It is hard to observe packet drops without increasing relevant
drop counters, here we should increase sk->sk_drops which is
a protocol-independent counter. Fortunately psock is always
associated with a struct sock, we can just use psock->sk.
Suggested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-9-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
sk_psock_skb_redirect() only takes skb as a parameter, we
will need to know where this skb is from, so just pass
the source psock to this function as a new parameter.
This patch prepares for the next one.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-8-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Currently sk_psock_verdict_apply() is void, but it handles some
error conditions too. Its caller is impossible to learn whether
it succeeds or fails, especially sk_psock_verdict_recv().
Make it return int to indicate error cases and propagate errors
to callers properly.
Fixes: ef5659280e ("bpf, sockmap: Allow skipping sk_skb parser program")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-7-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
If the dest psock does not set SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED,
the skb can't be queued anywhere so must be dropped.
This one is found during code review.
Fixes: 799aa7f98d ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-6-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
When we drop skb inside sk_psock_skb_redirect(), we have to clear
its skb->_sk_redir pointer too, otherwise kfree_skb() would
misinterpret it as a valid skb->_skb_refdst and dst_release()
would eventually complain.
Fixes: e3526bb92a ("skmsg: Move sk_redir from TCP_SKB_CB to skb")
Reported-by: Jiang Wang <jiang.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-5-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
sk_psock_verdict_recv() clones the skb and uses the clone
afterward, so udp_read_sock() should free the skb after using
it, regardless of error or not.
This fixes a real kmemleak.
Fixes: d7f571188e ("udp: Implement ->read_sock() for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-4-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
I tried to reuse sk_msg_wait_data() for different protocols,
but it turns out it can not be simply reused. For example,
UDP actually uses two queues to receive skb:
udp_sk(sk)->reader_queue and sk->sk_receive_queue. So we have
to check both of them to know whether we have received any
packet.
Also, UDP does not lock the sock during BH Rx path, it makes
no sense for its ->recvmsg() to lock the sock. It is always
possible for ->recvmsg() to be called before packets actually
arrive in the receive queue, we just use best effort to make
it accurate here.
Fixes: 1f5be6b3b0 ("udp: Implement udp_bpf_recvmsg() for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210615021342.7416-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Fix broken Tx ring validation for AF_XDP. The commit under the Fixes
tag, fixed an off-by-one error in the validation but introduced
another error. Descriptors are now let through even if they straddle a
chunk boundary which they are not allowed to do in aligned mode. Worse
is that they are let through even if they straddle the end of the umem
itself, tricking the kernel to read data outside the allowed umem
region which might or might not be mapped at all.
Fix this by reintroducing the old code, but subtract the length by one
to fix the off-by-one error that the original patch was
addressing. The test chunk != chunk_end makes sure packets do not
straddle chunk boundraries. Note that packets of zero length are
allowed in the interface, therefore the test if the length is
non-zero.
Fixes: ac31565c21 ("xsk: Fix for xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_size")
Signed-off-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210618075805.14412-1-magnus.karlsson@gmail.com
While unix_may_send(sk, osk) is called while osk is locked, it appears
unix_release_sock() can overwrite unix_peer() after this lock has been
released, making KCSAN unhappy.
Changing unix_release_sock() to access/change unix_peer()
before lock is released should fix this issue.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_dgram_sendmsg / unix_release_sock
write to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20852 on cpu 1:
unix_release_sock+0x4ed/0x6e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:558
unix_release+0x2f/0x50 net/unix/af_unix.c:859
__sock_release net/socket.c:599 [inline]
sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1258
__fput+0x25b/0x4e0 fs/file_table.c:280
____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x156/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:209
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:302
do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20888 on cpu 0:
unix_may_send net/unix/af_unix.c:189 [inline]
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x923/0x1610 net/unix/af_unix.c:1712
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xffff888167905400 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 20888 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.
KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname
write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
__sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.
KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-5.13-20210616' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can 2021-06-16
this is a pull request of 4 patches for net/master.
The first patch is by Oleksij Rempel and fixes a Use-after-Free found
by syzbot in the j1939 stack.
The next patch is by Tetsuo Handa and fixes hung task detected by
syzbot in the bcm, raw and isotp protocols.
Norbert Slusarek's patch fixes a infoleak in bcm's struct
bcm_msg_head.
Pavel Skripkin's patch fixes a memory leak in the mcba_usb driver.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888101bc4c00 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor527", pid 360, jiffies 4294807421 (age 19.329s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 14 14 bb 00 00 02 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f17c5244>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:558 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:688 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1971 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add_src+0x95f/0xdb0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2095
[<000000001cb99709>] ip_mc_source+0x84c/0xea0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2416
[<0000000052cf19ed>] do_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1294 [inline]
[<0000000052cf19ed>] ip_setsockopt+0x114b/0x30c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1423
[<00000000477edfbc>] raw_setsockopt+0x13d/0x170 net/ipv4/raw.c:857
[<00000000e75ca9bb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x158/0x270 net/socket.c:2117
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2125
[<000000006a1ffdbd>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000b11467c4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In commit 24803f38a5 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set
link down"), the ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() was removed,
because it was also called in igmpv3_clear_delrec().
Rough callgraph:
inetdev_destroy
-> ip_mc_destroy_dev
-> igmpv3_clear_delrec
-> ip_mc_clear_src
-> RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip_ptr, NULL)
However, ip_mc_clear_src() called in igmpv3_clear_delrec() doesn't
release in_dev->mc_list->sources. And RCU_INIT_POINTER() assigns the
NULL to dev->ip_ptr. As a result, in_dev cannot be obtained through
inetdev_by_index() and then in_dev->mc_list->sources cannot be released
by ip_mc_del1_src() in the sock_close. Rough call sequence goes like:
sock_close
-> __sock_release
-> inet_release
-> ip_mc_drop_socket
-> inetdev_by_index
-> ip_mc_leave_src
-> ip_mc_del_src
-> ip_mc_del1_src
So we still need to call ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() to free
in_dev->mc_list->sources.
Fixes: 24803f38a5 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info ...")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengyang Fan <cy.fan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On 64-bit systems, struct bcm_msg_head has an added padding of 4 bytes between
struct members count and ival1. Even though all struct members are initialized,
the 4-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack. This patch zeroes out
struct bcm_msg_head before usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace.
Fixes: ffd980f976 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-7c1b2e82-e34f-4885-8060-2cd7a13769ce-1623532166177@3c-app-gmx-bs52
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
syzbot is reporting hung task at register_netdevice_notifier() [1] and
unregister_netdevice_notifier() [2], for cleanup_net() might perform
time consuming operations while CAN driver's raw/bcm/isotp modules are
calling {register,unregister}_netdevice_notifier() on each socket.
Change raw/bcm/isotp modules to call register_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __init function and call unregister_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __exit function, as with gw/j1939 modules are doing.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391b9498827788b3cc6830226d4ff5be87107c30 [1]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1724d278c83ca6e6df100a2e320c10d991cf2bce [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54a5f451-05ed-f977-8534-79e7aa2bcc8f@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0f1827363a305f74996f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
The function get_net_ns_by_fd() could be inlined when NET_NS is not
enabled.
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When receiving a new connection pchan->conn won't be initialized so the
code cannot use bt_dev_dbg as the pointer to hci_dev won't be
accessible.
Fixes: 2e1614f7d6 ("Bluetooth: SMP: Convert BT_ERR/BT_DBG to bt_dev_err/bt_dev_dbg")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds Read in
qrtr_endpoint_post. The problem was in wrong
_size_ type:
if (len != ALIGN(size, 4) + hdrlen)
goto err;
If size from qrtr_hdr is 4294967293 (0xfffffffd), the result of
ALIGN(size, 4) will be 0. In case of len == hdrlen and size == 4294967293
in header this check won't fail and
skb_put_data(skb, data + hdrlen, size);
will read out of bound from data, which is hdrlen allocated block.
Fixes: 194ccc8829 ("net: qrtr: Support decoding incoming v2 packets")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1917d778024161609247@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Oliver reported a use case where deleting a VRF device can hang
waiting for the refcnt to drop to 0. The root cause is that the dst
is allocated against the VRF device but cached on the loopback
device.
The use case (added to the selftests) has an implicit VRF crossing
due to the ordering of the FIB rules (lookup local is before the
l3mdev rule, but the problem occurs even if the FIB rules are
re-ordered with local after l3mdev because the VRF table does not
have a default route to terminate the lookup). The end result is
is that the FIB lookup returns the loopback device as the nexthop,
but the ingress device is in a VRF. The mismatch causes the dst
alloc against the VRF device but then cached on the loopback.
The fix is to bring the trick used for IPv6 (see ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu):
pick the dst alloc device based the fib lookup result but with checks
that the result has a nexthop device (e.g., not an unreachable or
prohibit entry).
Fixes: f5a0aab84b ("net: ipv4: dst for local input routes should use l3mdev if relevant")
Reported-by: Oliver Herms <oliver.peter.herms@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Outer nest for ETHTOOL_A_STRSET_STRINGSETS is not accounted for.
This may result in ETHTOOL_MSG_STRSET_GET producing a warning like:
calculated message payload length (684) not sufficient
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30967 at net/ethtool/netlink.c:369 ethnl_default_doit+0x87a/0xa20
and a splat.
As usually with such warnings three conditions must be met for the warning
to trigger:
- there must be no skb size rounding up (e.g. reply_size of 684);
- string set must be per-device (so that the header gets populated);
- the device name must be at least 12 characters long.
all in all with current user space it looks like reading priv flags
is the only place this could potentially happen. Or with syzbot :)
Reported-by: syzbot+59aa77b92d06cd5a54f2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 71921690f9 ("ethtool: provide string sets with STRSET_GET request")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit b8392808eb ("sch_cake: add RFC 8622 LE PHB support to CAKE
diffserv handling") added the LE mark to the Bulk tin. Update the
comments to reflect the change.
Signed-off-by: Tyson Moore <tyson@tyson.me>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There is a panic in socket ioctl cmd SIOCGSKNS when NET_NS is not enabled.
The reason is that nsfs tries to access ns->ops but the proc_ns_operations
is not implemented in this case.
[7.670023] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000010
[7.670268] pgd = 32b54000
[7.670544] [00000010] *pgd=00000000
[7.671861] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
[7.672315] Modules linked in:
[7.672918] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-00375-g6799d4f2da49 #16
[7.673309] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[7.673642] PC is at nsfs_evict+0x24/0x30
[7.674486] LR is at clear_inode+0x20/0x9c
The same to tun SIOCGSKNS command.
To fix this problem, we make get_net_ns() return -EINVAL when NET_NS is
disabled. Meanwhile move it to right place net/core/net_namespace.c.
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Fixes: c62cce2cae ("net: add an ioctl to get a socket network namespace")
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
warn_bad_map() produces a kernel WARN on bad input coming
from the network. Use pr_debug() to avoid spamming the system
log.
Additionally, when the right bound check fails, warn_bad_map() reports
the wrong ssn value, let's fix it.
Fixes: 648ef4b886 ("mptcp: Implement MPTCP receive path")
Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently we rely on the subflow->data_avail field, which is subject to
races:
ssk1
skb len = 500 DSS(seq=1, len=1000, off=0)
# data_avail == MPTCP_SUBFLOW_DATA_AVAIL
ssk2
skb len = 500 DSS(seq = 501, len=1000)
# data_avail == MPTCP_SUBFLOW_DATA_AVAIL
ssk1
skb len = 500 DSS(seq = 1, len=1000, off =500)
# still data_avail == MPTCP_SUBFLOW_DATA_AVAIL,
# as the skb is covered by a pre-existing map,
# which was in-sequence at reception time.
Instead we can explicitly check if some has been received in-sequence,
propagating the info from __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow().
Additionally add the 'ONCE' annotation to the 'data_avail' memory
access, as msk will read it outside the subflow socket lock.
Fixes: 648ef4b886 ("mptcp: Implement MPTCP receive path")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If the host is under sever memory pressure, and RX forward
memory allocation for the msk fails, we try to borrow the
required memory from the ingress subflow.
The current attempt is a bit flaky: if skb->truesize is less
than SK_MEM_QUANTUM, the ssk will not release any memory, and
the next schedule will fail again.
Instead, directly move the required amount of pages from the
ssk to the msk, if available
Fixes: 9c3f94e168 ("mptcp: add missing memory scheduling in the rx path")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pablo Neira Ayuso says:
====================
Netfilter fixes for net
The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:
1) Fix a crash when stateful expression with its own gc callback
is used in a set definition.
2) Skip IPv6 packets from any link-local address in IPv6 fib expression.
Add a selftest for this scenario, from Florian Westphal.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The TCP option parser in cake qdisc (cake_get_tcpopt and
cake_tcph_may_drop) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length
is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the
opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads
one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
v2 changes:
Added doff validation in cake_get_tcphdr to avoid parsing garbage as TCP
header. Although it wasn't strictly an out-of-bounds access (memory was
allocated), garbage values could be read where CAKE expected the TCP
header if doff was smaller than 5.
Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8b7138814f ("sch_cake: Add optional ACK filter")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The TCP option parser in mptcp (mptcp_get_options) could read one byte
out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the
loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither
TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the
length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Fixes: cec37a6e41 ("mptcp: Handle MP_CAPABLE options for outgoing connections")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read
one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets
into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is
neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds
the length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
v2 changes:
Added an early return when length < 0 to avoid calling
skb_header_pointer with negative length.
Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 48b1de4c11 ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There is a known race in packet_sendmsg(), addressed
in commit 32d3182cd2 ("net/packet: fix race in tpacket_snd()")
Now we have data_race(), we can use it to avoid a future KCSAN warning,
as syzbot loves stressing af_packet sockets :)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch fixes a tunnel_dst null pointer dereference due to lockless
access in the tunnel egress path. When deleting a vlan tunnel the
tunnel_dst pointer is set to NULL without waiting a grace period (i.e.
while it's still usable) and packets egressing are dereferencing it
without checking. Use READ/WRITE_ONCE to annotate the lockless use of
tunnel_id, use RCU for accessing tunnel_dst and make sure it is read
only once and checked in the egress path. The dst is already properly RCU
protected so we don't need to do anything fancy than to make sure
tunnel_id and tunnel_dst are read only once and checked in the egress path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d039a ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
msg_zerocopy signals if a send operation required copying with a flag
in serr->ee.ee_code.
This field can be incorrect as of the below commit, as a result of
both structs uarg and serr pointing into the same skb->cb[].
uarg->zerocopy must be read before skb->cb[] is reinitialized to hold
serr. Similar to other fields len, hi and lo, use a local variable to
temporarily hold the value.
This was not a problem before, when the value was passed as a function
argument.
Fixes: 75518851a2 ("skbuff: Push status and refcounts into sock_zerocopy_callback")
Reported-by: Talal Ahmad <talalahmad@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This this the counterpart of 8aa7b526dc ("openvswitch: handle DNAT
tuple collision") for act_ct. From that commit changelog:
"""
With multiple DNAT rules it's possible that after destination
translation the resulting tuples collide.
...
Netfilter handles this case by allocating a null binding for SNAT at
egress by default. Perform the same operation in openvswitch for DNAT
if no explicit SNAT is requested by the user and allocate a null binding
for SNAT for packets in the "original" direction.
"""
Fixes: 95219afbb9 ("act_ct: support asymmetric conntrack")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cited commit started returning errors when notification info is not
filled by the bridge driver, resulting in the following regression:
# ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
# bridge vlan add dev br1 vid 555 self pvid untagged
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
As long as the bridge driver does not fill notification info for the
bridge device itself, an empty notification should not be considered as
an error. This is explained in commit 59ccaaaa49 ("bridge: dont send
notification when skb->len == 0 in rtnl_bridge_notify").
Fix by removing the error and add a comment to avoid future bugs.
Fixes: a8db57c1d2 ("rtnetlink: Fix missing error code in rtnl_bridge_notify()")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* fix more fallout from RTNL locking changes
* fixes for some of the bugs found by syzbot
* drop multicast fragments in mac80211 to align
with the spec and what drivers are doing now
* fix NULL-ptr deref in radiotap injection
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Merge tag 'mac80211-for-net-2021-06-09' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jberg/mac80211
Johannes berg says:
====================
A fair number of fixes:
* fix more fallout from RTNL locking changes
* fixes for some of the bugs found by syzbot
* drop multicast fragments in mac80211 to align
with the spec and what drivers are doing now
* fix NULL-ptr deref in radiotap injection
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Kaustubh reported and diagnosed a panic in udp_lib_lookup().
The root cause is udp_abort() racing with close(). Both
racing functions acquire the socket lock, but udp{v6}_destroy_sock()
release it before performing destructive actions.
We can't easily extend the socket lock scope to avoid the race,
instead use the SOCK_DEAD flag to prevent udp_abort from doing
any action when the critical race happens.
Diagnosed-and-tested-by: Kaustubh Pandey <kapandey@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: 5d77dca828 ("net: diag: support SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Both functions are known to be racy when reading inet_num
as we do not want to grab locks for the common case the socket
has been bound already. The race is resolved in inet_autobind()
by reading again inet_num under the socket lock.
syzbot reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet_send_prepare / udp_lib_get_port
write to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24135 on cpu 0:
udp_lib_get_port+0x4b2/0xe20 net/ipv4/udp.c:308
udp_v6_get_port+0x5e/0x70 net/ipv6/udp.c:89
inet_autobind net/ipv4/af_inet.c:183 [inline]
inet_send_prepare+0xd0/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88812cba150e of 2 bytes by task 24132 on cpu 1:
inet_send_prepare+0x21/0x210 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:806
inet6_sendmsg+0x29/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:639
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x9db4
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24132 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Several ethtool functions leave heap uncleared (potentially) by
drivers. This will leave the unused portion of heap unchanged and
might copy the full contents back to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The ip6tables rpfilter match has an extra check to skip packets with
"::" source address.
Extend this to ipv6 fib expression. Else ipv6 duplicate address detection
packets will fail rpf route check -- lookup returns -ENETUNREACH.
While at it, extend the prerouting check to also cover the ingress hook.
Closes: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1543
Fixes: f6d0cbcf09 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add fib expression")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
When reconfiguration fails, we shut down everything, but we
cannot call cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces() with the wiphy
mutex held. Since cfg80211 now calls it on resume errors, we
only need to do likewise for where we call reconfig (whether
directly or indirectly), but not under the wiphy lock.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fe8ef1062 ("cfg80211: change netdev registration/unregistration semantics")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608113226.78233c80f548.Iecc104aceb89f0568f50e9670a9cb191a1c8887b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
When I moved around the code here, I neglected that we could still
call register_netdev() or similar without the wiphy mutex held,
which then calls cfg80211_register_wdev() - that's also done from
cfg80211_register_netdevice(), but the phy80211 symlink creation
was only there. Now, the symlink isn't needed for a *pure* wdev,
but a netdev not registered via cfg80211_register_wdev() should
still have the symlink, so move the creation to the right place.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2fe8ef1062 ("cfg80211: change netdev registration/unregistration semantics")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210608113226.a5dc4c1e488c.Ia42fe663cefe47b0883af78c98f284c5555bbe5d@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Syzbot reported memory leak in rds. The problem
was in unputted refcount in case of error.
int rds_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int msg_flags)
{
...
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
...
}
After this "if" inc refcount incremented and
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg, rs)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
...
out:
return ret;
}
in case of rds_cmsg_recv() fail the refcount won't be
decremented. And it's easy to see from ftrace log, that
rds_inc_addref() don't have rds_inc_put() pair in
rds_recvmsg() after rds_cmsg_recv()
1) | rds_recvmsg() {
1) 3.721 us | rds_inc_addref();
1) 3.853 us | rds_message_inc_copy_to_user();
1) + 10.395 us | rds_cmsg_recv();
1) + 34.260 us | }
Fixes: bdbe6fbc6a ("RDS: recv.c")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5134cdf021c4ed5aaa5f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
