += (num_extents * crypt_stat->extent_size);
}
return lower_size;
}
/**
* truncate_upper
* @dentry: The ecryptfs layer dentry
* @ia: Address of the ecryptfs inode's attributes
* @lower_ia: Address of the lower inode's attributes
*
* Function to handle truncations modifying the size of the file. Note
* that the file sizes are interpolated. When expanding, we are simply
* writing strings of 0's out. When truncating, we truncate the upper
* inode and update the lower_ia according to the page index
* interpolations. If ATTR_SIZE is set in lower_ia->ia_valid upon return,
* the caller must use lower_ia in a call to notify_change() to perform
* the truncation of the lower inode.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
static int truncate_upper(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia,
struct iattr *lower_ia)
{
int rc = 0;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
loff_t lower_size_before_truncate;
loff_t lower_size_after_truncate;
if (unlikely((ia->ia_size == i_size))) {
lower_ia->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
return 0;
}
rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_file(dentry, inode);
if (rc)
return rc;
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(d_inode(dentry))->crypt_stat;
/* Switch on growing or shrinking file */
if (ia->ia_size > i_size) {
char zero[] = { 0x00 };
lower_ia->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
/* Write a single 0 at the last position of the file;
* this triggers code that will fill in 0's throughout
* the intermediate portion of the previous end of the
* file and the new and of the file */
rc = ecryptfs_write(inode, zero,
(ia->ia_size - 1), 1);
} else { /* ia->ia_size < i_size_read(inode) */
/* We're chopping off all the pages down to the page
* in which ia->ia_size is located. Fill in the end of
* that page from (ia->ia_size & ~PAGE_MASK) to
* PAGE_SIZE with zeros. */
size_t num_zeros = (PAGE_SIZE
- (ia->ia_size & ~PAGE_MASK));
if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
truncate_setsize(inode, ia->ia_size);
lower_ia->ia_size = ia->ia_size;
lower_ia->ia_valid |= ATTR_SIZE;
goto out;
}
if (num_zeros) {
char *zeros_virt;
zeros_virt = kzalloc(num_zeros, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!zeros_virt) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_write(inode, zeros_virt,
ia->ia_size, num_zeros);
kfree(zeros_virt);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to zero out "
"the remainder of the end page on "
"reducing truncate; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
}
truncate_setsize(inode, ia->ia_size);
rc = ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_metadata(inode);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Problem with "
"ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_metadata; "
"rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
/* We are reducing the size of the ecryptfs file, and need to
* know if we need to reduce the size of the lower file. */
lower_size_before_truncate =
upper_size_to_lower_size(crypt_stat, i_size);
lower_size_after_truncate =
upper_size_to_lower_size(crypt_stat, ia->ia_size);
if (lower_size_after_truncate < lower_size_before_truncate) {
lower_ia->ia_size = lower_size_after_truncate;
lower_ia->ia_valid |= ATTR_SIZE;
} else
lower_ia->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_SIZE;
}
out:
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(inode);
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset)
{
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
loff_t lower_oldsize, lower_newsize;
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat;
lower_oldsize = upper_size_to_lower_size(crypt_stat,
i_size_read(inode));
lower_newsize = upper_size_to_lower_size(crypt_stat, offset);
if (lower_newsize > lower_oldsize) {
/*
* The eCryptfs inode and the new *lower* size are mixed here
* because we may not have the lower i_mutex held and/or it may
* not be appropriate to call inode_newsize_ok() with inodes
* from other filesystems.
*/
return inode_newsize_ok(inode, lower_newsize);
}
return 0;
}
/**
* ecryptfs_truncate
* @dentry: The ecryptfs layer dentry
* @new_length: The length to expand the file to
*
* Simple function that handles the truncation of an eCryptfs inode and
* its corresponding lower inode.
*
* Returns zero on success; non-zero otherwise
*/
int ecryptfs_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t new_length)
{
struct iattr ia = { .ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE, .ia_size = new_length };
struct iattr lower_ia = { .ia_valid = 0 };
int rc;
rc = ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(d_inode(dentry), new_length);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = truncate_upper(dentry, &ia, &lower_ia);
if (!rc && lower_ia.ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
struct dentry *lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
rc = notify_change(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry,
&lower_ia, NULL);
inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
}
return rc;
}
static int
ecryptfs_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
int mask)
{
return inode_permission(&init_user_ns,
ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode), mask);
}
/**
* ecryptfs_setattr
* @dentry: dentry handle to the inode to modify
* @ia: Structure with flags of what to change and values
*
* Updates the metadata of an inode. If the update is to the size
* i.e. truncation, then ecryptfs_truncate will handle the size modification
* of both the ecryptfs inode and the lower inode.
*
* All other metadata changes will be passed right to the lower filesystem,
* and we will just update our inode to look like the lower.
*/
static int ecryptfs_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *ia)
{
int rc = 0;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct iattr lower_ia;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode *lower_inode;
struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat;
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(d_inode(dentry))->crypt_stat;
if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED)) {
rc = ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(crypt_stat);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
inode = d_inode(dentry);
lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode);
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
if (d_is_dir(dentry))
crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
else if (d_is_reg(dentry)
&& (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)
|| !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID))) {
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
rc = ecryptfs_get_lower_file(dentry, inode);
if (rc) {
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
goto out;
}
rc = ecryptfs_read_metadata(dentry);
ecryptfs_put_lower_file(inode);
if (rc) {
if (!(mount_crypt_stat->flags
& ECRYPTFS_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH_ENABLED)) {
rc = -EIO;
printk(KERN_WARNING "Either the lower file "
"is not in a valid eCryptfs format, "
"or the key could not be retrieved. "
"Plaintext passthrough mode is not "
"enabled; returning -EIO\n");
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
goto out;
}
rc = 0;
crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_I_SIZE_INITIALIZED
| ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
}
}
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
rc = setattr_prepare(&init_user_ns, dentry, ia);
if (rc)
goto out;
if (ia->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
rc = ecryptfs_inode_newsize_ok(inode, ia->ia_size);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
memcpy(&lower_ia, ia, sizeof(lower_ia));
if (ia->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)
lower_ia.ia_file = ecryptfs_file_to_lower(ia->ia_file);
if (ia->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
rc = truncate_upper(dentry, ia, &lower_ia);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
}
/*
* mode change is for clearing setuid/setgid bits. Allow lower fs
* to interpret this in its own way.
*/
if (lower_ia.ia_valid & (ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID))
lower_ia.ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
rc = notify_change(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, &lower_ia, NULL);
inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
out:
fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode);
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_getattr_link(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat;
int rc = 0;
mount_crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_superblock_to_private(
dentry->d_sb)->mount_crypt_stat;
generic_fillattr(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dentry), stat);
if (mount_crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_GLOBAL_ENCRYPT_FILENAMES) {
char *target;
size_t targetsiz;
target = ecryptfs_readlink_lower(dentry, &targetsiz);
if (!IS_ERR(target)) {
kfree(target);
stat->size = targetsiz;
} else {
rc = PTR_ERR(target);
}
}
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask, unsigned int flags)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct kstat lower_stat;
int rc;
rc = vfs_getattr(ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(dentry), &lower_stat,
request_mask, flags);
if (!rc) {
fsstack_copy_attr_all(d_inode(dentry),
ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(d_inode(dentry)));
generic_fillattr(&init_user_ns, d_inode(dentry), stat);
stat->blocks = lower_stat.blocks;
}
return rc;
}
int
ecryptfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, const void *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct inode *lower_inode;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
lower_inode = d_inode(lower_dentry);
if (!(lower_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
inode_lock(lower_inode);
rc = __vfs_setxattr_locked(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, name, value, size, flags, NULL);
inode_unlock(lower_inode);
if (!rc && inode)
fsstack_copy_attr_all(inode, lower_inode);
out:
return rc;
}
ssize_t
ecryptfs_getxattr_lower(struct dentry *lower_dentry, struct inode *lower_inode,
const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
int rc;
if (!(lower_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
inode_lock(lower_inode);
rc = __vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size);
inode_unlock(lower_inode);
out:
return rc;
}
static ssize_t
ecryptfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
return ecryptfs_getxattr_lower(ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry),
ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode),
name, value, size);
}
static ssize_t
ecryptfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
{
int rc = 0;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
if (!d_inode(lower_dentry)->i_op->listxattr) {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
inode_lock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
rc = d_inode(lower_dentry)->i_op->listxattr(lower_dentry, list, size);
inode_unlock(d_inode(lower_dentry));
out:
return rc;
}
static int ecryptfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name)
{
int rc;
struct dentry *lower_dentry;
struct inode *lower_inode;
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(dentry);
lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(inode);
if (!(lower_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
inode_lock(lower_inode);
rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, lower_dentry, name);
inode_unlock(lower_inode);
out:
return rc;
}
const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_symlink_iops = {
.get_link = ecryptfs_get_link,
.permission = ecryptfs_permission,
.setattr = ecryptfs_setattr,
.getattr = ecryptfs_getattr_link,
.listxattr = ecryptfs_listxattr,
};
const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_dir_iops = {
.create = ecryptfs_create,
.lookup = ecryptfs_lookup,
.link = ecryptfs_link,
.unlink = ecryptfs_unlink,
.symlink = ecryptfs_symlink,
.mkdir = ecryptfs_mkdir,
.rmdir = ecryptfs_rmdir,
.mknod = ecryptfs_mknod,
.rename = ecryptfs_rename,
.permission = ecryptfs_permission,
.setattr = ecryptfs_setattr,
.listxattr = ecryptfs_listxattr,
};
const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_main_iops = {
.permission = ecryptfs_permission,
.setattr = ecryptfs_setattr,
.getattr = ecryptfs_getattr,
.listxattr = ecryptfs_listxattr,
};
static int ecryptfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
return ecryptfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, name, buffer, size);
}
static int ecryptfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size,
int flags)
{
if (value)
return ecryptfs_setxattr(dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags);
else {
BUG_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
return ecryptfs_removexattr(dentry, inode, name);
}
}
static const struct xattr_handler ecryptfs_xattr_handler = {
.prefix = "", /* match anything */
.get = ecryptfs_xattr_get,
.set = ecryptfs_xattr_set,
};
const struct xattr_handler *ecryptfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
&ecryptfs_xattr_handler,
NULL
};
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