The kernel test robot reported multiple linkage problems like this:
hppa64-linux-ld: init/main.o(.init.text+0x56c): cannot reach printk
init/main.o: in function `unknown_bootoption':
(.init.text+0x56c): relocation truncated to fit: R_PARISC_PCREL22F against
symbol `printk' defined in .text.unlikely section in kernel/printk/printk.o
There are two ways to solve it:
a) Enable the -mlong-call compiler option (CONFIG_MLONGCALLS),
b) Add long branch stub support in 64-bit linker.
While b) is the long-term solution, this patch works around the issue by
automatically enabling the CONFIG_MLONGCALLS option when
CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is set, which indicates that a non-production kernel
(e.g. 0-day kernel) is built.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 00e35f2b0e ("parisc: Enable -mlong-calls gcc option by default when !CONFIG_MODULES")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6+
There is a quite huge "uncorrectable error in header" flood in KMSG
on a clean system boot since there is no pstore buffer saved in RAM.
Let's silence the redundant noisy messages by rate-limiting the printk
message. Now there are maximum 10 messages printed repeatedly instead
of 35+.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302095850.30894-1-digetx@gmail.com
This problem was reported on a SVM guest while executing kexec.
Kexec fails to load the new kernel when the PCID feature is enabled.
When kexec starts loading the new kernel, it starts the process by
resetting the vCPU's and then bringing each vCPU online one by one.
The vCPU reset is supposed to reset all the register states before the
vCPUs are brought online. However, the CR4 register is not reset during
this process. If this register is already setup during the last boot,
all the flags can remain intact. The X86_CR4_PCIDE bit can only be
enabled in long mode. So, it must be enabled much later in SMP
initialization. Having the X86_CR4_PCIDE bit set during SMP boot can
cause a boot failures.
Fix the issue by resetting the CR4 register in init_vmcb().
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Message-Id: <161471109108.30811.6392805173629704166.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is how Xen guests do steal time accounting. The hypervisor records
the amount of time spent in each of running/runnable/blocked/offline
states.
In the Xen accounting, a vCPU is still in state RUNSTATE_running while
in Xen for a hypercall or I/O trap, etc. Only if Xen explicitly schedules
does the state become RUNSTATE_blocked. In KVM this means that even when
the vCPU exits the kvm_run loop, the state remains RUNSTATE_running.
The VMM can explicitly set the vCPU to RUNSTATE_blocked by using the
KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_CURRENT attribute, and can also use
KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_RUNSTATE_ADJUST to retrospectively add a given
amount of time to the blocked state and subtract it from the running
state.
The state_entry_time corresponds to get_kvmclock_ns() at the time the
vCPU entered the current state, and the total times of all four states
should always add up to state_entry_time.
Co-developed-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20210301125309.874953-2-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When clearing the per-vCPU shared regions, set the return value to zero
to indicate success. This was causing spurious errors to be returned to
userspace on soft reset.
Also add a paranoid BUILD_BUG_ON() for compat structure compatibility.
Fixes: 0c165b3c01 ("KVM: x86/xen: Allow reset of Xen attributes")
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20210301125309.874953-1-dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The vcpu mmap area may consist of more than just the kvm_run struct.
Allocate enough space for the entire vcpu mmap area. Without this, on
x86, the PIO page, for example, will be missing. This is problematic
when dealing with an unhandled exception from the guest as the exception
vector will be incorrectly reported as 0x0.
Message-Id: <20210210165035.3712489-1-aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It should be 7.23 instead of 7.22, which has already been taken by
KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT.
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210226094832.380394-1-kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The Xen hypercall interface adds to the attack surface of the hypervisor
and will be used quite rarely. Allow compiling it out.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Correct the comments since bfq_fifo_expire[0] is for async request,
while bfq_fifo_expire[1] is for sync request.
Also update docs, according the source code, the default
fifo_expire_async is 250ms, and fifo_expire_sync is 125ms.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Valente <paolo.valente@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
If the platform set the dyn_pcm_assign to true, it will call
hdmi_find_pcm_slot() to find a pcm slot when hdmi/dp monitor is
connected and need to create a pcm.
So far only intel_hsw_common_init() and patch_nvhdmi() set the
dyn_pcm_assign to true, here we let tgl platforms assign the pcm slot
dynamically first, if the driver runs for a period of time and there
is no regression reported, we could set no_fixed_assgin to true in
the intel_hsw_common_init(), and then set it to true in the
patch_nvhdmi().
This change comes from the discussion between Takashi and
Kai Vehmanen. Please refer to:
https://github.com/alsa-project/alsa-lib/pull/118
Suggested-and-reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Suggested-and-reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301111202.2684-1-hui.wang@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
This applies a SND_PCI_QUIRK(...) to the Clevo NH55RZQ barebone. This
fixes the issue of the device not recognizing a pluged in microphone.
The device has both, a microphone only jack, and a speaker + microphone
combo jack. The combo jack already works. The microphone-only jack does
not recognize when a device is pluged in without this patch.
Signed-off-by: Eckhart Mohr <e.mohr@tuxedocomputers.com>
Co-developed-by: Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com>
Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0eee6545-5169-ef08-6cfa-5def8cd48c86@tuxedocomputers.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
In January, Intel kbuild bot and Arnd Bergmann reported multiple
issues with randconfig. This patchset builds on Arnd's suggestions to
a) expose ACPI and PCI devices in separate modules, while sof-acpi-dev
and sof-pci-dev become helpers. This will result in minor changes
required for developers/testers, i.e. modprobe snd-sof-pci will no
longer result in a probe. The SOF CI was already updated to deal with
this module dependency change and introduction of new modules.
b) Fix SOF/SoundWire/DSP_config dependencies by moving the code
required to detect SoundWire presence in ACPI tables to sound/hda.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
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Merge tag 'tags/sound-sdw-kconfig-fixes' into for-linus
ALSA/ASoC/SOF/SoundWire: fix Kconfig issues
In January, Intel kbuild bot and Arnd Bergmann reported multiple
issues with randconfig. This patchset builds on Arnd's suggestions to
a) expose ACPI and PCI devices in separate modules, while sof-acpi-dev
and sof-pci-dev become helpers. This will result in minor changes
required for developers/testers, i.e. modprobe snd-sof-pci will no
longer result in a probe. The SOF CI was already updated to deal with
this module dependency change and introduction of new modules.
b) Fix SOF/SoundWire/DSP_config dependencies by moving the code
required to detect SoundWire presence in ACPI tables to sound/hda.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
[BUG]
When running fstresss, we can hit strange data csum mismatch where the
on-disk data is in fact correct (passes scrub).
With some extra debug info added, we have the following traces:
0482us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=393216, submit force=0 pgoff=0 iosize=8192
0494us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=401408, submit force=0 pgoff=8192 iosize=4096
0498us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=393216 len=8192
0591us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=405504, submit force=0 pgoff=12288 iosize=36864
0594us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=401408 len=4096
0863us: btrfs_submit_data_bio: root=5 ino=284 bio first bvec=405504 len=36864
0933us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=393216 len=8192
0967us: btrfs_do_readpage: root=5 ino=284 offset=442368, skip beyond isize pgoff=49152 iosize=16384
1047us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=401408 len=4096
1163us: btrfs_verify_data_csum: root=5 ino=284 offset=405504 len=36864
1290us: check_data_csum: !!! root=5 ino=284 offset=438272 pg_off=45056 !!!
7387us: end_bio_extent_readpage: root=5 ino=284 before pending_read_bios=0
[CAUSE]
Normally we expect all submitted bio reads to only touch the range we
specified, and under subpage context, it means we should only touch the
range specified in each bvec.
But in data read path, inside end_bio_extent_readpage(), we have page
zeroing which only takes regular page size into consideration.
This means for subpage if we have an inode whose content looks like below:
0 16K 32K 48K 64K
|///////| |///////| |
|//| = data needs to be read from disk
| | = hole
And i_size is 64K initially.
Then the following race can happen:
T1 | T2
--------------------------------+--------------------------------
btrfs_do_readpage() |
|- isize = 64K; |
| At this time, the isize is |
| 64K |
| |
|- submit_extent_page() |
| submit previous assembled bio|
| assemble bio for [0, 16K) |
| |
|- submit_extent_page() |
submit read bio for [0, 16K) |
assemble read bio for |
[32K, 48K) |
|
| btrfs_setsize()
| |- i_size_write(, 16K);
| Now i_size is only 16K
end_io() for [0K, 16K) |
|- end_bio_extent_readpage() |
|- btrfs_verify_data_csum() |
| No csum error |
|- i_size = 16K; |
|- zero_user_segment(16K, |
PAGE_SIZE); |
!!! We zeroed range |
!!! [32K, 48K) |
| end_io for [32K, 48K)
| |- end_bio_extent_readpage()
| |- btrfs_verify_data_csum()
| ! CSUM MISMATCH !
| ! As the range is zeroed now !
[FIX]
To fix the problem, make end_bio_extent_readpage() to only zero the
range of bvec.
The bug only affects subpage read-write support, as for full read-only
mount we can't change i_size thus won't hit the race condition.
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
When we have smack enabled, during the creation of a directory smack may
attempt to add a "smack transmute" xattr on the inode, which results in
the following warning and trace:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2548 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:537 start_transaction+0x489/0x4f0
Modules linked in: nft_objref nf_conntrack_netbios_ns (...)
CPU: 3 PID: 2548 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2smack+ #81
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x489/0x4f0
Code: e9 be fc ff ff (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001887d10 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff88816f1e0000 RBX: 0000000000000201 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: 0000000000000201 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff888177849000
RBP: ffff888177849000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffffffff825e8f7a R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffffffffffe2
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88803d884270 R15: ffff8881680d8000
FS: 00007f67317b8440(0000) GS:ffff88817bcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f67247a22a8 CR3: 000000004bfbc002 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
? slab_free_freelist_hook+0xea/0x1b0
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0
btrfs_setxattr_trans+0x3c/0xf0
__vfs_setxattr+0x63/0x80
smack_d_instantiate+0x2d3/0x360
security_d_instantiate+0x29/0x40
d_instantiate_new+0x38/0x90
btrfs_mkdir+0x1cf/0x1e0
vfs_mkdir+0x14f/0x200
do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7f673196ae6b
Code: 8b 05 11 (...)
RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c679b18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000053
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000001ff RCX: 00007f673196ae6b
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000001ff RDI: 00007ffc3c67a30d
RBP: 00007ffc3c67a30d R08: 00000000000001ff R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000055d3e39fe930 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc3c679cd8 R14: 00007ffc3c67a30d R15: 00007ffc3c679ce0
irq event stamp: 11029
hardirqs last enabled at (11037): [<ffffffff81153fe6>] console_unlock+0x486/0x670
hardirqs last disabled at (11044): [<ffffffff81153c01>] console_unlock+0xa1/0x670
softirqs last enabled at (8864): [<ffffffff81e0102f>] asm_call_on_stack+0xf/0x20
softirqs last disabled at (8851): [<ffffffff81e0102f>] asm_call_on_stack+0xf/0x20
This happens because at btrfs_mkdir() we call d_instantiate_new() while
holding a transaction handle, which results in the following call chain:
btrfs_mkdir()
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
d_instantiate_new()
smack_d_instantiate()
__vfs_setxattr()
btrfs_setxattr_trans()
btrfs_start_transaction()
start_transaction()
WARN_ON()
--> a tansaction start has TRANS_EXTWRITERS
set in its type
h->orig_rsv = h->block_rsv
h->block_rsv = NULL
btrfs_end_transaction(trans)
Besides the warning triggered at start_transaction, we set the handle's
block_rsv to NULL which may cause some surprises later on.
So fix this by making btrfs_setxattr_trans() not start a transaction when
we already have a handle on one, stored in current->journal_info, and use
that handle. We are good to use the handle because at btrfs_mkdir() we did
reserve space for the xattr and the inode item.
Reported-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/434d856f-bd7b-4889-a6ec-e81aaebfa735@schaufler-ca.com/
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from
btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc
while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock
prone. In the past multiple commits:
* ae5e070eac ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're
already holding a transaction")
* 6f23277a49 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already
hold the handle")
Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a
whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock
scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread
can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying
its atime:
PID: 6963 TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "test"
#0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
#2 schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd
#3 wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held
#4 start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5
#5 btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836
#6 try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2
#7 __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6 <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes.
#8 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa <-- acquires delayed node mutex
#9 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8
#10 btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED
#11 touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000
#12 generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123
#13 new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a
#14 vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849
#15 ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1
#16 do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb
#17 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c
This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to
happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex:
PID: 455 TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30"
#0 __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
#1 schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
#2 schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a
#3 __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up.
#4 btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143 <-- tries to acquire the mutex
#5 btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8 <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding
#6 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7
#7 cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1
#8 btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c
#9 writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f
#10 __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01
#11 extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b
#12 extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2
#13 do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb
#14 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb
#15 btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987 <-- starts running delayed nodes
#16 normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c
#17 process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4
#18 worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd
#19 kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d
#20 ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff
To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any
flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This
patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will
either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the
latter case that return value is going to be propagated to
btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's
fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have
BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly
copying the in-memory state.
Fixes: c53e965360 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Following commit f218ea6c47 ("btrfs: delayed-inode: Remove wrong
qgroup meta reservation calls") this function now reserves num_bytes,
rather than the fixed amount of nodesize. As such this requires the
same amount to be freed in case of failure. Fix this by adjusting
the amount we are freeing.
Fixes: f218ea6c47 ("btrfs: delayed-inode: Remove wrong qgroup meta reservation calls")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The intended logic of the check is to catch cases where the desired
free_space_tree setting doesn't match the mounted setting, and the
remount is anything but ro->rw. However, it makes the mistake of
checking equality on a masked integer (btrfs_test_opt) against a boolean
(btrfs_fs_compat_ro).
If you run the reproducer:
$ mount -o space_cache=v2 dev mnt
$ mount -o remount,ro mnt
you would expect no warning, because the remount is not attempting to
change the free space tree setting, but we do see the warning.
To fix this, add explicit bool type casts to the condition.
I tested a variety of transitions:
sudo mount -o space_cache=v2 /dev/vg0/lv0 mnt/lol
(fst enabled)
mount -o remount,ro mnt/lol
(no warning, no fst change)
sudo mount -o remount,rw,space_cache=v1,clear_cache
(no warning, ro->rw)
sudo mount -o remount,rw,space_cache=v2 mnt
(warning, rw->rw with change)
sudo mount -o remount,ro mnt
(no warning, no fst change)
sudo mount -o remount,rw,space_cache=v2 mnt
(no warning, no fst change)
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11
Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
The problem is we're copying "inherit" from user space but we don't
necessarily know that we're copying enough data for a 64 byte
struct. Then the next problem is that 'inherit' has a variable size
array at the end, and we have to verify that array is the size we
expected.
Fixes: 6f72c7e20d ("Btrfs: add qgroup inheritance")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
If btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data returns an error (i.e quota limit reached)
the handling logic directly goes to the 'out' label without first
unlocking the extent range between lockstart, lockend. This results in
deadlocks as other processes try to lock the same extent.
Fixes: a7f8b1c2ac ("btrfs: file: reserve qgroup space after the hole punch range is locked")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Fix build warnings of function signature when CONFIG_STACKTRACE is not
enabled by reordering the 'inline' and 'void' keywords.
../fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:221:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
static void inline __save_stack_trace(struct ref_action *ra)
../fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:225:1: warning: ‘inline’ is not at beginning of declaration [-Wold-style-declaration]
static void inline __print_stack_trace(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Disallow updating the ownership bit on an existing table: Do not allow
to grab ownership on an existing table. Do not allow to drop ownership
on an existing table.
Fixes: 6001a930ce ("netfilter: nftables: introduce table ownership")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
We rely on implicit includes, list out explicitly what this code
relies on.
Suggested-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-8-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The ACPI scan capabilities is called from the intel-dspconfig as well
as the SOF/HDaudio drivers. This creates dependencies and randconfig issues
when HDaudio and SOF/SoundWire are not all configured as modules.
To simplify Kconfig dependencies between HDAudio, SoundWire, SOF and
intel-dspconfig, move the ACPI scan helpers to a dedicated
module. This follows the same idea as NHLT helpers which are already
handled as a dedicated module.
The only functional change is that the kernel parameter to filter
links is now handled by a different module, but that was only provided
for developers needing work-arounds for early BIOS releases.
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-7-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The Kconfig file is way too convoluted. Track platforms where
SoundWire is supported, and add simpler conditions to make sure there
is no module/built-in issue.
The use of 'depends on' is less intuitive if a required 'depend' is
missing, but that's a small price to pay for clarity and simplicity.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-6-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
There is no reason why we should call the intel_dspcfg helpers from
common code, this should be moved in Intel-specific code and only
called from platforms where a conflict may occur with the HDaudio or
SST/Skylake driver.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-5-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Move PCI IDs and device-specific definitions out of common code. No
functionality change for now, just code split and removal of
IF_ENABLED() which made the configurations too complicated in case of
reuse of IP across generations.
Additional changes to address the DSP_CONFIG case and SoundWire
depends/select confusions are provided in follow-up patches.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-4-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The SOF-ACPI driver is backwards from the normal Linux model, it has a
generic driver that knows about all the specific drivers, as opposed to
having hardware specific drivers that link against a common framework.
This requires ugly Kconfig magic and leads to missed dependencies as
seen in this link error:
arm-linux-gnueabi-ld: sound/soc/sof/sof-pci-dev.o: in function `sof_acpi_probe':
sof-pci-dev.c:(.text+0x1c): undefined reference to `snd_intel_dsp_driver_probe'
Change it to use the normal probe order of starting with a specific
device in a driver, turning the sof-acpi-dev.c driver into a
library (exported symbols are name-spaced to avoid symbol pollution).
For backwards-compatibility with previous Kconfigs, the default values
for platform drivers uses the top-level ACPI configurations. The
modules were also renamed to allow for gradual transitions in test
scripts.
Co-developed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-3-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
To change the module dependencies and simplify Kconfigs, we need to
introduce new driver names (sof-audio-acpi-intel-byt and
sof-audio-acpi-intel-bdw), and move from an exact string match to a
partial one.
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Bard Liao <bard.liao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302003125.1178419-2-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Commit af99da7433 ("powerpc/sstep: Support VSX vector paired storage
access instructions") added loading and storing 32 word long data into
adjacent VSRs. However the calculation used to determine if two VSRs
needed to be loaded/stored inadvertently prevented the load/storing
taking place for instructions with a data length less than 16 words.
This causes the emulation to not function correctly, which can be seen
by the alignment_handler selftest:
$ ./alignment_handler
[snip]
test: test_alignment_handler_vsx_207
tags: git_version:powerpc-5.12-1-0-g82d2c16b350f
VSX: 2.07B
Doing lxsspx: PASSED
Doing lxsiwax: FAILED: Wrong Data
Doing lxsiwzx: PASSED
Doing stxsspx: PASSED
Doing stxsiwx: PASSED
failure: test_alignment_handler_vsx_207
test: test_alignment_handler_vsx_300
tags: git_version:powerpc-5.12-1-0-g82d2c16b350f
VSX: 3.00B
Doing lxsd: PASSED
Doing lxsibzx: PASSED
Doing lxsihzx: PASSED
Doing lxssp: FAILED: Wrong Data
Doing lxv: PASSED
Doing lxvb16x: PASSED
Doing lxvh8x: PASSED
Doing lxvx: PASSED
Doing lxvwsx: FAILED: Wrong Data
Doing lxvl: PASSED
Doing lxvll: PASSED
Doing stxsd: PASSED
Doing stxsibx: PASSED
Doing stxsihx: PASSED
Doing stxssp: PASSED
Doing stxv: PASSED
Doing stxvb16x: PASSED
Doing stxvh8x: PASSED
Doing stxvx: PASSED
Doing stxvl: PASSED
Doing stxvll: PASSED
failure: test_alignment_handler_vsx_300
[snip]
Fix this by making sure all VSX instruction emulation correctly
load/store from the VSRs.
Fixes: af99da7433 ("powerpc/sstep: Support VSX vector paired storage access instructions")
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225031946.1458206-1-jniethe5@gmail.com
Running "perf mem record" in powerpc platforms with selinux enabled
resulted in soft lockup's. Below call-trace was seen in the logs:
CPU: 58 PID: 3751 Comm: sssd_nss Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7+ #2
NIP: c000000000dff3d4 LR: c000000000dff3d0 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c000007fffab7d60 TRAP: 0100 Not tainted (5.11.0-rc7+)
...
NIP _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x94/0x120
LR _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0x120
Call Trace:
0xc00000000fd47260 (unreliable)
skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
common_lsm_audit+0xb0/0xe0
slow_avc_audit+0xa4/0x110
avc_has_perm+0x1c4/0x260
selinux_perf_event_open+0x74/0xd0
security_perf_event_open+0x68/0xc0
record_and_restart+0x6e8/0x7f0
perf_event_interrupt+0x22c/0x560
performance_monitor_exception0x4c/0x60
performance_monitor_common_virt+0x1c8/0x1d0
interrupt: f00 at _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
NIP: c000000000dff378 LR: c000000000b5fbbc CTR: c0000000007d47f0
REGS: c00000000fd47860 TRAP: 0f00 Not tainted (5.11.0-rc7+)
...
NIP _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
LR skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
interrupt: f00
0x38 (unreliable)
0xc00000000aae6200
audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
audit_log_exit+0x344/0xf80
__audit_syscall_exit+0x2c0/0x320
do_syscall_trace_leave+0x148/0x200
syscall_exit_prepare+0x324/0x390
system_call_common+0xfc/0x27c
The above trace shows that while the CPU was handling a performance
monitor exception, there was a call to security_perf_event_open()
function. In powerpc core-book3s, this function is called from
perf_allow_kernel() check during recording of data address in the
sample via perf_get_data_addr().
Commit da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux
checks") introduced security enhancements to perf. As part of this
commit, the new security hook for perf_event_open() was added in all
places where perf paranoid check was previously used. In powerpc
core-book3s code, originally had paranoid checks in
perf_get_data_addr() and power_pmu_bhrb_read(). So
perf_paranoid_kernel() checks were replaced with perf_allow_kernel()
in these PMU helper functions as well.
The intention of paranoid checks in core-book3s was to verify
privilege access before capturing some of the sample data. Along with
paranoid checks, perf_allow_kernel() also does a
security_perf_event_open(). Since these functions are accessed while
recording a sample, we end up calling selinux_perf_event_open() in PMI
context. Some of the security functions use spinlock like
sidtab_sid2str_put(). If a perf interrupt hits under a spin lock and
if we end up in calling selinux hook functions in PMI handler, this
could cause a dead lock.
Since the purpose of this security hook is to control access to
perf_event_open(), it is not right to call this in interrupt context.
The paranoid checks in powerpc core-book3s were done at interrupt time
which is also not correct.
Reference commits:
Commit cd1231d703 ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak via perf_get_data_addr()")
Commit bb19af8160 ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak to userspace via BHRB buffer")
We only allow creation of events that have already passed the
privilege checks in perf_event_open(). So these paranoid checks are
not needed at event time. As a fix, patch uses
'event->attr.exclude_kernel' check to prevent exposing kernel address
for userspace only sampling.
Fixes: cd1231d703 ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak via perf_get_data_addr()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614247839-1428-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
The test robot has managed to generate a random config leading
to following build failure:
LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
powerpc64-linux-ld: arch/powerpc/mm/pgtable.o: in function `ptep_set_access_flags':
pgtable.c:(.text.ptep_set_access_flags+0xf0): undefined reference to `hash__flush_tlb_page'
powerpc64-linux-ld: arch/powerpc/mm/book3s32/mmu.o: in function `MMU_init_hw_patch':
mmu.c:(.init.text+0x452): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A0'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x45e): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A0'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x46a): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A1'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x476): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A1'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x482): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A2'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x48e): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_A2'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x49e): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_B'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4aa): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_B'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4b6): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_C'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4c2): undefined reference to `patch__hash_page_C'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4ce): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A0'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4da): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A0'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4e6): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A1'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4f2): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A1'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x4fe): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A2'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x50a): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_A2'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x522): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_B'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mmu.c:(.init.text+0x532): undefined reference to `patch__flush_hash_B'
powerpc64-linux-ld: arch/powerpc/mm/book3s32/mmu.o: in function `update_mmu_cache':
mmu.c:(.text.update_mmu_cache+0xa0): undefined reference to `add_hash_page'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mm/memory.o: in function `zap_pte_range':
memory.c:(.text.zap_pte_range+0x160): undefined reference to `flush_hash_pages'
powerpc64-linux-ld: mm/memory.o: in function `handle_pte_fault':
memory.c:(.text.handle_pte_fault+0x180): undefined reference to `hash__flush_tlb_page'
This is due to mmu_has_feature() not being inlined. See extract of build of
mmu.c with -Winline:
In file included from ./include/linux/mm_types.h:19,
from ./include/linux/mmzone.h:21,
from ./include/linux/gfp.h:6,
from ./include/linux/mm.h:10,
from arch/powerpc/mm/book3s32/mmu.c:21:
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu.h: In function 'find_free_bat':
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu.h:231:20: warning: inlining failed in call to 'early_mmu_has_feature': call is unlikely and code size would grow [-Winline]
231 | static inline bool early_mmu_has_feature(unsigned long feature)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./arch/powerpc/include/asm/mmu.h:291:9: note: called from here
291 | return early_mmu_has_feature(feature);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The code relies on constant folding of MMU_FTRS_POSSIBLE at buildtime
and elimination of non possible parts of code at compile time.
For this to work, mmu_has_feature() and early_mmu_has_feature()
must be inlined.
Fixes: 259149cf7c ("powerpc/32s: Only build hash code when CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_604 is selected")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf61345912c078c96f171afd0fcc48ef27cbdc3f.1614443418.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
The driver core ignores the return value of struct bus_type::remove()
because there is only little that can be done. To simplify the quest to
make this function return void, let struct vio_driver::remove() return
void, too. All users already unconditionally return 0, this commit makes
it obvious that returning an error code is a bad idea.
Note there are two nominally different implementations for a vio bus:
one in arch/sparc/kernel/vio.c and the other in
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c. This patch only adapts the powerpc
one.
Before this patch for a device that was bound to a driver without a
remove callback vio_cmo_bus_remove(viodev) wasn't called. As the device
core still considers the device unbound after vio_bus_remove() returns
calling this unconditionally is the consistent behaviour which is
implemented here.
Signed-off-by: Uwe Kleine-König <uwe@kleine-koenig.org>
Reviewed-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Lijun Pan <ljp@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[mpe: Drop unneeded hvcs_remove() forward declaration, squash in
change from sfr to drop ibmvnic_remove() forward declaration]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225221834.160083-1-uwe@kleine-koenig.org
The verifier test labelled "valid read map access into a read-only array
2" calls the bpf_csum_diff() helper and checks its return value. However,
architecture implementations of csum_partial() (which is what the helper
uses) differ in whether they fold the return value to 16 bit or not. For
example, x86 version has ...
if (unlikely(odd)) {
result = from32to16(result);
result = ((result >> 8) & 0xff) | ((result & 0xff) << 8);
}
... while generic lib/checksum.c does:
result = from32to16(result);
if (odd)
result = ((result >> 8) & 0xff) | ((result & 0xff) << 8);
This makes the helper return different values on different architectures,
breaking the test on non-x86. To fix this, add an additional instruction
to always mask the return value to 16 bits, and update the expected return
value accordingly.
Fixes: fb2abb73e5 ("bpf, selftest: test {rd, wr}only flags and direct value access")
Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta <yauheni.kaliuta@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210228103017.320240-1-yauheni.kaliuta@redhat.com
test_snprintf_btf fails on s390, because NULL points to a readable
struct lowcore there. Fix by using the last page instead.
Error message example:
printing fffffffffffff000 should generate error, got (361)
Fixes: 076a95f5af ("selftests/bpf: Add bpf_snprintf_btf helper tests")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210227051726.121256-1-iii@linux.ibm.com
Multiple bug reports report issues with the SOF and SST drivers when
dealing with single microphone cases.
We currently read the DMIC array information unconditionally but we
don't check that the configuration type is actually a mic array.
When the DMIC link does not rely on a mic array configuration, the
recommendation is to check the format information to infer the maximum
number of channels, and map this to the number of microphones.
This leaves a potential for a mismatch between actual microphones
available in hardware and what the ACPI table contains, but we have no
other source of information.
Note that single microphone configurations can alternatively be
handled with a 'mic array' configuration along with a 'vendor-defined'
geometry.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201251
BugLink: https://github.com/thesofproject/linux/issues/2725
Fixes: 7a33ea70e1 ('ALSA: hda: intel-nhlt: handle NHLT VENDOR_DEFINED DMIC geometry')
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guennadi Liakhovetski <guennadi.liakhovetski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rander Wang <rander.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302000146.1177770-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
v5.12-rc1 flags new warnings with make W=1, fix missing or broken
function descriptors.
sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c:3492: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hda_input_mux_info_info(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_input_mux_info() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c:3521: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hda_input_mux_info_put(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_input_mux_put() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c:3958: warning: expecting prototype for
_snd_hda_pin_ctl(). Prototype was for _snd_hda_set_pin_ctl() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_jack.c:223: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hda_set_dirty_all(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_jack_set_dirty_all() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_jack.c:309: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_mst(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_jack_detect_enable_callback_mst() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c:3933: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_dha_gen_add_mute_led_cdev(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_gen_add_mute_led_cdev() instead
sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c:4093: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_dha_gen_add_micmute_led_cdev(). Prototype was for
snd_hda_gen_add_micmute_led_cdev() instead
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c:2357: warning: expecting prototype for
Prepare and send the SCP message to DSP(). Prototype was for
dspio_scp() instead
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c:2883: warning: expecting prototype for
Allocate router ports(). Prototype was for dsp_allocate_router_ports()
instead
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c:3202: warning: expecting prototype for
Write a block of data into DSP code or data RAM using pre(). Prototype
was for dspxfr_one_seg() instead
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c:3397: warning: expecting prototype for
data overlay to DSP memories(). Prototype was for dspxfr_image()
instead
sound/hda/hdac_regmap.c:393: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hdac_regmap_init(). Prototype was for snd_hdac_regmap_exit()
instead
sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c:142: warning: expecting prototype
for snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link_index(). Prototype was for
snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link() instead
sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_stream.c:140: warning: expecting prototype for
snd_hdac_ext_linkstream_start(). Prototype was for
snd_hdac_ext_link_stream_start() instead
Signed-off-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301174617.116960-1-pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Fix the following coccicheck warning:
scripts/gcc-plugins/latent_entropy_plugin.c:539:2-3: Unneeded semicolon
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200418070521.10931-1-yanaijie@huawei.com
Fix the following coccicheck warning:
scripts/gcc-plugins/structleak_plugin.c:177:14-17: Unneeded variable:
"ret". Return "0" on line 207
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200418070505.10715-1-yanaijie@huawei.com
Contrary to the RNDIS protocol specification, certain (pre-Fe)
implementations of Hyper-V's vSwitch did not account for the status
buffer field in the length of an RNDIS packet; the bug was fixed in
newer implementations. Validate the status buffer fields using the
length of the 'vmtransfer_page' packet (all implementations), that
is known/validated to be less than or equal to the receive section
size and not smaller than the length of the RNDIS message.
Reported-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Fixes: 505e3f00c3 ("hv_netvsc: Add (more) validation for untrusted Hyper-V values")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A different TPID bit is used for 802.1ad VLAN frames.
Reported-by: Ilario Gelmetti <iochesonome@gmail.com>
Fixes: f0af34317f ("net: dsa: mediatek: combine MediaTek tag with VLAN tag")
Signed-off-by: DENG Qingfang <dqfext@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The referenced commit expands the skb_seq_state used by
skb_find_text with a 4B frag_off field, growing it to 48B.
This exceeds container ts_state->cb, causing a stack corruption:
[ 73.238353] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack
is corrupted in: skb_find_text+0xc5/0xd0
[ 73.247384] CPU: 1 PID: 376 Comm: nping Not tainted 5.11.0+ #4
[ 73.252613] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
[ 73.260078] Call Trace:
[ 73.264677] dump_stack+0x57/0x6a
[ 73.267866] panic+0xf6/0x2b7
[ 73.270578] ? skb_find_text+0xc5/0xd0
[ 73.273964] __stack_chk_fail+0x10/0x10
[ 73.277491] skb_find_text+0xc5/0xd0
[ 73.280727] string_mt+0x1f/0x30
[ 73.283639] ipt_do_table+0x214/0x410
The struct is passed between skb_find_text and its callbacks
skb_prepare_seq_read, skb_seq_read and skb_abort_seq read through
the textsearch interface using TS_SKB_CB.
I assumed that this mapped to skb->cb like other .._SKB_CB wrappers.
skb->cb is 48B. But it maps to ts_state->cb, which is only 40B.
skb->cb was increased from 40B to 48B after ts_state was introduced,
in commit 3e3850e989 ("[NETFILTER]: Fix xfrm lookup in
ip_route_me_harder/ip6_route_me_harder").
Increase ts_state.cb[] to 48 to fit the struct.
Also add a BUILD_BUG_ON to avoid a repeat.
The alternative is to directly add a dependency from textsearch onto
linux/skbuff.h, but I think the intent is textsearch to have no such
dependencies on its callers.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=211911
Fixes: 97550f6fa5 ("net: compound page support in skb_seq_read")
Reported-by: Kris Karas <bugs-a17@moonlit-rail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch fixes a spelling typo in bonding.rst.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Merge tag 'linux-can-fixes-for-5.12-20210301' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mkl/linux-can
Marc Kleine-Budde says:
====================
pull-request: can 2021-03-01
this is a pull request of 6 patches for net/master.
The first 3 patches are by Joakim Zhang for the flexcan driver and fix
the probing and starting of the chip.
The next patch is by me, for the mcp251xfd driver and reverts the BQL
support. BQL support got mainline with rc1 and assumes that CAN frames
are always echoed, which is not the case. A proper fix requires
changes more changes and will be rolled out via linux-can-next later.
Oleksij Rempel's patch fixes the socket ref counting if socket was
closed before setting skb ownership.
Torin Cooper-Bennun's patch for the tcan4x5x driver fixes a race
condition, where the chip is first attached the bus and then the MRAM
is initialized, which may result in lost data.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Vladimir Oltean says:
====================
Fixes for NXP ENETC driver
This contains an assorted set of fixes collected over the past 2 weeks
on the enetc driver. Some are related to VLAN processing, some to
physical link settings, some are fixups of previous hardware workarounds,
and some are simply zero-day data path bugs that for some reason were
never caught or at least identified.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The RX rings have a producer index owned by hardware, where newly
received frame buffers are placed, and a consumer index owned by
software, where newly allocated buffers are placed, in expectation of
hardware being able to place frame data in them.
Hardware increments the producer index when a frame is received, however
it is not allowed to increment the producer index to match the consumer
index (RBCIR) since the ring can hold at most RBLENR[LENGTH]-1 received
BDs. Whenever the producer index matches the value of the consumer
index, the ring has no unprocessed received frames and all BDs in the
ring have been initialized/prepared by software, i.e. hardware owns all
BDs in the ring.
The code uses the next_to_clean variable to keep track of the producer
index, and the next_to_use variable to keep track of the consumer index.
The RX rings are seeded from enetc_refill_rx_ring, which is called from
two places:
1. initially the ring is seeded until full with enetc_bd_unused(rx_ring),
i.e. with 511 buffers. This will make next_to_clean=0 and next_to_use=511:
.ndo_open
-> enetc_open
-> enetc_setup_bdrs
-> enetc_setup_rxbdr
-> enetc_refill_rx_ring
2. then during the data path processing, it is refilled with 16 buffers
at a time:
enetc_msix
-> napi_schedule
-> enetc_poll
-> enetc_clean_rx_ring
-> enetc_refill_rx_ring
There is just one problem: the initial seeding done during .ndo_open
updates just the producer index (ENETC_RBPIR) with 0, and the software
next_to_clean and next_to_use variables. Notably, it will not update the
consumer index to make the hardware aware of the newly added buffers.
Wait, what? So how does it work?
Well, the reset values of the producer index and of the consumer index
of a ring are both zero. As per the description in the second paragraph,
it means that the ring is full of buffers waiting for hardware to put
frames in them, which by coincidence is almost true, because we have in
fact seeded 511 buffers into the ring.
But will the hardware attempt to access the 512th entry of the ring,
which has an invalid BD in it? Well, no, because in order to do that, it
would have to first populate the first 511 entries, and the NAPI
enetc_poll will kick in by then. Eventually, after 16 processed slots
have become available in the RX ring, enetc_clean_rx_ring will call
enetc_refill_rx_ring and then will [ finally ] update the consumer index
with the new software next_to_use variable. From now on, the
next_to_clean and next_to_use variables are in sync with the producer
and consumer ring indices.
So the day is saved, right? Well, not quite. Freeing the memory
allocated for the rings is done in:
enetc_close
-> enetc_clear_bdrs
-> enetc_clear_rxbdr
-> this just disables the ring
-> enetc_free_rxtx_rings
-> enetc_free_rx_ring
-> sets next_to_clean and next_to_use to 0
but again, nothing is committed to the hardware producer and consumer
indices (yay!). The assumption is that the ring is disabled, so the
indices don't matter anyway, and it's the responsibility of the "open"
code path to set those up.
.. Except that the "open" code path does not set those up properly.
While initially, things almost work, during subsequent enetc_close ->
enetc_open sequences, we have problems. To be precise, the enetc_open
that is subsequent to enetc_close will again refill the ring with 511
entries, but it will leave the consumer index untouched. Untouched
means, of course, equal to the value it had before disabling the ring
and draining the old buffers in enetc_close.
But as mentioned, enetc_setup_rxbdr will at least update the producer
index though, through this line of code:
enetc_rxbdr_wr(hw, idx, ENETC_RBPIR, 0);
so at this stage we'll have:
next_to_clean=0 (in hardware 0)
next_to_use=511 (in hardware we'll have the refill index prior to enetc_close)
Again, the next_to_clean and producer index are in sync and set to
correct values, so the driver manages to limp on. Eventually, 16 ring
entries will be consumed by enetc_poll, and the savior
enetc_clean_rx_ring will come and call enetc_refill_rx_ring, and then
update the hardware consumer ring based upon the new next_to_use.
So.. it works?
Well, by coincidence, it almost does, but there's a circumstance where
enetc_clean_rx_ring won't be there to save us. If the previous value of
the consumer index was 15, there's a problem, because the NAPI poll
sequence will only issue a refill when 16 or more buffers have been
consumed.
It's easiest to illustrate this with an example:
ip link set eno0 up
ip addr add 192.168.100.1/24 dev eno0
ping 192.168.100.1 -c 20 # ping this port from another board
ip link set eno0 down
ip link set eno0 up
ping 192.168.100.1 -c 20 # ping it again from the same other board
One by one:
1. ip link set eno0 up
-> calls enetc_setup_rxbdr:
-> calls enetc_refill_rx_ring(511 buffers)
-> next_to_clean=0 (in hw 0)
-> next_to_use=511 (in hw 0)
2. ping 192.168.100.1 -c 20 # ping this port from another board
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=1 next_to_clean 0 (in hw 1) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=2 next_to_clean 1 (in hw 2) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=3 next_to_clean 2 (in hw 3) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=4 next_to_clean 3 (in hw 4) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=5 next_to_clean 4 (in hw 5) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=6 next_to_clean 5 (in hw 6) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=7 next_to_clean 6 (in hw 7) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=8 next_to_clean 7 (in hw 8) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=9 next_to_clean 8 (in hw 9) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=10 next_to_clean 9 (in hw 10) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=11 next_to_clean 10 (in hw 11) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=12 next_to_clean 11 (in hw 12) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=13 next_to_clean 12 (in hw 13) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=14 next_to_clean 13 (in hw 14) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=15 next_to_clean 14 (in hw 15) next_to_use 511 (in hw 0)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: enetc_refill_rx_ring(16) increments next_to_use by 16 (mod 512) and writes it to hw
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=0 next_to_clean 15 (in hw 16) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=1 next_to_clean 16 (in hw 17) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=2 next_to_clean 17 (in hw 18) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=3 next_to_clean 18 (in hw 19) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=4 next_to_clean 19 (in hw 20) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=5 next_to_clean 20 (in hw 21) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=6 next_to_clean 21 (in hw 22) next_to_use 15 (in hw 15)
20 packets transmitted, 20 packets received, 0% packet loss
3. ip link set eno0 down
enetc_free_rx_ring: next_to_clean 0 (in hw 22), next_to_use 0 (in hw 15)
4. ip link set eno0 up
-> calls enetc_setup_rxbdr:
-> calls enetc_refill_rx_ring(511 buffers)
-> next_to_clean=0 (in hw 0)
-> next_to_use=511 (in hw 15)
5. ping 192.168.100.1 -c 20 # ping it again from the same other board
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=1 next_to_clean 0 (in hw 1) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=2 next_to_clean 1 (in hw 2) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=3 next_to_clean 2 (in hw 3) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=4 next_to_clean 3 (in hw 4) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=5 next_to_clean 4 (in hw 5) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=6 next_to_clean 5 (in hw 6) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=7 next_to_clean 6 (in hw 7) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=8 next_to_clean 7 (in hw 8) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=9 next_to_clean 8 (in hw 9) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=10 next_to_clean 9 (in hw 10) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=11 next_to_clean 10 (in hw 11) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=12 next_to_clean 11 (in hw 12) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=13 next_to_clean 12 (in hw 13) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
enetc_clean_rx_ring: rx_frm_cnt=1 cleaned_cnt=14 next_to_clean 13 (in hw 14) next_to_use 511 (in hw 15)
20 packets transmitted, 12 packets received, 40% packet loss
And there it dies. No enetc_refill_rx_ring (because cleaned_cnt must be equal
to 15 for that to happen), no nothing. The hardware enters the condition where
the producer (14) + 1 is equal to the consumer (15) index, which makes it
believe it has no more free buffers to put packets in, so it starts discarding
them:
ip netns exec ns0 ethtool -S eno0 | grep -v ': 0'
NIC statistics:
Rx ring 0 discarded frames: 8
Summarized, if the interface receives between 16 and 32 (mod 512) frames
and then there is a link flap, then the port will eventually die with no
way to recover. If it receives less than 16 (mod 512) frames, then the
initial NAPI poll [ before the link flap ] will not update the consumer
index in hardware (it will remain zero) which will be ok when the buffers
are later reinitialized. If more than 32 (mod 512) frames are received,
the initial NAPI poll has the chance to refill the ring twice, updating
the consumer index to at least 32. So after the link flap, the consumer
index is still wrong, but the post-flap NAPI poll gets a chance to
refill the ring once (because it passes through cleaned_cnt=15) and
makes the consumer index be again back in sync with next_to_use.
The solution to this problem is actually simple, we just need to write
next_to_use into the hardware consumer index at enetc_open time, which
always brings it back in sync after an initial buffer seeding process.
The simpler thing would be to put the write to the consumer index into
enetc_refill_rx_ring directly, but there are issues with the MDIO
locking: in the NAPI poll code we have the enetc_lock_mdio() taken from
top-level and we use the unlocked enetc_wr_reg_hot, whereas in
enetc_open, the enetc_lock_mdio() is not taken at the top level, but
instead by each individual enetc_wr_reg, so we are forced to put an
additional enetc_wr_reg in enetc_setup_rxbdr. Better organization of
the code is left as a refactoring exercise.
Fixes: d4fd0404c1 ("enetc: Introduce basic PF and VF ENETC ethernet drivers")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Station Interface Receive Interrupt Detect Register (SIRXIDR)
contains a 16-bit wide mask of 'interrupt detected' events for each ring
associated with a port. Bit i is write-1-to-clean for RX ring i.
I have no explanation whatsoever how this line of code came to be
inserted in the blamed commit. I checked the downstream versions of that
patch and none of them have it.
The somewhat comical aspect of it is that we're writing a binary number
to the SIRXIDR register, which is derived from enetc_bd_unused(rx_ring).
Since the RX rings have 512 buffer descriptors, we end up writing 511 to
this register, which is 0x1ff, so we are effectively clearing the
'interrupt detected' event for rings 0-8.
This register is not what is used for interrupt handling though - it
only provides a summary for the entire SI. The hardware provides one
separate Interrupt Detect Register per RX ring, which auto-clears upon
read. So there doesn't seem to be any adverse effect caused by this
bogus write.
There is, however, one reason why this should be handled as a bugfix:
next_to_clean _should_ be committed to hardware, just not to that
register, and this was obscuring the fact that it wasn't. This is fixed
in the next patch, and removing the bogus line now allows the fix patch
to be backported beyond that point.
Fixes: fd5736bf9f ("enetc: Workaround for MDIO register access issue")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
