These uses sometimes do and sometimes don't have '\n' terminations. Make
the uses consistently use '\n' terminations and remove the newline from
the functions.
Miscellanea:
o Coalesce formats
o Realign arguments
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Caveat: This may return -EROFS for a read case, which seems wrong. This
is happening even without this patch series though. Should we convert
EROFS to EIO?
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The trusted extended attributes are only visible to the process which
hvae CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability but the check is missing in ocfs2
xattr_handler trusted list. The check is important because this will be
used for implementing mechanisms in the userspace for which other
ordinary processes should not have access to.
Signed-off-by: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Taesoo kim <taesoo@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some functions are only used locally, so mark them as static.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
"d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
fs/9p: fix readdir()
VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In ocfs2_local_alloc_find_clear_bits and ocfs2_get_dentry, variable
numfound and set may be uninitialized and then used in tracepoint. In
ocfs2_xattr_block_get and ocfs2_delete_xattr_in_bucket, variable block_off
and xv may be uninitialized and then used in the following logic due to
unchecked return value.
This patch fixes these possible issues.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_val() that is not used anywhere.
This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called
cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
ocfs2_get_xattr_nolock() checks whether inode has any extended attributes
(OCFS2_HAS_XATTR_FL). If not, it just sets 'ret' to -ENODATA but
continues with checking inline and external attributes anyway (which is
pointless although it does not harm). Just return immediately when we
know there are no extended attributes in the inode.
Coverity id: 1226906.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch fixes the following crash:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/uptodate.c:530!
Modules linked in: ocfs2(F) ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue configfs bridge xen_pciback xen_netback xen_blkback xen_gntalloc xen_gntdev xen_evtchn xenfs xen_privcmd sunrpc 8021q garp stp llc bonding be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i libcxgbi cxgb3 mdio ib_iser rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core ib_addr ipv6 iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas coretemp freq_table mperf microcode pcspkr serio_raw bnx2 lpc_ich mfd_core i5k_amb i5000_edac edac_core e1000e sg shpchp ext4(F) jbd2(F) mbcache(F) dm_round_robin(F) sr_mod(F) cdrom(F) usb_storage(F) sd_mod(F) crc_t10dif(F) pata_acpi(F) ata_generic(F) ata_piix(F) mptsas(F) mptscsih(F) mptbase(F) scsi_transport_sas(F) radeon(F)
ttm(F) drm_kms_helper(F) drm(F) hwmon(F) i2c_algo_bit(F) i2c_core(F) dm_multipath(F) dm_mirror(F) dm_region_hash(F) dm_log(F) dm_mod(F)
CPU 5
Pid: 21303, comm: xattr-test Tainted: GF W 3.8.13-30.el6uek.x86_64 #2 Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0M788G
RIP: ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x51/0x60 [ocfs2]
Process xattr-test (pid: 21303, threadinfo ffff880017aca000, task ffff880016a2c480)
Call Trace:
ocfs2_init_xattr_bucket+0x8a/0x120 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_cp_xattr_bucket+0xbb/0x1b0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_extend_xattr_bucket+0x20a/0x2f0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_add_new_xattr_bucket+0x23e/0x4b0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_set_entry_index_block+0x13c/0x3d0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_block_set+0xf9/0x220 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x118/0x710 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_set+0x691/0x880 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_user_set+0x46/0x50 [ocfs2]
generic_setxattr+0x96/0xa0
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x7b/0x170
vfs_setxattr+0xbc/0xc0
setxattr+0xde/0x230
sys_fsetxattr+0xc6/0xf0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 41 80 0c 24 01 48 89 df e8 7d f0 ff ff 4c 89 e6 48 89 df e8 a2 fe ff ff 48 89 df e8 3a f0 ff ff 48 8b 1c 24 4c 8b 64 24 08 c9 c3 <0f> 0b eb fe 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 66 66
RIP ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate+0x51/0x60 [ocfs2]
It hit the BUG_ON() in ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate():
void ocfs2_set_new_buffer_uptodate(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
/* This should definitely *not* exist in our cache */
if (ocfs2_buffer_cached(ci, bh))
printk(KERN_ERR "bh->b_blocknr: %lu @ %p\n", bh->b_blocknr, bh);
BUG_ON(ocfs2_buffer_cached(ci, bh));
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_lock(ci);
ocfs2_set_buffer_uptodate(ci, bh);
ocfs2_metadata_cache_io_unlock(ci);
}
The problem here is:
We cached a block, but the buffer_head got reused. When we are to pick
up this block again, a new buffer_head created with UPTODATE flag
cleared. ocfs2_buffer_uptodate() returned false since no UPTODATE is
set on the buffer_head. so we set this block to cache as a NEW block,
then it failed at asserting block is not in cache.
The fix is to add a new parameter indicating the bucket is a new
allocated or not to ocfs2_init_xattr_bucket().
ocfs2_init_xattr_bucket() assert block not cached accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Ensure that ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans() is called any time we touch
an inode in a given transaction. This is a follow-on to the previous
patch to reduce lock contention and deadlocking during an fsync
operation.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Wengang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Cc: Greg Marsden <greg.marsden@oracle.com>
Cc: Srinivas Eeda <srinivas.eeda@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Orabug: 18108070
ocfs2_xattr_extend_allocation() hits panic when creating xattr during
data extent alloc phase. The problem occurs if due to local alloc
fragmentation, clusters are spread over multiple extents. In this case
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree() finds no space to store more than one
extent record and therefore fails returning RESTART_META. The situation
is anticipated for xattr update case but not xattr create case. This
fix simply ports that code to create case.
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This contains some major refactoring for the create path so that
inodes are created with the right mode to start with instead of
fixing it up later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
sb_getblk() may return an err, so add a check for bh.
[joseph.qi@huawei.com: also add a check after calling sb_getblk() in ocfs2_create_xattr_block()]
Signed-off-by: Rui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The only reason for sb_getblk() failing is if it can't allocate the
buffer_head. So return ENOMEM instead when it fails.
[joseph.qi@huawei.com: ocfs2_symlink_get_block() and ocfs2_read_blocks_sync() and ocfs2_read_blocks() need the same change]
Signed-off-by: Rui Xiang <rui.xiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Code cleanup to remove unnecessary variable passed but never used
to ocfs2_calc_extend_credits.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In ocfs2_reflink_xattr_rec(), meta_ac and data_ac are allocated by calling
ocfs2_lock_reflink_xattr_rec_allocators().
Once an error occurs when allocating *data_ac, it frees *meta_ac which is
allocated before. Here it mistakenly sets meta_ac to NULL but *meta_ac.
Then ocfs2_reflink_xattr_rec() will try to free meta_ac again which is
already invalid.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In ocfs2_xattr_set(), if ocfs2_start_trans failed, meta_ac and data_ac
should be free. Otherwise, It would lead to a memory leak.
Signed-off-by: Younger Liu <younger.liu@huawei.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In ocfs2_xattr_value_attach_refcount(), if error occurs when calling
ocfs2_xattr_get_clusters(), it will go with unexpected behavior since
local variables p_cluster, num_clusters and ext_flags are declared without
initialization.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Inlined xattr shared free space of inode block with inlined data or data
extent record, so the size of the later two should be adjusted when
inlined xattr is enabled. See ocfs2_xattr_ibody_init(). But this isn't
done well when reflink. For inode with inlined data, its max inlined
data size is adjusted in ocfs2_duplicate_inline_data(), no problem. But
for inode with data extent record, its record count isn't adjusted. Fix
it, or data extent record and inlined xattr may overwrite each other,
then cause data corruption or xattr failure.
One panic caused by this bug in our test environment is the following:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1435!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
Pid: 10871, comm: multi_reflink_t Not tainted 2.6.39-300.17.1.el5uek #1
RIP: ocfs2_xa_offset_pointer+0x17/0x20 [ocfs2]
RSP: e02b:ffff88007a587948 EFLAGS: 00010283
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000010 RCX: 00000000000051e4
RDX: ffff880057092060 RSI: 0000000000000f80 RDI: ffff88007a587a68
RBP: ffff88007a587948 R08: 00000000000062f4 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000010
R13: ffff88007a587a68 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88007a587c68
FS: 00007fccff7f06e0(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000015cf000 CR3: 000000007aa76000 CR4: 0000000000000660
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process multi_reflink_t
Call Trace:
ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry+0x60/0x280 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry+0x17e/0x2a0 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xa_set+0xcc/0x250 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x98/0x230 [ocfs2]
__ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x4f/0x700 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_set+0x6c6/0x890 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_xattr_user_set+0x46/0x50 [ocfs2]
generic_setxattr+0x70/0x90
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x80/0x1a0
vfs_setxattr+0xa9/0xb0
setxattr+0xc3/0x120
sys_fsetxattr+0xa8/0xd0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Sunil Mushran <sunil.mushran@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Free space checking will be done in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_init(). So remove
here.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unused local]
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We need to re-initialize the security for a new reflinked inode with its
parent dirs if it isn't specified to be preserved for ocfs2_reflink().
However, the code logic is broken at ocfs2_init_security_and_acl()
although ocfs2_init_security_get() succeed. As a result,
ocfs2_acl_init() does not involked and therefore the default ACL of
parent dir was missing on the new inode.
Note this was introduced by 9d8f13ba3 ("security: new
security_inode_init_security API adds function callback")
To reproduce:
set default ACL for the parent dir(ocfs2 in this case):
$ setfacl -m default:user:jeff:rwx ../ocfs2/
$ getfacl ../ocfs2/
# file: ../ocfs2/
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rwx
group::r-x
other::r-x
default:user::rwx
default:user:jeff:rwx
default:group::r-x
default😷:rwx
default:other::r-x
$ touch a
$ getfacl a
# file: a
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
group::rw-
other::r--
Before patching, create reflink file b from a, the user
default ACL entry(user:jeff:rwx)was missing:
$ ./ocfs2_reflink a b
$ getfacl b
# file: b
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
group::rw-
other::r--
In this case, the end user can also observed an error message at syslog:
(ocfs2_reflink,3229,2):ocfs2_init_security_and_acl:7193 ERROR: status = 0
After applying this patch, create reflink file c from a:
$ ./ocfs2_reflink a c
$ getfacl c
# file: c
# owner: jeff
# group: jeff
user::rw-
user:jeff:rwx #effective:rw-
group::r-x #effective:r--
mask::rw-
other::r--
Test program:
/* Usage: reflink <source> <dest> */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
static int
reflink_file(char const *src_name, char const *dst_name,
bool preserve_attrs)
{
int fd;
#ifndef REFLINK_ATTR_NONE
# define REFLINK_ATTR_NONE 0
#endif
#ifndef REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE
# define REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE 1
#endif
#ifndef OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK
struct reflink_arguments {
uint64_t old_path;
uint64_t new_path;
uint64_t preserve;
};
# define OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK _IOW ('o', 4, struct reflink_arguments)
#endif
struct reflink_arguments args = {
.old_path = (unsigned long) src_name,
.new_path = (unsigned long) dst_name,
.preserve = preserve_attrs ? REFLINK_ATTR_PRESERVE :
REFLINK_ATTR_NONE,
};
fd = open(src_name, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s: %s\n",
src_name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (ioctl(fd, OCFS2_IOC_REFLINK, &args) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to reflink %s to %s: %s\n",
src_name, dst_name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc != 3) {
fprintf(stdout, "Usage: %s source dest\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
return reflink_file(argv[1], argv[2], 0);
}
Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'upstream-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlbec/ocfs2: (31 commits)
ocfs2: avoid unaligned access to dqc_bitmap
ocfs2: Use filemap_write_and_wait() instead of write_inode_now()
ocfs2: honor O_(D)SYNC flag in fallocate
ocfs2: Add a missing journal credit in ocfs2_link_credits() -v2
ocfs2: send correct UUID to cleancache initialization
ocfs2: Commit transactions in error cases -v2
ocfs2: make direntry invalid when deleting it
fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmlock.c: free kmem_cache_zalloc'd data using kmem_cache_free
ocfs2: Avoid livelock in ocfs2_readpage()
ocfs2: serialize unaligned aio
ocfs2: Implement llseek()
ocfs2: Fix ocfs2_page_mkwrite()
ocfs2: Add comment about orphan scanning
ocfs2: Clean up messages in the fs
ocfs2/cluster: Cluster up now includes network connections too
ocfs2/cluster: Add new function o2net_fill_node_map()
ocfs2/cluster: Fix output in file elapsed_time_in_ms
ocfs2/dlm: dlmlock_remote() needs to account for remastery
ocfs2/dlm: Take inflight reference count for remotely mastered resources too
ocfs2/dlm: Cleanup dlm_wait_for_node_death() and dlm_wait_for_node_recovery()
...
There are three cases found that in error cases, journal transactions are not
committed nor aborted. We should take care of these case by committing the
transactions. Otherwise, there would left a journal handle which will lead to
, in same process context, the comming ocfs2_start_trans() gets wrong credits.
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
mlog_exit is used to record the exit status of a function.
But because it is added in so many functions, if we enable it,
the system logs get filled up quickly and cause too much I/O.
So actually no one can open it for a production system or even
for a test.
This patch just try to remove it or change it. So:
1. if all the error paths already use mlog_errno, it is just removed.
Otherwise, it will be replaced by mlog_errno.
2. if it is used to print some return value, it is replaced with
mlog(0,...).
mlog_exit_ptr is changed to mlog(0.
All those mlog(0,...) will be replaced with trace events later.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
ENTRY is used to record the entry of a function.
But because it is added in so many functions, if we enable it,
the system logs get filled up quickly and cause too much I/O.
So actually no one can open it for a production system or even
for a test.
So for mlog_entry_void, we just remove it.
for mlog_entry(...), we replace it with mlog(0,...), and they
will be replace by trace event later.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It was evaludated to indexed before, check it is ok i think.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Liu <jeff.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
The new reservation code in local alloc has add the limitation
that the caller should handle the case that the local alloc
doesn't give use enough contiguous clusters. It make the old
xattr reflink code broken.
So this patch udpate the xattr reflink code so that it can
handle the case that local alloc give us one cluster at a time.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
The old ocfs2_xattr_extent_allocation is too optimistic about
the clusters we can get. So actually if the file system is
too fragmented, ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree will return us
with EGAIN and we need to allocate clusters once again.
So this patch change it to a while loop so that we can allocate
clusters until we reach clusters_to_add.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
In normal xattr set, the set sequence is inode, xattr block
and finally xattr bucket if we meet with a ENOSPC. But there
is a corner case.
So consider we will set a xattr whose value will be stored in
a cluster, and there is no xattr block by now. So we will
reserve 1 xattr block and 1 cluster for setting it. Now if we
fail in value extension(in case the volume is almost full and
we can't allocate the cluster because the check in
ocfs2_test_bg_bit_allocatable), ENOSPC will be returned. So
we will try to create a bucket(this time there is a chance that
the reserved cluster will be used), and when we try value extension
again, kernel bug happens. We did meet with it. Check the bug below.
http://oss.oracle.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=1251
This patch just try to avoid this by adding a set_abort in
ocfs2_xattr_set_ctxt, so in case ENOSPC happens in value extension,
we will check whether it is caused by the real ENOSPC or just the
full of inode or xattr block. If it is the first case, we set set_abort
so that we don't try any further. we are safe to exit directly here
ince it is really ENOSPC.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
In ocfs2_prepare_xattr_entry, if we fail to grow an existing value,
xa_cleanup_value_truncate() will leave the old entry in place. Thus, we
reset its value size. However, if we were allocating a new value, we
must not reset the value size or we will BUG(). This resolves
oss.oracle.com bug 1247.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
In case the block we are going to free is allocated from
a discontiguous block group, we have to use suballoc_loc
to be the right group.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Get the suballoc_loc from ocfs2_claim_new_inode() or
ocfs2_claim_metadata(). Store it on the appropriate field of the block
we just allocated.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
They all take an ocfs2_alloc_context, which has the allocation inode.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
In ocfs2, we use ocfs2_extend_trans() to extend a journal handle's
blocks. But if jbd2_journal_extend() fails, it will only restart
with the the new number of blocks. This tends to be awkward since
in most cases we want additional reserved blocks. It makes our code
harder to mantain since the caller can't be sure all the original
blocks will not be accessed and dirtied again. There are 15 callers
of ocfs2_extend_trans() in fs/ocfs2, and 12 of them have to add
h_buffer_credits before they call ocfs2_extend_trans(). This makes
ocfs2_extend_trans() really extend atop the original block count.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
jbd[2]_journal_dirty_metadata() only returns 0. It's been returning 0
since before the kernel moved to git. There is no point in checking
this error.
ocfs2_journal_dirty() has been faithfully returning the status since the
beginning. All over ocfs2, we have blocks of code checking this can't
fail status. In the past few years, we've tried to avoid adding these
checks, because they are pointless. But anyone who looks at our code
assumes they are needed.
Finally, ocfs2_journal_dirty() is made a void function. All error
checking is removed from other files. We'll BUG_ON() the status of
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() just in case they change it someday. They
won't.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
You can't store a pointer that you haven't filled in yet and expect it
to work.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
When replacing a xattr's value, in some case we wipe its name/value
first and then re-add it. The wipe is done by
ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue() when the xattr is in the inode or
block. We currently adjust name_offset for all the entries which have
(offset < name_offset). This does not adjust the entrie we're replacing.
Since we are replacing the entry, we don't adjust the total entry count.
When we calculate a new namevalue location, we trust the entries
now-wrong offset in ocfs2_xa_get_free_start(). The solution is to
also adjust the name_offset for the replaced entry, allowing
ocfs2_xa_get_free_start() to calculate the new namevalue location
correctly.
The following script can trigger a kernel panic easily.
echo 'y'|mkfs.ocfs2 --fs-features=local,xattr -b 4K $DEVICE
mount -t ocfs2 $DEVICE $MNT_DIR
FILE=$MNT_DIR/$RANDOM
for((i=0;i<76;i++))
do
string_76="a$string_76"
done
string_78="aa$string_76"
string_82="aaaa$string_78"
touch $FILE
setfattr -n 'user.test1234567890' -v $string_76 $FILE
setfattr -n 'user.test1234567890' -v $string_78 $FILE
setfattr -n 'user.test1234567890' -v $string_82 $FILE
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
ocfs2 can store extended attribute values as large as a single file. It
does this using a standard ocfs2 btree for the large value. However,
the previous code did not handle all error cases cleanly.
There are multiple problems to have.
1) We have trouble allocating space for a new xattr. This leaves us
with an empty xattr.
2) We overwrote an existing local xattr with a value root, and now we
have an error allocating the storage. This leaves us an empty xattr.
where there used to be a value. The value is lost.
3) We have trouble truncating a reused value. This leaves us with the
original entry pointing to the truncated original value. The value
is lost.
4) We have trouble extending the storage on a reused value. This leaves
us with the original value safely in place, but with more storage
allocated when needed.
This doesn't consider storing local xattrs (values that don't require a
btree). Those only fail when the journal fails.
Case (1) is easy. We just remove the xattr we added. We leak the
storage because we can't safely remove it, but otherwise everything is
happy. We'll print a warning about the leak.
Case (4) is easy. We still have the original value in place. We can
just leave the extra storage attached to this xattr. We return the
error, but the old value is untouched. We print a warning about the
storage.
Case (2) and (3) are hard because we've lost the original values. In
the old code, we ended up with values that could be partially read.
That's not good. Instead, we just wipe the xattr entry and leak the
storage. It stinks that the original value is lost, but now there isn't
a partial value to be read. We'll print a big fat warning.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set() is the only remaining user of
ocfs2_xattr_set_entry(). ocfs2_xattr_set_entry() actually does two
things: it calls ocfs2_xa_set(), and it initializes the inline xattrs.
Initializing the inline space really belongs in its own call.
We lift the initialization to ocfs2_xattr_ibody_init(), called from
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set() only when necessary. Now
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set() can call ocfs2_xa_set() directly.
ocfs2_xattr_set_entry() goes away.
Another nice fact is that ocfs2_init_dinode_xa_loc() can trust
i_xattr_inline_size.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
ocfs2_xattr_block_set() calls into ocfs2_xattr_set_entry() with just the
HAS_XATTR flag. Most of the machinery of ocfs2_xattr_set_entry() is
skipped. All that really happens other than the call to ocfs2_xa_set()
is making sure the HAS_XATTR flag is set on the inode.
But HAS_XATTR should be set when we also set di->i_xattr_loc. And
that's done in ocfs2_create_xattr_block(). So let's move it there, and
then ocfs2_xattr_block_set() can just call ocfs2_xa_set().
While we're there, ocfs2_create_xattr_block() can take the set_ctxt for
a smaller argument list. It also learns to set HAS_XATTR_FL, because it
knows for sure. ocfs2_create_empty_xatttr_block() in the reflink path
fakes a set_ctxt to call ocfs2_create_xattr_block().
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
ocfs2_xattr_set_in_bucket() doesn't need to do its own hacky space
checking. Let's let ocfs2_xa_prepare_entry() (via ocfs2_xa_set()) do
the more accurate work. Whenever it doesn't have space,
ocfs2_xattr_set_in_bucket() can try to get more space.
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
