forked from Minki/linux
83f73c5bb7
691 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Vlastimil Babka
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8e57f8acbb |
mm, debug_pagealloc: don't rely on static keys too early
Commit |
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Pengfei Li
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dc0a7f7558 |
mm, slab: remove unused kmalloc_size()
The size of kmalloc can be obtained from kmalloc_info[], so remove kmalloc_size() that will not be used anymore. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-3-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Pengfei Li
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cb5d9fb38c |
mm, slab: make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names
Patch series "mm, slab: Make kmalloc_info[] contain all types of names", v6.
There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM
and KMALLOC_DMA.
The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name,
but the names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically
generated by kmalloc_cache_name().
Patch1 predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save
the time spent dynamically generating names.
These changes make sense, and the time spent by new_kmalloc_cache()
has been reduced by approximately 36.3%.
Time spent by new_kmalloc_cache()
(CPU cycles)
5.3-rc7 66264
5.3-rc7+patch 42188
This patch (of 3):
There are three types of kmalloc, KMALLOC_NORMAL, KMALLOC_RECLAIM and
KMALLOC_DMA.
The name of KMALLOC_NORMAL is contained in kmalloc_info[].name, but the
names of KMALLOC_RECLAIM and KMALLOC_DMA are dynamically generated by
kmalloc_cache_name().
This patch predefines the names of all types of kmalloc to save the time
spent dynamically generating names.
Besides, remove the kmalloc_cache_name() that is no longer used.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1569241648-26908-2-git-send-email-lpf.vector@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pengfei Li <lpf.vector@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Randy Dunlap
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87bf4f71af |
mm/slab.c: fix kernel-doc warning for __ksize()
Fix kernel-doc warning in mm/slab.c:
mm/slab.c:4215: warning: Function parameter or member 'objp' not described in '__ksize'
Also add Return: documentation section for this function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/68c9fd7d-f09e-d376-e292-c7b2bdf1774d@infradead.org
Fixes:
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Alexander Potapenko
|
6471384af2 |
mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
Patch series "add init_on_alloc/init_on_free boot options", v10. Provide init_on_alloc and init_on_free boot options. These are aimed at preventing possible information leaks and making the control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. Enabling either of the options guarantees that the memory returned by the page allocator and SL[AU]B is initialized with zeroes. SLOB allocator isn't supported at the moment, as its emulation of kmem caches complicates handling of SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches correctly. Enabling init_on_free also guarantees that pages and heap objects are initialized right after they're freed, so it won't be possible to access stale data by using a dangling pointer. As suggested by Michal Hocko, right now we don't let the heap users to disable initialization for certain allocations. There's not enough evidence that doing so can speed up real-life cases, and introducing ways to opt-out may result in things going out of control. This patch (of 2): The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks where memory forensics is included in their threat models.) init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed. init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses. Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never zero-initialized to preserve their semantics. Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, those options take precedence over init_on_alloc and init_on_free: initialization is only applied to unpoisoned allocations. Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0: hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%) hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%) The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline is within the standard error. The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the same cost as memory initialization. Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost, it seems reasonable to include it in this series. [glider@google.com: v8] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626121943.131390-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v9] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190627130316.254309-2-glider@google.com [glider@google.com: v10] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628093131.199499-2-glider@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617151050.92663-2-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> [page and dmapool parts Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>] Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Roman Gushchin
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6cea1d569d |
mm: memcg/slab: unify SLAB and SLUB page accounting
Currently the page accounting code is duplicated in SLAB and SLUB internals. Let's move it into new (un)charge_slab_page helpers in the slab_common.c file. These helpers will be responsible for statistics (global and memcg-aware) and memcg charging. So they are replacing direct memcg_(un)charge_slab() calls. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190611231813.3148843-6-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Roman Gushchin
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4348669475 |
mm: memcg/slab: generalize postponed non-root kmem_cache deactivation
Currently SLUB uses a work scheduled after an RCU grace period to
deactivate a non-root kmem_cache. This mechanism can be reused for
kmem_caches release, but requires generalization for SLAB case.
Introduce kmemcg_cache_deactivate() function, which calls
allocator-specific __kmem_cache_deactivate() and schedules execution of
__kmem_cache_deactivate_after_rcu() with all necessary locks in a worker
context after an rcu grace period.
Here is the new calling scheme:
kmemcg_cache_deactivate()
__kmemcg_cache_deactivate() SLAB/SLUB-specific
kmemcg_rcufn() rcu
kmemcg_workfn() work
__kmemcg_cache_deactivate_after_rcu() SLAB/SLUB-specific
instead of:
__kmemcg_cache_deactivate() SLAB/SLUB-specific
slab_deactivate_memcg_cache_rcu_sched() SLUB-only
kmemcg_rcufn() rcu
kmemcg_workfn() work
kmemcg_cache_deact_after_rcu() SLUB-only
For consistency, all allocator-specific functions start with "__".
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190611231813.3148843-4-guro@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Roman Gushchin
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c03914b7aa |
mm: memcg/slab: postpone kmem_cache memcg pointer initialization to memcg_link_cache()
Patch series "mm: reparent slab memory on cgroup removal", v7. # Why do we need this? We've noticed that the number of dying cgroups is steadily growing on most of our hosts in production. The following investigation revealed an issue in the userspace memory reclaim code [1], accounting of kernel stacks [2], and also the main reason: slab objects. The underlying problem is quite simple: any page charged to a cgroup holds a reference to it, so the cgroup can't be reclaimed unless all charged pages are gone. If a slab object is actively used by other cgroups, it won't be reclaimed, and will prevent the origin cgroup from being reclaimed. Slab objects, and first of all vfs cache, is shared between cgroups, which are using the same underlying fs, and what's even more important, it's shared between multiple generations of the same workload. So if something is running periodically every time in a new cgroup (like how systemd works), we do accumulate multiple dying cgroups. Strictly speaking pagecache isn't different here, but there is a key difference: we disable protection and apply some extra pressure on LRUs of dying cgroups, and these LRUs contain all charged pages. My experiments show that with the disabled kernel memory accounting the number of dying cgroups stabilizes at a relatively small number (~100, depends on memory pressure and cgroup creation rate), and with kernel memory accounting it grows pretty steadily up to several thousands. Memory cgroups are quite complex and big objects (mostly due to percpu stats), so it leads to noticeable memory losses. Memory occupied by dying cgroups is measured in hundreds of megabytes. I've even seen a host with more than 100Gb of memory wasted for dying cgroups. It leads to a degradation of performance with the uptime, and generally limits the usage of cgroups. My previous attempt [3] to fix the problem by applying extra pressure on slab shrinker lists caused a regressions with xfs and ext4, and has been reverted [4]. The following attempts to find the right balance [5, 6] were not successful. So instead of trying to find a maybe non-existing balance, let's do reparent accounted slab caches to the parent cgroup on cgroup removal. # Implementation approach There is however a significant problem with reparenting of slab memory: there is no list of charged pages. Some of them are in shrinker lists, but not all. Introducing of a new list is really not an option. But fortunately there is a way forward: every slab page has a stable pointer to the corresponding kmem_cache. So the idea is to reparent kmem_caches instead of slab pages. It's actually simpler and cheaper, but requires some underlying changes: 1) Make kmem_caches to hold a single reference to the memory cgroup, instead of a separate reference per every slab page. 2) Stop setting page->mem_cgroup pointer for memcg slab pages and use page->kmem_cache->memcg indirection instead. It's used only on slab page release, so performance overhead shouldn't be a big issue. 3) Introduce a refcounter for non-root slab caches. It's required to be able to destroy kmem_caches when they become empty and release the associated memory cgroup. There is a bonus: currently we release all memcg kmem_caches all together with the memory cgroup itself. This patchset allows individual kmem_caches to be released as soon as they become inactive and free. Some additional implementation details are provided in corresponding commit messages. # Results Below is the average number of dying cgroups on two groups of our production hosts. They do run some sort of web frontend workload, the memory pressure is moderate. As we can see, with the kernel memory reparenting the number stabilizes in 60s range; however with the original version it grows almost linearly and doesn't show any signs of plateauing. The difference in slab and percpu usage between patched and unpatched versions also grows linearly. In 7 days it exceeded 200Mb. day 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 original 56 362 628 752 1070 1250 1490 1560 patched 23 46 51 55 60 57 67 69 mem diff(Mb) 22 74 123 152 164 182 214 241 # Links [1]: commit |
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Marco Elver
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10d1f8cb39 |
mm/slab: refactor common ksize KASAN logic into slab_common.c
This refactors common code of ksize() between the various allocators into slab_common.c: __ksize() is the allocator-specific implementation without instrumentation, whereas ksize() includes the required KASAN logic. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190626142014.141844-5-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Kees Cook
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a64b53780e |
mm/slab: sanity-check page type when looking up cache
This avoids any possible type confusion when looking up an object. For example, if a non-slab were to be passed to kfree(), the invalid slab_cache pointer (i.e. overlapped with some other value from the struct page union) would be used for subsequent slab manipulations that could lead to further memory corruption. Since the page is already in cache, adding the PageSlab() check will have nearly zero cost, so add a check and WARN() to virt_to_cache(). Additionally replaces an open-coded virt_to_cache(). To support the failure mode this also updates all callers of virt_to_cache() and cache_from_obj() to handle a NULL cache pointer return value (though note that several already handle this case gracefully). [dan.carpenter@oracle.com: restore IRQs in kfree()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190613065637.GE16334@mwanda Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530045017.15252-3-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Qian Cai
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7878c231da |
slab: remove /proc/slab_allocators
It turned out that DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK is still broken even after recent
recue efforts that when there is a large number of objects like
kmemleak_object which is normal on a debug kernel,
# grep kmemleak /proc/slabinfo
kmemleak_object 2243606 3436210 ...
reading /proc/slab_allocators could easily loop forever while processing
the kmemleak_object cache and any additional freeing or allocating
objects will trigger a reprocessing. To make a situation worse,
soft-lockups could easily happen in this sitatuion which will call
printk() to allocate more kmemleak objects to guarantee an infinite
loop.
Also, since it seems no one had noticed when it was totally broken
more than 2-year ago - see the commit
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Qian Cai
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745e10146c |
mm/slab.c: fix an infinite loop in leaks_show()
"cat /proc/slab_allocators" could hang forever on SMP machines with
kmemleak or object debugging enabled due to other CPUs running do_drain()
will keep making kmemleak_object or debug_objects_cache dirty and unable
to escape the first loop in leaks_show(),
do {
set_store_user_clean(cachep);
drain_cpu_caches(cachep);
...
} while (!is_store_user_clean(cachep));
For example,
do_drain
slabs_destroy
slab_destroy
kmem_cache_free
__cache_free
___cache_free
kmemleak_free_recursive
delete_object_full
__delete_object
put_object
free_object_rcu
kmem_cache_free
cache_free_debugcheck --> dirty kmemleak_object
One approach is to check cachep->name and skip both kmemleak_object and
debug_objects_cache in leaks_show(). The other is to set store_user_clean
after drain_cpu_caches() which leaves a small window between
drain_cpu_caches() and set_store_user_clean() where per-CPU caches could
be dirty again lead to slightly wrong information has been stored but
could also speed up things significantly which sounds like a good
compromise. For example,
# cat /proc/slab_allocators
0m42.778s # 1st approach
0m0.737s # 2nd approach
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190411032635.10325-1-cai@lca.pw
Fixes:
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Li RongQing
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517f9f1ee5 |
mm/slab.c: remove unneed check in cpuup_canceled
nc is a member of percpu allocation memory, and cannot be NULL. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1553159353-5056-1-git-send-email-lirongqing@baidu.com Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tobin C. Harding
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16cb0ec75b |
slab: use slab_list instead of lru
Currently we use the page->lru list for maintaining lists of slabs. We have a list in the page structure (slab_list) that can be used for this purpose. Doing so makes the code cleaner since we are not overloading the lru list. Use the slab_list instead of the lru list for maintaining lists of slabs. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190402230545.2929-7-tobin@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
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8f14772703 |
Merge branch 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 irq updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Here are the main changes in this tree:
- Introduce x86-64 IRQ/exception/debug stack guard pages to detect
stack overflows immediately and deterministically.
- Clean up over a decade worth of cruft accumulated.
The outcome of this should be more clear-cut faults/crashes when any
of the low level x86 CPU stacks overflow, instead of silent memory
corruption and sporadic failures much later on"
* 'x86-irq-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (33 commits)
x86/irq: Fix outdated comments
x86/irq/64: Remove stack overflow debug code
x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages
x86/irq/64: Split the IRQ stack into its own pages
x86/irq/64: Init hardirq_stack_ptr during CPU hotplug
x86/irq/32: Handle irq stack allocation failure proper
x86/irq/32: Invoke irq_ctx_init() from init_IRQ()
x86/irq/64: Rename irq_stack_ptr to hardirq_stack_ptr
x86/irq/32: Rename hard/softirq_stack to hard/softirq_stack_ptr
x86/irq/32: Make irq stack a character array
x86/irq/32: Define IRQ_STACK_SIZE
x86/dumpstack/64: Speedup in_exception_stack()
x86/exceptions: Split debug IST stack
x86/exceptions: Enable IST guard pages
x86/exceptions: Disconnect IST index and stack order
x86/cpu: Remove orig_ist array
x86/cpu: Prepare TSS.IST setup for guard pages
x86/dumpstack/64: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
x86/irq/64: Use cpu entry area instead of orig_ist
x86/traps: Use cpu_entry_area instead of orig_ist
...
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Qian Cai
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1a62b18d51 |
slab: store tagged freelist for off-slab slabmgmt
Commit |
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Qian Cai
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80552f0f7a |
mm/slab: Remove store_stackinfo()
store_stackinfo() does not seem used in actual SLAB debugging. Potentially, it could be added to check_poison_obj() to provide more information but this seems like an overkill due to the declining popularity of SLAB, so just remove it instead. Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: rientjes@google.com Cc: sean.j.christopherson@intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190416142258.18694-1-cai@lca.pw |
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Qian Cai
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fcf88917dd |
slab: fix a crash by reading /proc/slab_allocators
The commit |
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Nicolas Boichat
|
6d6ea1e967 |
mm: add support for kmem caches in DMA32 zone
Patch series "iommu/io-pgtable-arm-v7s: Use DMA32 zone for page tables",
v6.
This is a followup to the discussion in [1], [2].
IOMMUs using ARMv7 short-descriptor format require page tables (level 1
and 2) to be allocated within the first 4GB of RAM, even on 64-bit
systems.
For L1 tables that are bigger than a page, we can just use
__get_free_pages with GFP_DMA32 (on arm64 systems only, arm would still
use GFP_DMA).
For L2 tables that only take 1KB, it would be a waste to allocate a full
page, so we considered 3 approaches:
1. This series, adding support for GFP_DMA32 slab caches.
2. genalloc, which requires pre-allocating the maximum number of L2 page
tables (4096, so 4MB of memory).
3. page_frag, which is not very memory-efficient as it is unable to reuse
freed fragments until the whole page is freed. [3]
This series is the most memory-efficient approach.
stable@ note:
We confirmed that this is a regression, and IOMMU errors happen on 4.19
and linux-next/master on MT8173 (elm, Acer Chromebook R13). The issue
most likely starts from commit
|
||
Mike Rapoport
|
a862f68a8b |
docs/core-api/mm: fix return value descriptions in mm/
Many kernel-doc comments in mm/ have the return value descriptions either misformatted or omitted at all which makes kernel-doc script unhappy: $ make V=1 htmldocs ... ./mm/util.c:36: info: Scanning doc for kstrdup ./mm/util.c:41: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrdup' ./mm/util.c:57: info: Scanning doc for kstrdup_const ./mm/util.c:66: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrdup_const' ./mm/util.c:75: info: Scanning doc for kstrndup ./mm/util.c:83: warning: No description found for return value of 'kstrndup' ... Fixing the formatting and adding the missing return value descriptions eliminates ~100 such warnings. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1549549644-4903-4-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Alexey Dobriyan
|
b9726c26dc |
numa: make "nr_node_ids" unsigned int
Number of NUMA nodes can't be negative. This saves a few bytes on x86_64: add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 4/21 up/down: 27/-265 (-238) Function old new delta hv_synic_alloc.cold 88 110 +22 prealloc_shrinker 260 262 +2 bootstrap 249 251 +2 sched_init_numa 1566 1567 +1 show_slab_objects 778 777 -1 s_show 1201 1200 -1 kmem_cache_init 346 345 -1 __alloc_workqueue_key 1146 1145 -1 mem_cgroup_css_alloc 1614 1612 -2 __do_sys_swapon 4702 4699 -3 __list_lru_init 655 651 -4 nic_probe 2379 2374 -5 store_user_store 118 111 -7 red_zone_store 106 99 -7 poison_store 106 99 -7 wq_numa_init 348 338 -10 __kmem_cache_empty 75 65 -10 task_numa_free 186 173 -13 merge_across_nodes_store 351 336 -15 irq_create_affinity_masks 1261 1246 -15 do_numa_crng_init 343 321 -22 task_numa_fault 4760 4737 -23 swapfile_init 179 156 -23 hv_synic_alloc 536 492 -44 apply_wqattrs_prepare 746 695 -51 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190201223029.GA15820@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Qian Cai
|
92d1d07daa |
mm/slab.c: kmemleak no scan alien caches
Kmemleak throws endless warnings during boot due to in
__alloc_alien_cache(),
alc = kmalloc_node(memsize, gfp, node);
init_arraycache(&alc->ac, entries, batch);
kmemleak_no_scan(ac);
Kmemleak does not track the array cache (alc->ac) but the alien cache
(alc) instead, so let it track the latter by lifting kmemleak_no_scan()
out of init_arraycache().
There is another place that calls init_arraycache(), but
alloc_kmem_cache_cpus() uses the percpu allocation where will never be
considered as a leak.
kmemleak: Found object by alias at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38
CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
lookup_object+0x84/0xac
find_and_get_object+0x84/0xe4
kmemleak_no_scan+0x74/0xf4
setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
__do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
__kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
create_cache+0xc0/0x198
kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
kernel_init+0x18/0x124
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
kmemleak: Object 0xffff8007b9aa7e00 (size 256):
kmemleak: comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294697137
kmemleak: min_count = 1
kmemleak: count = 0
kmemleak: flags = 0x1
kmemleak: checksum = 0
kmemleak: backtrace:
kmemleak_alloc+0x84/0xb8
kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x31c/0x3a0
__kmalloc_node+0x58/0x78
setup_kmem_cache_node+0x26c/0x35c
__do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
__kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
create_cache+0xc0/0x198
kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
kernel_init+0x18/0x124
kmemleak: Not scanning unknown object at 0xffff8007b9aa7e38
CPU: 190 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #2
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x168
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack+0x88/0xb0
kmemleak_no_scan+0x90/0xf4
setup_kmem_cache_node+0x2b4/0x35c
__do_tune_cpucache+0x250/0x2d4
do_tune_cpucache+0x4c/0xe4
enable_cpucache+0xc8/0x110
setup_cpu_cache+0x40/0x1b8
__kmem_cache_create+0x240/0x358
create_cache+0xc0/0x198
kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x158/0x20c
kmem_cache_create+0x50/0x64
fsnotify_init+0x58/0x6c
do_one_initcall+0x194/0x388
kernel_init_freeable+0x668/0x688
kernel_init+0x18/0x124
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190129184518.39808-1-cai@lca.pw
Fixes:
|
||
Andrey Konovalov
|
557ea25383 |
kasan, slab: remove redundant kasan_slab_alloc hooks
kasan_slab_alloc() calls in kmem_cache_alloc() and kmem_cache_alloc_node() are redundant as they are already called via slab_alloc/slab_alloc_node()-> slab_post_alloc_hook()->kasan_slab_alloc(). Remove them. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4ca1655cdcfc4379c49c50f7bf80f81c4ad01485.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Andrey Konovalov
|
51dedad06b |
kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags
Similarly to "kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before page_address", move kasan_poison_slab() before alloc_slabmgmt(), which calls page_address(), to make page_address() return value to be non-tagged. This, combined with calling kasan_reset_tag() for off-slab slab management object, leads to freelist being stored non-tagged. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/dfb53b44a4d00de3879a05a9f04c1f55e584f7a1.1550602886.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Andrey Konovalov
|
219667c23c |
kasan, slab: fix conflicts with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
Similarly to commit
|
||
Christoph Lameter
|
09c2e76ed7 |
slab: alien caches must not be initialized if the allocation of the alien cache failed
Callers of __alloc_alien() check for NULL. We must do the same check in __alloc_alien_cache to avoid NULL pointer dereferences on allocation failures. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/010001680f42f192-82b4e12e-1565-4ee0-ae1f-1e98974906aa-000000@email.amazonses.com Fixes: |
||
Arun KS
|
ca79b0c211 |
mm: convert totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages variables to atomic
totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function. Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating things. It was discussed in length here, https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org> Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Andrey Konovalov
|
2813b9c029 |
kasan, mm, arm64: tag non slab memory allocated via pagealloc
Tag-based KASAN doesn't check memory accesses through pointers tagged with 0xff. When page_address is used to get pointer to memory that corresponds to some page, the tag of the resulting pointer gets set to 0xff, even though the allocated memory might have been tagged differently. For slab pages it's impossible to recover the correct tag to return from page_address, since the page might contain multiple slab objects tagged with different values, and we can't know in advance which one of them is going to get accessed. For non slab pages however, we can recover the tag in page_address, since the whole page was marked with the same tag. This patch adds tagging to non slab memory allocated with pagealloc. To set the tag of the pointer returned from page_address, the tag gets stored to page->flags when the memory gets allocated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d758ddcef46a5abc9970182b9137e2fbee202a2c.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
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Andrey Konovalov
|
5b7c414822 |
mm: move obj_to_index to include/linux/slab_def.h
While with SLUB we can actually preassign tags for caches with contructors and store them in pointers in the freelist, SLAB doesn't allow that since the freelist is stored as an array of indexes, so there are no pointers to store the tags. Instead we compute the tag twice, once when a slab is created before calling the constructor and then again each time when an object is allocated with kmalloc. Tag is computed simply by taking the lowest byte of the index that corresponds to the object. However in kasan_kmalloc we only have access to the objects pointer, so we need a way to find out which index this object corresponds to. This patch moves obj_to_index from slab.c to include/linux/slab_def.h to be reused by KASAN. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c02cd9e574cfd93858e43ac94b05e38f891fef64.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
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Andrey Konovalov
|
4d176711ea |
kasan: preassign tags to objects with ctors or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
An object constructor can initialize pointers within this objects based on the address of the object. Since the object address might be tagged, we need to assign a tag before calling constructor. The implemented approach is to assign tags to objects with constructors when a slab is allocated and call constructors once as usual. The downside is that such object would always have the same tag when it is reallocated, so we won't catch use-after-frees on it. Also pressign tags for objects from SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU caches, since they can be validy accessed after having been freed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f158a8a74a031d66f0a9398a5b0ed453c37ba09a.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
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Andrey Konovalov
|
0116523cff |
kasan, mm: change hooks signatures
Patch series "kasan: add software tag-based mode for arm64", v13. This patchset adds a new software tag-based mode to KASAN [1]. (Initially this mode was called KHWASAN, but it got renamed, see the naming rationale at the end of this section). The plan is to implement HWASan [2] for the kernel with the incentive, that it's going to have comparable to KASAN performance, but in the same time consume much less memory, trading that off for somewhat imprecise bug detection and being supported only for arm64. The underlying ideas of the approach used by software tag-based KASAN are: 1. By using the Top Byte Ignore (TBI) arm64 CPU feature, we can store pointer tags in the top byte of each kernel pointer. 2. Using shadow memory, we can store memory tags for each chunk of kernel memory. 3. On each memory allocation, we can generate a random tag, embed it into the returned pointer and set the memory tags that correspond to this chunk of memory to the same value. 4. By using compiler instrumentation, before each memory access we can add a check that the pointer tag matches the tag of the memory that is being accessed. 5. On a tag mismatch we report an error. With this patchset the existing KASAN mode gets renamed to generic KASAN, with the word "generic" meaning that the implementation can be supported by any architecture as it is purely software. The new mode this patchset adds is called software tag-based KASAN. The word "tag-based" refers to the fact that this mode uses tags embedded into the top byte of kernel pointers and the TBI arm64 CPU feature that allows to dereference such pointers. The word "software" here means that shadow memory manipulation and tag checking on pointer dereference is done in software. As it is the only tag-based implementation right now, "software tag-based" KASAN is sometimes referred to as simply "tag-based" in this patchset. A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would use hardware memory tagging support (announced by Arm [3]) instead of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation. Same as generic KASAN, software tag-based KASAN is strictly a debugging feature. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html [2] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [3] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a ====== Rationale On mobile devices generic KASAN's memory usage is significant problem. One of the main reasons to have tag-based KASAN is to be able to perform a similar set of checks as the generic one does, but with lower memory requirements. Comment from Vishwath Mohan <vishwath@google.com>: I don't have data on-hand, but anecdotally both ASAN and KASAN have proven problematic to enable for environments that don't tolerate the increased memory pressure well. This includes (a) Low-memory form factors - Wear, TV, Things, lower-tier phones like Go, (c) Connected components like Pixel's visual core [1]. These are both places I'd love to have a low(er) memory footprint option at my disposal. Comment from Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>: Looking at a live Android device under load, slab (according to /proc/meminfo) + kernel stack take 8-10% available RAM (~350MB). KASAN's overhead of 2x - 3x on top of it is not insignificant. Not having this overhead enables near-production use - ex. running KASAN/KHWASAN kernel on a personal, daily-use device to catch bugs that do not reproduce in test configuration. These are the ones that often cost the most engineering time to track down. CPU overhead is bad, but generally tolerable. RAM is critical, in our experience. Once it gets low enough, OOM-killer makes your life miserable. [1] https://www.blog.google/products/pixel/pixel-visual-core-image-processing-and-machine-learning-pixel-2/ ====== Technical details Software tag-based KASAN mode is implemented in a very similar way to the generic one. This patchset essentially does the following: 1. TCR_TBI1 is set to enable Top Byte Ignore. 2. Shadow memory is used (with a different scale, 1:16, so each shadow byte corresponds to 16 bytes of kernel memory) to store memory tags. 3. All slab objects are aligned to shadow scale, which is 16 bytes. 4. All pointers returned from the slab allocator are tagged with a random tag and the corresponding shadow memory is poisoned with the same value. 5. Compiler instrumentation is used to insert tag checks. Either by calling callbacks or by inlining them (CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE flags are reused). 6. When a tag mismatch is detected in callback instrumentation mode KASAN simply prints a bug report. In case of inline instrumentation, clang inserts a brk instruction, and KASAN has it's own brk handler, which reports the bug. 7. The memory in between slab objects is marked with a reserved tag, and acts as a redzone. 8. When a slab object is freed it's marked with a reserved tag. Bug detection is imprecise for two reasons: 1. We won't catch some small out-of-bounds accesses, that fall into the same shadow cell, as the last byte of a slab object. 2. We only have 1 byte to store tags, which means we have a 1/256 probability of a tag match for an incorrect access (actually even slightly less due to reserved tag values). Despite that there's a particular type of bugs that tag-based KASAN can detect compared to generic KASAN: use-after-free after the object has been allocated by someone else. ====== Testing Some kernel developers voiced a concern that changing the top byte of kernel pointers may lead to subtle bugs that are difficult to discover. To address this concern deliberate testing has been performed. It doesn't seem feasible to do some kind of static checking to find potential issues with pointer tagging, so a dynamic approach was taken. All pointer comparisons/subtractions have been instrumented in an LLVM compiler pass and a kernel module that would print a bug report whenever two pointers with different tags are being compared/subtracted (ignoring comparisons with NULL pointers and with pointers obtained by casting an error code to a pointer type) has been used. Then the kernel has been booted in QEMU and on an Odroid C2 board and syzkaller has been run. This yielded the following results. The two places that look interesting are: is_vmalloc_addr in include/linux/mm.h is_kernel_rodata in mm/util.c Here we compare a pointer with some fixed untagged values to make sure that the pointer lies in a particular part of the kernel address space. Since tag-based KASAN doesn't add tags to pointers that belong to rodata or vmalloc regions, this should work as is. To make sure debug checks to those two functions that check that the result doesn't change whether we operate on pointers with or without untagging has been added. A few other cases that don't look that interesting: Comparing pointers to achieve unique sorting order of pointee objects (e.g. sorting locks addresses before performing a double lock): tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c pipe_double_lock in fs/pipe.c unix_state_double_lock in net/unix/af_unix.c lock_two_nondirectories in fs/inode.c mutex_lock_double in kernel/events/core.c ep_cmp_ffd in fs/eventpoll.c fsnotify_compare_groups fs/notify/mark.c Nothing needs to be done here, since the tags embedded into pointers don't change, so the sorting order would still be unique. Checks that a pointer belongs to some particular allocation: is_sibling_entry in lib/radix-tree.c object_is_on_stack in include/linux/sched/task_stack.h Nothing needs to be done here either, since two pointers can only belong to the same allocation if they have the same tag. Overall, since the kernel boots and works, there are no critical bugs. As for the rest, the traditional kernel testing way (use until fails) is the only one that looks feasible. Another point here is that tag-based KASAN is available under a separate config option that needs to be deliberately enabled. Even though it might be used in a "near-production" environment to find bugs that are not found during fuzzing or running tests, it is still a debug tool. ====== Benchmarks The following numbers were collected on Odroid C2 board. Both generic and tag-based KASAN were used in inline instrumentation mode. Boot time [1]: * ~1.7 sec for clean kernel * ~5.0 sec for generic KASAN * ~5.0 sec for tag-based KASAN Network performance [2]: * 8.33 Gbits/sec for clean kernel * 3.17 Gbits/sec for generic KASAN * 2.85 Gbits/sec for tag-based KASAN Slab memory usage after boot [3]: * ~40 kb for clean kernel * ~105 kb (~260% overhead) for generic KASAN * ~47 kb (~20% overhead) for tag-based KASAN KASAN memory overhead consists of three main parts: 1. Increased slab memory usage due to redzones. 2. Shadow memory (the whole reserved once during boot). 3. Quaratine (grows gradually until some preset limit; the more the limit, the more the chance to detect a use-after-free). Comparing tag-based vs generic KASAN for each of these points: 1. 20% vs 260% overhead. 2. 1/16th vs 1/8th of physical memory. 3. Tag-based KASAN doesn't require quarantine. [1] Time before the ext4 driver is initialized. [2] Measured as `iperf -s & iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -t 30`. [3] Measured as `cat /proc/meminfo | grep Slab`. ====== Some notes A few notes: 1. The patchset can be found here: https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype/tree/khwasan 2. Building requires a recent Clang version (7.0.0 or later). 3. Stack instrumentation is not supported yet and will be added later. This patch (of 25): Tag-based KASAN changes the value of the top byte of pointers returned from the kernel allocation functions (such as kmalloc). This patch updates KASAN hooks signatures and their usage in SLAB and SLUB code to reflect that. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aec2b5e3973781ff8a6bb6760f8543643202c451.1544099024.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Paul E. McKenney
|
6564a25e6c |
slab: Replace synchronize_sched() with synchronize_rcu()
Now that synchronize_rcu() waits for preempt-disable regions of code as well as RCU read-side critical sections, synchronize_sched() can be replaced by synchronize_rcu(). This commit therefore makes this change. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> |
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Vlastimil Babka
|
cc252eae85 |
mm, slab: combine kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches
Patch series "kmalloc-reclaimable caches", v4. As discussed at LSF/MM [1] here's a patchset that introduces kmalloc-reclaimable caches (more details in the second patch) and uses them for dcache external names. That allows us to repurpose the NR_INDIRECTLY_RECLAIMABLE_BYTES counter later in the series. With patch 3/6, dcache external names are allocated from kmalloc-rcl-* caches, eliminating the need for manual accounting. More importantly, it also ensures the reclaimable kmalloc allocations are grouped in pages separate from the regular kmalloc allocations. The need for proper accounting of dcache external names has shown it's easy for misbehaving process to allocate lots of them, causing premature OOMs. Without the added grouping, it's likely that a similar workload can interleave the dcache external names allocations with regular kmalloc allocations (note: I haven't searched myself for an example of such regular kmalloc allocation, but I would be very surprised if there wasn't some). A pathological case would be e.g. one 64byte regular allocations with 63 external dcache names in a page (64x64=4096), which means the page is not freed even after reclaiming after all dcache names, and the process can thus "steal" the whole page with single 64byte allocation. If other kmalloc users similar to dcache external names become identified, they can also benefit from the new functionality simply by adding __GFP_RECLAIMABLE to the kmalloc calls. Side benefits of the patchset (that could be also merged separately) include removed branch for detecting __GFP_DMA kmalloc(), and shortening kmalloc cache names in /proc/slabinfo output. The latter is potentially an ABI break in case there are tools parsing the names and expecting the values to be in bytes. This is how /proc/slabinfo looks like after booting in virtme: ... kmalloc-rcl-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... kmalloc-rcl-96 7 32 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 1 1 0 kmalloc-rcl-64 25 128 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 2 2 0 kmalloc-rcl-32 0 0 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-4M 0 0 4194304 1 1024 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-2M 0 0 2097152 1 512 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 kmalloc-1M 0 0 1048576 1 256 : tunables 1 1 0 : slabdata 0 0 0 ... /proc/vmstat with renamed nr_indirectly_reclaimable_bytes counter: ... nr_slab_reclaimable 2817 nr_slab_unreclaimable 1781 ... nr_kernel_misc_reclaimable 0 ... /proc/meminfo with new KReclaimable counter: ... Shmem: 564 kB KReclaimable: 11260 kB Slab: 18368 kB SReclaimable: 11260 kB SUnreclaim: 7108 kB KernelStack: 1248 kB ... This patch (of 6): The kmalloc caches currently mainain separate (optional) array kmalloc_dma_caches for __GFP_DMA allocations. There are tests for __GFP_DMA in the allocation hotpaths. We can avoid the branches by combining kmalloc_caches and kmalloc_dma_caches into a single two-dimensional array where the outer dimension is cache "type". This will also allow to add kmalloc-reclaimable caches as a third type. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180731090649.16028-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Dmitry Vyukov
|
61448479a9 |
mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab
Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, instead it falls back to kmalloc_large(). For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for over-sized allocations. This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for over-sized allocations for slab. Returning NULL for failed allocations is the expected behavior. Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab(). While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab(). We should check against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. It all kinda worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab(). But if we get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will happen. For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code. Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size > 192 case. This partially compensates for the additional check in slab code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically). Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check. This warning means a bug in slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it. Nothing of this affects slob. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180927171502.226522-1-dvyukov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot+87829a10073277282ad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+ef4e8fc3a06e9019bb40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6e438f4036df52cbb863@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8574471d8734457d98aa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+af1504df0807a083dbd9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Kees Cook
|
6396bb2215 |
treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kzalloc(a * b, gfp)
with:
kcalloc(a * b, gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)
with:
kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
||
Matthew Wilcox
|
bf68c214df |
slab,slub: remove rcu_head size checks
rcu_head may now grow larger than list_head without affecting slab or slub. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180518194519.3820-15-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Matthew Wilcox
|
128227e7fe |
slab: __GFP_ZERO is incompatible with a constructor
__GFP_ZERO requests that the object be initialised to all-zeroes, while
the purpose of a constructor is to initialise an object to a particular
pattern. We cannot do both. Add a warning to catch any users who
mistakenly pass a __GFP_ZERO flag when allocating a slab with a
constructor.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180412191322.GA21205@bombadil.infradead.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Vlastimil Babka
|
a9f2a846f0 |
mm, slab: reschedule cache_reap() on the same CPU
cache_reap() is initially scheduled in start_cpu_timer() via schedule_delayed_work_on(). But then the next iterations are scheduled via schedule_delayed_work(), i.e. using WORK_CPU_UNBOUND. Thus since commit |
||
Shakeel Butt
|
f9e13c0a5a |
slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()
The kasan quarantine is designed to delay freeing slab objects to catch
use-after-free. The quarantine can be large (several percent of machine
memory size). When kmem_caches are deleted related objects are flushed
from the quarantine but this requires scanning the entire quarantine
which can be very slow. We have seen the kernel busily working on this
while holding slab_mutex and badly affecting cache_reaper, slabinfo
readers and memcg kmem cache creations.
It can easily reproduced by following script:
yes . | head -1000000 | xargs stat > /dev/null
for i in `seq 1 10`; do
seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs mkdir)
seq 500 | xargs -I{} sh -c 'echo $BASHPID > \
/cg/memory/{}/tasks && exec stat .' > /dev/null
seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs rmdir)
done
The busy stack:
kasan_cache_shutdown
shutdown_cache
memcg_destroy_kmem_caches
mem_cgroup_css_free
css_free_rwork_fn
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
ret_from_fork
This patch is based on the observation that if the kmem_cache to be
destroyed is empty then there should not be any objects of this cache in
the quarantine.
Without the patch the script got stuck for couple of hours. With the
patch the script completed within a second.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327230603.54721-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||
|
Alexey Dobriyan
|
be4a7988b3 |
kasan: make kasan_cache_create() work with 32-bit slab cache sizes
If SLAB doesn't support 4GB+ kmem caches (it never did), KASAN should not do it as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-20-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Alexey Dobriyan
|
0293d1fdd6 |
slab: make kmem_cache_flags accept 32-bit object size
Now that all sizes are properly typed, propagate "unsigned int" down the callgraph. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-19-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Alexey Dobriyan
|
f4957d5bd0 |
slab: make kmem_cache_create() work with 32-bit sizes
struct kmem_cache::size and ::align were always 32-bit. Out of curiosity I created 4GB kmem_cache, it oopsed with division by 0. kmem_cache_create(1UL<<32+1) created 1-byte cache as expected. size_t doesn't work and never did. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-6-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Shakeel Butt
|
880cd276df |
mm, slab: memcg_link the SLAB's kmem_cache
All the root caches are linked into slab_root_caches which was introduced by the commit |
||
|
Dmitry Vyukov
|
ee3ce779b5 |
kasan: don't use __builtin_return_address(1)
__builtin_return_address(1) is unreliable without frame pointers. With defconfig on kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free test I am getting: BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in (null) Pass caller PC from callers explicitly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b01bc2d237a4df74ff8472a3bf6b7635908de01.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
617aebe6a9 |
Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> iQIcBAABCgAGBQJabvleAAoJEIly9N/cbcAmO1kQAJnjVPutnLSbnUteZxtsv7W4 43Cggvokfxr6l08Yh3hUowNxZVKjhF9uwMVgRRg9Nl5WdYCN+vCQbHz+ZdzGJXKq cGqdKWgexMKX+aBdNDrK7BphUeD46sH7JWR+a/lDV/BgPxBCm9i5ZZCgXbPP89AZ NpLBji7gz49wMsnm/x135xtNlZ3dG0oKETzi7MiR+NtKtUGvoIszSKy5JdPZ4m8q 9fnXmHqmwM6uQFuzDJPt1o+D1fusTuYnjI7EgyrJRRhQ+BB3qEFZApXnKNDRS9Dm uB7jtcwefJCjlZVCf2+PWTOEifH2WFZXLPFlC8f44jK6iRW2Nc+wVRisJ3vSNBG1 gaRUe/FSge68eyfQj5OFiwM/2099MNkKdZ0fSOjEBeubQpiFChjgWgcOXa5Bhlrr C4CIhFV2qg/tOuHDAF+Q5S96oZkaTy5qcEEwhBSW15ySDUaRWFSrtboNt6ZVOhug d8JJvDCQWoNu1IQozcbv6xW/Rk7miy8c0INZ4q33YUvIZpH862+vgDWfTJ73Zy9H jR/8eG6t3kFHKS1vWdKZzOX1bEcnd02CGElFnFYUEewKoV7ZeeLsYX7zodyUAKyi Yp5CImsDbWWTsptBg6h9nt2TseXTxYCt2bbmpJcqzsqSCUwOQNQ4/YpuzLeG0ihc JgOmUnQNJWCTwUUw5AS1 =tzmJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook: "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage" * tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits) lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache ... |
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Oscar Salvador
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84ebb5827d |
mm/slab.c: remove redundant assignments for slab_state
slab_state is being set to "UP" in create_kmalloc_caches(), and later on we set it again in kmem_cache_init_late(), but slab_state does not change in the meantime. Remove the redundant assignment from kmem_cache_init_late(). And unless I overlooked anything, the same goes for "slab_state = FULL". slab_state is set to "FULL" in kmem_cache_init_late(), but it is later being set again in cpucache_init(), which gets called from do_initcall_level(). So remove the assignment from cpucache_init() as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215134452.GA1920@techadventures.net Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@techadventures.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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David Windsor
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6c0c21adc7 |
usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches as whitelisted. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> |
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Kees Cook
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2d891fbc3b |
usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
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Kees Cook
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afcc90f862 |
usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's defined usercopy region. Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor. Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
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David Windsor
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8eb8284b41 |
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations
(useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on
my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size
members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a
new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache
with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields
within the objects that get copied to/from userspace.
In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation
as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained
whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed
to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not
copyable to/from userspace.
After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15%
of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs
after a fresh boot:
Total Slab Memory: 48074720
Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2%
task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720
RAW 0.3% 300/96000
RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768
ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224
dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856
mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448
kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576
kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672
kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920
kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768
kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360
names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840
kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936
kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968
kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720
kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616
kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360
kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032
kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200
kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720
After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by
dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%:
Total Slab Memory: 95516184
Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8%
task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000
RAW 0.3% 300/96000
RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768
ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872
dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800
mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264
kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576
kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672
kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208
kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768
kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360
names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840
kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760
kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968
kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720
kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520
kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360
kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624
kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200
kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks]
[kees: add field names to function declarations]
[kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed]
[kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log]
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
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