The machine check idtentry uses an indirect branch directly from the low
level code. This evades the speculation protection.
Replace it by a direct call into C code and issue the indirect call there
so the compiler can apply the proper speculation protection.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by:Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Niced-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801181626290.1847@nanos
Historically, IDT entries from usermode have always gone directly
to the running task's kernel stack. Rearrange it so that we enter on
a per-CPU trampoline stack and then manually switch to the task's stack.
This touches a couple of extra cachelines, but it gives us a chance
to run some code before we touch the kernel stack.
The asm isn't exactly beautiful, but I think that fully refactoring
it can wait.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.225330557@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Instead of trying to execute any NMI via the bare metal's NMI trap
handler use a Xen specific one for PV domains, like we do for e.g.
debug traps. As in a PV domain the NMI is handled via the normal
kernel stack this is the correct thing to do.
This will enable us to get rid of the very fragile and questionable
dependencies between the bare metal NMI handler and Xen assumptions
believed to be broken anyway.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5baf5c0528d58402441550c5770b98e7961e7680.1509609304.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Up to this point, only fault.c used the definitions of the page fault error
codes. Thus, it made sense to keep them within such file. Other portions of
code might be interested in those definitions too. For instance, the User-
Mode Instruction Prevention emulation code will use such definitions to
emulate a page fault when it is unable to successfully copy the results
of the emulated instructions to user space.
While relocating the error code enumeration, the prefix X86_ is used to
make it consistent with the rest of the definitions in traps.h. Of course,
code using the enumeration had to be updated as well. No functional changes
were performed.
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509135945-13762-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
When running as Xen pv-guest the exception frame on the stack contains
%r11 and %rcx additional to the other data pushed by the processor.
Instead of having a paravirt op being called for each exception type
prepend the Xen specific code to each exception entry. When running as
Xen pv-guest just use the exception entry with prepended instructions,
otherwise use the entry without the Xen specific code.
[ tglx: Merged through tip to avoid ugly merge conflict ]
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Cc: luto@amacapital.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170831174249.26853-1-jg@pfupf.net
Stephen reported a merge conflict with the XEN tree. That also shows that the
IDT cleanup forgot to remove the now unused trace_{trap} defines.
Remove them.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Make use of the new irqvector tracing static key and remove the duplicated
trace_do_pagefault() implementation.
If irq vector tracing is disabled, then the overhead of this is a single
NOP5, which is a reasonable tradeoff to avoid duplicated code and the
unholy macro mess.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828064956.672965407@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
If we get a page fault indicating kernel stack overflow, invoke
handle_stack_overflow(). To prevent us from overflowing the stack
again while handling the overflow (because we are likely to have
very little stack space left), call handle_stack_overflow() on the
double-fault stack.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6d6cf96b3fb9b4c9aa303817e1dc4de0c7c36487.1472603235.git.luto@kernel.org
[ Minor edit. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
On 64-bit kernels, we don't need it any more: we handle context
tracking directly on entry from user mode and exit to user mode.
On 32-bit kernels, we don't support context tracking at all, so
these callbacks had no effect.
Note: this doesn't change do_page_fault(). Before we do that,
we need to make sure that there is no code that can page fault
from kernel mode with CONTEXT_USER. The 32-bit fast system call
stack argument code is the only offender I'm aware of right now.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ae22f4dfebd799c916574089964592be218151f9.1435952415.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Deferred errors indicate error conditions that were not corrected, but
require no action from S/W (or action is optional).These errors provide
info about a latent UC MCE that can occur when a poisoned data is
consumed by the processor.
Processors that report these errors can be configured to generate APIC
interrupts to notify OS about the error.
Provide an interrupt handler in this patch so that OS can catch these
errors as and when they happen. Currently, we simply log the errors and
exit the handler as S/W action is not mandated.
Signed-off-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-edac <linux-edac@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430913538-1415-5-git-send-email-Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
In some IST handlers, if the interrupt came from user mode,
we can safely enable preemption. Add helpers to do it safely.
This is intended to be used my the memory failure code in
do_machine_check.
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
We currently pretend that IST context is like standard exception
context, but this is incorrect. IST entries from userspace are like
standard exceptions except that they use per-cpu stacks, so they are
atomic. IST entries from kernel space are like NMIs from RCU's
perspective -- they are not quiescent states even if they
interrupted the kernel during a quiescent state.
Add and use ist_enter and ist_exit to track IST context. Even
though x86_32 has no IST stacks, we track these interrupts the same
way.
This fixes two issues:
- Scheduling from an IST interrupt handler will now warn. It would
previously appear to work as long as we got lucky and nothing
overwrote the stack frame. (I don't know of any bugs in this
that would trigger the warning, but it's good to be on the safe
side.)
- RCU handling in IST context was dangerous. As far as I know,
only machine checks were likely to trigger this, but it's good to
be on the safe side.
Note that the machine check handlers appears to have been missing
any context tracking at all before this patch.
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull more perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"A second round of perf updates:
- wide reaching kprobes sanitization and robustization, with the hope
of fixing all 'probe this function crashes the kernel' bugs, by
Masami Hiramatsu.
- uprobes updates from Oleg Nesterov: tmpfs support, corner case
fixes and robustization work.
- perf tooling updates and fixes from Jiri Olsa, Namhyung Ki, Arnaldo
et al:
* Add support to accumulate hist periods (Namhyung Kim)
* various fixes, refactorings and enhancements"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (101 commits)
perf: Differentiate exec() and non-exec() comm events
perf: Fix perf_event_comm() vs. exec() assumption
uprobes/x86: Rename arch_uprobe->def to ->defparam, minor comment updates
perf/documentation: Add description for conditional branch filter
perf/x86: Add conditional branch filtering support
perf/tool: Add conditional branch filter 'cond' to perf record
perf: Add new conditional branch filter 'PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND'
uprobes: Teach copy_insn() to support tmpfs
uprobes: Shift ->readpage check from __copy_insn() to uprobe_register()
perf/x86: Use common PMU interrupt disabled code
perf/ARM: Use common PMU interrupt disabled code
perf: Disable sampled events if no PMU interrupt
perf: Fix use after free in perf_remove_from_context()
perf tools: Fix 'make help' message error
perf record: Fix poll return value propagation
perf tools: Move elide bool into perf_hpp_fmt struct
perf tools: Remove elide setup for SORT_MODE__MEMORY mode
perf tools: Fix "==" into "=" in ui_browser__warning assignment
perf tools: Allow overriding sysfs and proc finding with env var
perf tools: Consider header files outside perf directory in tags target
...
I noticed on some of my systems that page fault tracing doesn't
work:
cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
echo 1 > events/exceptions/enable
cat trace;
# nothing shows up
I eventually traced it down to CONFIG_KVM_GUEST. At least in a
KVM VM, enabling that option breaks page fault tracing, and
disabling fixes it. I tried on some old kernels and this does
not appear to be a regression: it never worked.
There are two page-fault entry functions today. One when tracing
is on and another when it is off. The KVM code calls do_page_fault()
directly instead of calling the traced version:
> dotraplinkage void __kprobes
> do_async_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long
> error_code)
> {
> enum ctx_state prev_state;
>
> switch (kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason()) {
> default:
> do_page_fault(regs, error_code);
> break;
> case KVM_PV_REASON_PAGE_NOT_PRESENT:
I'm also having problems with the page fault tracing on bare
metal (same symptom of no trace output). I'm unsure if it's
related.
Steven had an alternative to this which has zero overhead when
tracing is off where this includes the standard noops even when
tracing is disabled. I'm unconvinced that the extra complexity
of his apporach:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140508194508.561ed220@gandalf.local.home
is worth it, expecially considering that the KVM code is already
making page fault entry slower here. This solution is
dirt-simple.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro for protecting functions
from kprobes instead of __kprobes annotation under
arch/x86.
This applies nokprobe_inline annotation for some cases,
because NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() will inhibit inlining by
referring the symbol address.
This just folds a bunch of previous NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
cleanup patches for x86 to one patch.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081814.26341.51656.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch registers exception handlers for tracing to a trace IDT.
To implemented it in set_intr_gate(), this patch does followings.
- Register the exception handlers to
the trace IDT by prepending "trace_" to the handler's names.
- Also, newly introduce trace_page_fault() to add tracepoints
in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52716DEC.5050204@hds.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Mark 32bit dotraplinkage functions as __visible for LTO.
64bit already is using asmlinkage which includes it.
v2: Clean up (M.Marek)
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1375740170-7446-3-git-send-email-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
The traps are referred to by their numbers and it can be difficult to
understand them while reading the code without context. This patch adds
enumeration of the trap numbers and replaces the numbers with the correct
enum for x86.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120310000710.GA32667@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
There are three choices:
vsyscall=native: Vsyscalls are native code that issues the
corresponding syscalls.
vsyscall=emulate (default): Vsyscalls are emulated by instruction
fault traps, tested in the bad_area path. The actual contents of
the vsyscall page is the same as the vsyscall=native case except
that it's marked NX. This way programs that make assumptions about
what the code in the page does will not be confused when they read
that code.
vsyscall=none: Trying to execute a vsyscall will segfault.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8449fb3abf89851fd6b2260972666a6f82542284.1312988155.git.luto@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
There's a fair amount of code in the vsyscall page. It contains
a syscall instruction (in the gettimeofday fallback) and who
knows what will happen if an exploit jumps into the middle of
some other code.
Reduce the risk by replacing the vsyscalls with short magic
incantations that cause the kernel to emulate the real
vsyscalls. These incantations are useless if entered in the
middle.
This causes vsyscalls to be a little more expensive than real
syscalls. Fortunately sensible programs don't use them.
The only exception is time() which is still called by glibc
through the vsyscall - but calling time() millions of times
per second is not sensible. glibc has this fixed in the
development tree.
This patch is not perfect: the vread_tsc and vread_hpet
functions are still at a fixed address. Fixing that might
involve making alternative patching work in the vDSO.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jesper Juhl <jj@chaosbits.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@novell.com>
Cc: richard -rw- weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikael Pettersson <mikpe@it.uu.se>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Louis Rilling <Louis.Rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: pageexec@freemail.hu
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e64e1b3c64858820d12c48fa739efbd1485e79d5.1307292171.git.luto@mit.edu
[ Removed the CONFIG option - it's simpler to just do it unconditionally. Tidied up the code as well. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
When async PF capability is detected hook up special page fault handler
that will handle async page fault events and bypass other page faults to
regular page fault handler. Also add async PF handling to nested SVM
emulation. Async PF always generates exit to L1 where vcpu thread will
be scheduled out until page is available.
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
The only difference between FPU and SIMD exceptions is where the
status bits are read from (cwd/swd vs. mxcsr). This also fixes
the discrepency introduced by commit adf77bac, which fixed FPU
but not SIMD.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <1269176446-2489-3-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
patch_espfix_desc() is not used after commit
dc4c2a0aed
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
LKML-Reference: <20090718150955.GB11294@localhost.localdomain>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
* 'x86-xen-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (42 commits)
xen: cache cr0 value to avoid trap'n'emulate for read_cr0
xen/x86-64: clean up warnings about IST-using traps
xen/x86-64: fix breakpoints and hardware watchpoints
xen: reserve Xen start_info rather than e820 reserving
xen: add FIX_TEXT_POKE to fixmap
lguest: update lazy mmu changes to match lguest's use of kvm hypercalls
xen: honour VCPU availability on boot
xen: add "capabilities" file
xen: drop kexec bits from /sys/hypervisor since kexec isn't implemented yet
xen/sys/hypervisor: change writable_pt to features
xen: add /sys/hypervisor support
xen/xenbus: export xenbus_dev_changed
xen: use device model for suspending xenbus devices
xen: remove suspend_cancel hook
xen/dev-evtchn: clean up locking in evtchn
xen: export ioctl headers to userspace
xen: add /dev/xen/evtchn driver
xen: add irq_from_evtchn
xen: clean up gate trap/interrupt constants
xen: set _PAGE_NX in __supported_pte_mask before pagetable construction
...
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (22 commits)
x86: fix system without memory on node0
x86, mm: Fix node_possible_map logic
mm, x86: remove MEMORY_HOTPLUG_RESERVE related code
x86: make sparse mem work in non-NUMA mode
x86: process.c, remove useless headers
x86: merge process.c a bit
x86: use sparse_memory_present_with_active_regions() on UMA
x86: unify 64-bit UMA and NUMA paging_init()
x86: Allow 1MB of slack between the e820 map and SRAT, not 4GB
x86: Sanity check the e820 against the SRAT table using e820 map only
x86: clean up and and print out initial max_pfn_mapped
x86/pci: remove rounding quirk from e820_setup_gap()
x86, e820, pci: reserve extra free space near end of RAM
x86: fix typo in address space documentation
x86: 46 bit physical address support on 64 bits
x86, mm: fault.c, use printk_once() in is_errata93()
x86: move per-cpu mmu_gathers to mm/init.c
x86: move max_pfn_mapped and max_low_pfn_mapped to setup.c
x86: unify noexec handling
x86: remove (null) in /sys kernel_page_tables
...
Native x86-64 uses the IST mechanism to run int3 and debug traps on
an alternative stack. Xen does not do this, and so the frames were
being misinterpreted by the ptrace code. This change special-cases
these two exceptions by using Xen variants which run on the normal
kernel stack properly.
Impact: avoid crash or bad data when IST trap is invoked under Xen
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy.fitzhardinge@citrix.com>
Impact: cleanup
Eliminate more than 20 unnecessary #include lines in fault.c
Also fix include file dependency bug in asm/traps.h. (this was
masked before, by implicit inclusion)
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
LKML-Reference: <tip-56aea8468746e673a4bf50b6a13d97b2d1cbe1e8@git.kernel.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
The generic exception handler (error_code) passes in the pt_regs
pointer and the error code (unused in this case). The commit
"x86: fix math_emu register frame access" changed this to pass by
value, which doesn't work correctly with stack protector enabled.
Change it back to use the pt_regs pointer.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
do_device_not_available() is the handler for #NM and it declares that
it takes a unsigned long and calls math_emu(), which takes a long
argument and surprisingly expects the stack frame starting at the zero
argument would match struct math_emu_info, which isn't true regardless
of configuration in the current code.
This patch makes do_device_not_available() take struct pt_regs like
other exception handlers and initialize struct math_emu_info with
pointer to it and pass pointer to the math_emu_info to math_emulate()
like normal C functions do. This way, unless gcc makes a copy of
struct pt_regs in do_device_not_available(), the register frame is
correctly accessed regardless of kernel configuration or compiler
used.
This doesn't fix all math_emu problems but it at least gets it
somewhat working.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup
In asm/traps.h :-
do_double_fault : added under X86_64
sync_regs : added under X86_64
math_error : moved out from X86_32 as it is common for both 32 and 64 bit
math_emulate : moved from X86_32 as it is common for both 32 and 64 bit
smp_thermal_interrupt : added under X86_64
mce_threshold_interrupt : added under X86_64
Signed-off-by: Jaswinder Singh <jaswinder@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Change header guards named "ASM_X86__*" to "_ASM_X86_*" since:
a. the double underscore is ugly and pointless.
b. no leading underscore violates namespace constraints.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
