Files removed in 'net-next' had their license header updated
in 'net'. We take the remove from 'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull initial SPDX identifiers from Greg KH:
"License cleanup: add SPDX license identifiers to some files
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the
'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally
binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate
text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart
and Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset
of the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to
license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied
to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of
the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver)
producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.
Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review
of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537
files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the
scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license
identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any
determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with
the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained
>5 lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that
was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that
became the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected
a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply
(and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases,
confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.
The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in
part, so they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot
checks in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect
the correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial
patch version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch
license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the
applied SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>"
* tag 'spdx_identifiers-4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with a license
License cleanup: add SPDX license identifier to uapi header files with no license
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
the documentation for keyctl_read().
We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior
of the "encrypted" key type.
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.38+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Commit e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer
in keyring_read()") made keyring_read() stop corrupting userspace memory
when the user-supplied buffer is too small. However it also made the
return value in that case be the short buffer size rather than the size
required, yet keyctl_read() is actually documented to return the size
required. Therefore, switch it over to the documented behavior.
Note that for now we continue to have it fill the short buffer, since it
did that before (pre-v3.13) and dump_key_tree_aux() in keyutils arguably
relies on it.
Fixes: e645016abc ("KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read()")
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Several conflicts here.
NFP driver bug fix adding nfp_netdev_is_nfp_repr() check to
nfp_fl_output() needed some adjustments because the code block is in
an else block now.
Parallel additions to net/pkt_cls.h and net/sch_generic.h
A bug fix in __tcp_retransmit_skb() conflicted with some of
the rbtree changes in net-next.
The tc action RCU callback fixes in 'net' had some overlap with some
of the recent tcf_block reworking.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This reverts commit 651e28c553.
This caused a regression:
"The specific problem is that dnsmasq refuses to start on openSUSE Leap
42.2. The specific cause is that and attempt to open a PF_LOCAL socket
gets EACCES. This means that networking doesn't function on a system
with a 4.14-rc2 system."
Sadly, the developers involved seemed to be in denial for several weeks
about this, delaying the revert. This has not been a good release for
the security subsystem, and this area needs to change development
practices.
Reported-and-bisected-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Tracked-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There were quite a few overlapping sets of changes here.
Daniel's bug fix for off-by-ones in the new BPF branch instructions,
along with the added allowances for "data_end > ptr + x" forms
collided with the metadata additions.
Along with those three changes came veritifer test cases, which in
their final form I tried to group together properly. If I had just
trimmed GIT's conflict tags as-is, this would have split up the
meta tests unnecessarily.
In the socketmap code, a set of preemption disabling changes
overlapped with the rename of bpf_compute_data_end() to
bpf_compute_data_pointers().
Changes were made to the mv88e6060.c driver set addr method
which got removed in net-next.
The hyperv transport socket layer had a locking change in 'net'
which overlapped with a change of socket state macro usage
in 'net-next'.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode->i_ib->s_user_ns before
a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we
will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this
by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on
inode.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check")
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
In proc_keys_show(), the key semaphore is not held, so the key ->flags
and ->expiry can be changed concurrently. We therefore should read them
atomically just once.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Similar to the case for key_validate(), we should load the key ->expiry
once atomically in keyring_search_iterator(), since it can be changed
concurrently with the flags whenever the key semaphore isn't held.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In key_validate(), load the flags and expiry time once atomically, since
these can change concurrently if key_validate() is called without the
key semaphore held. And we don't want to get inconsistent results if a
variable is referenced multiple times. For example, key->expiry was
referenced in both 'if (key->expiry)' and in 'if (now.tv_sec >=
key->expiry)', making it theoretically possible to see a spurious
EKEYEXPIRED while the expiration time was being removed, i.e. set to 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Currently, when passed a key that already exists, add_key() will call the
key's ->update() method if such exists. But this is heavily broken in the
case where the key is uninstantiated because it doesn't call
__key_instantiate_and_link(). Consequently, it doesn't do most of the
things that are supposed to happen when the key is instantiated, such as
setting the instantiation state, clearing KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT and
awakening tasks waiting on it, and incrementing key->user->nikeys.
It also never takes key_construction_mutex, which means that
->instantiate() can run concurrently with ->update() on the same key. In
the case of the "user" and "logon" key types this causes a memory leak, at
best. Maybe even worse, the ->update() methods of the "encrypted" and
"trusted" key types actually just dereference a NULL pointer when passed an
uninstantiated key.
Change key_create_or_update() to wait interruptibly for the key to finish
construction before continuing.
This patch only affects *uninstantiated* keys. For now we still allow a
negatively instantiated key to be updated (thereby positively
instantiating it), although that's broken too (the next patch fixes it)
and I'm not sure that anyone actually uses that functionality either.
Here is a simple reproducer for the bug using the "encrypted" key type
(requires CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y), though as noted above the bug
pertained to more than just the "encrypted" key type:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int ringid = keyctl_join_session_keyring(NULL);
if (fork()) {
for (;;) {
const char payload[] = "update user:foo 32";
usleep(rand() % 10000);
add_key("encrypted", "desc", payload, sizeof(payload), ringid);
keyctl_clear(ringid);
}
} else {
for (;;)
request_key("encrypted", "desc", "callout_info", ringid);
}
}
It causes:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
PGD 7a178067 P4D 7a178067 PUD 77269067 PMD 0
PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 340 Comm: reproduce Tainted: G D 4.14.0-rc1-00025-g428490e38b2e #796
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff8a467a39a340 task.stack: ffffb15c40770000
RIP: 0010:encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170
RSP: 0018:ffffb15c40773de8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8a467a275b00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffff8a467a275b14 RDI: ffffffffb742f303
RBP: ffffb15c40773e20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8a467a275b17
R10: 0000000000000020 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a4677057180 R15: ffff8a467a275b0f
FS: 00007f5d7fb08700(0000) GS:ffff8a467f200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000077262005 CR4: 00000000001606f0
Call Trace:
key_create_or_update+0x2bc/0x460
SyS_add_key+0x10c/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f5d7f211259
RSP: 002b:00007ffed03904c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b2a7955 RCX: 00007f5d7f211259
RDX: 00000000004009e4 RSI: 00000000004009ff RDI: 0000000000400a04
RBP: 0000000068db8bad R08: 000000003b2a7955 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: 000000000000001a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400868
R13: 00007ffed03905d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 77 28 e8 64 34 1f 00 45 31 c0 31 c9 48 8d 55 c8 48 89 df 48 8d 75 d0 e8 ff f9 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 0f 88 84 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d c8 <49> 8b 75 18 4c 89 ff e8 24 f8 ff ff 85 c0 41 89 c4 78 6d 49 8b
RIP: encrypted_update+0xb0/0x170 RSP: ffffb15c40773de8
CR2: 0000000000000018
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.12+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b145 ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
The recent rework introduced a possible randconfig build failure
when CONFIG_CRYPTO configured to only allow modules:
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_crypt':
big_key.c:(.text+0x29f): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setkey'
security/keys/big_key.o: In function `big_key_init':
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x1a): undefined reference to `crypto_alloc_aead'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x45): undefined reference to `crypto_aead_setauthsize'
big_key.c:(.init.text+0x77): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `gcm_hash_crypt_remain_continue':
gcm.c:(.text+0x167): undefined reference to `crypto_ahash_finup'
crypto/gcm.o: In function `crypto_gcm_exit_tfm':
gcm.c:(.text+0x847): undefined reference to `crypto_destroy_tfm'
When we 'select CRYPTO' like the other users, we always get a
configuration that builds.
Fixes: 428490e38b ("security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
A key of type "encrypted" references a "master key" which is used to
encrypt and decrypt the encrypted key's payload. However, when we
accessed the master key's payload, we failed to handle the case where
the master key has been revoked, which sets the payload pointer to NULL.
Note that request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.
Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.
This was an issue for master keys of type "user" only. Master keys can
also be of type "trusted", but those cannot be revoked.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.38+]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.
The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.
Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
From David Howells:
"There are two sets of patches here:
(1) A bunch of core keyrings bug fixes from Eric Biggers.
(2) Fixing big_key to use safe crypto from Jason A. Donenfeld."
This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.
It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.
So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:
* Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
guess or predict keys.
* Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
* Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
compare identical plaintext blocks.
* Key re-use.
* Faulty memory zeroing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf6 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again. But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.
Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user. But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16a ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring. But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer. Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key. This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES. But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.
Fixes: 29db919063 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'. Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory. But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped. Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key. (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.
Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke(). key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.
Fixes: b5f545c880 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.
That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and
has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the
description of the return value to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
+ minor cleanups and changes
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
+ Bug Fixes
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is the apparmor pull request, similar to SELinux and seccomp.
It's the same series that I was sent to James' security tree + one
regression fix that was found after the series was sent to James and
would have been sent for v4.14-rc2.
Features:
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
minor cleanups and changes:
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
Bug Fixes:
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix apparmorfs DAC access permissions
apparmor: fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
apparmor: fix incorrect type assignment when freeing proxies
apparmor: ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels
apparmor: cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
apparmor: add mount mediation
apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
apparmor: Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
apparmor: Fix an error code in aafs_create()
apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
The DAC access permissions for several apparmorfs files are wrong.
.access - needs to be writable by all tasks to perform queries
the others in the set only provide a read fn so should be read only.
With policy namespace virtualization all apparmor needs to control
the permission and visibility checks directly which means DAC
access has to be allowed for all user, group, and other.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1713103
Fixes: c97204baf8 ("apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In file included from security/apparmor/ipc.c:23:0:
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: 'SIGSTKFLT' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGSTKFLT] = 16, /* -, 16, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: 'SIGUNUSED' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGUNUSED] = 34, /* -, 31, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes: c6bf1adaecaa ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
sparse reports
poisoning the proxy->label before freeing the struct is resulting in
a sparse build warning.
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: expected struct aa_label [noderef] <asn:4>*label
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: got struct aa_label *<noident>
fix with RCU_INIT_POINTER as this is one of those cases where
rcu_assign_pointer() is not needed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Generally unconfined has early bailout tests and does not need the
dfas initialized, however if an early bailout test is ever missed
it will result in an oops.
Be defensive and initialize the unconfined profile to have null dfas
(no permission) so if an early bailout test is missed we fail
closed (no perms granted) instead of oopsing.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There is a race when null- profile is being created between the
initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the
profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being
added to the list which need to be removed/replaced.
Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns()
so move instead of doing forward fn declarations.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
why an unpack failed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
With apparmor policy virtualization based on policy namespace View's
we don't generally want/need absolute root based views, however there
are cases like debugging and some secid based conversions where
using a root based view is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Add signal mediation where the signal can be mediated based on the
signal, direction, or the label or the peer/target. The signal perms
are verified on a cross check to ensure policy consistency in the case
of incremental policy load/replacement.
The optimization of skipping the cross check when policy is guaranteed
to be consistent (single compile unit) remains to be done.
policy rules have the form of
SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]
[ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]
SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST
SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL
ACCESS ')'
SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' |
'receive' )
SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'
SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALS
SIGNALS = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' |
'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' |
'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' |
'stop' | 'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' |
'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' |
'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32'
)
SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE
eg.
signal, # allow all signals
signal send set=(hup, kill) peer=foo,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
