Add a capability for userspace to mirror SEV encryption context from
one vm to another. On our side, this is intended to support a
Migration Helper vCPU, but it can also be used generically to support
other in-guest workloads scheduled by the host. The intention is for
the primary guest and the mirror to have nearly identical memslots.
The primary benefits of this are that:
1) The VMs do not share KVM contexts (think APIC/MSRs/etc), so they
can't accidentally clobber each other.
2) The VMs can have different memory-views, which is necessary for post-copy
migration (the migration vCPUs on the target need to read and write to
pages, when the primary guest would VMEXIT).
This does not change the threat model for AMD SEV. Any memory involved
is still owned by the primary guest and its initial state is still
attested to through the normal SEV_LAUNCH_* flows. If userspace wanted
to circumvent SEV, they could achieve the same effect by simply attaching
a vCPU to the primary VM.
This patch deliberately leaves userspace in charge of the memslots for the
mirror, as it already has the power to mess with them in the primary guest.
This patch does not support SEV-ES (much less SNP), as it does not
handle handing off attested VMSAs to the mirror.
For additional context, we need a Migration Helper because SEV PSP
migration is far too slow for our live migration on its own. Using
an in-guest migrator lets us speed this up significantly.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Tempelman <natet@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210408223214.2582277-1-natet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Xnack retries are used for page fault recovery. Some AMD chip
families support continuously retry while page table entries are invalid.
The driver must handle the page fault interrupt and fill in a valid entry
for the GPU to continue.
This ioctl allows to enable/disable XNACK retries per KFD process.
Signed-off-by: Alex Sierra <alex.sierra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Add svm (shared virtual memory) ioctl data structure and API definition.
The svm ioctl API is designed to be extensible in the future. All
operations are provided by a single IOCTL to preserve ioctl number
space. The arguments structure ends with a variable size array of
attributes that can be used to set or get one or multiple attributes.
Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Sierra <alex.sierra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Johannes Berg says:
====================
Another set of updates, all over the map:
* set sk_pacing_shift for 802.3->802.11 encap offload
* some monitor support for 802.11->802.3 decap offload
* HE (802.11ax) spec updates
* userspace API for TDLS HE support
* along with various other small features, cleanups and
fixups
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
cap_setfcap is required to create file capabilities.
Since commit 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"),
a process running as uid 0 but without cap_setfcap is able to work
around this as follows: unshare a new user namespace which maps parent
uid 0 into the child namespace.
While this task will not have new capabilities against the parent
namespace, there is a loophole due to the way namespaced file
capabilities are represented as xattrs. File capabilities valid in
userns 1 are distinguished from file capabilities valid in userns 2 by
the kuid which underlies uid 0. Therefore the restricted root process
can unshare a new self-mapping namespace, add a namespaced file
capability onto a file, then use that file capability in the parent
namespace.
To prevent that, do not allow mapping parent uid 0 if the process which
opened the uid_map file does not have CAP_SETFCAP, which is the
capability for setting file capabilities.
As a further wrinkle: a task can unshare its user namespace, then open
its uid_map file itself, and map (only) its own uid. In this case we do
not have the credential from before unshare, which was potentially more
restricted. So, when creating a user namespace, we record whether the
creator had CAP_SETFCAP. Then we can use that during map_write().
With this patch:
1. Unprivileged user can still unshare -Ur
ubuntu@caps:~$ unshare -Ur
root@caps:~# logout
2. Root user can still unshare -Ur
ubuntu@caps:~$ sudo bash
root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
root@caps:/home/ubuntu# logout
3. Root user without CAP_SETFCAP cannot unshare -Ur:
root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/capsh --drop=cap_setfcap --
root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/setcap cap_setfcap=p /sbin/setcap
unable to set CAP_SETFCAP effective capability: Operation not permitted
root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted
Note: an alternative solution would be to allow uid 0 mappings by
processes without CAP_SETFCAP, but to prevent such a namespace from
writing any file capabilities. This approach can be seen at [1].
Background history: commit 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow
writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities") tried to fix the issue by
preventing v3 fscaps to be written to disk when the root uid would map
to the same uid in nested user namespaces. This led to regressions for
various workloads. For example, see [2]. Ultimately this is a valid
use-case we have to support meaning we had to revert this change in
3b0c2d3eaa ("Revert 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing
ambiguous v3 file capabilities")").
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/log/?h=2021-04-15/setfcap-nsfscaps-v4 [1]
Link: https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071 [2]
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Expose a non standard query port via IOCTL that will be used to expose
port attributes that are specific to mlx5 devices.
The new interface receives a port number to query and returns a structure
that contains the available attributes for that port. This will be used
to fill the gap between pure DEVX use cases and use cases where a kernel
needs to inform userspace about various kernel driver configurations that
userspace must use in order to work correctly.
Flags is used to indicate which fields are valid on return.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_VPORT:
The vport number of the queered port.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_VPORT_VHCA_ID:
The VHCA ID of the vport of the queered port.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_VPORT_STEERING_ICM_RX:
The vport's RX ICM address used for sw steering.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_VPORT_STEERING_ICM_TX:
The vport's TX ICM address used for sw steering.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_VPORT_REG_C0:
The metadata used to tag egress packets of the vport.
MLX5_IB_UAPI_QUERY_PORT_ESW_OWNER_VHCA_ID:
The E-Switch owner vhca id of the vport.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6e2ef13e5a266a6c037eb0105eb1564c7bb52f23.1618743394.git.leonro@nvidia.com
Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.
The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.
To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <0b099d65e933e068e3ea934b0523bab070cb8cea.1618196135.git.kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The implementation takes inspiration from the existing bpf_trace_printk
helper but there are a few differences:
To allow for a large number of format-specifiers, parameters are
provided in an array, like in bpf_seq_printf.
Because the output string takes two arguments and the array of
parameters also takes two arguments, the format string needs to fit in
one argument. Thankfully, ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR is guaranteed to point to
a zero-terminated read-only map so we don't need a format string length
arg.
Because the format-string is known at verification time, we also do
a first pass of format string validation in the verifier logic. This
makes debugging easier.
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210419155243.1632274-4-revest@chromium.org
Current Hardware events and Hardware cache events have special perf
types, PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE and PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE. The two types don't
pass the PMU type in the user interface. For a hybrid system, the perf
subsystem doesn't know which PMU the events belong to. The first capable
PMU will always be assigned to the events. The events never get a chance
to run on the other capable PMUs.
Extend the two types to become PMU aware types. The PMU type ID is
stored at attr.config[63:32].
Add a new PMU capability, PERF_PMU_CAP_EXTENDED_HW_TYPE, to indicate a
PMU which supports the extended PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE and
PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE.
The PMU type is only required when searching a specific PMU. The PMU
specific codes will only be interested in the 'real' config value, which
is stored in the low 32 bit of the event->attr.config. Update the
event->attr.config in the generic code, so the PMU specific codes don't
need to calculate it separately.
If a user specifies a PMU type, but the PMU doesn't support the extended
type, error out.
If an event cannot be initialized in a PMU specified by a user, error
out immediately. Perf should not try to open it on other PMUs.
The new PMU capability is only set for the X86 hybrid PMUs for now.
Other architectures, e.g., ARM, may need it as well. The support on ARM
may be implemented later separately.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1618237865-33448-22-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c
- keep the ZC code, drop the code related to reinit
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
- fix build after move to net_generic
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Most devices maintain RMON (RFC 2819) stats - particularly
the "histogram" of packets received by size. Unlike other
RFCs which duplicate IEEE stats, the short/oversized frame
counters in RMON don't seem to match IEEE stats 1-to-1 either,
so expose those, too. Do not expose basic packet, CRC errors
etc - those are already otherwise covered.
Because standard defines packet ranges only up to 1518, and
everything above that should theoretically be "oversized"
- devices often create their own ranges.
Going beyond what the RFC defines - expose the "histogram"
in the Tx direction (assume for now that the ranges will
be the same).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Number of devices maintains the standard-based MAC control
counters for control frames. Add a API for those.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Most of the MAC statistics are included in
struct rtnl_link_stats64, but some fields
are aggregated. Besides it's good to expose
these clearly hardware stats separately.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add an interface for reading standard stats, including
stats which don't have a corresponding control interface.
Start with IEEE 802.3 PHY stats. There seems to be only
one stat to expose there.
Define API to not require user space changes when new
stats or groups are added. Groups are based on bitset,
stats have a string set associated.
v1: wrap stats in a nest
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds a new software event to count context switches
involving cgroup switches. So it's counted only if cgroups of
previous and next tasks are different. Note that it only checks the
cgroups in the perf_event subsystem. For cgroup v2, it shouldn't
matter anyway.
One can argue that we can do this by using existing sched_switch event
with eBPF. But some systems might not have eBPF for some reason so
I'd like to add this as a simple way.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210210083327.22726-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Adds bit perf_event_attr::sigtrap, which can be set to cause events to
send SIGTRAP (with si_code TRAP_PERF) to the task where the event
occurred. The primary motivation is to support synchronous signals on
perf events in the task where an event (such as breakpoints) triggered.
To distinguish perf events based on the event type, the type is set in
si_errno. For events that are associated with an address, si_addr is
copied from perf_sample_data.
The new field perf_event_attr::sig_data is copied to si_perf, which
allows user space to disambiguate which event (of the same type)
triggered the signal. For example, user space could encode the relevant
information it cares about in sig_data.
We note that the choice of an opaque u64 provides the simplest and most
flexible option. Alternatives where a reference to some user space data
is passed back suffer from the problem that modification of referenced
data (be it the event fd, or the perf_event_attr) can race with the
signal being delivered (of course, the same caveat applies if user space
decides to store a pointer in sig_data, but the ABI explicitly avoids
prescribing such a design).
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YBv3rAT566k+6zjg@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Adds bit perf_event_attr::remove_on_exec, to support removing an event
from a task on exec.
This option supports the case where an event is supposed to be
process-wide only, and should not propagate beyond exec, to limit
monitoring to the original process image only.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210408103605.1676875-5-elver@google.com
Adds bit perf_event_attr::inherit_thread, to restricting inheriting
events only if the child was cloned with CLONE_THREAD.
This option supports the case where an event is supposed to be
process-wide only (including subthreads), but should not propagate
beyond the current process's shared environment.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YBvj6eJR%2FDY2TsEB@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Similarly to pause statistics add stats for FEC.
The IEEE standard mandates two sets of counters:
- 30.5.1.1.17 aFECCorrectedBlocks
- 30.5.1.1.18 aFECUncorrectableBlocks
where block is a block of bits FEC operates on.
Each of these counters is defined per lane (PCS instance).
Multiple vendors provide number of corrected _bits_ rather
than/as well as blocks.
This set adds the 2 standard-based block counters and a extra
one for corrected bits.
Counters are exposed to user space via netlink in new attributes.
Each attribute carries an array of u64s, first element is
the total count, and the following ones are a per-lane break down.
Much like with pause stats the operation will not fail when driver
does not implement the get_fec_stats callback (nor can the driver
fail the operation by returning an error). If stats can't be
reported the relevant attributes will be empty.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull dmaengine fixes from Vinod Koul:
"A couple of dmaengine driver fixes for:
- race and descriptor issue for xilinx driver
- fix interrupt handling, wq state & cleanup, field sizes for
completion, msix permissions for idxd driver
- runtime pm fix for tegra driver
- double free fix in dma_async_device_register"
* tag 'dmaengine-fix-5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vkoul/dmaengine:
dmaengine: idxd: fix wq cleanup of WQCFG registers
dmaengine: idxd: clear MSIX permission entry on shutdown
dmaengine: plx_dma: add a missing put_device() on error path
dmaengine: tegra20: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
dmaengine: Fix a double free in dma_async_device_register
dmaengine: dw: Make it dependent to HAS_IOMEM
dmaengine: idxd: fix wq size store permission state
dmaengine: idxd: fix opcap sysfs attribute output
dmaengine: idxd: fix delta_rec and crc size field for completion record
dmaengine: idxd: Fix clobbering of SWERR overflow bit on writeback
dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix race condition in done IRQ
dmaengine: xilinx: dpdma: Fix descriptor issuing on video group
When posix access ACL is set, it can have an effect on file mode and it can
also need to clear SGID if.
- None of caller's group/supplementary groups match file owner group.
AND
- Caller is not priviliged (No CAP_FSETID).
As of now fuser server is responsible for changing the file mode as
well. But it does not know whether to clear SGID or not.
So add a flag FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID and send this info with SETXATTR
to let file server know that sgid needs to be cleared as well.
Reported-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fuse client needs to send additional information to file server when it
calls SETXATTR(system.posix_acl_access), so add extra flags field to the
structure.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Maor Gottlieb says:
====================
This series from Maor extends MEMIC to support atomic operations from the
host in addition to already supported regular read/write.
====================
* 'memic_ops':
RDMA/mlx5: Expose UAPI to query DM
RDMA/mlx5: Add support in MEMIC operations
RDMA/mlx5: Add support to MODIFY_MEMIC command
RDMA/mlx5: Re-organize the DM code
RDMA/mlx5: Move all DM logic to separate file
RDMA/uverbs: Make UVERBS_OBJECT_METHODS to consider line number
net/mlx5: Add MEMIC operations related bits
MEMIC buffer, in addition to regular read and write operations, can
support atomic operations from the host.
Introduce and implement new UAPI to allocate address space for MEMIC
operations such as atomic. This includes:
1. Expose new IOCTL for request mapping of MEMIC operation.
2. Hold the operations address in a list, so same operation to same DM
will be allocated only once.
3. Manage refcount on the mlx5_ib_dm object, so it would be keep valid
until all addresses were unmapped.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210411122924.60230-7-leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
msm-next from Rob:
* Big DSI phy/pll cleanup. Includes some clk patches, acked by
maintainer
* Initial support for sc7280
* compatibles fixes for sm8150/sm8250
* cleanups for all dpu gens to use same bandwidth scaling paths (\o/)
* various shrinker path lock contention optimizations
* unpin/swap support for GEM objects (disabled by default, enable with
msm.enable_eviction=1 .. due to various combinations of iommu drivers
with older gens I want to get more testing on hw I don't have in front
of me before enabling by default)
* The usual assortment of misc fixes and cleanups
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
From: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/CAF6AEGvL=4aw15qoY8fbKG9FCgnx8Y-dCtf7xiFwTQSHopwSQg@mail.gmail.com
msm-next pull request has a baseline with stuff from -fixes, roll
forward first.
Some simple conflicts in amdgpu, ttm and one in i915 where git gets
confused and tries to add the same function twice.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
This change introduces a prctl that allows the user program to control
which PAC keys are enabled in a particular task. The main reason
why this is useful is to enable a userspace ABI that uses PAC to
sign and authenticate function pointers and other pointers exposed
outside of the function, while still allowing binaries conforming
to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that do not sign or
authenticate pointers.
The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.
This change adds a small amount of overhead to kernel entry and exit
due to additional required instruction sequences.
On a DragonBoard 845c (Cortex-A75) with the powersave governor, the
overhead of similar instruction sequences was measured as 4.9ns when
simulating the common case where IA is left enabled, or 43.7ns when
simulating the uncommon case where IA is disabled. These numbers can
be seen as the worst case scenario, since in more realistic scenarios
a better performing governor would be used and a newer chip would be
used that would support PAC unlike Cortex-A75 and would be expected
to be faster than Cortex-A75.
On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of the entry/exit
instruction sequences introduced by this patch was measured as 0.3ns
in the case where IA is left enabled, and 33.0ns in the case where
IA is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibc41a5e6a76b275efbaa126b31119dc197b927a5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6609065f8f40397a4124654eb68c9f490b4d477.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Per net/bpf/test_run.c, particular prog types have additional
restrictions around the parameters that can be provided, so document
these in the header.
I didn't bother documenting the limitation on duration for raw
tracepoints since that's an output parameter anyway.
Tested with ./tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_doc_build.sh.
Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@cilium.io>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210410174549.816482-1-joe@cilium.io
