linux/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce-ccm-glue.c
Ard Biesheuvel 898387e40c crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - avoid by-ref argument for ce_aes_ccm_auth_data
With the SIMD code path removed, we can clean up the CCM auth-only path
a bit further, by passing the 'macp' input buffer pointer by value,
rather than by reference, and taking the output value from the
function's return value.

This way, the compiler is no longer forced to allocate macp on the
stack. This is not expected to make any difference in practice, it just
makes for slightly cleaner code.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-09-17 11:05:11 +08:00

301 lines
7.4 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* aes-ccm-glue.c - AES-CCM transform for ARMv8 with Crypto Extensions
*
* Copyright (C) 2013 - 2017 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
*/
#include <asm/neon.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "aes-ce-setkey.h"
static int num_rounds(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* # of rounds specified by AES:
* 128 bit key 10 rounds
* 192 bit key 12 rounds
* 256 bit key 14 rounds
* => n byte key => 6 + (n/4) rounds
*/
return 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
}
asmlinkage u32 ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(u8 mac[], u8 const in[], u32 abytes,
u32 macp, u32 const rk[], u32 rounds);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
u8 ctr[]);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 cbytes,
u32 const rk[], u32 rounds, u8 mac[],
u8 ctr[]);
asmlinkage void ce_aes_ccm_final(u8 mac[], u8 const ctr[], u32 const rk[],
u32 rounds);
static int ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
unsigned int key_len)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
return ce_aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len);
}
static int ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
{
if ((authsize & 1) || authsize < 4)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
__be32 *n = (__be32 *)&maciv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 8];
u32 l = req->iv[0] + 1;
/* verify that CCM dimension 'L' is set correctly in the IV */
if (l < 2 || l > 8)
return -EINVAL;
/* verify that msglen can in fact be represented in L bytes */
if (l < 4 && msglen >> (8 * l))
return -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* Even if the CCM spec allows L values of up to 8, the Linux cryptoapi
* uses a u32 type to represent msglen so the top 4 bytes are always 0.
*/
n[0] = 0;
n[1] = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
memcpy(maciv, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l);
/*
* Meaning of byte 0 according to CCM spec (RFC 3610/NIST 800-38C)
* - bits 0..2 : max # of bytes required to represent msglen, minus 1
* (already set by caller)
* - bits 3..5 : size of auth tag (1 => 4 bytes, 2 => 6 bytes, etc)
* - bit 6 : indicates presence of authenticate-only data
*/
maciv[0] |= (crypto_aead_authsize(aead) - 2) << 2;
if (req->assoclen)
maciv[0] |= 0x40;
memset(&req->iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l], 0, l);
return 0;
}
static void ccm_calculate_auth_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 mac[])
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct __packed { __be16 l; __be32 h; u16 len; } ltag;
struct scatter_walk walk;
u32 len = req->assoclen;
u32 macp = 0;
/* prepend the AAD with a length tag */
if (len < 0xff00) {
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(len);
ltag.len = 2;
} else {
ltag.l = cpu_to_be16(0xfffe);
put_unaligned_be32(len, &ltag.h);
ltag.len = 6;
}
macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, (u8 *)&ltag, ltag.len, macp,
ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
scatterwalk_start(&walk, req->src);
do {
u32 n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
u8 *p;
if (!n) {
scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg_next(walk.sg));
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk, len);
}
n = min_t(u32, n, SZ_4K); /* yield NEON at least every 4k */
p = scatterwalk_map(&walk);
macp = ce_aes_ccm_auth_data(mac, p, n, macp, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx));
if (len / SZ_4K > (len - n) / SZ_4K) {
kernel_neon_end();
kernel_neon_begin();
}
len -= n;
scatterwalk_unmap(p);
scatterwalk_advance(&walk, n);
scatterwalk_done(&walk, 0, len);
} while (len);
}
static int ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 len = req->cryptlen;
int err;
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
if (err)
return err;
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
err = skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt(&walk, req, false);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
if (req->assoclen)
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
do {
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
tail = 0;
ce_aes_ccm_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
if (walk.nbytes) {
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
if (unlikely(walk.nbytes))
kernel_neon_begin();
}
} while (walk.nbytes);
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(mac, req->dst, req->assoclen + req->cryptlen,
crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
return 0;
}
static int ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
u8 __aligned(8) mac[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
u32 len = req->cryptlen - authsize;
int err;
err = ccm_init_mac(req, mac, len);
if (err)
return err;
/* preserve the original iv for the final round */
memcpy(buf, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
err = skcipher_walk_aead_decrypt(&walk, req, false);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
kernel_neon_begin();
if (req->assoclen)
ccm_calculate_auth_mac(req, mac);
do {
u32 tail = walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
tail = 0;
ce_aes_ccm_decrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
walk.nbytes - tail, ctx->key_enc,
num_rounds(ctx), mac, walk.iv);
if (walk.nbytes == walk.total)
ce_aes_ccm_final(mac, buf, ctx->key_enc, num_rounds(ctx));
kernel_neon_end();
if (walk.nbytes) {
err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, tail);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
if (unlikely(walk.nbytes))
kernel_neon_begin();
}
} while (walk.nbytes);
/* compare calculated auth tag with the stored one */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->src,
req->assoclen + req->cryptlen - authsize,
authsize, 0);
if (crypto_memneq(mac, buf, authsize))
return -EBADMSG;
return 0;
}
static struct aead_alg ccm_aes_alg = {
.base = {
.cra_name = "ccm(aes)",
.cra_driver_name = "ccm-aes-ce",
.cra_priority = 300,
.cra_blocksize = 1,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
},
.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.chunksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
.setkey = ccm_setkey,
.setauthsize = ccm_setauthsize,
.encrypt = ccm_encrypt,
.decrypt = ccm_decrypt,
};
static int __init aes_mod_init(void)
{
if (!cpu_have_named_feature(AES))
return -ENODEV;
return crypto_register_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
}
static void __exit aes_mod_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_aead(&ccm_aes_alg);
}
module_init(aes_mod_init);
module_exit(aes_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Synchronous AES in CCM mode using ARMv8 Crypto Extensions");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ccm(aes)");