Commit Graph

199 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Herbert Xu
75b8c13326 [IPSEC]: Fix potential dst leak in xfrm_lookup
If we get an error during the actual policy lookup we don't free the
original dst while the caller expects us to always free the original
dst in case of error.

This patch fixes that.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-11 04:38:08 -08:00
Herbert Xu
5e5234ff17 [IPSEC]: Fix uninitialised dst warning in __xfrm_lookup
Andrew Morton reported that __xfrm_lookup generates this warning:

net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c: In function '__xfrm_lookup':
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1449: warning: 'dst' may be used uninitialized in this function

This is because if policy->action is of an unexpected value then dst will
not be initialised.  Of course, in practice this should never happen since
the input layer xfrm_user/af_key will filter out all illegal values.  But
the compiler doesn't know that of course.

So this patch fixes this by taking the conservative approach and treat all
unknown actions the same as a blocking action.

Thanks to Andrew for finding this and providing an initial fix.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2007-11-30 00:50:31 +11:00
Herbert Xu
13996378e6 [IPSEC]: Rename mode to outer_mode and add inner_mode
This patch adds a new field to xfrm states called inner_mode.  The existing
mode object is renamed to outer_mode.

This is the first part of an attempt to fix inter-family transforms.  As it
is we always use the outer family when determining which mode to use.  As a
result we may end up shoving IPv4 packets into netfilter6 and vice versa.

What we really want is to use the inner family for the first part of outbound
processing and the outer family for the second part.  For inbound processing
we'd use the opposite pairing.

I've also added a check to prevent silly combinations such as transport mode
with inter-family transforms.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-17 21:35:51 -07:00
Herbert Xu
1bfcb10f67 [IPSEC]: Add missing BEET checks
Currently BEET mode does not reinject the packet back into the stack
like tunnel mode does.  Since BEET should behave just like tunnel mode
this is incorrect.

This patch fixes this by introducing a flags field to xfrm_mode that
tells the IPsec code whether it should terminate and reinject the packet
back into the stack.

It then sets the flag for BEET and tunnel mode.

I've also added a number of missing BEET checks elsewhere where we check
whether a given mode is a tunnel or not.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-17 21:31:50 -07:00
Herbert Xu
aa5d62cc87 [IPSEC]: Move type and mode map into xfrm_state.c
The type and mode maps are only used by SAs, not policies.  So it makes
sense to move them from xfrm_policy.c into xfrm_state.c.  This also allows
us to mark xfrm_get_type/xfrm_put_type/xfrm_get_mode/xfrm_put_mode as
static.

The only other change I've made in the move is to get rid of the casts
on the request_module call for types.  They're unnecessary because C
will promote them to ints anyway.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-17 21:31:12 -07:00
Herbert Xu
1ecafede83 [IPSEC]: Remove bogus ref count in xfrm_secpath_reject
Constructs of the form

	xfrm_state_hold(x);
	foo(x);
	xfrm_state_put(x);

tend to be broken because foo is either synchronous where this is totally
unnecessary or if foo is asynchronous then the reference count is in the
wrong spot.

In the case of xfrm_secpath_reject, the function is synchronous and therefore
we should just kill the reference count.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:54:59 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
2774c7aba6 [NET]: Make the loopback device per network namespace.
This patch makes loopback_dev per network namespace.  Adding
code to create a different loopback device for each network
namespace and adding the code to free a loopback device
when a network namespace exits.

This patch modifies all users the loopback_dev so they
access it as init_net.loopback_dev, keeping all of the
code compiling and working.  A later pass will be needed to
update the users to use something other than the initial network
namespace.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:52:49 -07:00
Daniel Lezcano
de3cb747ff [NET]: Dynamically allocate the loopback device, part 1.
This patch replaces all occurences to the static variable
loopback_dev to a pointer loopback_dev. That provides the
mindless, trivial, uninteressting change part for the dynamic
allocation for the loopback.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com>
Acked-By: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
Acked-by: Benjamin Thery <benjamin.thery@bull.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:52:14 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
e9dc865340 [NET]: Make device event notification network namespace safe
Every user of the network device notifiers is either a protocol
stack or a pseudo device.  If a protocol stack that does not have
support for multiple network namespaces receives an event for a
device that is not in the initial network namespace it quite possibly
can get confused and do the wrong thing.

To avoid problems until all of the protocol stacks are converted
this patch modifies all netdev event handlers to ignore events on
devices that are not in the initial network namespace.

As the rest of the code is made network namespace aware these
checks can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:49:09 -07:00
Joy Latten
ab5f5e8b14 [XFRM]: xfrm audit calls
This patch modifies the current ipsec audit layer
by breaking it up into purpose driven audit calls.

So far, the only audit calls made are when add/delete
an SA/policy. It had been discussed to give each
key manager it's own calls to do this, but I found
there to be much redundnacy since they did the exact
same things, except for how they got auid and sid, so I
combined them. The below audit calls can be made by any
key manager. Hopefully, this is ok.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:49:02 -07:00
Thomas Graf
f7944fb191 [XFRM] policy: Replace magic number with XFRM_POLICY_OUT
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-10-10 16:48:34 -07:00
Jesper Juhl
b5890d8ba4 [XFRM]: Clean up duplicate includes in net/xfrm/
This patch cleans up duplicate includes in
	net/xfrm/

Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-13 22:52:08 -07:00
Paul Moore
e6e0871cce Net/Security: fix memory leaks from security_secid_to_secctx()
The security_secid_to_secctx() function returns memory that must be freed
by a call to security_release_secctx() which was not always happening.  This
patch fixes two of these problems (all that I could find in the kernel source
at present).

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by:  Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-08-02 11:52:26 -04:00
Joakim Koskela
48b8d78315 [XFRM]: State selection update to use inner addresses.
This patch modifies the xfrm state selection logic to use the inner
addresses where the outer have been (incorrectly) used. This is
required for beet mode in general and interfamily setups in both
tunnel and beet mode.

Signed-off-by: Joakim Koskela <jookos@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu     <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <diego.beltrami@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu     <miika@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-07-31 02:28:33 -07:00
Paul Mundt
20c2df83d2 mm: Remove slab destructors from kmem_cache_create().
Slab destructors were no longer supported after Christoph's
c59def9f22 change. They've been
BUGs for both slab and slub, and slob never supported them
either.

This rips out support for the dtor pointer from kmem_cache_create()
completely and fixes up every single callsite in the kernel (there were
about 224, not including the slab allocator definitions themselves,
or the documentation references).

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
2007-07-20 10:11:58 +09:00
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
7dc12d6dd6 [NET] XFRM: Fix whitespace errors.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
2007-07-19 10:45:15 +09:00
Patrick McHardy
bd0bf0765e [XFRM]: Fix crash introduced by struct dst_entry reordering
XFRM expects xfrm_dst->u.next to be same pointer as dst->next, which
was broken by the dst_entry reordering in commit 1e19e02c~, causing
an oops in xfrm_bundle_ok when walking the bundle upwards.

Kill xfrm_dst->u.next and change the only user to use dst->next instead.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-07-18 01:55:52 -07:00
Joy Latten
4aa2e62c45 xfrm: Add security check before flushing SAD/SPD
Currently we check for permission before deleting entries from SAD and
SPD, (see security_xfrm_policy_delete() security_xfrm_state_delete())
However we are not checking for authorization when flushing the SPD and
the SAD completely. It was perhaps missed in the original security hooks
patch.

This patch adds a security check when flushing entries from the SAD and
SPD.  It runs the entire database and checks each entry for a denial.
If the process attempting the flush is unable to remove all of the
entries a denial is logged the the flush function returns an error
without removing anything.

This is particularly useful when a process may need to create or delete
its own xfrm entries used for things like labeled networking but that
same process should not be able to delete other entries or flush the
entire database.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten<latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-06-07 13:42:46 -07:00
David S. Miller
aad0e0b9b6 [XFRM]: xfrm_larval_drop sysctl should be __read_mostly.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-05-31 01:23:24 -07:00
David S. Miller
14e50e57ae [XFRM]: Allow packet drops during larval state resolution.
The current IPSEC rule resolution behavior we have does not work for a
lot of people, even though technically it's an improvement from the
-EAGAIN buisness we had before.

Right now we'll block until the key manager resolves the route.  That
works for simple cases, but many folks would rather packets get
silently dropped until the key manager resolves the IPSEC rules.

We can't tell these folks to "set the socket non-blocking" because
they don't have control over the non-block setting of things like the
sockets used to resolve DNS deep inside of the resolver libraries in
libc.

With that in mind I coded up the patch below with some help from
Herbert Xu which provides packet-drop behavior during larval state
resolution, controllable via sysctl and off by default.

This lays the framework to either:

1) Make this default at some point or...

2) Move this logic into xfrm{4,6}_policy.c and implement the
   ARP-like resolution queue we've all been dreaming of.
   The idea would be to queue packets to the policy, then
   once the larval state is resolved by the key manager we
   re-resolve the route and push the packets out.  The
   packets would timeout if the rule didn't get resolved
   in a certain amount of time.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-05-24 18:17:54 -07:00
Herbert Xu
b5505c6e10 [IPSEC]: Check validity of direction in xfrm_policy_byid
The function xfrm_policy_byid takes a dir argument but finds the policy
using the index instead.  We only use the dir argument to update the
policy count for that direction.  Since the user can supply any value
for dir, this can corrupt our policy count.

I know this is the problem because a few days ago I was deleting
policies by hand using indicies and accidentally typed in the wrong
direction.  It still deleted the policy and at the time I thought
that was cool.  In retrospect it isn't such a good idea :)

I decided against letting it delete the policy anyway just in case
we ever remove the connection between indicies and direction.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-05-14 02:15:47 -07:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
5a6d34162f [XFRM] SPD info TLV aggregation
Aggregate the SPD info TLVs.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-05-04 12:55:39 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
157bfc2502 [XFRM]: Restrict upper layer information by bundle.
On MIPv6 usage, XFRM sub policy is enabled.
When main (IPsec) and sub (MIPv6) policy selectors have the same
address set but different upper layer information (i.e. protocol
number and its ports or type/code), multiple bundle should be created.
However, currently we have issue to use the same bundle created for
the first time with all flows covered by the case.

It is useful for the bundle to have the upper layer information
to be restructured correctly if it does not match with the flow.

1. Bundle was created by two policies
Selector from another policy is added to xfrm_dst.
If the flow does not match the selector, it goes to slow path to
restructure new bundle by single policy.

2. Bundle was created by one policy
Flow cache is added to xfrm_dst as originated one. If the flow does
not match the cache, it goes to slow path to try searching another
policy.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-30 00:58:09 -07:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
ecfd6b1837 [XFRM]: Export SPD info
With this patch you can use iproute2 in user space to efficiently see
how many policies exist in different directions.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-28 21:20:32 -07:00
Stephen Hemminger
3ff50b7997 [NET]: cleanup extra semicolons
Spring cleaning time...

There seems to be a lot of places in the network code that have
extra bogus semicolons after conditionals.  Most commonly is a
bogus semicolon after: switch() { }

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:29:24 -07:00
James Morris
9d729f72dc [NET]: Convert xtime.tv_sec to get_seconds()
Where appropriate, convert references to xtime.tv_sec to the
get_seconds() helper function.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-04-25 22:23:32 -07:00
Joy Latten
961995582e [XFRM]: ipsecv6 needs a space when printing audit record.
This patch adds a space between printing of the src and dst ipv6 addresses.
Otherwise, audit or other test tools may fail to process the audit
record properly because they cannot find the dst address.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-03-20 00:09:47 -07:00
Eric Paris
ef41aaa0b7 [IPSEC]: xfrm_policy delete security check misplaced
The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed.  Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions.  There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion.  Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.

This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)

It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire.  In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT.  But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT.  Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-03-07 16:08:09 -08:00
Kazunori MIYAZAWA
928ba4169d [IPSEC]: Fix the address family to refer encap_family
Fix the address family to refer encap_family
when comparing with a kernel generated xfrm_state

Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-13 12:57:16 -08:00
David S. Miller
13fcfbb067 [XFRM]: Fix OOPSes in xfrm_audit_log().
Make sure that this function is called correctly, and
add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane.

Based upon a patch by Joy Latten.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-12 13:53:54 -08:00
YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
a716c1197d [NET] XFRM: Fix whitespace errors.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-10 23:20:24 -08:00
David S. Miller
e610e679dd [XFRM]: xfrm_migrate() needs exporting to modules.
Needed by xfrm_user and af_key.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-08 13:29:15 -08:00
Shinta Sugimoto
80c9abaabf [XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)
Extend the XFRM framework so that endpoint address(es) in the XFRM
databases could be dynamically updated according to a request (MIGRATE
message) from user application. Target XFRM policy is first identified
by the selector in the MIGRATE message. Next, the endpoint addresses
of the matching templates and XFRM states are updated according to
the MIGRATE message.

Signed-off-by: Shinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-02-08 13:11:42 -08:00
Herbert Xu
a6c7ab55dd [IPSEC]: Policy list disorder
The recent hashing introduced an off-by-one bug in policy list insertion.
Instead of adding after the last entry with a lesser or equal priority,
we're adding after the successor of that entry.

This patch fixes this and also adds a warning if we detect a duplicate
entry in the policy list.  This should never happen due to this if clause.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-01-23 20:25:51 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
2685b267bc Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6
* master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (48 commits)
  [NETFILTER]: Fix non-ANSI func. decl.
  [TG3]: Identify Serdes devices more clearly.
  [TG3]: Use msleep.
  [TG3]: Use netif_msg_*.
  [TG3]: Allow partial speed advertisement.
  [TG3]: Add TG3_FLG2_IS_NIC flag.
  [TG3]: Add 5787F device ID.
  [TG3]: Fix Phy loopback.
  [WANROUTER]: Kill kmalloc debugging code.
  [TCP] inet_twdr_hangman: Delete unnecessary memory barrier().
  [NET]: Memory barrier cleanups
  [IPSEC]: Fix inetpeer leak in ipv4 xfrm dst entries.
  audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n
  audit: Add auditing to ipsec
  [IRDA] irlan: Fix compile warning when CONFIG_PROC_FS=n
  [IrDA]: Incorrect TTP header reservation
  [IrDA]: PXA FIR code device model conversion
  [GENETLINK]: Fix misplaced command flags.
  [NETLIK]: Add a pointer to the Generic Netlink wiki page.
  [IPV6] RAW: Don't release unlocked sock.
  ...
2006-12-07 09:05:15 -08:00
Christoph Lameter
e18b890bb0 [PATCH] slab: remove kmem_cache_t
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.

The patch was generated using the following script:

	#!/bin/sh
	#
	# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
	#

	set -e

	for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
		quilt add $file
		sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
		mv /tmp/$$ $file
		quilt refresh
	done

The script was run like this

	sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-07 08:39:25 -08:00
Joy Latten
c9204d9ca7 audit: disable ipsec auditing when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=n
Disables auditing in ipsec when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is
disabled in the kernel.

Also includes a bug fix for xfrm_state.c as a result of
original ipsec audit patch.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-06 20:14:23 -08:00
Joy Latten
161a09e737 audit: Add auditing to ipsec
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.

Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-06 20:14:22 -08:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
baf5d743d1 [XFRM] Optimize policy dumping
This change optimizes the dumping of Security policies.

1) Before this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip xf pol

real    0m22.274s
user    0m0.000s
sys     0m22.269s

2) Turn off sub-policies

speedopolis:~# ./ip xf pol

real    0m13.496s
user    0m0.000s
sys     0m13.493s

i suppose the above is to be expected

3) With this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip x policy

real    0m7.901s
user    0m0.008s
sys     0m7.896s
2006-12-06 18:38:44 -08:00
David Howells
4c1ac1b491 Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:

	drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
	drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
	drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
	drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
	drivers/usb/core/hub.h
	drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
	net/core/netpoll.c

Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2006-12-05 14:37:56 +00:00
Miika Komu
76b3f055f3 [IPSEC]: Add encapsulation family.
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02 21:31:48 -08:00
Andrew Morton
776810217a [XFRM]: uninline xfrm_selector_match()
Six callsites, huge.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-12-02 21:21:36 -08:00
Venkat Yekkirala
67f83cbf08 SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.

With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:

1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }

2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-12-02 21:21:34 -08:00
David Howells
c4028958b6 WorkStruct: make allyesconfig
Fix up for make allyesconfig.

Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2006-11-22 14:57:56 +00:00
Venkat Yekkirala
3bccfbc7a7 IPsec: fix handling of errors for socket policies
This treats the security errors encountered in the case of
socket policy matching, the same as how these are treated in
the case of main/sub policies, which is to return a full lookup
failure.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:39 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala
5b368e61c2 IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.

The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.

This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).

Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.

This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.

Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:37 -07:00
James Morris
134b0fc544 IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup
When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error).  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.

The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.

The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.

However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.

The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.

Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-11 23:59:34 -07:00
David S. Miller
ae8c05779a [XFRM]: Clearing xfrm_policy_count[] to zero during flush is incorrect.
When we flush policies, we do a type match so we might not
actually delete all policies matching a certain direction.

So keep track of how many policies we actually kill and
subtract that number from xfrm_policy_count[dir] at the
end.

Based upon a patch by Masahide NAKAMURA.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-10-04 00:31:02 -07:00
Patrick McHardy
a1e59abf82 [XFRM]: Fix wildcard as tunnel source
Hashing SAs by source address breaks templates with wildcards as tunnel
source since the source address used for hashing/lookup is still 0/0.
Move source address lookup to xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() so we can use the
real address in the lookup.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:19:06 -07:00
James Morris
d1d9facfd1 [XFRM]: remove xerr_idxp from __xfrm_policy_check()
It seems that during the MIPv6 respin, some code which was originally
conditionally compiled around CONFIG_XFRM_ADVANCED was accidently left
in after the config option was removed.

This patch removes an extraneous pointer (xerr_idxp) which is no
longer needed.

Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:49 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
e5d679f339 [NET]: Use SLAB_PANIC
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:19 -07:00
David S. Miller
acba48e1a3 [XFRM]: Respect priority in policy lookups.
Even if we find an exact match in the hash table,
we must inspect the inexact list to look for a match
with a better priority.

Noticed by Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:18:05 -07:00
David S. Miller
44e36b42a8 [XFRM]: Extract common hashing code into xfrm_hash.[ch]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:49 -07:00
David S. Miller
2518c7c2b3 [XFRM]: Hash policies when non-prefixed.
This idea is from Alexey Kuznetsov.

It is common for policies to be non-prefixed.  And for
that case we can optimize lookups, insert, etc. quite
a bit.

For each direction, we have a dynamically sized policy
hash table for non-prefixed policies.  We also have a
hash table on policy->index.

For prefixed policies, we have a list per-direction which
we will consult on lookups when a non-prefix hashtable
lookup fails.

This still isn't as efficient as I would like it.  There
are four immediate problems:

1) Lots of excessive refcounting, which can be fixed just
   like xfrm_state was
2) We do 2 hash probes on insert, one to look for dups and
   one to allocate a unique policy->index.  Althought I wonder
   how much this matters since xfrm_state inserts do up to
   3 hash probes and that seems to perform fine.
3) xfrm_policy_insert() is very complex because of the priority
   ordering and entry replacement logic.
4) Lots of counter bumping, in addition to policy refcounts,
   in the form of xfrm_policy_count[].  This is merely used
   to let code path(s) know that some IPSEC rules exist.  So
   this count is indexed per-direction, maybe that is overkill.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:48 -07:00
David S. Miller
1c09539975 [XFRM]: Purge dst references to deleted SAs passively.
Just let GC and other normal mechanisms take care of getting
rid of DST cache references to deleted xfrm_state objects
instead of walking all the policy bundles.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:46 -07:00
David S. Miller
c7f5ea3a4d [XFRM]: Do not flush all bundles on SA insert.
Instead, simply set all potentially aliasing existing xfrm_state
objects to have the current generation counter value.

This will make routes get relooked up the next time an existing
route mentioning these aliased xfrm_state objects gets used,
via xfrm_dst_check().

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:45 -07:00
David S. Miller
9d4a706d85 [XFRM]: Add generation count to xfrm_state and xfrm_dst.
Each xfrm_state inserted gets a new generation counter
value.  When a bundle is created, the xfrm_dst objects
get the current generation counter of the xfrm_state
they will attach to at dst->xfrm.

xfrm_bundle_ok() will return false if it sees an
xfrm_dst with a generation count different from the
generation count of the xfrm_state that dst points to.

This provides a facility by which to passively and
cheaply invalidate cached IPSEC routes during SA
database changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:42 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
41a49cc3c0 [XFRM]: Add sorting interface for state and template.
Under two transformation policies it is required to merge them.
This is a platform to sort state for outbound and templates
for inbound respectively.
It will be used when Mobile IPv6 and IPsec are used at the same time.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:34 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
4e81bb8336 [XFRM] POLICY: sub policy support.
Sub policy is introduced. Main and sub policy are applied the same flow.
(Policy that current kernel uses is named as main.)
It is required another transformation policy management to keep IPsec
and Mobile IPv6 lives separate.
Policy which lives shorter time in kernel should be a sub i.e. normally
main is for IPsec and sub is for Mobile IPv6.
(Such usage as two IPsec policies on different database can be used, too.)

Limitation or TODOs:
 - Sub policy is not supported for per socket one (it is always inserted as main).
 - Current kernel makes cached outbound with flowi to skip searching database.
   However this patch makes it disabled only when "two policies are used and
   the first matched one is bypass case" because neither flowi nor bundle
   information knows about transformation template size.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
2006-09-22 15:08:34 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
df0ba92a99 [XFRM]: Trace which secpath state is reject factor.
For Mobile IPv6 usage, it is required to trace which secpath state is
reject factor in order to notify it to user space (to know the address
which cannot be used route optimized communication).

Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.

This patch was also written by: Henrik Petander <petander@tcs.hut.fi>

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:08:29 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
e53820de0f [XFRM] IPV6: Restrict bundle reusing
For outbound transformation, bundle is checked whether it is
suitable for current flow to be reused or not. In such IPv6 case
as below, transformation may apply incorrect bundle for the flow instead
of creating another bundle:

- The policy selector has destination prefix length < 128
  (Two or more addresses can be matched it)
- Its bundle holds dst entry of default route whose prefix length < 128
  (Previous traffic was used such route as next hop)
- The policy and the bundle were used a transport mode state and
  this time flow address is not matched the bundled state.

This issue is found by Mobile IPv6 usage to protect mobility signaling
by IPsec, but it is not a Mobile IPv6 specific.
This patch adds strict check to xfrm_bundle_ok() for each
state mode and address when prefix length is less than 128.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:06:44 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
9e51fd371a [XFRM]: Rename secpath_has_tunnel to secpath_has_nontransport.
On current kernel inbound transformation state is allowed transport and
disallowed tunnel mode when mismatch is occurred between tempates and states.
As the result of adding two more modes by Mobile IPv6, this function name
is misleading. Inbound transformation can allow only transport mode
when mismatch is occurred between template and secpath.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:06:40 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
f3bd484021 [XFRM]: Restrict authentication algorithm only when inbound transformation protocol is IPsec.
For Mobile IPv6 usage, routing header or destination options header is
used and it doesn't require this comparison. It is checked only for
IPsec template.

Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:06:38 -07:00
Masahide NAKAMURA
7e49e6de30 [XFRM]: Add XFRM_MODE_xxx for future use.
Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel.
It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger
for Mobile IPv6.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.

This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>

Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 15:05:15 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala
beb8d13bed [MLSXFRM]: Add flow labeling
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.

The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.

ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:27 -07:00
Venkat Yekkirala
e0d1caa7b0 [MLSXFRM]: Flow based matching of xfrm policy and state
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-09-22 14:53:24 -07:00
David S. Miller
d49c73c729 [IPSEC]: Validate properly in xfrm_dst_check()
If dst->obsolete is -1, this is a signal from the
bundle creator that we want the XFRM dst and the
dsts that it references to be validated on every
use.

I misunderstood this intention when I changed
xfrm_dst_check() to always return NULL.

Now, when we purge a dst entry, by running dst_free()
on it.  This will set the dst->obsolete to a positive
integer, and we want to return NULL in that case so
that the socket does a relookup for the route.

Thus, if dst->obsolete<0, let stale_bundle() validate
the state, else always return NULL.

In general, we need to do things more intelligently
here because we flush too much state during rule
changes.  Herbert Xu has some ideas wherein the key
manager gives us some help in this area.  We can also
use smarter state management algorithms inside of
the kernel as well.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-13 18:55:53 -07:00
Panagiotis Issaris
0da974f4f3 [NET]: Conversions from kmalloc+memset to k(z|c)alloc.
Signed-off-by: Panagiotis Issaris <takis@issaris.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-07-21 14:51:30 -07:00
Jörn Engel
6ab3d5624e Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-30 19:25:36 +02:00
Herbert Xu
b59f45d0b2 [IPSEC] xfrm: Abstract out encapsulation modes
This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode.  It is meant to represent
the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes.

By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added
without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths.

Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and
BEET modes.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:28:39 -07:00
Herbert Xu
546be2405b [IPSEC] xfrm: Undo afinfo lock proliferation
The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced
down to one each for policy and state respectively.  This is based on the
observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal
which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate
between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6.

The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look
suspicious at first.  However, after you realise that nobody ever takes
the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :)

As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of
the corresponding modules.  Since neither module can be unloaded at all
we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :)

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-17 21:28:37 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
e959d8121f [XFRM]: fix incorrect xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock use
xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at:

 [<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d
 [<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22
 [<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d
 [<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32
 [<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b
 [<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad
 [<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a
 [<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e
 [<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7
 [<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141
 [<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0
 [<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46
 [<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138
 [<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9
 [<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413
 [<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356
 [<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110
 [<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d
 [<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6
 [<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1

this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be
bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and
xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo().

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-04-29 18:33:21 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
8dff7c2970 [XFRM]: fix softirq-unsafe xfrm typemap->lock use
xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock()
uses must be softirq-safe.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-04-29 18:33:18 -07:00
Herbert Xu
dbe5b4aaaf [IPSEC]: Kill unused decap state structure
This patch removes the *_decap_state structures which were previously
used to share state between input/post_input.  This is no longer
needed.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-04-01 00:54:16 -08:00
Arjan van de Ven
4a3e2f711a [NET] sem2mutex: net/
Semaphore to mutex conversion.

The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20 22:33:17 -08:00
David S. Miller
a70fcb0ba3 [XFRM]: Add some missing exports.
To fix the case of modular xfrm_user.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20 19:18:52 -08:00
Jamal Hadi Salim
6c5c8ca7ff [IPSEC]: Sync series - policy expires
This is similar to the SA expire insertion patch - only it inserts
expires for SP.

Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-20 19:17:25 -08:00
Herbert Xu
752c1f4c78 [IPSEC]: Kill post_input hook and do NAT-T in esp_input directly
The only reason post_input exists at all is that it gives us the
potential to adjust the checksums incrementally in future which
we ought to do.

However, after thinking about it for a bit we can adjust the
checksums without using this post_input stuff at all.  The crucial
point is that only the inner-most NAT-T SA needs to be considered
when adjusting checksums.  What's more, the checksum adjustment
comes down to a single u32 due to the linearity of IP checksums.

We just happen to have a spare u32 lying around in our skb structure :)
When ip_summed is set to CHECKSUM_NONE on input, the value of skb->csum
is currently unused.  All we have to do is to make that the checksum
adjustment and voila, there goes all the post_input and decap structures!

I've left in the decap data structures for now since it's intricately
woven into the sec_path stuff.  We can kill them later too.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-02-27 13:00:40 -08:00
Patrick McHardy
42cf93cd46 [NETFILTER]: Fix bridge netfilter related in xfrm_lookup
The bridge-netfilter code attaches a fake dst_entry with dst->ops == NULL
to purely bridged packets. When these packets are SNATed and a policy
lookup is done, xfrm_lookup crashes because it tries to dereference
dst->ops.

Change xfrm_lookup not to dereference dst->ops before checking for the
DST_NOXFRM flag and set this flag in the fake dst_entry.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-02-23 16:10:51 -08:00
Patrick McHardy
9951101438 [XFRM]: Fix policy double put
The policy is put once immediately and once at the error label, which results
in the following Oops:

kernel BUG at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:250!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#2]
PREEMPT
[...]
CPU:    0
EIP:    0060:[<c028caf7>]    Not tainted VLI
EFLAGS: 00210246   (2.6.16-rc3 #39)
EIP is at __xfrm_policy_destroy+0xf/0x46
eax: d49f2000   ebx: d49f2000   ecx: f74bd880   edx: f74bd280
esi: d49f2000   edi: 00000001   ebp: cd506dcc   esp: cd506dc8
ds: 007b   es: 007b   ss: 0068
Process ssh (pid: 31970, threadinfo=cd506000 task=cfb04a70)
Stack: <0>cd506000 cd506e34 c028e92b ebde7280 cd506e58 cd506ec0 f74bd280 00000000
       00000214 0000000a 0000000a 00000000 00000002 f7ae6000 00000000 cd506e58
       cd506e14 c0299e36 f74bd280 e873fe00 c02943fd cd506ec0 ebde7280 f271f440
Call Trace:
 [<c0103a44>] show_stack_log_lvl+0xaa/0xb5
 [<c0103b75>] show_registers+0x126/0x18c
 [<c0103e68>] die+0x14e/0x1db
 [<c02b6809>] do_trap+0x7c/0x96
 [<c0104237>] do_invalid_op+0x89/0x93
 [<c01035af>] error_code+0x4f/0x54
 [<c028e92b>] xfrm_lookup+0x349/0x3c2
 [<c02b0b0d>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x317/0x452
 [<c0281749>] inet_dgram_connect+0x49/0x54
 [<c02404d2>] sys_connect+0x51/0x68
 [<c0240928>] sys_socketcall+0x6f/0x166
 [<c0102aa1>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-02-19 22:11:50 -08:00
Herbert Xu
00de651d14 [IPSEC]: Fix strange IPsec freeze.
Problem discovered and initial patch by Olaf Kirch:

	there's a problem with IPsec that has been bugging some of our users
	for the last couple of kernel revs. Every now and then, IPsec will
	freeze the machine completely. This is with openswan user land,
	and with kernels up to and including 2.6.16-rc2.

	I managed to debug this a little, and what happens is that we end
	up looping in xfrm_lookup, and never get out. With a bit of debug
	printks added, I can this happening:

		ip_route_output_flow calls xfrm_lookup

		xfrm_find_bundle returns NULL (apparently we're in the
			middle of negotiating a new SA or something)

		We therefore call xfrm_tmpl_resolve. This returns EAGAIN
			We go to sleep, waiting for a policy update.
			Then we loop back to the top

		Apparently, the dst_orig that was passed into xfrm_lookup
			has been dropped from the routing table (obsolete=2)
			This leads to the endless loop, because we now create
			a new bundle, check the new bundle and find it's stale
			(stale_bundle -> xfrm_bundle_ok -> dst_check() return 0)

	People have been testing with the patch below, which seems to fix the
	problem partially. They still see connection hangs however (things
	only clear up when they start a new ping or new ssh). So the patch
	is obvsiouly not sufficient, and something else seems to go wrong.

	I'm grateful for any hints you may have...

I suggest that we simply bail out always.  If the dst decides to die
on us later on, the packet will be dropped anyway.  So there is no
great urgency to retry here.  Once we have the proper resolution
queueing, we can then do the retry again.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Olaf Kirch <okir@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-02-13 16:01:27 -08:00
Al Viro
1b8623545b [PATCH] remove bogus asm/bug.h includes.
A bunch of asm/bug.h includes are both not needed (since it will get
pulled anyway) and bogus (since they are done too early).  Removed.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2006-02-07 20:56:35 -05:00
Kris Katterjohn
09a626600b [NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"
This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);"

Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-09 14:16:18 -08:00
Patrick McHardy
eb9c7ebe69 [NETFILTER]: Handle NAT in IPsec policy checks
Handle NAT of decapsulated IPsec packets by reconstructing the struct flowi
of the original packet from the conntrack information for IPsec policy
checks.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-07 12:57:37 -08:00
Patrick McHardy
3e3850e989 [NETFILTER]: Fix xfrm lookup in ip_route_me_harder/ip6_route_me_harder
ip_route_me_harder doesn't use the port numbers of the xfrm lookup and
uses ip_route_input for non-local addresses which doesn't do a xfrm
lookup, ip6_route_me_harder doesn't do a xfrm lookup at all.

Use xfrm_decode_session and do the lookup manually, make sure both
only do the lookup if the packet hasn't been transformed already.

Makeing sure the lookup only happens once needs a new field in the
IP6CB, which exceeds the size of skb->cb. The size of skb->cb is
increased to 48b. Apparently the IPv6 mobile extensions need some
more room anyway.

Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-07 12:57:33 -08:00
Trent Jaeger
df71837d50 [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.
This patch series implements per packet access control via the
extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
included that leverage the patch for this purpose.

This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
association) to send/receive network packets.

Patch purpose:

The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
enforce the access control policy.

Patch design approach:

The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
policies.

A presentation available at
www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf
from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.

Patch implementation details:

On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.

On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
(at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
also match the security association being used.

The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
before.

Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
processing proceeds as in the original case.

Testing:

The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
using the security contexts via racoon.

The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
behavior.

Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-01-03 13:10:24 -08:00
David S. Miller
9b78a82c1c [IPSEC]: Fix policy updates missed by sockets
The problem is that when new policies are inserted, sockets do not see
the update (but all new route lookups do).

This bug is related to the SA insertion stale route issue solved
recently, and this policy visibility problem can be fixed in a similar
way.

The fix is to flush out the bundles of all policies deeper than the
policy being inserted.  Consider beginning state of "outgoing"
direction policy list:

	policy A --> policy B --> policy C --> policy D

First, realize that inserting a policy into a list only potentially
changes IPSEC routes for that direction.  Therefore we need not bother
considering the policies for other directions.  We need only consider
the existing policies in the list we are doing the inserting.

Consider new policy "B'", inserted after B.

	policy A --> policy B --> policy B' --> policy C --> policy D

Two rules:

1) If policy A or policy B matched before the insertion, they
   appear before B' and thus would still match after inserting
   B'

2) Policy C and D, now "shadowed" and after policy B', potentially
   contain stale routes because policy B' might be selected
   instead of them.

Therefore we only need flush routes assosciated with policies
appearing after a newly inserted policy, if any.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-22 07:39:48 -08:00
David S. Miller
399c180ac5 [IPSEC]: Perform SA switchover immediately.
When we insert a new xfrm_state which potentially
subsumes an existing one, make sure all cached
bundles are flushed so that the new SA is used
immediately.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-19 14:23:23 -08:00
Herbert Xu
80b30c1023 [IPSEC]: Kill obsolete get_mss function
Now that we've switched over to storing MTUs in the xfrm_dst entries,
we no longer need the dst's get_mss methods.  This patch gets rid of
them.

It also documents the fact that our MTU calculation is not optimal
for ESP.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
2005-10-26 00:48:45 -02:00
Al Viro
dd0fc66fb3 [PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1
- added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;

 - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
   the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change
   generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with
   typedef) and documents what's going on far better.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-10-08 15:00:57 -07:00
Herbert Xu
77d8d7a684 [IPSEC]: Document that policy direction is derived from the index.
Here is a patch that adds a helper called xfrm_policy_id2dir to
document the fact that the policy direction can be and is derived
from the index.

This is based on a patch by YOSHIFUJI Hideaki and 210313105@suda.edu.cn.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-10-05 12:15:12 -07:00
Randy Dunlap
83fa3400eb [XFRM]: fix sparse gfp nocast warnings
Fix implicit nocast warnings in xfrm code:
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:232:47: warning: implicit cast to nocast type

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-10-04 22:45:35 -07:00
Patrick McHardy
e104411b82 [XFRM]: Always release dst_entry on error in xfrm_lookup
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-09-08 15:11:55 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
ba89966c19 [NET]: use __read_mostly on kmem_cache_t , DEFINE_SNMP_STAT pointers
This patch puts mostly read only data in the right section
(read_mostly), to help sharing of these data between CPUS without
memory ping pongs.

On one of my production machine, tcp_statistics was sitting in a
heavily modified cache line, so *every* SNMP update had to force a
reload.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-08-29 16:11:18 -07:00
Herbert Xu
72cb6962a9 [IPSEC]: Add xfrm_init_state
This patch adds xfrm_init_state which is simply a wrapper that calls
xfrm_get_type and subsequently x->type->init_state.  It also gets rid
of the unused args argument.

Abstracting it out allows us to add common initialisation code, e.g.,
to set family-specific flags.

The add_time setting in xfrm_user.c was deleted because it's already
set by xfrm_state_alloc.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-06-20 13:18:08 -07:00
Herbert Xu
4666faab09 [IPSEC] Kill spurious hard expire messages
This patch ensures that the hard state/policy expire notifications are
only sent when the state/policy is successfully removed from their
respective tables.

As it is, it's possible for a state/policy to both expire through
reaching a hard limit, as well as being deleted by the user.

Note that this behaviour isn't actually forbidden by RFC 2367.
However, it is a quality of implementation issue.

As an added bonus, the restructuring in this patch will help
eventually in moving the expire notifications from softirq
context into process context, thus improving their reliability.

One important side-effect from this change is that SAs reaching
their hard byte/packet limits are now deleted immediately, just
like SAs that have reached their hard time limits.

Previously they were announced immediately but only deleted after
30 seconds.

This is bad because it prevents the system from issuing an ACQUIRE
command until the existing state was deleted by the user or expires
after the time is up.

In the scenario where the expire notification was lost this introduces
a 30 second delay into the system for no good reason.
 
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2005-06-18 22:43:22 -07:00
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI
92d63decc0 From: Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
[XFRM] Call dst_check() with appropriate cookie

This fixes infinite loop issue with IPv6 tunnel mode.

Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <kazunori@miyazawa.org>
Signed-off-by: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-26 12:58:04 -07:00
Herbert Xu
aabc9761b6 [IPSEC]: Store idev entries
I found a bug that stopped IPsec/IPv6 from working.  About
a month ago IPv6 started using rt6i_idev->dev on the cached socket dst
entries.  If the cached socket dst entry is IPsec, then rt6i_idev will
be NULL.

Since we want to look at the rt6i_idev of the original route in this
case, the easiest fix is to store rt6i_idev in the IPsec dst entry just
as we do for a number of other IPv6 route attributes.  Unfortunately
this means that we need some new code to handle the references to
rt6i_idev.  That's why this patch is bigger than it would otherwise be.

I've also done the same thing for IPv4 since it is conceivable that
once these idev attributes start getting used for accounting, we
probably need to dereference them for IPv4 IPsec entries too.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-05-03 16:27:10 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00