forked from Minki/linux
f5e55e777c
Currently, trying to rename or link a regular file, directory, or symlink into an encrypted directory fails with EPERM when the source file is unencrypted or is encrypted with a different encryption policy, and is on the same mountpoint. It is correct for the operation to fail, but the choice of EPERM breaks tools like 'mv' that know to copy rather than rename if they see EXDEV, but don't know what to do with EPERM. Our original motivation for EPERM was to encourage users to securely handle their data. Encrypting files by "moving" them into an encrypted directory can be insecure because the unencrypted data may remain in free space on disk, where it can later be recovered by an attacker. It's much better to encrypt the data from the start, or at least try to securely delete the source data e.g. using the 'shred' program. However, the current behavior hasn't been effective at achieving its goal because users tend to be confused, hack around it, and complain; see e.g. https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/76. And in some cases it's actually inconsistent or unnecessary. For example, 'mv'-ing files between differently encrypted directories doesn't work even in cases where it can be secure, such as when in userspace the same passphrase protects both directories. Yet, you *can* already 'mv' unencrypted files into an encrypted directory if the source files are on a different mountpoint, even though doing so is often insecure. There are probably better ways to teach users to securely handle their files. For example, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool could provide a command that migrates unencrypted files into an encrypted directory, acting like 'shred' on the source files and providing appropriate warnings depending on the type of the source filesystem and disk. Receiving errors on unimportant files might also force some users to disable encryption, thus making the behavior counterproductive. It's desirable to make encryption as unobtrusive as possible. Therefore, change the error code from EPERM to EXDEV so that tools looking for EXDEV will fall back to a copy. This, of course, doesn't prevent users from still doing the right things to securely manage their files. Note that this also matches the behavior when a file is renamed between two project quota hierarchies; so there's precedent for using EXDEV for things other than mountpoints. xfstests generic/398 will require an update with this change. [Rewritten from an earlier patch series by Michael Halcrow.] Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
268 lines
8.3 KiB
C
268 lines
8.3 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Encryption policy functions for per-file encryption support.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility.
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*
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* Written by Michael Halcrow, 2015.
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* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
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*/
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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/*
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* check whether an encryption policy is consistent with an encryption context
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*/
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static bool is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(
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const struct fscrypt_context *ctx,
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const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
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{
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return memcmp(ctx->master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
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(ctx->flags == policy->flags) &&
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(ctx->contents_encryption_mode ==
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policy->contents_encryption_mode) &&
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(ctx->filenames_encryption_mode ==
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policy->filenames_encryption_mode);
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}
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static int create_encryption_context_from_policy(struct inode *inode,
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const struct fscrypt_policy *policy)
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{
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struct fscrypt_context ctx;
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ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
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memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, policy->master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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if (!fscrypt_valid_enc_modes(policy->contents_encryption_mode,
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policy->filenames_encryption_mode))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (policy->flags & ~FS_POLICY_FLAGS_VALID)
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return -EINVAL;
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ctx.contents_encryption_mode = policy->contents_encryption_mode;
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ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = policy->filenames_encryption_mode;
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ctx.flags = policy->flags;
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx.nonce) != FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
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get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
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return inode->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx), NULL);
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}
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int fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg)
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{
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struct fscrypt_policy policy;
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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int ret;
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struct fscrypt_context ctx;
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if (copy_from_user(&policy, arg, sizeof(policy)))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
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return -EACCES;
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if (policy.version != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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ret = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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inode_lock(inode);
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ret = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
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if (ret == -ENODATA) {
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if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
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ret = -ENOTDIR;
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else if (!inode->i_sb->s_cop->empty_dir(inode))
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ret = -ENOTEMPTY;
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else
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ret = create_encryption_context_from_policy(inode,
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&policy);
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} else if (ret == sizeof(ctx) &&
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is_encryption_context_consistent_with_policy(&ctx,
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&policy)) {
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/* The file already uses the same encryption policy. */
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ret = 0;
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} else if (ret >= 0 || ret == -ERANGE) {
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/* The file already uses a different encryption policy. */
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ret = -EEXIST;
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}
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inode_unlock(inode);
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mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy);
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int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
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struct fscrypt_context ctx;
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struct fscrypt_policy policy;
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int res;
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if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
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return -ENODATA;
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res = inode->i_sb->s_cop->get_context(inode, &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
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if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
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return res;
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if (res != sizeof(ctx))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (ctx.format != FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1)
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return -EINVAL;
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policy.version = 0;
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policy.contents_encryption_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
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policy.filenames_encryption_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
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policy.flags = ctx.flags;
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memcpy(policy.master_key_descriptor, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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if (copy_to_user(arg, &policy, sizeof(policy)))
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return -EFAULT;
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return 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy);
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/**
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* fscrypt_has_permitted_context() - is a file's encryption policy permitted
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* within its directory?
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*
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* @parent: inode for parent directory
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* @child: inode for file being looked up, opened, or linked into @parent
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*
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* Filesystems must call this before permitting access to an inode in a
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* situation where the parent directory is encrypted (either before allowing
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* ->lookup() to succeed, or for a regular file before allowing it to be opened)
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* and before any operation that involves linking an inode into an encrypted
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* directory, including link, rename, and cross rename. It enforces the
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* constraint that within a given encrypted directory tree, all files use the
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* same encryption policy. The pre-access check is needed to detect potentially
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* malicious offline violations of this constraint, while the link and rename
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* checks are needed to prevent online violations of this constraint.
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*
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* Return: 1 if permitted, 0 if forbidden.
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*/
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int fscrypt_has_permitted_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child)
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{
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const struct fscrypt_operations *cops = parent->i_sb->s_cop;
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const struct fscrypt_info *parent_ci, *child_ci;
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struct fscrypt_context parent_ctx, child_ctx;
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int res;
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/* No restrictions on file types which are never encrypted */
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if (!S_ISREG(child->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(child->i_mode) &&
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!S_ISLNK(child->i_mode))
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return 1;
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/* No restrictions if the parent directory is unencrypted */
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if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent))
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return 1;
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/* Encrypted directories must not contain unencrypted files */
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if (!IS_ENCRYPTED(child))
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return 0;
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/*
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* Both parent and child are encrypted, so verify they use the same
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* encryption policy. Compare the fscrypt_info structs if the keys are
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* available, otherwise retrieve and compare the fscrypt_contexts.
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*
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* Note that the fscrypt_context retrieval will be required frequently
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* when accessing an encrypted directory tree without the key.
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* Performance-wise this is not a big deal because we already don't
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* really optimize for file access without the key (to the extent that
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* such access is even possible), given that any attempted access
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* already causes a fscrypt_context retrieval and keyring search.
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*
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* In any case, if an unexpected error occurs, fall back to "forbidden".
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*/
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res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
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if (res)
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return 0;
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res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child);
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if (res)
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return 0;
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parent_ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
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child_ci = child->i_crypt_info;
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if (parent_ci && child_ci) {
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return memcmp(parent_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
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child_ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
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(parent_ci->ci_data_mode == child_ci->ci_data_mode) &&
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(parent_ci->ci_filename_mode ==
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child_ci->ci_filename_mode) &&
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(parent_ci->ci_flags == child_ci->ci_flags);
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}
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res = cops->get_context(parent, &parent_ctx, sizeof(parent_ctx));
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if (res != sizeof(parent_ctx))
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return 0;
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res = cops->get_context(child, &child_ctx, sizeof(child_ctx));
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if (res != sizeof(child_ctx))
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return 0;
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return memcmp(parent_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
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child_ctx.master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) == 0 &&
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(parent_ctx.contents_encryption_mode ==
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child_ctx.contents_encryption_mode) &&
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(parent_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode ==
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child_ctx.filenames_encryption_mode) &&
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(parent_ctx.flags == child_ctx.flags);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_has_permitted_context);
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/**
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* fscrypt_inherit_context() - Sets a child context from its parent
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* @parent: Parent inode from which the context is inherited.
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* @child: Child inode that inherits the context from @parent.
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* @fs_data: private data given by FS.
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* @preload: preload child i_crypt_info if true
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
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*/
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int fscrypt_inherit_context(struct inode *parent, struct inode *child,
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void *fs_data, bool preload)
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{
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struct fscrypt_context ctx;
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struct fscrypt_info *ci;
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int res;
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res = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(parent);
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if (res < 0)
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return res;
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ci = parent->i_crypt_info;
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if (ci == NULL)
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return -ENOKEY;
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ctx.format = FS_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT_FORMAT_V1;
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ctx.contents_encryption_mode = ci->ci_data_mode;
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ctx.filenames_encryption_mode = ci->ci_filename_mode;
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ctx.flags = ci->ci_flags;
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memcpy(ctx.master_key_descriptor, ci->ci_master_key_descriptor,
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FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
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get_random_bytes(ctx.nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
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BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ctx) != FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE);
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res = parent->i_sb->s_cop->set_context(child, &ctx,
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sizeof(ctx), fs_data);
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if (res)
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return res;
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return preload ? fscrypt_get_encryption_info(child): 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_inherit_context);
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