Add IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE flag to ieee80211_key_flags in order to allow the driver to notify mac80211 to generate MMIE and that it requires sequence number generation only. This is a preliminary patch to add BIP_CMAC_128 hw support to mt7615 driver Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/dfe275f9aa0f1cc6b33085f9efd5d8447f68ad13.1563228405.git.lorenzo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			1266 lines
		
	
	
		
			32 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			1266 lines
		
	
	
		
			32 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 | |
| /*
 | |
|  * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
 | |
|  * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
 | |
|  * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
 | |
|  */
 | |
| 
 | |
| #include <linux/netdevice.h>
 | |
| #include <linux/types.h>
 | |
| #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 | |
| #include <linux/compiler.h>
 | |
| #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
 | |
| #include <linux/gfp.h>
 | |
| #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 | |
| #include <net/mac80211.h>
 | |
| #include <crypto/aes.h>
 | |
| #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 | |
| 
 | |
| #include "ieee80211_i.h"
 | |
| #include "michael.h"
 | |
| #include "tkip.h"
 | |
| #include "aes_ccm.h"
 | |
| #include "aes_cmac.h"
 | |
| #include "aes_gmac.h"
 | |
| #include "aes_gcm.h"
 | |
| #include "wpa.h"
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	u8 *data, *key, *mic;
 | |
| 	size_t data_len;
 | |
| 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 	int tail;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 	if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
 | |
| 	    skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	if (skb->len < hdrlen)
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
 | |
| 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
 | |
| 		/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
 | |
| 		info->control.hw_key = NULL;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
 | |
| 	     ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
 | |
| 	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
 | |
| 				     IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) {
 | |
| 		/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
 | |
| 	if (!info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
 | |
| 		 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
 | |
| 		 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
 | |
| 		 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
 | |
| 		 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) {
 | |
| 		/* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */
 | |
| 		memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
 | |
| 	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
 | |
| 	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
 | |
| 		mic[0]++;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	u8 *data, *key = NULL;
 | |
| 	size_t data_len;
 | |
| 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
 | |
| 	 * than data frames.
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
 | |
| 	 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
 | |
| 	 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
 | |
| 	 * MIC failure report.
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
 | |
| 		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
 | |
| 			goto mic_fail_no_key;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
 | |
| 		    rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
 | |
| 			goto update_iv;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
 | |
| 	 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
 | |
| 	 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
 | |
| 	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
 | |
| 		/*
 | |
| 		 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
 | |
| 		 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
 | |
| 		 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
 | |
| 		 * frames in the BSS.
 | |
| 		 */
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
 | |
| 		goto mic_fail;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
 | |
| 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
 | |
| 	key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
 | |
| 	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
 | |
| 	if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
 | |
| 		goto mic_fail;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
 | |
| 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| update_iv:
 | |
| 	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
 | |
| 	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
 | |
| 	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| mic_fail:
 | |
| 	rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
 | |
| 
 | |
| mic_fail_no_key:
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
 | |
| 	 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
 | |
| 	 * the key is set.
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
 | |
| 				     is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
 | |
| 				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
 | |
| 				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
 | |
| 				     rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
 | |
| 				     NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
 | |
| 	return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	int len, tail;
 | |
| 	u64 pn;
 | |
| 	u8 *pos;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
 | |
| 		/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		tail = 0;
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
 | |
| 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
 | |
| 		return -1;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
 | |
| 	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	pos += hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Increase IV for the frame */
 | |
| 	pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 	pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* hwaccel - with software IV */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Add room for ICV */
 | |
| 	skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx,
 | |
| 					   key, skb, pos, len);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
 | |
| 		if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
 | |
| 			return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
 | |
| 	int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
 | |
| 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
 | |
| 	 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
 | |
| 	 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
 | |
| 		hwaccel = 1;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx,
 | |
| 					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
 | |
| 					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
 | |
| 					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
 | |
| 					  &rx->tkip_iv32,
 | |
| 					  &rx->tkip_iv16);
 | |
| 	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Trim ICV */
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
 | |
| 		skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove IV */
 | |
| 	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	__le16 mask_fc;
 | |
| 	int a4_included, mgmt;
 | |
| 	u8 qos_tid;
 | |
| 	u16 len_a;
 | |
| 	unsigned int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
 | |
| 	 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
 | |
| 	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
 | |
| 				IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
 | |
| 	if (!mgmt)
 | |
| 		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
 | |
| 	mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	len_a = hdrlen - 2;
 | |
| 	a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		qos_tid = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
 | |
| 	 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
 | |
| 	 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
 | |
| 	 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
 | |
| 	 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
 | |
| 	 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	b_0[0] = 0x1;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
 | |
| 	 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
 | |
| 	memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 	memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
 | |
| 	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
 | |
| 	put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
 | |
| 	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
 | |
| 	memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
 | |
| 	aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
 | |
| 	aad[23] = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (a4_included) {
 | |
| 		memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 		aad[30] = qos_tid;
 | |
| 		aad[31] = 0;
 | |
| 	} else {
 | |
| 		memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
 | |
| 		aad[24] = qos_tid;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	hdr[0] = pn[5];
 | |
| 	hdr[1] = pn[4];
 | |
| 	hdr[2] = 0;
 | |
| 	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
 | |
| 	hdr[4] = pn[3];
 | |
| 	hdr[5] = pn[2];
 | |
| 	hdr[6] = pn[1];
 | |
| 	hdr[7] = pn[0];
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	pn[0] = hdr[7];
 | |
| 	pn[1] = hdr[6];
 | |
| 	pn[2] = hdr[5];
 | |
| 	pn[3] = hdr[4];
 | |
| 	pn[4] = hdr[1];
 | |
| 	pn[5] = hdr[0];
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
 | |
| 			    unsigned int mic_len)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 	int hdrlen, len, tail;
 | |
| 	u8 *pos;
 | |
| 	u8 pn[6];
 | |
| 	u64 pn64;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
 | |
| 	u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
 | |
| 	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
 | |
| 	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
 | |
| 	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
 | |
| 		/*
 | |
| 		 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
 | |
| 		 * header or MIC fields
 | |
| 		 */
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		tail = 0;
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		tail = mic_len;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
 | |
| 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
 | |
| 		return -1;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
 | |
| 	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
 | |
| 	pos += hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pn[5] = pn64;
 | |
| 	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
 | |
| 	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
 | |
| 	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
 | |
| 	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
 | |
| 	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
 | |
| 	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
 | |
| 	return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
 | |
| 					 skb_put(skb, mic_len));
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
 | |
| 			      unsigned int mic_len)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
 | |
| 		if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
 | |
| 			return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
 | |
| 			      unsigned int mic_len)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 | |
| 	int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
 | |
| 	int data_len;
 | |
| 	int queue;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
 | |
| 	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
 | |
| 		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
 | |
| 			mic_len = 0;
 | |
| 	} else {
 | |
| 		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
 | |
| 	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
 | |
| 		int res;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		queue = rx->security_idx;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
 | |
| 			     IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 		if (res < 0 ||
 | |
| 		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
 | |
| 			key->u.ccmp.replays++;
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 | |
| 			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 			u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 | |
| 			ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 			if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
 | |
| 				    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
 | |
| 				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
 | |
| 				    data_len,
 | |
| 				    skb->data + skb->len - mic_len))
 | |
| 				return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
 | |
| 	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	__le16 mask_fc;
 | |
| 	u8 qos_tid;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 	memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 	j_0[13] = 0;
 | |
| 	j_0[14] = 0;
 | |
| 	j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
 | |
| 	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
 | |
| 	/* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
 | |
| 	 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
 | |
| 	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
 | |
| 				IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
 | |
| 	mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
 | |
| 	memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
 | |
| 	aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
 | |
| 	aad[23] = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		qos_tid = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
 | |
| 		memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 		aad[30] = qos_tid;
 | |
| 		aad[31] = 0;
 | |
| 	} else {
 | |
| 		memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
 | |
| 		aad[24] = qos_tid;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	hdr[0] = pn[5];
 | |
| 	hdr[1] = pn[4];
 | |
| 	hdr[2] = 0;
 | |
| 	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
 | |
| 	hdr[4] = pn[3];
 | |
| 	hdr[5] = pn[2];
 | |
| 	hdr[6] = pn[1];
 | |
| 	hdr[7] = pn[0];
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	pn[0] = hdr[7];
 | |
| 	pn[1] = hdr[6];
 | |
| 	pn[2] = hdr[5];
 | |
| 	pn[3] = hdr[4];
 | |
| 	pn[4] = hdr[1];
 | |
| 	pn[5] = hdr[0];
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 	int hdrlen, len, tail;
 | |
| 	u8 *pos;
 | |
| 	u8 pn[6];
 | |
| 	u64 pn64;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
 | |
| 	u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
 | |
| 	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
 | |
| 	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
 | |
| 	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
 | |
| 		/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
 | |
| 		 * header or MIC fields
 | |
| 		 */
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		tail = 0;
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
 | |
| 		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
 | |
| 		return -1;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
 | |
| 	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
 | |
| 				    IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
 | |
| 	pos += hdrlen;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pn[5] = pn64;
 | |
| 	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
 | |
| 	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
 | |
| 	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
 | |
| 	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
 | |
| 	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
 | |
| 	gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
 | |
| 	return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
 | |
| 					 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
 | |
| 		if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
 | |
| 			return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 | |
| 	int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
 | |
| 	int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
 | |
| 	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
 | |
| 		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
 | |
| 			mic_len = 0;
 | |
| 	} else {
 | |
| 		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
 | |
| 	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
 | |
| 		int res;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		queue = rx->security_idx;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
 | |
| 			     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 		if (res < 0 ||
 | |
| 		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
 | |
| 			key->u.gcmp.replays++;
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 | |
| 			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 			u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 | |
| 			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 | |
| 			gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 			if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
 | |
| 				    key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
 | |
| 				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
 | |
| 				    data_len,
 | |
| 				    skb->data + skb->len -
 | |
| 				    IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
 | |
| 				return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
 | |
| 	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
 | |
| 			    struct sk_buff *skb)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 	int hdrlen;
 | |
| 	u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
 | |
| 		/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len &&
 | |
| 		     pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len);
 | |
| 	memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	int i;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* pn is little endian */
 | |
| 	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 | |
| 		if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
 | |
| 			return -1;
 | |
| 		else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
 | |
| 			return 1;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return 0;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 | |
| 	const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
 | |
| 	int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
 | |
| 	int data_len;
 | |
| 	u8 *rx_pn;
 | |
| 	u8 *skb_pn;
 | |
| 	u8 qos_tid;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
 | |
| 	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (data_len < 0)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
 | |
| 	else
 | |
| 		qos_tid = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
 | |
| 	skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* remove security header and MIC */
 | |
| 	if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
 | |
| 	skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	__le16 mask_fc;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* FC type/subtype */
 | |
| 	/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
 | |
| 	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
 | |
| 	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
 | |
| 				IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
 | |
| 	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
 | |
| 	/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
 | |
| 	memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	*d++ = pn;
 | |
| 	*d++ = pn >> 8;
 | |
| 	*d++ = pn >> 16;
 | |
| 	*d++ = pn >> 24;
 | |
| 	*d++ = pn >> 32;
 | |
| 	*d = pn >> 40;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	*d++ = s[5];
 | |
| 	*d++ = s[4];
 | |
| 	*d++ = s[3];
 | |
| 	*d++ = s[2];
 | |
| 	*d++ = s[1];
 | |
| 	*d = s[0];
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[20];
 | |
| 	u64 pn64;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key &&
 | |
| 	    !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE))
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
 | |
| 	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
 | |
| 	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* PN = PN + 1 */
 | |
| 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/*
 | |
| 	 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 | |
| 			   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[20];
 | |
| 	u64 pn64;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
 | |
| 	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
 | |
| 	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* PN = PN + 1 */
 | |
| 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
 | |
| 	 */
 | |
| 	ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 | |
| 			       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* management frames are already linear */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
 | |
| 		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
 | |
| 	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
 | |
| 		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 | |
| 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 | |
| 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 | |
| 				   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
 | |
| 		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 | |
| 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove MMIE */
 | |
| 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* management frames are already linear */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
 | |
| 		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
 | |
| 	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
 | |
| 		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 | |
| 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 | |
| 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 		ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 | |
| 				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
 | |
| 		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 | |
| 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove MMIE */
 | |
| 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
 | |
| 	u64 pn64;
 | |
| 	u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 		return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
 | |
| 	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
 | |
| 	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* PN = PN + 1 */
 | |
| 	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 	memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
 | |
| 	if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
 | |
| 			       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
 | |
| 		return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
 | |
| 	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
 | |
| 		return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* management frames are already linear */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
 | |
| 		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
 | |
| 	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
 | |
| 		key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
 | |
| 		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
 | |
| 		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
 | |
| 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
 | |
| 		memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
 | |
| 		if (!mic)
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
 | |
| 				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
 | |
| 				       mic) < 0 ||
 | |
| 		    crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 | |
| 			key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
 | |
| 			kfree(mic);
 | |
| 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 		kfree(mic);
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	/* Remove MMIE */
 | |
| 	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_tx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 | |
| 	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
 | |
| 	ieee80211_tx_result res;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
 | |
| 		info  = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		/* handle hw-only algorithm */
 | |
| 		if (!info->control.hw_key)
 | |
| 			return TX_DROP;
 | |
| 
 | |
| 		if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) {
 | |
| 			res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
 | |
| 			if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
 | |
| 				return res;
 | |
| 		}
 | |
| 	}
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return TX_CONTINUE;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ieee80211_rx_result
 | |
| ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 | |
| {
 | |
| 	if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
 | |
| 		return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
 | |
| 
 | |
| 	return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 | |
| }
 |