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xen/console: harden hvc_xen against event channel storms

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The Xen console driver is still vulnerable for an attack via excessive
number of events sent by the backend. Fix that by using a lateeoi event
channel.

For the normal domU initial console this requires the introduction of
bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi() as there is no xenbus device available
at the time the event channel is bound to the irq.

As the decision whether an interrupt was spurious or not requires to
test for bytes having been read from the backend, move sending the
event into the if statement, as sending an event without having found
any bytes to be read is making no sense at all.

This is part of XSA-391

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
V2:
- slightly adapt spurious irq detection (Jan Beulich)
V3:
- fix spurious irq detection (Jan Beulich)
This commit is contained in:
Juergen Gross 2021-12-16 08:24:08 +01:00
parent b27d47950e
commit fe415186b4
3 changed files with 34 additions and 3 deletions
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28
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
View File

@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ struct xencons_info {
struct xenbus_device *xbdev;
struct xencons_interface *intf;
unsigned int evtchn;
XENCONS_RING_IDX out_cons;
unsigned int out_cons_same;
struct hvc_struct *hvc;
int irq;
int vtermno;
@ -138,6 +140,8 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vtermno, char *buf, int len)
XENCONS_RING_IDX cons, prod;
int recv = 0;
struct xencons_info *xencons = vtermno_to_xencons(vtermno);
unsigned int eoiflag = 0;
if (xencons == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
intf = xencons->intf;
@ -157,7 +161,27 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vtermno, char *buf, int len)
mb(); /* read ring before consuming */
intf->in_cons = cons;
/*
* When to mark interrupt having been spurious:
* - there was no new data to be read, and
* - the backend did not consume some output bytes, and
* - the previous round with no read data didn't see consumed bytes
* (we might have a race with an interrupt being in flight while
* updating xencons->out_cons, so account for that by allowing one
* round without any visible reason)
*/
if (intf->out_cons != xencons->out_cons) {
xencons->out_cons = intf->out_cons;
xencons->out_cons_same = 0;
}
if (recv) {
notify_daemon(xencons);
} else if (xencons->out_cons_same++ > 1) {
eoiflag = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
}
xen_irq_lateeoi(xencons->irq, eoiflag);
return recv;
}
@ -386,7 +410,7 @@ static int xencons_connect_backend(struct xenbus_device *dev,
if (ret)
return ret;
info->evtchn = evtchn;
irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn);
irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev, evtchn);
if (irq < 0)
return irq;
info->irq = irq;
@ -551,7 +575,7 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void)
return r;
info = vtermno_to_xencons(HVC_COOKIE);
info->irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq(info->evtchn);
info->irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->evtchn);
}
if (info->irq < 0)
info->irq = 0; /* NO_IRQ */

6
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
View File

@ -1251,6 +1251,12 @@ int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irq);
int bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
{
return bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, &xen_lateeoi_chip, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi);
static int bind_ipi_to_irq(unsigned int ipi, unsigned int cpu)
{
struct evtchn_bind_ipi bind_ipi;

1
include/xen/events.h
View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct xenbus_device;
unsigned xen_evtchn_nr_channels(void);
int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
int bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags, const char *devname,