forked from Minki/linux
netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix a race in __nf_conntrack_confirm against nf_ct_get_next_corpse()
This race was triggered by a 'conntrack -F' command running in parallel to the insertion of a hash for a new connection. Losing this race led to a dead conntrack entry effectively blocking traffic for a particular connection until timeout or flushing the conntrack hashes again. Now the check for an already dying connection is done inside the lock. Signed-off-by: Joerg Marx <joerg.marx@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
This commit is contained in:
parent
a1d7c1b4b8
commit
fc350777c7
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static inline int nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
int ret = NF_ACCEPT;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ct && ct != &nf_conntrack_untracked) {
|
||||
if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) && !nf_ct_is_dying(ct))
|
||||
if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct))
|
||||
ret = __nf_conntrack_confirm(skb);
|
||||
if (likely(ret == NF_ACCEPT))
|
||||
nf_ct_deliver_cached_events(ct);
|
||||
|
@ -424,6 +424,16 @@ __nf_conntrack_confirm(struct sk_buff *skb)
|
||||
|
||||
spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
|
||||
|
||||
/* We have to check the DYING flag inside the lock to prevent
|
||||
a race against nf_ct_get_next_corpse() possibly called from
|
||||
user context, else we insert an already 'dead' hash, blocking
|
||||
further use of that particular connection -JM */
|
||||
|
||||
if (unlikely(nf_ct_is_dying(ct))) {
|
||||
spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_lock);
|
||||
return NF_ACCEPT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* See if there's one in the list already, including reverse:
|
||||
NAT could have grabbed it without realizing, since we're
|
||||
not in the hash. If there is, we lost race. */
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user