SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware
protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that
are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all
SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
In VMX, the host NMI handler needs to be invoked after NMI VM-Exit.
Before commit 1a5488ef0d ("KVM: VMX: Invoke NMI handler via indirect
call instead of INTn"), this was done by INTn ("int $2"). But INTn
microcode is relatively expensive, so the commit reworked NMI VM-Exit
handling to invoke the kernel handler by function call.
But this missed a detail. The NMI entry point for direct invocation is
fetched from the IDT table and called on the kernel stack. But on 64-bit
the NMI entry installed in the IDT expects to be invoked on the IST stack.
It relies on the "NMI executing" variable on the IST stack to work
correctly, which is at a fixed position in the IST stack. When the entry
point is unexpectedly called on the kernel stack, the RSP-addressed "NMI
executing" variable is obviously also on the kernel stack and is
"uninitialized" and can cause the NMI entry code to run in the wrong way.
Provide a non-ist entry point for VMX which shares the C-function with
the regular NMI entry and invoke the new asm entry point instead.
On 32-bit this just maps to the regular NMI entry point as 32-bit has no
ISTs and is not affected.
[ tglx: Made it independent for backporting, massaged changelog ]
Fixes: 1a5488ef0d ("KVM: VMX: Invoke NMI handler via indirect call instead of INTn")
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87r1imi8i1.ffs@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Lockdep state handling on NMI enter and exit is nothing specific to X86. It's
not any different on other architectures. Also the extra state type is not
necessary, irqentry_state_t can carry the necessary information as well.
Move it to common code and extend irqentry_state_t to carry lockdep state.
[ Ira: Make exit_rcu and lockdep a union as they are mutually exclusive
between the IRQ and NMI exceptions, and add kernel documentation for
struct irqentry_state_t ]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201102205320.1458656-7-ira.weiny@intel.com
called SEV by also encrypting the guest register state, making the
registers inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared between
the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest so
in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init code
needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself, brings
a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early boot code
like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand building of the
identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do not use the EFI
page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly
separate from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and behind
static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others.
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Merge tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 SEV-ES support from Borislav Petkov:
"SEV-ES enhances the current guest memory encryption support called SEV
by also encrypting the guest register state, making the registers
inaccessible to the hypervisor by en-/decrypting them on world
switches. Thus, it adds additional protection to Linux guests against
exfiltration, control flow and rollback attacks.
With SEV-ES, the guest is in full control of what registers the
hypervisor can access. This is provided by a guest-host exchange
mechanism based on a new exception vector called VMM Communication
Exception (#VC), a new instruction called VMGEXIT and a shared
Guest-Host Communication Block which is a decrypted page shared
between the guest and the hypervisor.
Intercepts to the hypervisor become #VC exceptions in an SEV-ES guest
so in order for that exception mechanism to work, the early x86 init
code needed to be made able to handle exceptions, which, in itself,
brings a bunch of very nice cleanups and improvements to the early
boot code like an early page fault handler, allowing for on-demand
building of the identity mapping. With that, !KASLR configurations do
not use the EFI page table anymore but switch to a kernel-controlled
one.
The main part of this series adds the support for that new exchange
mechanism. The goal has been to keep this as much as possibly separate
from the core x86 code by concentrating the machinery in two
SEV-ES-specific files:
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c
Other interaction with core x86 code has been kept at minimum and
behind static keys to minimize the performance impact on !SEV-ES
setups.
Work by Joerg Roedel and Thomas Lendacky and others"
* tag 'x86_seves_for_v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (73 commits)
x86/sev-es: Use GHCB accessor for setting the MMIO scratch buffer
x86/sev-es: Check required CPU features for SEV-ES
x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
x86/sev-es: Handle NMI State
x86/sev-es: Support CPU offline/online
x86/head/64: Don't call verify_cpu() on starting APs
x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
x86/realmode: Setup AP jump table
x86/realmode: Add SEV-ES specific trampoline entry point
x86/vmware: Add VMware-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
x86/kvm: Add KVM-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/paravirt: Allow hypervisor-specific VMMCALL handling under SEV-ES
x86/sev-es: Handle #DB Events
x86/sev-es: Handle #AC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle VMMCALL Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MWAIT/MWAITX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
x86/sev-es: Handle INVD Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDPMC Events
x86/sev-es: Handle RDTSC(P) Events
...
When nmi_check_duration() is checking the time an NMI handler took to
execute, the whole_msecs value used should be read from the @duration
argument, not from the ->max_duration, the latter being used to store
the current maximal duration.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message. ]
Fixes: 248ed51048 ("x86/nmi: Remove irq_work from the long duration NMI handler")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Libing Zhou <libing.zhou@nokia-sbell.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200820025641.44075-1-libing.zhou@nokia-sbell.com
When running under SEV-ES, the kernel has to tell the hypervisor when to
open the NMI window again after an NMI was injected. This is done with
an NMI-complete message to the hypervisor.
Add code to the kernel's NMI handler to send this message right at the
beginning of do_nmi(). This always allows nesting NMIs.
[ bp: Mark __sev_es_nmi_complete() noinstr:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_nmi()+0x17: call to __sev_es_nmi_complete()
leaves .noinstr.text section
While at it, use __pa_nodebug() for the same reason due to
CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __sev_es_nmi_complete()+0xd9: call to __phys_addr()
leaves .noinstr.text section ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-71-joro@8bytes.org
When an NMI hits in the #VC handler entry code before it has switched to
another stack, any subsequent #VC exception in the NMI code-path will
overwrite the interrupted #VC handler's stack.
Make sure this doesn't happen by explicitly adjusting the #VC IST entry
in the NMI handler for the time it can cause #VC exceptions.
[ bp: Touchups, spelling fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-44-joro@8bytes.org
While the nmi_enter() users did
trace_hardirqs_{off_prepare,on_finish}() there was no matching
lockdep_hardirqs_*() calls to complete the picture.
Introduce idtentry_{enter,exit}_nmi() to enable proper IRQ state
tracking across the NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200623083721.216740948@infradead.org
For no reason other than beginning brainmelt, IDTENTRY_NMI was mapped to
IDTENTRY_IST.
This is not a problem on 64bit because the IST default entry point maps to
IDTENTRY_RAW which does not any entry handling. The surplus function
declaration for the noist C entry point is unused and as there is no ASM
code emitted for NMI this went unnoticed.
On 32bit IDTENTRY_IST maps to a regular IDTENTRY which does the normal
entry handling. That is clearly the wrong thing to do for NMI.
Map it to IDTENTRY_RAW to unbreak it. The IDTENTRY_NMI mapping needs to
stay to avoid emitting ASM code.
Fixes: 6271fef00b ("x86/entry: Convert NMI to IDTENTRY_NMI")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Debugged-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+G9fYvF3cyrY+-iw_SZtpN-i2qA2BruHg4M=QYECU2-dNdsMw@mail.gmail.com
The typical pattern for trace_hardirqs_off_prepare() is:
ENTRY
lockdep_hardirqs_off(); // because hardware
... do entry magic
instrumentation_begin();
trace_hardirqs_off_prepare();
... do actual work
trace_hardirqs_on_prepare();
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare();
instrumentation_end();
... do exit magic
lockdep_hardirqs_on();
which shows that it's named wrong, rename it to
trace_hardirqs_off_finish(), as it concludes the hardirq_off transition.
Also, given that the above is the only correct order, make the traditional
all-in-one trace_hardirqs_off() follow suit.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200529213321.415774872@infradead.org
Instead of playing stupid games with IST stacks, fully disallow #DB
during NMIs. There is absolutely no reason to allow them, and killing
this saves a heap of trouble.
#DB is already forbidden on noinstr and CEA, so there can't be a #DB before
this. Disabling it right after nmi_enter() ensures that the full NMI code
is protected.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200529213321.069223695@infradead.org
The last step to remove the irq tracing cruft from ASM. Ignore #DF as the
maschine is going to die anyway.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200521202120.414043330@linutronix.de
Mark all functions in the fragile code parts noinstr or force inlining so
they can't be instrumented.
Also make the hardware latency tracer invocation explicit outside of
non-instrumentable section.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135314.716186134@linutronix.de
Convert #NMI to IDTENTRY_NMI:
- Implement the C entry point with DEFINE_IDTENTRY_NMI
- Fixup the XEN/PV code
- Remove the old prototypes
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200505135314.609932306@linutronix.de
Fix a couple of typos in code comments.
[ bp: While at it: s/IRQ's/IRQs/. ]
Signed-off-by: Martin Molnar <martin.molnar.programming@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0819a044-c360-44a4-f0b6-3f5bafe2d35c@gmail.com
First, printk() is NMI-context safe now since the safe printk() has been
implemented and it already has an irq_work to make NMI-context safe.
Second, this NMI irq_work actually does not work if a NMI handler causes
panic by watchdog timeout. It has no chance to run in such case, while
the safe printk() will flush its per-cpu buffers before panicking.
While at it, repurpose the irq_work callback into a function which
concentrates the NMI duration checking and makes the code easier to
follow.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200111125427.15662-1-changbin.du@gmail.com
In order to support IPI/NMI broadcasting via the shorthand mechanism side
effects of shorthands need to be mitigated:
Shorthand IPIs and NMIs hit all CPUs including unplugged CPUs
Neither of those can be handled on unplugged CPUs for obvious reasons.
It would be trivial to just fully disable the APIC via the enable bit in
MSR_APICBASE. But that's not possible because clearing that bit on systems
based on the 3 wire APIC bus would require a hardware reset to bring it
back as the APIC would lose track of bus arbitration. On systems with FSB
delivery APICBASE could be disabled, but it has to be guaranteed that no
interrupt is sent to the APIC while in that state and it's not clear from
the SDM whether it still responds to INIT/SIPI messages.
Therefore stay on the safe side and switch the APIC into soft disabled mode
so it won't deliver any regular vector to the CPU.
NMIs are still propagated to the 'dead' CPUs. To mitigate that add a check
for the CPU being offline on early nmi entry and if so bail.
Note, this cannot use the stop/restart_nmi() magic which is used in the
alternatives code. A dead CPU cannot invoke nmi_enter() or anything else
due to RCU and other reasons.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907241723290.1791@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pull x86 MDS mitigations from Thomas Gleixner:
"Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a hardware vulnerability
which allows unprivileged speculative access to data which is
available in various CPU internal buffers. This new set of misfeatures
has the following CVEs assigned:
CVE-2018-12126 MSBDS Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12130 MFBDS Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
CVE-2018-12127 MLPDS Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
CVE-2019-11091 MDSUM Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
MDS attacks target microarchitectural buffers which speculatively
forward data under certain conditions. Disclosure gadgets can expose
this data via cache side channels.
Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS
vulnerability does not allow the attacker to control the memory target
address. As a consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but
as demonstrated with the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed
successfully.
The mitigation is to flush the microarchitectural buffers on return to
user space and before entering a VM. It's bolted on the VERW
instruction and requires a microcode update. As some of the attacks
exploit data structures shared between hyperthreads, full protection
requires to disable hyperthreading. The kernel does not do that by
default to avoid breaking unattended updates.
The mitigation set comes with documentation for administrators and a
deeper technical view"
* 'x86-mds-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (23 commits)
x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo
Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values
x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation
x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option
Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation
Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV
x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS
x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry
x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active
x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests
x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY
...
The debug IST stack is actually two separate debug stacks to handle #DB
recursion. This is required because the CPU starts always at top of stack
on exception entry, which means on #DB recursion the second #DB would
overwrite the stack of the first.
The low level entry code therefore adjusts the top of stack on entry so a
secondary #DB starts from a different stack page. But the stack pages are
adjacent without a guard page between them.
Split the debug stack into 3 stacks which are separated by guard pages. The
3rd stack is never mapped into the cpu_entry_area and is only there to
catch triple #DB nesting:
--- top of DB_stack <- Initial stack
--- end of DB_stack
guard page
--- top of DB1_stack <- Top of stack after entering first #DB
--- end of DB1_stack
guard page
--- top of DB2_stack <- Top of stack after entering second #DB
--- end of DB2_stack
guard page
If DB2 would not act as the final guard hole, a second #DB would point the
top of #DB stack to the stack below #DB1 which would be valid and not catch
the not so desired triple nesting.
The backing store does not allocate any memory for DB2 and its guard page
as it is not going to be mapped into the cpu_entry_area.
- Adjust the low level entry code so it adjusts top of #DB with the offset
between the stacks instead of exception stack size.
- Make the dumpstack code aware of the new stacks.
- Adjust the in_debug_stack() implementation and move it into the NMI code
where it belongs. As this is NMI hotpath code, it just checks the full
area between top of DB_stack and bottom of DB1_stack without checking
for the guard page. That's correct because the NMI cannot hit a
stackpointer pointing to the guard page between DB and DB1 stack. Even
if it would, then the NMI operation still is unaffected, but the resume
of the debug exception on the topmost DB stack will crash by touching
the guard page.
[ bp: Make exception_stack_names static const char * const ]
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160145.439944544@linutronix.de
Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.
Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.
For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.
However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:
----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()
// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch
virtual patch
@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)
@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@
- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
register_nmi_handler() can be called from PREEMPT_RT atomic context
(e.g. wakeup_cpu_via_init_nmi() or native_stop_other_cpus()), and thus
ordinary spinlocks cannot be used.
Signed-off-by: Scott Wood <swood@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170724213242.27598-1-swood@redhat.com
Apparently, some machines used to report DRAM errors through a PCI SERR
NMI. This is why we have a call into EDAC in the NMI handler. See
c0d1217202 ("drivers/edac: add new nmi rescan").
From looking at the patch above, that's two drivers: e752x_edac.c and
e7xxx_edac.c. Now, I wanna say those are old machines which are probably
decommissioned already.
Tony says that "[t]the newest CPU supported by either of those drivers
is the Xeon E7520 (a.k.a. "Nehalem") released in Q1'2010. Possibly some
folks are still using these ... but people that hold onto h/w for 7
years generally cling to old s/w too ... so I'd guess it unlikely that
we will get complaints for breaking these in upstream."
So even if there is a small number still in use, we did load EDAC with
edac_op_state == EDAC_OPSTATE_POLL by default (we still do, in fact)
which means a default EDAC setup without any parameters supplied on the
command line or otherwise would never even log the error in the NMI
handler because we're polling by default:
inline int edac_handler_set(void)
{
if (edac_op_state == EDAC_OPSTATE_POLL)
return 0;
return atomic_read(&edac_handlers);
}
So, long story short, I'd like to get rid of that nastiness called
edac_stub.c and confine all the EDAC drivers solely to drivers/edac/. If
we ever have to do stuff like that again, it should be notifiers we're
using and not some insanity like this one.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Remove the WARNING message associated with multiple NMI handlers as
there are at least two that are legitimate. These are the KGDB and the
UV handlers and both want to be called if the NMI has not been claimed
by any other NMI handler.
Use of the UNKNOWN NMI call chain dramatically lowers the NMI call rate
when high frequency NMI tools are in use, notably the perf tools. It is
required on systems that cannot sustain a high NMI call rate without
adversely affecting the system operation.
Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Frank Ramsay <frank.ramsay@hpe.com>
Cc: Tony Ernst <tony.ernst@hpe.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170307210841.730959611@asylum.americas.sgi.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
We are going to split <linux/sched/debug.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/debug.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/clock.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/clock.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
When building random configurations, we now occasionally get a new
build error:
In file included from include/linux/kernel.h:13:0,
from include/linux/list.h:8,
from include/linux/preempt.h:10,
from include/linux/spinlock.h:50,
from arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c:13:
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c: In function 'nmi_max_handler':
include/linux/printk.h:375:9: error: type defaults to 'int' in declaration of 'DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE' [-Werror=implicit-int]
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(_rs, \
^
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c:110:2: note: in expansion of macro 'printk_ratelimited'
printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This was working before the rtc rework series because linux/ratelimit.h
was included implictly through asm/mach_traps.h -> asm/mc146818rtc.h
-> linux/mc146818rtc.h -> linux/rtc.h -> linux/device.h.
We clearly shouldn't rely on this indirect inclusion, so this adds
an explicit #include in the file that needs it.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5ab788d738 ("rtc: cmos: move mc146818rtc code out of asm-generic/rtc.h")
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com>
ignore_nmis is used in two distinct places:
1. modified through {stop,restart}_nmi by alternative_instructions
2. read by do_nmi to determine if default_do_nmi should be called or not
thus the access pattern conforms to __read_mostly and do_nmi() is a fastpath.
Signed-off-by: Kostenzer Felix <fkostenzer@live.at>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Now, multiple CPUs can receive an external NMI simultaneously by
specifying the "apic_extnmi=all" command line parameter. When we take
a crash dump by using external NMI with this option, we fail to save
registers into the crash dump. This happens as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
================================ =============================
receive an external NMI
default_do_nmi() receive an external NMI
spin_lock(&nmi_reason_lock) default_do_nmi()
io_check_error() spin_lock(&nmi_reason_lock)
panic() busy loop
...
kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus()
issue NMI IPI -----------> blocked until IRET
busy loop...
Here, since CPU 1 is in NMI context, an additional NMI from CPU 0
remains unhandled until CPU 1 IRETs. However, CPU 1 will never execute
IRET so the NMI is not handled and the callback function to save
registers is never called.
To solve this issue, we check if the IPI for crash dumping was issued
while waiting for nmi_reason_lock to be released, and if so, call its
callback function directly. If the IPI is not issued (e.g. kdump is
disabled), the actual behavior doesn't change.
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210065245.4587.39316.stgit@softrs
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Currently, kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus(), a subroutine of crash_kexec(),
sends an NMI IPI to CPUs which haven't called panic() to stop them,
save their register information and do some cleanups for crash dumping.
However, if such a CPU is infinitely looping in NMI context, we fail to
save its register information into the crash dump.
For example, this can happen when unknown NMIs are broadcast to all
CPUs as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
=========================== ==========================
receive an unknown NMI
unknown_nmi_error()
panic() receive an unknown NMI
spin_trylock(&panic_lock) unknown_nmi_error()
crash_kexec() panic()
spin_trylock(&panic_lock)
panic_smp_self_stop()
infinite loop
kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus()
issue NMI IPI -----------> blocked until IRET
infinite loop...
Here, since CPU 1 is in NMI context, the second NMI from CPU 0 is
blocked until CPU 1 executes IRET. However, CPU 1 never executes IRET,
so the NMI is not handled and the callback function to save registers is
never called.
In practice, this can happen on some servers which broadcast NMIs to all
CPUs when the NMI button is pushed.
To save registers in this case, we need to:
a) Return from NMI handler instead of looping infinitely
or
b) Call the callback function directly from the infinite loop
Inherently, a) is risky because NMI is also used to prevent corrupted
data from being propagated to devices. So, we chose b).
This patch does the following:
1. Move the infinite looping of CPUs which haven't called panic() in NMI
context (actually done by panic_smp_self_stop()) outside of panic() to
enable us to refer pt_regs. Please note that panic_smp_self_stop() is
still used for normal context.
2. Call a callback of kdump_nmi_shootdown_cpus() directly to save
registers and do some cleanups after setting waiting_for_crash_ipi which
is used for counting down the number of CPUs which handled the callback
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com>
Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014628.25437.75256.stgit@softrs
[ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
If panic on NMI happens just after panic() on the same CPU, panic() is
recursively called. Kernel stalls, as a result, after failing to acquire
panic_lock.
To avoid this problem, don't call panic() in NMI context if we've
already entered panic().
For that, introduce nmi_panic() macro to reduce code duplication. In
the case of panic on NMI, don't return from NMI handlers if another CPU
already panicked.
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Gobinda Charan Maji <gobinda.cemk07@gmail.com>
Cc: HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151210014626.25437.13302.stgit@softrs
[ Cleanup comments, fixup formatting. ]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
It has never had any effect. Remove it for comprehensibility.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c91fa38507760d9e54a4b8737fa6409bde896b33.1437418322.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I found the nested NMI documentation to be difficult to follow.
Improve the comments.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
32-bit kernels handle nested NMIs in C. Enable the exact same
handling on 64-bit kernels as well. This isn't currently
necessary, but it will become necessary once the asm code starts
allowing limited nesting.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro for protecting functions
from kprobes instead of __kprobes annotation under
arch/x86.
This applies nokprobe_inline annotation for some cases,
because NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() will inhibit inlining by
referring the symbol address.
This just folds a bunch of previous NOKPROBE_SYMBOL()
cleanup patches for x86 to one patch.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081814.26341.51656.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fernando Luis Vázquez Cao <fernando_b1@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com>
Cc: Srivatsa Vaddagiri <vatsa@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Calling printk() from NMI context is bad (TM), so move it to IRQ
context.
In doing so we slightly change (probably wreck) the debugfs
nmi_longest_ns thingy, in that it doesn't update to reflect the
longest, nor does writing to it reset the count.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-rdw0au56a5ymis1u8p48c12d@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
OK, so what I'm actually seeing on my WSM is that sched/clock.c is
'broken' for the purpose we're using it for.
What triggered it is that my WSM-EP is broken :-(
[ 0.001000] tsc: Fast TSC calibration using PIT
[ 0.002000] tsc: Detected 2533.715 MHz processor
[ 0.500180] TSC synchronization [CPU#0 -> CPU#6]:
[ 0.505197] Measured 3 cycles TSC warp between CPUs, turning off TSC clock.
[ 0.004000] tsc: Marking TSC unstable due to check_tsc_sync_source failed
For some reason it consistently detects TSC skew, even though NHM+
should have a single clock domain for 'reasonable' systems.
This marks sched_clock_stable=0, which means that we do fancy stuff to
try and get a 'sane' clock. Part of this fancy stuff relies on the tick,
clearly that's gone when NOHZ=y. So for idle cpus time gets stuck, until
it either wakes up or gets kicked by another cpu.
While this is perfectly fine for the scheduler -- it only cares about
actually running stuff, and when we're running stuff we're obviously not
idle. This does somewhat break down for perf which can trigger events
just fine on an otherwise idle cpu.
So I've got NMIs get get 'measured' as taking ~1ms, which actually
don't last nearly that long:
<idle>-0 [013] d.h. 886.311970: rcu_nmi_enter <-do_nmi
...
<idle>-0 [013] d.h. 886.311997: perf_sample_event_took: HERE!!! : 1040990
So ftrace (which uses sched_clock(), not the fancy bits) only sees
~27us, but we measure ~1ms !!
Now since all this measurement stuff lives in x86 code, we can actually
fix it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: mingo@kernel.org
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: eranian@google.com
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: jmario@redhat.com
Cc: acme@infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131017133350.GG3364@laptop.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I completely botched understanding the calling conventions of
do_div(). I assumed that do_div() returned the result instead
of realizing that it modifies its argument and returns a
remainder. The side-effect from this would be bogus numbers
for the "msecs" value in the warning messages:
INFO: NMI handler (perf_event_nmi_handler) took too long to run: 0.114 msecs
Note, there was a second fix posted by Stephane Eranian for
a separate patch which I also botched:
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130704223010.GA30625@quad
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130708214404.B0B6EA66@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch has been invaluable in my adventures finding
issues in the perf NMI handler. I'm as big a fan of
printk() as anybody is, but using printk() in NMIs is
deadly when they're happening frequently.
Even hacking in trace_printk() ended up eating enough
CPU to throw off some of the measurements I was making.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: acme@ghostprotocols.net
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
I have a system which is causing all kinds of problems. It has
8 NUMA nodes, and lots of cores that can fight over cachelines.
If things are not working _perfectly_, then NMIs can take longer
than expected.
If we get too many of them backed up to each other, we can
easily end up in a situation where we are doing nothing *but*
running NMIs. The biggest problem, though, is that this happens
_silently_. You might be lucky to get an hrtimer warning, but
most of the time system simply hangs.
This patch should at least give us some warning before we fall
off the cliff. the warnings look like this:
nmi_handle: perf_event_nmi_handler() took: 26095071 ns
The message is triggered whenever we notice the longest NMI
we've seen to date. You can always view and reset this value
via the debugfs interface if you like.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: paulus@samba.org
Cc: acme@ghostprotocols.net
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Avi Kivity reported that page faults in NMIs could cause havic if
the NMI preempted another page fault handler:
The recent changes to NMI allow exceptions to take place in NMI
handlers, but I think that a #PF (say, due to access to vmalloc space)
is still problematic. Consider the sequence
#PF (cr2 set by processor)
NMI
...
#PF (cr2 clobbered)
do_page_fault()
IRET
...
IRET
do_page_fault()
address = read_cr2()
The last line reads the overwritten cr2 value.
This is the i386 version, which has the luxury of doing the work
in C code.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4FBB8C40.6080304@redhat.com
Reported-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
I've been informed by someone on LWN called 'slashdot' that
some i386 machines do not support a true cmpxchg. The cmpxchg
used by the i386 NMI nesting code must be a true cmpxchg as
disabling interrupts will not work for NMIs (which is the work
around for i386s that do not have a true cmpxchg).
This 'slashdot' character also suggested a fix to the issue.
As the state of the nesting NMIs goes as follows:
NOT_RUNNING -> EXECUTING
EXECUTING -> NOT_RUNNING
EXECUTING -> LATCHED
LATCHED -> EXECUTING
Having these states as enum values of:
NOT_RUNNING = 0
EXECUTING = 1
LATCHED = 2
Instead of a cmpxchg to make EXECUTING -> NOT_RUNNING a
dec_and_test() would work as well. If the dec_and_test brings
the state to NOT_RUNNING, that is the same as a cmpxchg
succeeding to change EXECUTING to NOT_RUNNING. If a nested NMI
were to come in and change it to LATCHED, the dec_and_test() would
convert the state to EXECUTING (what we want it to be in such a
case anyway).
I asked 'slashdot' to post this as a patch, but it never came to
be. I decided to do the work instead.
Thanks to H. Peter Anvin for suggesting to use this_cpu_dec_and_return()
instead of local_dec_and_test(&__get_cpu_var()).
Link: http://lwn.net/Articles/484932/
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
When an NMI goes off and it sees that it preempted the debug stack,
to keep the debug stack safe, it changes the IDT to point to one that
does not modify the stack on breakpoint (to allow breakpoints in NMIs).
But the variable that gets set to know to undo it on exit never gets
cleared on exit. Thus every NMI will reset it on exit the first time
it is done even if it does not need to be reset.
[ Added H. Peter Anvin's suggestion to use this_cpu_read/write ]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.3
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Pull the MCA deletion branch from Paul Gortmaker:
"It was good that we could support MCA machines back in the day, but
realistically, nobody is using them anymore. They were mostly limited
to 386-sx 16MHz CPU and some 486 class machines and never more than
64MB of RAM. Even the enthusiast hobbyist community seems to have
dried up close to ten years ago, based on what you can find searching
various websites dedicated to the relatively short lived hardware.
So lets remove the support relating to CONFIG_MCA. There is no point
carrying this forward, wasting cycles doing routine maintenance on it;
wasting allyesconfig build time on validating it, wasting I/O on git
grep'ping over it, and so on."
Let's see if anybody screams. It generally has compiled, and James
Bottomley pointed out that there was a MCA extension from NCR that
allowed for up to 4GB of memory and PPro-class machines. So in *theory*
there may be users out there.
But even James (technically listed as a maintainer) doesn't actually
have a system, and while Alan Cox claims to have a machine in his cellar
that he offered to anybody who wants to take it off his hands, he didn't
argue for keeping MCA support either.
So we could bring it back. But somebody had better speak up and talk
about how they have actually been using said MCA hardware with modern
kernels for us to do that. And David already took the patch to delete
all the networking driver code (commit a5e371f61a: "drivers/net:
delete all code/drivers depending on CONFIG_MCA").
* 'delete-mca' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/paulg/linux:
MCA: delete all remaining traces of microchannel bus support.
scsi: delete the MCA specific drivers and driver code
serial: delete the MCA specific 8250 support.
arm: remove ability to select CONFIG_MCA
