mainlining shenanigans
in copy_process(): non root users but with capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN will clean PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag even rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds. Add the same capability check logic here. Align the permission checks in copy_process() and set_user(). In copy_process() CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable users will be able to circumvent and clear the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag whereas they aren't able to the same in set_user(). There's no obvious logic to this and trying to unearth the reason in the thread didn't go anywhere. The gist seems to be that this code wants to make sure that a program can't successfully exec if it has gone through a set*id() transition while exceeding its RLIMIT_NPROC. A capable but non-INIT_USER caller getting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED set during a set*id() transition wouldn't be able to exec right away if they still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC at the time of exec. So their exec would fail in fs/exec.c: if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) && is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { retval = -EAGAIN; goto out_ret; } However, if the caller were to fork() right after the set*id() transition but before the exec while still exceeding their RLIMIT_NPROC then they would get PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED cleared (while the child would inherit it): retval = -EAGAIN; if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto bad_fork_free; } current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; which means a subsequent exec by the capable caller would now succeed even though they could still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC limit. This seems inconsistent. Allow a CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable user to avoid PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED as they already can in copy_process(). Cc: peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>, , , Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728072629.530435-1-ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
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arch | ||
block | ||
certs | ||
crypto | ||
Documentation | ||
drivers | ||
fs | ||
include | ||
init | ||
ipc | ||
kernel | ||
lib | ||
LICENSES | ||
mm | ||
net | ||
samples | ||
scripts | ||
security | ||
sound | ||
tools | ||
usr | ||
virt | ||
.clang-format | ||
.cocciconfig | ||
.get_maintainer.ignore | ||
.gitattributes | ||
.gitignore | ||
.mailmap | ||
COPYING | ||
CREDITS | ||
Kbuild | ||
Kconfig | ||
MAINTAINERS | ||
Makefile | ||
README |
Linux kernel ============ There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first. In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or ``make pdfdocs``. The formatted documentation can also be read online at: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/ There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory, several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation. Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.