Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The big thing in this pile is Eric's unmount-on-rmdir series; we
finally have everything we need for that. The final piece of prereqs
is delayed mntput() - now filesystem shutdown always happens on
shallow stack.
Other than that, we have several new primitives for iov_iter (Matt
Wilcox, culled from his XIP-related series) pushing the conversion to
->read_iter()/ ->write_iter() a bit more, a bunch of fs/dcache.c
cleanups and fixes (including the external name refcounting, which
gives consistent behaviour of d_move() wrt procfs symlinks for long
and short names alike) and assorted cleanups and fixes all over the
place.
This is just the first pile; there's a lot of stuff from various
people that ought to go in this window. Starting with
unionmount/overlayfs mess... ;-/"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (60 commits)
fs/file_table.c: Update alloc_file() comment
vfs: Deduplicate code shared by xattr system calls operating on paths
reiserfs: remove pointless forward declaration of struct nameidata
don't need that forward declaration of struct nameidata in dcache.h anymore
take dname_external() into fs/dcache.c
let path_init() failures treated the same way as subsequent link_path_walk()
fix misuses of f_count() in ppp and netlink
ncpfs: use list_for_each_entry() for d_subdirs walk
vfs: move getname() from callers to do_mount()
gfs2_atomic_open(): skip lookups on hashed dentry
[infiniband] remove pointless assignments
gadgetfs: saner API for gadgetfs_create_file()
f_fs: saner API for ffs_sb_create_file()
jfs: don't hash direct inode
[s390] remove pointless assignment of ->f_op in vmlogrdr ->open()
ecryptfs: ->f_op is never NULL
android: ->f_op is never NULL
nouveau: __iomem misannotations
missing annotation in fs/file.c
fs: namespace: suppress 'may be used uninitialized' warnings
...
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"Nothing too interesting. Just a handful of cleanup patches"
* 'for-3.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
Revert "cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()"
cgroup: remove redundant variable in cgroup_mount()
cgroup: fix missing unlock in cgroup_release_agent()
cgroup: remove CGRP_RELEASABLE flag
perf/cgroup: Remove perf_put_cgroup()
cgroup: remove redundant check in cgroup_ino()
cpuset: simplify proc_cpuset_show()
cgroup: simplify proc_cgroup_show()
cgroup: use a per-cgroup work for release agent
cgroup: remove bogus comments
cgroup: remove redundant code in cgroup_rmdir()
cgroup: remove some useless forward declarations
cgroup: fix a typo in comment.
Extract the mm_access() code from __mem_open() into the new helper,
proc_mem_open(), the next patch will add another caller.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that d_invalidate always succeeds and flushes mount points use
it in stead of a combination of shrink_dcache_parent and d_drop
in proc_flush_task_mnt. This removes the danger of a mount point
under /proc/<pid>/... becoming unreachable after the d_drop.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Now that d_invalidate always succeeds it is not longer necessary or
desirable to hard code d_drop calls into filesystem specific
d_revalidate implementations.
Remove the unnecessary d_drop calls and rely on d_invalidate
to drop the dentries. Using d_invalidate ensures that paths
to mount points will not be dropped.
Reviewed-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cpuset_show().
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Use the ONE macro instead of REG, and we can simplify proc_cgroup_show().
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"This is a bunch of small changes built against 3.16-rc6. The most
significant change for users is the first patch which makes setns
drmatically faster by removing unneded rcu handling.
The next chunk of changes are so that "mount -o remount,.." will not
allow the user namespace root to drop flags on a mount set by the
system wide root. Aks this forces read-only mounts to stay read-only,
no-dev mounts to stay no-dev, no-suid mounts to stay no-suid, no-exec
mounts to stay no exec and it prevents unprivileged users from messing
with a mounts atime settings. I have included my test case as the
last patch in this series so people performing backports can verify
this change works correctly.
The next change fixes a bug in NFS that was discovered while auditing
nsproxy users for the first optimization. Today you can oops the
kernel by reading /proc/fs/nfsfs/{servers,volumes} if you are clever
with pid namespaces. I rebased and fixed the build of the
!CONFIG_NFS_FS case yesterday when a build bot caught my typo. Given
that no one to my knowledge bases anything on my tree fixing the typo
in place seems more responsible that requiring a typo-fix to be
backported as well.
The last change is a small semantic cleanup introducing
/proc/thread-self and pointing /proc/mounts and /proc/net at it. This
prevents several kinds of problemantic corner cases. It is a
user-visible change so it has a minute chance of causing regressions
so the change to /proc/mounts and /proc/net are individual one line
commits that can be trivially reverted. Unfortunately I lost and
could not find the email of the original reporter so he is not
credited. From at least one perspective this change to /proc/net is a
refgression fix to allow pthread /proc/net uses that were broken by
the introduction of the network namespace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc: Point /proc/mounts at /proc/thread-self/mounts instead of /proc/self/mounts
proc: Point /proc/net at /proc/thread-self/net instead of /proc/self/net
proc: Implement /proc/thread-self to point at the directory of the current thread
proc: Have net show up under /proc/<tgid>/task/<tid>
NFS: Fix /proc/fs/nfsfs/servers and /proc/fs/nfsfs/volumes
mnt: Add tests for unprivileged remount cases that have found to be faulty
mnt: Change the default remount atime from relatime to the existing value
mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
mnt: Move the test for MNT_LOCK_READONLY from change_mount_flags into do_remount
mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
namespaces: Use task_lock and not rcu to protect nsproxy
If you're applying this patch, all /proc/$PID/* files were converted
to seq_file interface and this code became unused.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently lookup for /proc/$PID first goes through spinlock and whole list
of misc /proc entries only to confirm that, yes, /proc/42 can not possibly
match random proc entry.
List is is several dozens entries long (52 entries on my setup).
None of this is necessary.
Try to convert dentry name to integer first.
If it works, it must be /proc/$PID.
If it doesn't, it must be random proc entry.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* remove proc_create(NULL, ...) check, let it oops
* warn about proc_create("", ...) and proc_create("very very long name", ...)
proc code keeps length as u8, no 256+ name length possible
* warn about proc_create("123", ...)
/proc/$PID and /proc/misc namespaces are separate things,
but dumb module might create funky a-la $PID entry.
* remove post mortem strchr('/') check
Triggering it implies either strchr() is buggy or memory corruption.
It should be VFS check anyway.
In reality, none of these checks will ever trigger,
it is preparation for the next patch.
Based on patch from Al Viro.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_uid_seq_operations, proc_gid_seq_operations and
proc_projid_seq_operations are only called in proc_id_map_open with
seq_open as const struct seq_operations so we can constify the 3
structures and update proc_id_map_open prototype.
text data bss dec hex filename
6817 404 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-before
6913 308 1984 9205 23f5 kernel/user_namespace.o-after
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
/proc/thread-self is derived from /proc/self. /proc/thread-self
points to the directory in proc containing information about the
current thread.
This funtionality has been missing for a long time, and is tricky to
implement in userspace as gettid() is not exported by glibc. More
importantly this allows fixing defects in /proc/mounts and /proc/net
where in a threaded application today they wind up being empty files
when only the initial pthread has exited, causing problems for other
threads.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
sched: declare pid_alive as inline
audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
audit: include subject in login records
audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
audit: Add generic compat syscall support
audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
...
/proc/self/make-it-fail is a boolean, but accepts any number, including
negative ones. Change variable to unsigned, and cap upper bound at 1.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: don't make make_it_fail unsigned]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The /proc/*/pagemap contain sensitive information and currently its mode
is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will prevent unprivileged
processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary privileged
/proc/*/pagemap files.
This reduces the scope of address space leaking and bypasses by protecting
already running processes.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
These procfs files contain sensitive information and currently their
mode is 0444. Change this to 0400, so the VFS will be able to block
unprivileged processes from getting file descriptors on arbitrary
privileged /proc/*/{stack,syscall,personality} files.
This reduces the scope of ASLR leaking and bypasses by protecting already
running processes.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Re-factor proc_pid_cmdline() to use get_cmdline() helper
from mm.h.
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <wroberts@tresys.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The expected logic of proc_map_files_get_link() is either to return 0
and initialize 'path' or return an error and leave 'path' uninitialized.
By the time dname_to_vma_addr() returns 0 the corresponding vma may have
already be gone. In this case the path is not initialized but the
return value is still 0. This results in 'general protection fault'
inside d_path().
Steps to reproduce:
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y
fd = open(...);
while (1) {
mmap(fd, ...);
munmap(fd, ...);
}
ls -la /proc/$PID/map_files
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=68991
Signed-off-by: Artem Fetishev <artem_fetishev@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Terekhov <aleksandr_terekhov@epam.com>
Reported-by: <wiebittewas@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. proc_task_readdir()->first_tid() path truncates f_pos to int, this
is wrong even on 64bit.
We could check that f_pos < PID_MAX or even INT_MAX in
proc_task_readdir(), but this patch simply checks the potential
overflow in first_tid(), this check is nop on 64bit. We do not care if
it was negative and the new unsigned value is huge, all we need to
ensure is that we never wrongly return !NULL.
2. Remove the 2nd "nr != 0" check before get_nr_threads(),
nr_threads == 0 is not distinguishable from !pid_task() above.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_task_readdir() does not really need "leader", first_tid() has to
revalidate it anyway. Just pass proc_pid(inode) to first_tid() instead,
it can do pid_task(PIDTYPE_PID) itself and read ->group_leader only if
necessary.
The patch also extracts the "inode is dead" code from
pid_delete_dentry(dentry) into the new trivial helper,
proc_inode_is_dead(inode), proc_task_readdir() uses it to return -ENOENT
if this dir was removed.
This is a bit racy, but the race is very inlikely and the getdents() after
openndir() can see the empty "." + ".." dir only once.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rerwrite the main loop to use while_each_thread() instead of
next_thread(). We are going to fix or replace while_each_thread(),
next_thread() should be avoided whenever possible.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
proc_task_readdir() verifies that the result of get_proc_task() is
pid_alive() and thus its ->group_leader is fine too. However this is not
necessarily true after rcu_read_unlock(), we need to recheck this again
after first_tid() does rcu_read_lock(). Otherwise
leader->thread_group.next (used by next_thread()) can be invalid if the
rcu grace period expires in between.
The race is subtle and unlikely, but still it is possible afaics. To
simplify lets ignore the "likely" case when tid != 0, f_version can be
cleared by proc_task_operations->llseek().
Suppose we have a main thread M and its subthread T. Suppose that f_pos
== 3, iow first_tid() should return T. Now suppose that the following
happens between rcu_read_unlock() and rcu_read_lock():
1. T execs and becomes the new leader. This removes M from
->thread_group but next_thread(M) is still T.
2. T creates another thread X which does exec as well, T
goes away.
3. X creates another subthread, this increments nr_threads.
4. first_tid() does next_thread(M) and returns the already
dead T.
Note also that we need 2. and 3. only because of get_nr_threads() check,
and this check was supposed to be optimization only.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If a task has CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL allow that task to unset their loginuid.
This would allow a child of that task to set their loginuid without
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. Thus when launching a new login daemon, a
priviledged helper would be able to unset the loginuid and then the
daemon, which may be malicious user facing, do not need priv to function
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Expand information about posix-timers in /proc/<pid>/timers by adding
info about clock, with which the timer was created. I.e. in the forth
line of timer info after "notify:" line go "ClockID: <clock_id>".
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <snorcht@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368742323-46949-2-git-send-email-snorcht@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Pull VFS updates from Al Viro,
Misc cleanups all over the place, mainly wrt /proc interfaces (switch
create_proc_entry to proc_create(), get rid of the deprecated
create_proc_read_entry() in favor of using proc_create_data() and
seq_file etc).
7kloc removed.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (204 commits)
don't bother with deferred freeing of fdtables
proc: Move non-public stuff from linux/proc_fs.h to fs/proc/internal.h
proc: Make the PROC_I() and PDE() macros internal to procfs
proc: Supply a function to remove a proc entry by PDE
take cgroup_open() and cpuset_open() to fs/proc/base.c
ppc: Clean up scanlog
ppc: Clean up rtas_flash driver somewhat
hostap: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use remove_proc_subtree()
drm: proc: Use minor->index to label things, not PDE->name
drm: Constify drm_proc_list[]
zoran: Don't print proc_dir_entry data in debug
reiserfs: Don't access the proc_dir_entry in r_open(), r_start() r_show()
proc: Supply an accessor for getting the data from a PDE's parent
airo: Use remove_proc_subtree()
rtl8192u: Don't need to save device proc dir PDE
rtl8187se: Use a dir under /proc/net/r8180/
proc: Add proc_mkdir_data()
proc: Move some bits from linux/proc_fs.h to linux/{of.h,signal.h,tty.h}
proc: Move PDE_NET() to fs/proc/proc_net.c
...
Uninline pid_delete_dentry() as it's only used by three function pointers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, a write to a procfs file will return the number of bytes
successfully written. If the actual string is longer than this, the
remainder of the string will not be be written and userspace will
complete the operation by issuing additional write()s.
Hence
$ echo -n "abcdefghijklmnopqrs" > /proc/self/comm
results in
$ cat /proc/$$/comm
pqrs
since the final four bytes were written with a second write() since
TASK_COMM_LEN == 16. This is obviously an undesired result and not
equivalent to prctl(PR_SET_NAME). The implementation should not need to
know the definition of TASK_COMM_LEN.
This patch truncates the string to the first TASK_COMM_LEN bytes and
returns the bytes written as the length of the string written so the
second write() is suppressed.
$ cat /proc/$$/comm
abcdefghijklmno
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Previous patch added proc file to list posix timers created by task.
Expand the information provided in this file by adding info about
notification method, with which timers were created. I.e. after
the "ID:" line there go
1. "signal:" line, that shows signal number and sigval bits;
2. "notify:" line, that shows the timer notification method.
Thus the timer entry would looke like this:
ID: 123
signal: 14/0000000000b005d0
notify: signal/pid.732
This information is enough to understand how timer_create() was called
for each particular timer.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA024.80404@parallels.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Currently kernel doesn't provide any API for getting info about what
posix timers are configured by processes. It's implied, that a process
which configured some timers, knows what it did. However, for external
tools it's impossible to get this information. In particular, this is
critical for checkpoint-restore project to have this info.
Introduce a per-pid proc file with information about posix
timers. Since these timers are shared between threads, this file is
present on tgid level only, no such thing in tid subdirs.
The file format is expected to be the "/proc/<pid>/smaps"-like,
i.e. each timer will occupy seveal lines to allow for future
extending.
Each new timer entry starts with the
ID: <number>
line which is added by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Helsley <matt.helsley@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/513DA00D.6070009@parallels.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
- use pr_foo() throughout
- remove a couple of duplicated KERN_WARNINGs, via WARN(KERN_WARNING "...")
- nuke a few warnings which I've never seen happen, ever.
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
According to SUSv3:
[EACCES] Permission denied. An attempt was made to access a file in a way
forbidden by its file access permissions.
[EPERM] Operation not permitted. An attempt was made to perform an operation
limited to processes with appropriate privileges or to the owner of a file
or other resource.
So -EPERM should be returned if capability checks fails.
Strictly speaking this is an API change since the error code user sees is
altered.
Signed-off-by: Zhao Hongjiang <zhaohongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
