proc_pident_instantiate() has following call flow.
proc_pident_lookup()
proc_pident_instantiate()
proc_pid_make_inode()
And, proc_pident_lookup() has following error handling.
const struct pid_entry *p, *last;
error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
Then, proc_pident_instantiate should return ENOENT too when racing against
exit(2) occur.
EINAL has two bad reason.
- it implies caller is wrong. bad the race isn't caller's mistake.
- man 2 open don't explain EINVAL. user often don't handle it.
Note: Other proc_pid_make_inode() caller already use ENOENT properly.
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
By using the same test as is used for /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps,
only allow processes that can ptrace() a given process to see information
that might be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR).
These include eip, esp, wchan, and start_stack in /proc/pid/stat as well
as the non-symbolic output from /proc/pid/wchan.
ASLR can be bypassed by sampling eip as shown by the proof-of-concept
code at http://code.google.com/p/fuzzyaslr/ As part of a presentation
(http://www.cr0.org/paper/to-jt-linux-alsr-leak.pdf) esp and wchan were
also noted as possibly usable information leaks as well. The
start_stack address also leaks potentially useful information.
Cc: Stable Team <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In recently sysfs_poll discussion, Neil Brown pointed out /proc/mounts
also should be fixed.
SUSv3 says "Regular files shall always poll TRUE for reading and
writing". see
http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/poll.html
Then, mounts_poll()'s default should be "POLLIN | POLLRDNORM". it mean
always readable.
In addition, event trigger should use "POLLERR | POLLPRI" instead
POLLERR. it makes consistent to mdstat_poll() and sysfs_poll(). and,
select(2) can handle POLLPRI easily.
Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Don't pull it in sched.h; very few files actually need it and those
can include directly. sched.h itself only needs forward declaration
of struct fs_struct;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being
shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient
use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid,
in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec
also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one).
We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs,
replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get
while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
___
fs/proc/base.c | 50 +++++++++++++++--------------------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit ee6f779b9e ("filp->f_pos not
correctly updated in proc_task_readdir") changed the proc code to use
filp->f_pos directly, rather than through a temporary variable. In the
process, that caused the operations to be done on the full 64 bits, even
though the offset is never that big.
That's all fine and dandy per se, but for some unfathomable reason gcc
generates absolutely horrid code when using 64-bit values in switch()
statements. To the point of actually calling out to gcc helper
functions like __cmpdi2 rather than just doing the trivial comparisons
directly the way gcc does for normal compares. At which point we get
link failures, because we really don't want to support that kind of
crazy code.
Fix this by just casting the f_pos value to "unsigned long", which
is plenty big enough for /proc, and avoids the gcc code generation issue.
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
filp->f_pos only get updated at the end of the function. Thus d_off of those
dirents who are in the middle will be 0, and this will cause a problem in
glibc's readdir implementation, specifically endless loop. Because when overflow
occurs, f_pos will be set to next dirent to read, however it will be 0, unless
the next one is the last one. So it will start over again and again.
There is a sample program in man 2 gendents. This is the output of the program
running on a multithread program's task dir before this patch is applied:
$ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
--------------- nread=128 ---------------
i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name
506442 directory 16 1 .
506441 directory 16 0 ..
506443 directory 16 0 3807
506444 directory 16 0 3809
506445 directory 16 0 3812
506446 directory 16 0 3861
506447 directory 16 0 3862
506448 directory 16 8 3863
This is the output after this patch is applied
$ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
--------------- nread=128 ---------------
i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name
506442 directory 16 1 .
506441 directory 16 2 ..
506443 directory 16 3 3807
506444 directory 16 4 3809
506445 directory 16 5 3812
506446 directory 16 6 3861
506447 directory 16 7 3862
506448 directory 16 8 3863
Signed-off-by: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
... and don't bother in callers. Don't bother with zeroing i_blocks,
while we are at it - it's already been zeroed.
i_mode is not worth the effort; it has no common default value.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
fs/proc/base.c:312:4: warning: do-while statement is not a compound statement
Signed-off-by: Hannes Eder <hannes@hanneseder.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
/proc/*/stack adds the ability to query a task's stack trace. It is more
useful than /proc/*/wchan as it provides full stack trace instead of single
depth. Example output:
$ cat /proc/self/stack
[<c010a271>] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x17/0x35
[<c01827b4>] proc_pid_stack+0x4a/0x76
[<c018312d>] proc_single_show+0x4a/0x5e
[<c016bdec>] seq_read+0xf3/0x29f
[<c015a004>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x91
[<c015a0c1>] sys_read+0x3b/0x60
[<c0102eda>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
[add save_stack_trace_tsk() on mips, ACK Ralf --adobriyan]
Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Stephen Rothwell reported this new (harmless) build warning on platforms that
define u64 to long:
fs/proc/base.c: In function 'proc_pid_schedstat':
fs/proc/base.c:352: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64'
asm-generic/int-l64.h platforms strike again: that file should be eliminated.
Fix it by casting the parameters to long long.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: simplify code
When we turn on CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS, per-task cpu runtime is accumulated
twice. Once in task->se.sum_exec_runtime and once in sched_info.cpu_time.
These two stats are exactly the same.
Given that task->se.sum_exec_runtime is always accumulated by the core
scheduler, sched_info can reuse that data instead of duplicate the accounting.
Signed-off-by: Ken Chen <kenchen@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Miles Lane tailing /sys files hit a BUG which Pekka Enberg has tracked
to my 966c8c12dc sprint_symbol(): use
less stack exposing a bug in slub's list_locations() -
kallsyms_lookup() writes a 0 to namebuf[KSYM_NAME_LEN-1], but that was
beyond the end of page provided.
The 100 slop which list_locations() allows at end of page looks roughly
enough for all the other stuff it might print after the symbol before
it checks again: break out KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN earlier than before.
Latencytop and ftrace and are using KSYM_NAME_LEN buffers where they
need KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN buffers, and vmallocinfo a 2*KSYM_NAME_LEN buffer
where it wants a KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN buffer: fix those before anyone copies
them.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: ftrace.h needs module.h]
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds.
This means that it will be possible for the credentials of a task to be
replaced without another task (a) requiring a full lock to read them, and (b)
seeing deallocated memory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
pointing to it.
Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in
entry.S via asm-offsets.
With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
After commit 831830b5a2 aka
"restrict reading from /proc/<pid>/maps to those who share ->mm or can ptrace"
sysctl stopped being relevant because commit moved security checks from ->show
time to ->start time (mm_for_maps()).
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Make process personality flags visible in /proc. Since a process's
personality is potentially sensitive (e.g. READ_IMPLIES_EXEC), make this
file only readable by the process owner.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
lock_task_sighand() make sure task->sighand is being protected,
so we do not need rcu_read_lock().
[ exec() will get task->sighand->siglock before change task->sighand! ]
But code using rcu_read_lock() _just_ to protect lock_task_sighand()
only appear in procfs. (and some code in procfs use lock_task_sighand()
without such redundant protection.)
Other subsystem may put lock_task_sighand() into rcu_read_lock()
critical region, but these rcu_read_lock() are used for protecting
"for_each_process()", "find_task_by_vpid()" etc. , not for protecting
lock_task_sighand().
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
[ok from Oleg]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
proc: fix warnings
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 3 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 5 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 6 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 7 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 8 has type 'u64'
fs/proc/base.c:2429: warning: format '%llu' expects type 'long long unsigned int', but argument 9 has type 'u64'
Signed-off-by: Alexander Beregalov <a.beregalov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Simplify the code of include/linux/task_io_accounting.h.
It is also more reasonable to have all the task i/o-related statistics in a
single struct (task_io_accounting).
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Put all i/o statistics in struct proc_io_accounting and use inline functions to
initialize and increment statistics, removing a lot of single variable
assignments.
This also reduces the kernel size as following (with CONFIG_TASK_XACCT=y and
CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING=y).
text data bss dec hex filename
11651 0 0 11651 2d83 kernel/exit.o.before
11619 0 0 11619 2d63 kernel/exit.o.after
10886 132 136 11154 2b92 kernel/fork.o.before
10758 132 136 11026 2b12 kernel/fork.o.after
3082029 807968 4818600 8708597 84e1f5 vmlinux.o.before
3081869 807968 4818600 8708437 84e155 vmlinux.o.after
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits)
[PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
[PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely
[PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap
[PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h
[PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open
[PATCH] f_count may wrap around
[PATCH] dup3 fix
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate()
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi()
[PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent()
[PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
[PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
[PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()
[PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup
[patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change
[patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup
[patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok()
[PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation
...
Oleg Nesterov points out that we should check that the task is still alive
before we iterate over the threads. This patch includes a fixup for this.
Also simplify do_io_accounting() implementation.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares
about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask.
* kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission()
* sanitize ecryptfs_permission()
* fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new
MAY_... found in mask.
The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9)
folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This adds /proc/PID/syscall and /proc/PID/task/TID/syscall magic files.
These use task_current_syscall() to show the task's current system call
number and argument registers, stack pointer and PC. For a task blocked
but not in a syscall, the file shows "-1" in place of the syscall number,
followed by only the SP and PC. For a task that's not blocked, it shows
"running".
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This adds the tracehook_tracer_task() hook to consolidate all forms of
"Who is using ptrace on me?" logic. This is used for "TracerPid:" in
/proc and for permission checks. We also clean up the selinux code the
called an identical accessor.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Report per-thread I/O statistics in /proc/pid/task/tid/io and aggregate
parent I/O statistics in /proc/pid/io. This approach follows the same
model used to account per-process and per-thread CPU times.
As a practial application, this allows for example to quickly find the top
I/O consumer when a process spawns many child threads that perform the
actual I/O work, because the aggregated I/O statistics can always be found
in /proc/pid/io.
[ Oleg Nesterov points out that we should check that the task is still
alive before we iterate over the threads, but also says that we can do
that fixup on top of this later. - Linus ]
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Righi <righi.andrea@gmail.com>
Cc: Matt Heaton <matt@hostmonster.com>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by-with-comments: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.
In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).
Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch:
commit e9720acd72
Author: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Date: Fri Mar 7 11:08:40 2008 -0800
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3)
introduced a /proc/self/net directory without bumping the corresponding
link count for /proc/self.
This patch replaces the static link count initializations with a call that
counts the number of directory entries in the given pid_entry table
whenever it is instantiated, and thus relieves the burden of manually
keeping the two in sync.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup]
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current permissions on sessionid are a little too restrictive.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This cleans up the permission checks done for /proc/PID/mem i/o calls. It
puts all the logic in a new function, check_mem_permission().
The old code repeated the (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
magical expression multiple times. The new function does all that work in one
place, with clear comments.
The old code called security_ptrace() twice on successful checks, once in
MAY_PTRACE() and once in __ptrace_may_attach(). Now it's only called once,
and only if all other checks have succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
the first executable VMA. Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
reported as the result.
Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems. Instead of
walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.
That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs. So we track the number
of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
unmapped. This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments]
[yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap]
Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[mszeredi@suse.cz] rewrite and split big patch into managable chunks
/proc/mounts in its current form lacks important information:
- propagation state
- root of mount for bind mounts
- the st_dev value used within the filesystem
- identifier for each mount and it's parent
It also suffers from the following problems:
- not easily extendable
- ambiguity of mountpoints within a chrooted environment
- doesn't distinguish between filesystem dependent and independent options
- doesn't distinguish between per mount and per super block options
This patch introduces /proc/<pid>/mountinfo which attempts to address
all these deficiencies.
Code shared between /proc/<pid>/mounts and /proc/<pid>/mountinfo is
extracted into separate functions.
Thanks to Al Viro for the help in getting the design right.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Allow /proc/<pid>/mountinfo to use the root of <pid> to calculate
mountpoints.
- move definition of 'struct proc_mounts' to <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
- add the process's namespace and root to this structure
- pass a pointer to 'struct proc_mounts' into seq_operations
In addition the following cleanups are made:
- use a common open function for /proc/<pid>/{mounts,mountstat}
- surround namespace.c part of these proc files with #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
- make the seq_operations structures const
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Since we drop the rcu_read_lock inside the loop, we can't assume
that files->fdt will remain unchanged (and not freed) between
iterations.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
commit e9720ac ([NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3))
broke ganglia and probably other applications that read /proc/net/dev.
This is due to the change of permissions of /proc/net that was
introduced in that commit.
Before: dr-xr-xr-x 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:30 /proc/net
After: dr-xr--r-- 5 root root 0 Mar 19 11:29 /proc/self/net
This patch restores the permissions to the old value which makes
ganglia happy again.
Pavel Emelyanov says:
This also broke the postfix, as it was reported in bug #10286
and described in detail by Benjamin.
Signed-off-by: Andre Noll <maan@systemlinux.org>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (47 commits)
[SCTP]: Fix local_addr deletions during list traversals.
net: fix build with CONFIG_NET=n
[TCP]: Prevent sending past receiver window with TSO (at last skb)
rt2x00: Add new D-Link USB ID
rt2x00: never disable multicast because it disables broadcast too
libertas: fix the 'compare command with itself' properly
drivers/net/Kconfig: fix whitespace for GELIC_WIRELESS entry
[NETFILTER]: nf_queue: don't return error when unregistering a non-existant handler
[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_queue: fix EPERM when binding/unbinding and instance 0 exists
[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_log: fix EPERM when binding/unbinding and instance 0 exists
[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: replace horrible hack with ksize()
[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add \n to "expectation table full" message
[NETFILTER]: xt_time: fix failure to match on Sundays
[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_log: fix computation of netlink skb size
[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_queue: fix computation of allocated size for netlink skb.
[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink: fix ifdef in nfnetlink_compat.h
[NET]: include <linux/types.h> into linux/ethtool.h for __u* typedef
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3)
RxRPC: fix rxrpc_recvmsg()'s returning of msg_name
net/enc28j60: oops fix
...
fs/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1134): undefined reference to `proc_net_inode_operations'
fs/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1138): undefined reference to `proc_net_operations'
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current
implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed.
The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has
fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different
net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but
currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any
other namespace, depending on who opened the file first.
The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points
to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in
/proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the
appropriate task lives in.
# ls -l /proc/net
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net
In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike
"mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory.
Changes from v2:
* Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling
screwup pointed out by Stephen.
To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net
is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry.
To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized
properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent.
Selinux fixes are
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Changes from v1:
* Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
