Allow fractional bits of entropy to be tracked by scaling the entropy
counter (fixed point). This will be used in a subsequent patch that
accounts for entropy lost due to overwrites.
[ Modified by tytso to fix up a few missing places where the
entropy_count wasn't properly converted from fractional bits to
bits. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Use a macro to statically compute poolbitshift (will be used in a
subsequent patch), poolbytes, and poolbits. On virtually all
architectures the cost of a memory load with an offset is the same as
the one of a memory load.
It is still possible for this to generate worse code since the C
compiler doesn't know the fixed relationship between these fields, but
that is somewhat unlikely.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Previously if CPU chip had a built-in random number generator (i.e.,
RDRAND on newer x86 chips), we mixed it in at the very end of
extract_buf() using an XOR operation.
We now mix it in right after the calculate a hash across the entire
pool. This has the advantage that any contribution of entropy from
the CPU's HWRNG will get mixed back into the pool. In addition, it
means that if the HWRNG has any defects (either accidentally or
maliciously introduced), this will be mitigated via the non-linear
transform of the SHA-1 hash function before we hand out generated
output.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Allow architectures which have a disabled get_cycles() function to
provide a random_get_entropy() function which provides a fine-grained,
rapidly changing counter that can be used by the /dev/random driver.
For example, an architecture might have a rapidly changing register
used to control random TLB cache eviction, or DRAM refresh that
doesn't meet the requirements of get_cycles(), but which is good
enough for the needs of the random driver.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The some platforms (e.g., ARM) initializes their clocks as
late_initcalls for some unknown reason. So make sure
random_int_secret_init() is run after all of the late_initcalls are
run.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 902c098a36 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt
path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless
cmpxchg-retry update.
That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits
from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace
read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in
account() to use cmpxchg as well.
It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to
read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets
corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0
all the way from account() to the actual read() call.
Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of
what has been partially done by 902c098a36.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit ec8f02da9e ("random: prime last_data value per fips
requirements") added priming of last_data per fips requirements.
Unfortuantely, it did so in a way that can lead to multiple threads all
incrementing nbytes, but only one actually doing anything with the extra
data, which leads to some fun random corruption and panics.
The fix is to simply do everything needed to prime last_data in a single
shot, so there's no window for multiple cpus to increment nbytes -- in
fact, we won't even increment or decrement nbytes anymore, we'll just
extract the needed EXTRACT_SIZE one time per pool and then carry on with
the normal routine.
All these changes have been tested across multiple hosts and
architectures where panics were previously encoutered. The code changes
are are strictly limited to areas only touched when when booted in fips
mode.
This change should also go into 3.8-stable, to make the myriads of fips
users on 3.8.x happy.
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stodola <jstodola@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are several places in kernel where modules unescapes input to convert
C-Style Escape Sequences into byte codes.
The patch provides generic implementation of such approach. Test cases are
also included into the patch.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: clarify comment]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export get_random_int() to modules]
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: William Hubbs <w.d.hubbs@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Brannon <chris@the-brannons.com>
Cc: Kirk Reiser <kirk@braille.uwo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
used by a thread when it exits.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix a circular locking dependency in random's collection of cputime
used by a thread when it exits."
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: fix locking dependency with the tasklist_lock
Commit 6133705494 introduced a circular lock dependency because
posix_cpu_timers_exit() is called by release_task(), which is holding
a writer lock on tasklist_lock, and this can cause a deadlock since
kill_fasync() gets called with nonblocking_pool.lock taken.
There's no reason why kill_fasync() needs to be taken while the random
pool is locked, so move it out to fix this locking dependency.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Russ Dill <Russ.Dill@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
The static lock initializers want to be fed the proper name of the
lock and not some random string. In mainline random strings are
obfuscating the readability of debug output, but for RT they prevent
the spinlock substitution. Fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The value stored in last_data must be primed for FIPS 140-2 purposes. Upon
first use, either on system startup or after an RNDCLEARPOOL ioctl, we
need to take an initial random sample, store it internally in last_data,
then pass along the value after that to the requester, so that consistency
checks aren't being run against stale and possibly known data.
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Fix the following warnings in formatting debug output:
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘xfer_secondary_pool’:
drivers/char/random.c:827: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 7 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘account’:
drivers/char/random.c:859: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c:881: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘random_read’:
drivers/char/random.c:1141: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 6 has type ‘long unsigned int’
by using '%zd' instead of '%d' to properly denote ssize_t/size_t conversion.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The module parameter that turns debugging mode (which basically means
printing a few extra lines during runtime) is in '#if 0' block. Forcing
everyone who would like to see how entropy is behaving on his system to
rebuild seems to be a little bit too harsh.
If we were concerned about speed, we could potentially turn 'debug' into a
static key, but I don't think it's necessary.
Drop the '#if 0' block to allow using the 'debug' parameter without rebuilding.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Mix in any architectural randomness in extract_buf() instead of
xfer_secondary_buf(). This allows us to mix in more architectural
randomness, and it also makes xfer_secondary_buf() faster, moving a
tiny bit of additional CPU overhead to process which is extracting the
randomness.
[ Commit description modified by tytso to remove an extended
advertisement for the RDRAND instruction. ]
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: DJ Johnston <dj.johnston@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Many platforms have per-machine instance data (serial numbers,
asset tags, etc.) squirreled away in areas that are accessed
during early system bringup. Mixing this data into the random
pools has a very high value in providing better random data,
so we should allow (and even encourage) architecture code to
call add_device_randomness() from the setup_arch() paths.
However, this limits our options for internal structure of
the random driver since random_initialize() is not called
until long after setup_arch().
Add a big fat comment to rand_initialize() spelling out
this requirement.
Suggested-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
With the new interrupt sampling system, we are no longer using the
timer_rand_state structure in the irq descriptor, so we can stop
initializing it now.
[ Merged in fixes from Sedat to find some last missing references to
rand_initialize_irq() ]
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.
The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)
It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
--- especially since Bull Mountain is documented to use AES as a
whitener. Hence, the output of an evil, trojan-horse version of
RDRAND is statistically indistinguishable from an RDRAND implemented
to the specifications claimed by Intel. Short of using a tunnelling
electronic microscope to reverse engineer an Ivy Bridge chip and
disassembling and analyzing the CPU microcode, there's no way for us
to tell for sure.
Since users of get_random_bytes() in the Linux kernel need to be able
to support hardware systems where the HW RNG is not present, most
time-sensitive users of this interface have already created their own
cryptographic RNG interface which uses get_random_bytes() as a seed.
So it's much better to use the HW RNG to improve the existing random
number generator, by mixing in any entropy returned by the HW RNG into
/dev/random's entropy pool, but to always _use_ /dev/random's entropy
pool.
This way we get almost of the benefits of the HW RNG without any
potential liabilities. The only benefits we forgo is the
speed/performance enhancements --- and generic kernel code can't
depend on depend on get_random_bytes() having the speed of a HW RNG
anyway.
For those places that really want access to the arch-specific HW RNG,
if it is available, we provide get_random_bytes_arch().
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
If the CPU supports a hardware random number generator, use it in
xfer_secondary_pool(), where it will significantly improve things and
where we can afford it.
Also, remove the use of the arch-specific rng in
add_timer_randomness(), since the call is significantly slower than
get_cycles(), and we're much better off using it in
xfer_secondary_pool() anyway.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Add a new interface, add_device_randomness() for adding data to the
random pool that is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly
even per boot). This would be things like MAC addresses or serial
numbers, or the read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual
entropy to the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values
for devices that might otherwise be identical and have very little
entropy available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
[ Modified by tytso to mix in a timestamp, since there may be some
variability caused by the time needed to detect/configure the hardware
in question. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
The real-time Linux folks don't like add_interrupt_randomness() taking
a spinlock since it is called in the low-level interrupt routine.
This also allows us to reduce the overhead in the fast path, for the
random driver, which is the interrupt collection path.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
We've been moving away from add_interrupt_randomness() for various
reasons: it's too expensive to do on every interrupt, and flooding the
CPU with interrupts could theoretically cause bogus floods of entropy
from a somewhat externally controllable source.
This solves both problems by limiting the actual randomness addition
to just once a second or after 64 interrupts, whicever comes first.
During that time, the interrupt cycle data is buffered up in a per-cpu
pool. Also, we make sure the the nonblocking pool used by urandom is
initialized before we start feeding the normal input pool. This
assures that /dev/urandom is returning unpredictable data as soon as
possible.
(Based on an original patch by Linus, but significantly modified by
tytso.)
Tested-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Eric Wustrow <ewust@umich.edu>
Reported-by: Nadia Heninger <nadiah@cs.ucsd.edu>
Reported-by: Zakir Durumeric <zakir@umich.edu>
Reported-by: J. Alex Halderman <jhalderm@umich.edu>.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id can be read concurrently by userspace
processes. If two (or more) user-space processes concurrently read
boot_id when sysctl_bootid is not yet assigned, a race can occur making
boot_id differ between the reads. Because the whole point of the boot id
is to be unique across a kernel execution, fix this by protecting this
operation with a spinlock.
Given that this operation is not frequently used, hitting the spinlock
on each call should not be an issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'x86/rdrand' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
random: Adjust the number of loops when initializing
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
When we are initializing using arch_get_random_long() we only need to
loop enough times to touch all the bytes in the buffer; using
poolwords for that does twice the number of operations necessary on a
64-bit machine, since in the random number generator code "word" means
32 bits.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
module_param(bool) used to counter-intuitively take an int. In
fddd5201 (mid-2009) we allowed bool or int/unsigned int using a messy
trick.
It's time to remove the int/unsigned int option. For this version
it'll simply give a warning, but it'll break next kernel version.
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We still don't use rdrand in /dev/random, which just seems stupid. We
accept the *cycle*counter* as a random input, but we don't accept
rdrand? That's just broken.
Sure, people can do things in user space (write to /dev/random, use
rdrand in addition to /dev/random themselves etc etc), but that
*still* seems to be a particularly stupid reason for saying "we
shouldn't bother to try to do better in /dev/random".
And even if somebody really doesn't trust rdrand as a source of random
bytes, it seems singularly stupid to trust the cycle counter *more*.
So I'd suggest the attached patch. I'm not going to even bother
arguing that we should add more bits to the entropy estimate, because
that's not the point - I don't care if /dev/random fills up slowly or
not, I think it's just stupid to not use the bits we can get from
rdrand and mix them into the strong randomness pool.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFwn59N1=m651QAyTy-1gO1noGbK18zwKDwvwqnravA84A@mail.gmail.com
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
If there is an architecture-specific random number generator we use it
to acquire randomness one "long" at a time. We should put these random
words into consecutive words in the result buffer - not just overwrite
the first word again and again.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'x86-rdrand-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled
x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND
random: Add support for architectural random hooks
Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/char/random.c: the architectural
random hooks touched "get_random_int()" that was simplified to use MD5
and not do the keyptr thing any more (see commit 6e5714eaf7: "net:
Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5").
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add support for architecture-specific hooks into the kernel-directed
random number generator interfaces. This patchset does not use the
architecture random number generator interfaces for the
userspace-directed interfaces (/dev/random and /dev/urandom), thus
eliminating the need to distinguish between them based on a pool
pointer.
Changes in version 3:
- Moved the hooks from extract_entropy() to get_random_bytes().
- Changes the hooks to inlines.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
At present, the comment header in random.c makes no mention of
add_disk_randomness, and instead, suggests that disk activity adds to the
random pool by way of add_interrupt_randomness, which appears to not have
been the case since sometime prior to the existence of git, and even prior
to bitkeeper. Didn't look any further back. At least, as far as I can
tell, there are no storage drivers setting IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM, which is a
requirement for add_interrupt_randomness to trigger, so the only way for a
disk to contribute entropy is by way of add_disk_randomness. Update
comments accordingly, complete with special mention about solid state
drives being a crappy source of entropy (see e2e1a148bc for reference).
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
__this_cpu_inc can create a single instruction to do the same as
__get_cpu_var()++.
Cc: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Re-order structure entropy_store to remove 8 bytes of padding on
64 bit builds, so shrinking this structure from 72 to 64 bytes
and allowing it to fit into one cache line.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Rather than dynamically allocate 10 bytes, move it to static allocation.
This saves space and avoids the need for error checking.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Some comments misspell "truly"; this fixes them. No code changes.
Signed-off-by: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
The previous changeset left behind an unused inode variable.
This patch removes it.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
No other driver does anything remotely like this that I know of except
for the tty drivers, and I can't see any reason for random/urandom to do
it. In fact, it's a (trivial, harmless) timing information leak. And
obviously, it generates power- and flash-cycle wasting I/O, especially
if combined with something like hwrngd. Also, it breaks ubifs's
expectations.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
For consistency drop & in front of every proc_handler. Explicity
taking the address is unnecessary and it prevents optimizations
like stubbing the proc_handlers to NULL.
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Now that sys_sysctl is a wrapper around /proc/sys all of
the binary sysctl support elsewhere in the tree is
dead code.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> for drivers/char/hpet.c
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
It's unused.
It isn't needed -- read or write flag is already passed and sysctl
shouldn't care about the rest.
It _was_ used in two places at arch/frv for some reason.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
FIPS-140 requires that all random number generators implement continuous self
tests in which each extracted block of data is compared against the last block
for repetition. The ansi_cprng implements such a test, but it would be nice if
the hw rng's did the same thing. Obviously its not something thats always
needed, but it seems like it would be a nice feature to have on occasion. I've
written the below patch which allows individual entropy stores to be flagged as
desiring a continuous test to be run on them as is extracted. By default this
option is off, but is enabled in the event that fips mode is selected during
bootup.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
