introduced post-6.0 or which aren't considered serious enough to justify a
-stable backport.
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Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2022-11-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc hotfixes from Andrew Morton:
"22 hotfixes.
Eight are cc:stable and the remainder address issues which were
introduced post-6.0 or which aren't considered serious enough to
justify a -stable backport"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2022-11-11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (22 commits)
docs: kmsan: fix formatting of "Example report"
mm/damon/dbgfs: check if rm_contexts input is for a real context
maple_tree: don't set a new maximum on the node when not reusing nodes
maple_tree: fix depth tracking in maple_state
arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c: pud_huge() returns 0 when using 2-level paging
fs: fix leaked psi pressure state
nilfs2: fix use-after-free bug of ns_writer on remount
x86/traps: avoid KMSAN bugs originating from handle_bug()
kmsan: make sure PREEMPT_RT is off
Kconfig.debug: ensure early check for KMSAN in CONFIG_KMSAN_WARN
x86/uaccess: instrument copy_from_user_nmi()
kmsan: core: kmsan_in_runtime() should return true in NMI context
mm: hugetlb_vmemmap: include missing linux/moduleparam.h
mm/shmem: use page_mapping() to detect page cache for uffd continue
mm/memremap.c: map FS_DAX device memory as decrypted
Partly revert "mm/thp: carry over dirty bit when thp splits on pmd"
nilfs2: fix deadlock in nilfs_count_free_blocks()
mm/mmap: fix memory leak in mmap_region()
hugetlbfs: don't delete error page from pagecache
maple_tree: reorganize testing to restore module testing
...
* PCI fix
* PV clock fix
x86:
* Fix clash between PMU MSRs and other MSRs
* Prepare SVM assembly trampoline for 6.2 retbleed mitigation
and for...
* ... tightening IBRS restore on vmexit, moving it before
the first RET or indirect branch
* Fix log level for VMSA dump
* Block all page faults during kvm_zap_gfn_range()
Tools:
* kvm_stat: fix incorrect detection of debugfs
* kvm_stat: update vmexit definitions
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm
"This is a pretty large diffstat for this time of the release. The main
culprit is a reorganization of the AMD assembly trampoline, allowing
percpu variables to be accessed early.
This is needed for the return stack depth tracking retbleed mitigation
that will be in 6.2, but it also makes it possible to tighten the IBRS
restore on vmexit. The latter change is a long tail of the
spectrev2/retbleed patches (the corresponding Intel change was simpler
and went in already last June), which is why I am including it right
now instead of sharing a topic branch with tip.
Being assembly and being rich in comments makes the line count balloon
a bit, but I am pretty confident in the change (famous last words)
because the reorganization actually makes everything simpler and more
understandable than before. It has also had external review and has
been tested on the aforementioned 6.2 changes, which explode quite
brutally without the fix.
Apart from this, things are pretty normal.
s390:
- PCI fix
- PV clock fix
x86:
- Fix clash between PMU MSRs and other MSRs
- Prepare SVM assembly trampoline for 6.2 retbleed mitigation and
for...
- ... tightening IBRS restore on vmexit, moving it before the first
RET or indirect branch
- Fix log level for VMSA dump
- Block all page faults during kvm_zap_gfn_range()
Tools:
- kvm_stat: fix incorrect detection of debugfs
- kvm_stat: update vmexit definitions"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86/mmu: Block all page faults during kvm_zap_gfn_range()
KVM: x86/pmu: Limit the maximum number of supported AMD GP counters
KVM: x86/pmu: Limit the maximum number of supported Intel GP counters
KVM: x86/pmu: Do not speculatively query Intel GP PMCs that don't exist yet
KVM: SVM: Only dump VMSA to klog at KERN_DEBUG level
tools/kvm_stat: update exit reasons for vmx/svm/aarch64/userspace
tools/kvm_stat: fix incorrect detection of debugfs
x86, KVM: remove unnecessary argument to x86_virt_spec_ctrl and callers
KVM: SVM: move MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL save/restore to assembly
KVM: SVM: restore host save area from assembly
KVM: SVM: move guest vmsave/vmload back to assembly
KVM: SVM: do not allocate struct svm_cpu_data dynamically
KVM: SVM: remove dead field from struct svm_cpu_data
KVM: SVM: remove unused field from struct vcpu_svm
KVM: SVM: retrieve VMCB from assembly
KVM: SVM: adjust register allocation for __svm_vcpu_run()
KVM: SVM: replace regs argument of __svm_vcpu_run() with vcpu_svm
KVM: x86: use a separate asm-offsets.c file
KVM: s390: pci: Fix allocation size of aift kzdev elements
KVM: s390: pv: don't allow userspace to set the clock under PV
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Merge tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed-20221110' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux
Pull hyperv fixes from Wei Liu:
- Fix TSC MSR write for root partition (Anirudh Rayabharam)
- Fix definition of vector in pci-hyperv driver (Dexuan Cui)
- A few other misc patches
* tag 'hyperv-fixes-signed-20221110' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hyperv/linux:
PCI: hv: Fix the definition of vector in hv_compose_msi_msg()
MAINTAINERS: remove sthemmin
x86/hyperv: fix invalid writes to MSRs during root partition kexec
clocksource/drivers/hyperv: add data structure for reference TSC MSR
Drivers: hv: fix repeated words in comments
x86/hyperv: Remove BUG_ON() for kmap_local_page()
When zapping a GFN range, pass 0 => ALL_ONES for the to-be-invalidated
range to effectively block all page faults while the zap is in-progress.
The invalidation helpers take a host virtual address, whereas zapping a
GFN obviously provides a guest physical address and with the wrong unit
of measurement (frame vs. byte).
Alternatively, KVM could walk all memslots to get the associated HVAs,
but thanks to SMM, that would require multiple lookups. And practically
speaking, kvm_zap_gfn_range() usage is quite rare and not a hot path,
e.g. MTRR and CR0.CD are almost guaranteed to be done only on vCPU0
during boot, and APICv inhibits are similarly infrequent operations.
Fixes: edb298c663 ("KVM: x86/mmu: bump mmu notifier count in kvm_zap_gfn_range")
Reported-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221111001841.2412598-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'kvm-s390-master-6.1-1' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD
A PCI allocation fix and a PV clock fix.
The AMD PerfMonV2 specification allows for a maximum of 16 GP counters,
but currently only 6 pairs of MSRs are accepted by KVM.
While AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE is already equal to 6, increasing without
adjusting msrs_to_save_all[] could result in out-of-bounds accesses.
Therefore introduce a macro (named KVM_AMD_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) to
refer to the number of counters supported by KVM.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-3-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The Intel Architectural IA32_PMCx MSRs addresses range allows for a
maximum of 8 GP counters, and KVM cannot address any more. Introduce a
local macro (named KVM_INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and use it consistently to
refer to the number of counters supported by KVM, thus avoiding possible
out-of-bound accesses.
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-2-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SDM lists an architectural MSR IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES (0xCF)
that limits the theoretical maximum value of the Intel GP PMC MSRs
allocated at 0xC1 to 14; likewise the Intel April 2022 SDM adds
IA32_OVERCLOCKING_STATUS at 0x195 which limits the number of event
selection MSRs to 15 (0x186-0x194).
Limiting the maximum number of counters to 14 or 18 based on the currently
allocated MSRs is clearly fragile, and it seems likely that Intel will
even place PMCs 8-15 at a completely different range of MSR indices.
So stop at the maximum number of GP PMCs supported today on Intel
processors.
There are some machines, like Intel P4 with non Architectural PMU, that
may indeed have 18 counters, but those counters are in a completely
different MSR address range and are not supported by KVM.
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cf05a67b68 ("KVM: x86: omit "impossible" pmu MSRs from MSR list")
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <likexu@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220919091008.60695-1-likexu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Explicitly print the VMSA dump at KERN_DEBUG log level, KERN_CONT uses
KERNEL_DEFAULT if the previous log line has a newline, i.e. if there's
nothing to continuing, and as a result the VMSA gets dumped when it
shouldn't.
The KERN_CONT documentation says it defaults back to KERNL_DEFAULT if the
previous log line has a newline. So switch from KERN_CONT to
print_hex_dump_debug().
Jarkko pointed this out in reference to the original patch. See:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/YuPMeWX4uuR1Tz3M@kernel.org/
print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, ...) was pointed out there, but
print_hex_dump_debug() should similar.
Fixes: 6fac42f127 ("KVM: SVM: Dump Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA) to klog")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Harald Hoyer <harald@profian.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Message-Id: <20221104142220.469452-1-pgonda@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
x86_virt_spec_ctrl only deals with the paravirtualized
MSR_IA32_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL now and does not handle MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
anymore; remove the corresponding, unused argument.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Restoration of the host IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is probably too late
with respect to the return thunk training sequence.
With respect to the user/kernel boundary, AMD says, "If software chooses
to toggle STIBP (e.g., set STIBP on kernel entry, and clear it on kernel
exit), software should set STIBP to 1 before executing the return thunk
training sequence." I assume the same requirements apply to the guest/host
boundary. The return thunk training sequence is in vmenter.S, quite close
to the VM-exit. On hosts without V_SPEC_CTRL, however, the host's
IA32_SPEC_CTRL value is not restored until much later.
To avoid this, move the restoration of host SPEC_CTRL to assembly and,
for consistency, move the restoration of the guest SPEC_CTRL as well.
This is not particularly difficult, apart from some care to cover both
32- and 64-bit, and to share code between SEV-ES and normal vmentry.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Allow access to the percpu area via the GS segment base, which is
needed in order to access the saved host spec_ctrl value. In linux-next
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER also needs to access percpu data.
For simplicity, the physical address of the save area is added to struct
svm_cpu_data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Analyzed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It is error-prone that code after vmexit cannot access percpu data
because GSBASE has not been restored yet. It forces MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
save/restore to happen very late, after the predictor untraining
sequence, and it gets in the way of return stack depth tracking
(a retbleed mitigation that is in linux-next as of 2022-11-09).
As a first step towards fixing that, move the VMCB VMSAVE/VMLOAD to
assembly, essentially undoing commit fb0c4a4fee ("KVM: SVM: move
VMLOAD/VMSAVE to C code", 2021-03-15). The reason for that commit was
that it made it simpler to use a different VMCB for VMLOAD/VMSAVE versus
VMRUN; but that is not a big hassle anymore thanks to the kvm-asm-offsets
machinery and other related cleanups.
The idea on how to number the exception tables is stolen from
a prototype patch by Peter Zijlstra.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Link: <https://lore.kernel.org/all/f571e404-e625-bae1-10e9-449b2eb4cbd8@citrix.com/>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The svm_data percpu variable is a pointer, but it is allocated via
svm_hardware_setup() when KVM is loaded. Unlike hardware_enable()
this means that it is never NULL for the whole lifetime of KVM, and
static allocation does not waste any memory compared to the status quo.
It is also more efficient and more easily handled from assembly code,
so do it and don't look back.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The "cpu" field of struct svm_cpu_data has been write-only since commit
4b656b1202 ("KVM: SVM: force new asid on vcpu migration", 2009-08-05).
Remove it.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The pointer to svm_cpu_data in struct vcpu_svm looks interesting from
the point of view of accessing it after vmexit, when the GSBASE is still
containing the guest value. However, despite existing since the very
first commit of drivers/kvm/svm.c (commit 6aa8b732ca, "[PATCH] kvm:
userspace interface", 2006-12-10), it was never set to anything.
Ignore the opportunity to fix a 16 year old "bug" and delete it; doing
things the "harder" way makes it possible to remove more old cruft.
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Continue moving accesses to struct vcpu_svm to vmenter.S. Reducing the
number of arguments limits the chance of mistakes due to different
registers used for argument passing in 32- and 64-bit ABIs; pushing the
VMCB argument and almost immediately popping it into a different
register looks pretty weird.
32-bit ABI is not a concern for __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run() which is 64-bit
only; however, it will soon need @svm to save/restore SPEC_CTRL so stay
consistent with __svm_vcpu_run() and let them share the same prototype.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
32-bit ABI uses RAX/RCX/RDX as its argument registers, so they are in
the way of instructions that hardcode their operands such as RDMSR/WRMSR
or VMLOAD/VMRUN/VMSAVE.
In preparation for moving vmload/vmsave to __svm_vcpu_run(), keep
the pointer to the struct vcpu_svm in %rdi. In particular, it is now
possible to load svm->vmcb01.pa in %rax without clobbering the struct
vcpu_svm pointer.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since registers are reachable through vcpu_svm, and we will
need to access more fields of that struct, pass it instead
of the regs[] array.
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This already removes an ugly #include "" from asm-offsets.c, but
especially it avoids a future error when trying to define asm-offsets
for KVM's svm/svm.h header.
This would not work for kernel/asm-offsets.c, because svm/svm.h
includes kvm_cache_regs.h which is not in the include path when
compiling asm-offsets.c. The problem is not there if the .c file is
in arch/x86/kvm.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a149180fbc ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is a case in exc_invalid_op handler that is executed outside the
irqentry_enter()/irqentry_exit() region when an UD2 instruction is used to
encode a call to __warn().
In that case the `struct pt_regs` passed to the interrupt handler is never
unpoisoned by KMSAN (this is normally done in irqentry_enter()), which
leads to false positives inside handle_bug().
Use kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() to explicitly unpoison those registers
before using them.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221102110611.1085175-5-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure usercopy hooks from linux/instrumented.h are invoked for
copy_from_user_nmi(). This fixes KMSAN false positives reported when
dumping opcodes for a stack trace.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221102110611.1085175-2-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
fixed microcode revisions checking quirk
- Update Icelake and Sapphire Rapids events constraints
- Use the standard energy unit for Sapphire Rapids in RAPL
- Fix the hw_breakpoint test to fail more graciously on !SMP configs
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Merge tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.1_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add Cooper Lake's stepping to the PEBS guest/host events isolation
fixed microcode revisions checking quirk
- Update Icelake and Sapphire Rapids events constraints
- Use the standard energy unit for Sapphire Rapids in RAPL
- Fix the hw_breakpoint test to fail more graciously on !SMP configs
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.1_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel: Add Cooper Lake stepping to isolation_ucodes[]
perf/x86/intel: Fix pebs event constraints for SPR
perf/x86/intel: Fix pebs event constraints for ICL
perf/x86/rapl: Use standard Energy Unit for SPR Dram RAPL domain
perf/hw_breakpoint: test: Skip the test if dependencies unmet
- Enforce that TDX guests are successfully loaded only on TDX hardware
where virtualization exception (#VE) delivery on kernel memory is
disabled because handling those in all possible cases is "essentially
impossible"
- Add the proper include to the syscall wrappers so that BTF can see the
real pt_regs definition and not only the forward declaration
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.1_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Add new Intel CPU models
- Enforce that TDX guests are successfully loaded only on TDX hardware
where virtualization exception (#VE) delivery on kernel memory is
disabled because handling those in all possible cases is "essentially
impossible"
- Add the proper include to the syscall wrappers so that BTF can see
the real pt_regs definition and not only the forward declaration
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.1_rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Add several Intel server CPU model numbers
x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access
x86/tdx: Prepare for using "INFO" call for a second purpose
x86/syscall: Include asm/ptrace.h in syscall_wrapper header
* Fix the pKVM stage-1 walker erronously using the stage-2 accessor
* Correctly convert vcpu->kvm to a hyp pointer when generating
an exception in a nVHE+MTE configuration
* Check that KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_* are valid before enabling them
* Fix SMPRI_EL1/TPIDR2_EL0 trapping on VHE
* Document the boot requirements for FGT when entering the kernel
at EL1
x86:
* Use SRCU to protect zap in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
* Make argument order consistent for kvcalloc()
* Userspace API fixes for DEBUGCTL and LBRs
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"ARM:
- Fix the pKVM stage-1 walker erronously using the stage-2 accessor
- Correctly convert vcpu->kvm to a hyp pointer when generating an
exception in a nVHE+MTE configuration
- Check that KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_* are valid before enabling them
- Fix SMPRI_EL1/TPIDR2_EL0 trapping on VHE
- Document the boot requirements for FGT when entering the kernel at
EL1
x86:
- Use SRCU to protect zap in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
- Make argument order consistent for kvcalloc()
- Userspace API fixes for DEBUGCTL and LBRs"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: Fix a typo about the usage of kvcalloc()
KVM: x86: Use SRCU to protect zap in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
KVM: VMX: Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to DEBUGCTL
KVM: VMX: Fold vmx_supported_debugctl() into vcpu_supported_debugctl()
KVM: VMX: Advertise PMU LBRs if and only if perf supports LBRs
arm64: booting: Document our requirements for fine grained traps with SME
KVM: arm64: Fix SMPRI_EL1/TPIDR2_EL0 trapping on VHE
KVM: Check KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_{RING, RING_ACQ_REL} prior to enabling them
KVM: arm64: Fix bad dereference on MTE-enabled systems
KVM: arm64: Use correct accessor to parse stage-1 PTEs
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Merge tag 'for-linus-6.1-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen fixes from Juergen Gross:
"One fix for silencing a smatch warning, and a small cleanup patch"
* tag 'for-linus-6.1-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
x86/xen: simplify sysenter and syscall setup
x86/xen: silence smatch warning in pmu_msr_chk_emulated()
x86:
* Use SRCU to protect zap in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
* Make argument order consistent for kvcalloc()
* Userspace API fixes for DEBUGCTL and LBRs
These servers are all on the public versions of the roadmap. The model
numbers for Grand Ridge, Granite Rapids, and Sierra Forest were included
in the September 2022 edition of the Instruction Set Extensions document.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221103203310.5058-1-tony.luck@intel.com
hyperv_cleanup resets the hypercall page by setting the MSR to 0. However,
the root partition is not allowed to write to the GPA bits of the MSR.
Instead, it uses the hypercall page provided by the MSR. Similar is the
case with the reference TSC MSR.
Clear only the enable bit instead of zeroing the entire MSR to make
the code valid for root partition too.
Signed-off-by: Anirudh Rayabharam <anrayabh@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221027095729.1676394-3-anrayabh@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Swap the 1st and 2nd arguments to be consistent with the usage of
kvcalloc().
Fixes: c9b8fecddb ("KVM: use kvcalloc for array allocations")
Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20221103011749.139262-1-liaochang1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kvm_zap_gfn_range() must be called in an SRCU read-critical section, but
there is no SRCU annotation in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(). This
can lead to the following warning via
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug() if a Shadow MMU is in use (TDP
MMU disabled or nesting):
[ 1416.659809] =============================
[ 1416.659810] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 1416.659839] 6.1.0-dbg-DEV #1 Tainted: G S I
[ 1416.659853] -----------------------------
[ 1416.659854] include/linux/kvm_host.h:954 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 1416.659856]
...
[ 1416.659904] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xaa
[ 1416.659910] dump_stack+0x10/0x15
[ 1416.659913] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x11e/0x130
[ 1416.659919] kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x226/0x5e0
[ 1416.659926] ? kvm_make_all_cpus_request_except+0x18b/0x1e0
[ 1416.659935] __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit+0xcc/0x100
[ 1416.659940] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug+0x350/0x390
[ 1416.659946] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2fc/0x620
[ 1416.659955] __se_sys_ioctl+0x77/0xc0
[ 1416.659962] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1d/0x20
[ 1416.659965] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[ 1416.659969] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Always take the KVM SRCU read lock in __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit()
to protect the GFN to memslot translation. The SRCU read lock is not
technically required when no Shadow MMUs are in use, since the TDP MMU
walks the paging structures from the roots and does not need to look up
GFN translations in the memslots, but make the SRCU locking
unconditional for simplicty.
In most cases, the SRCU locking is taken care of in the vCPU run loop,
but when called through other ioctls (such as KVM_SET_GUEST_DEBUG)
there is no srcu_read_lock.
Tested: ran tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/debug_regs on a DBG
build. This patch causes the suspicious RCU warning to disappear.
Note that the warning is hit in __kvm_zap_rmaps(), so
kvm_memslots_have_rmaps() must return true in order for this to
repro (i.e. the TDP MMU must be off or nesting in use.)
Reported-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Fixes: 36222b117e ("KVM: x86: don't disable APICv memslot when inhibited")
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221102205359.1260980-1-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
xen_enable_sysenter() and xen_enable_syscall() can be simplified a lot.
While at it, switch to use cpu_feature_enabled() instead of
boot_cpu_has().
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Commit 8714f7bcd3 ("xen/pv: add fault recovery control to pmu msr
accesses") introduced code resulting in a warning issued by the smatch
static checker, claiming to use an uninitialized variable.
This is a false positive, but work around the warning nevertheless.
Fixes: 8714f7bcd3 ("xen/pv: add fault recovery control to pmu msr accesses")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to the DEBUGCTL MSR, KVM's
ABI is that setting CPUID vs. state can be done in any order, i.e. KVM
allows userspace to stuff MSRs prior to setting the guest's CPUID that
makes the new MSR "legal".
Keep the vmx_get_perf_capabilities() check for guest writes, even though
it's technically unnecessary since the vCPU's PERF_CAPABILITIES is
consulted when refreshing LBR support. A future patch will clean up
vmx_get_perf_capabilities() to avoid the RDMSR on every call, at which
point the paranoia will incur no meaningful overhead.
Note, prior to vmx_get_perf_capabilities() checking that the host fully
supports LBRs via x86_perf_get_lbr(), KVM effectively relied on
intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() to guard against host userspace enabling LBRs
on platforms without full support.
Fixes: c646236344 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Add PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT check when guest LBR is enabled")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-5-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fold vmx_supported_debugctl() into vcpu_supported_debugctl(), its only
caller. Setting bits only to clear them a few instructions later is
rather silly, and splitting the logic makes things seem more complicated
than they actually are.
Opportunistically drop DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK now that there's a single
reference to the pair of bits. The extra layer of indirection provides
no meaningful value and makes it unnecessarily tedious to understand
what KVM is doing.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-4-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Advertise LBR support to userspace via MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES if and
only if perf fully supports LBRs. Perf may disable LBRs (by zeroing the
number of LBRs) even on platforms the allegedly support LBRs, e.g. if
probing any LBR MSRs during setup fails.
Fixes: be635e34c2 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Expose LBR_FMT in the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES")
Reported-by: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20221006000314.73240-3-seanjc@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The intel_pebs_isolation quirk checks both model number and stepping.
Cooper Lake has a different stepping (11) than the other Skylake Xeon.
It cannot benefit from the optimization in commit 9b545c04ab
("perf/x86/kvm: Avoid unnecessary work in guest filtering").
Add the stepping of Cooper Lake into the isolation_ucodes[] table.
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221031154550.571663-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
According to the latest event list, update the MEM_INST_RETIRED events
which support the DataLA facility.
Fixes: 6017608936 ("perf/x86/intel: Add Icelake support")
Reported-by: Jannis Klinkenberg <jannis.klinkenberg@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221031154119.571386-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Intel Xeon servers used to use a fixed energy resolution (15.3uj) for
Dram RAPL domain. But on SPR, Dram RAPL domain follows the standard
energy resolution as described in MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT.
Remove the SPR Dram energy unit quirk.
Fixes: bcfd218b66 ("perf/x86/rapl: Add support for Intel SPR platform")
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Wang Wendy <wendy.wang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220924054738.12076-3-rui.zhang@intel.com
All normal kernel memory is "TDX private memory". This includes
everything from kernel stacks to kernel text. Handling
exceptions on arbitrary accesses to kernel memory is essentially
impossible because they can happen in horribly nasty places like
kernel entry/exit. But, TDX hardware can theoretically _deliver_
a virtualization exception (#VE) on any access to private memory.
But, it's not as bad as it sounds. TDX can be configured to never
deliver these exceptions on private memory with a "TD attribute"
called ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE. The guest has no way to *set* this
attribute, but it can check it.
Ensure ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE is set in early boot. panic() if it
is unset. There is no sane way for Linux to run with this
attribute clear so a panic() is appropriate.
There's small window during boot before the check where kernel
has an early #VE handler. But the handler is only for port I/O
and will also panic() as soon as it sees any other #VE, such as
a one generated by a private memory access.
[ dhansen: Rewrite changelog and rebase on new tdx_parse_tdinfo().
Add Kirill's tested-by because I made changes since
he wrote this. ]
Fixes: 9a22bf6deb ("x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest")
Reported-by: ruogui.ygr@alibaba-inc.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221028141220.29217-3-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com
- fix lock initialization race in gfn-to-pfn cache (+selftests)
- fix two refcounting errors
- emulator fixes
- mask off reserved bits in CPUID
- fix bug with disabling SGX
RISC-V:
- update MAINTAINERS
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"x86:
- fix lock initialization race in gfn-to-pfn cache (+selftests)
- fix two refcounting errors
- emulator fixes
- mask off reserved bits in CPUID
- fix bug with disabling SGX
RISC-V:
- update MAINTAINERS"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86/xen: Fix eventfd error handling in kvm_xen_eventfd_assign()
KVM: x86: smm: number of GPRs in the SMRAM image depends on the image format
KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after CR0 write
KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after rsm
KVM: x86: emulator: introduce emulator_recalc_and_set_mode
KVM: x86: emulator: em_sysexit should update ctxt->mode
KVM: selftests: Mark "guest_saw_irq" as volatile in xen_shinfo_test
KVM: selftests: Add tests in xen_shinfo_test to detect lock races
KVM: Reject attempts to consume or refresh inactive gfn_to_pfn_cache
KVM: Initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache locks in dedicated helper
KVM: VMX: fully disable SGX if SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING unavailable
KVM: x86: Exempt pending triple fault from event injection sanity check
MAINTAINERS: git://github -> https://github.com for kvm-riscv
KVM: debugfs: Return retval of simple_attr_open() if it fails
KVM: x86: Reduce refcount if single_open() fails in kvm_mmu_rmaps_stat_open()
KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.8000001FH
KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.8000001AH
KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000008H
KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000006H
KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000001H
The TDG.VP.INFO TDCALL provides the guest with various details about
the TDX system that the guest needs to run. Only one field is currently
used: 'gpa_width' which tells the guest which PTE bits mark pages shared
or private.
A second field is now needed: the guest "TD attributes" to tell if
virtualization exceptions are configured in a way that can harm the guest.
Make the naming and calling convention more generic and discrete from the
mask-centric one.
Thanks to Sathya for the inspiration here, but there's no code, comments
or changelogs left from where he started.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
- Add Alder and Raptor Lakes support to RAPL
- Make sure raw sample data is output with tracepoints
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Merge tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.1_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Rename a perf memory level event define to denote it is of CXL type
- Add Alder and Raptor Lakes support to RAPL
- Make sure raw sample data is output with tracepoints
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v6.1_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/mem: Rename PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_EXTN_MEM to PERF_MEM_LVLNUM_CXL
perf/x86/rapl: Add support for Intel Raptor Lake
perf/x86/rapl: Add support for Intel AlderLake-N
perf: Fix missing raw data on tracepoint events
Eight fix pre-6.0 bugs and the remainder address issues which were
introduced in the 6.1-rc merge cycle, or address issues which aren't
considered sufficiently serious to warrant a -stable backport.
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Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2022-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull misc hotfixes from Andrew Morton:
"Eight fix pre-6.0 bugs and the remainder address issues which were
introduced in the 6.1-rc merge cycle, or address issues which aren't
considered sufficiently serious to warrant a -stable backport"
* tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2022-10-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (23 commits)
mm: multi-gen LRU: move lru_gen_add_mm() out of IRQ-off region
lib: maple_tree: remove unneeded initialization in mtree_range_walk()
mmap: fix remap_file_pages() regression
mm/shmem: ensure proper fallback if page faults
mm/userfaultfd: replace kmap/kmap_atomic() with kmap_local_page()
x86: fortify: kmsan: fix KMSAN fortify builds
x86: asm: make sure __put_user_size() evaluates pointer once
Kconfig.debug: disable CONFIG_FRAME_WARN for KMSAN by default
x86/purgatory: disable KMSAN instrumentation
mm: kmsan: export kmsan_copy_page_meta()
mm: migrate: fix return value if all subpages of THPs are migrated successfully
mm/uffd: fix vma check on userfault for wp
mm: prep_compound_tail() clear page->private
mm,madvise,hugetlb: fix unexpected data loss with MADV_DONTNEED on hugetlbfs
mm/page_isolation: fix clang deadcode warning
fs/ext4/super.c: remove unused `deprecated_msg'
ipc/msg.c: fix percpu_counter use after free
memory tier, sysfs: rename attribute "nodes" to "nodelist"
MAINTAINERS: git://github.com -> https://github.com for nilfs2
mm/kmemleak: prevent soft lockup in kmemleak_scan()'s object iteration loops
...
Ensure that KMSAN builds replace memset/memcpy/memmove calls with the
respective __msan_XXX functions, and that none of the macros are redefined
twice. This should allow building kernel with both CONFIG_KMSAN and
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024212144.2852069-5-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
User access macros must ensure their arguments are evaluated only once if
they are used more than once in the macro body. Adding
instrument_put_user() to __put_user_size() resulted in double evaluation
of the `ptr` argument, which led to correctness issues when performing
e.g. unsafe_put_user(..., p++, ...).
To fix those issues, evaluate the `ptr` argument of __put_user_size() at
the beginning of the macro.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024212144.2852069-4-glider@google.com
Fixes: 888f84a6da ("x86: asm: instrument usercopy in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reported-by: youling257 <youling257@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
The stand-alone purgatory.ro does not contain the KMSAN runtime, therefore
it can't be built with KMSAN compiler instrumentation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221024212144.2852069-2-glider@google.com
Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'v6.1-p3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fix from Herbert Xu:
"Fix an alignment crash in x86/polyval"
* tag 'v6.1-p3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: x86/polyval - Fix crashes when keys are not 16-byte aligned
