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Drivers: ccree: ssi_aead.c - align block comments

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Fixed block comment alignment, Style fix only
Found using checkpatch

Signed-off-by: Derek Robson <robsonde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Derek Robson 2017-05-30 18:16:22 +12:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent f5bd89b893
commit f4e929bbd8
1 changed files with 29 additions and 16 deletions
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45
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
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@ -250,7 +250,8 @@ static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem *c
"(auth-size=%d, cipher=%d).\n",
ctx->authsize, ctx->cipher_mode);
/* In case of payload authentication failure, MUST NOT
revealed the decrypted message --> zero its memory. */
* revealed the decrypted message --> zero its memory.
*/
ssi_buffer_mgr_zero_sgl(areq->dst, areq_ctx->cryptlen);
err = -EBADMSG;
}
@ -279,7 +280,8 @@ static int xcbc_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
/* Load the AES key */
HW_DESC_INIT(&desc[0]);
/* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer as for the output keys,
because after this key loading it is not needed anymore */
* because after this key loading it is not needed anymore
*/
HW_DESC_SET_DIN_TYPE(&desc[0], DMA_DLLI, ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr, ctx->auth_keylen, NS_BIT);
HW_DESC_SET_CIPHER_MODE(&desc[0], DRV_CIPHER_ECB);
HW_DESC_SET_CIPHER_CONFIG0(&desc[0], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
@ -420,8 +422,9 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
return 0; /* All tests of keys sizes passed */
}
/*This function prepers the user key so it can pass to the hmac processing
(copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block */
/* This function prepers the user key so it can pass to the hmac processing
* (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
*/
static int
ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
@ -600,7 +603,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
(AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
goto badkey;
/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
* first 4 bytes in CTR IV */
* first 4 bytes in CTR IV
*/
memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen + ctx->enc_keylen -
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
/* Set CTR key size */
@ -829,7 +833,8 @@ ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(
{
/* DOUBLE-PASS flow (as default)
* assoc. + iv + data -compact in one table
* if assoclen is ZERO only IV perform */
* if assoclen is ZERO only IV perform
*/
ssi_sram_addr_t mlli_addr = areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr;
u32 mlli_nents = areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents;
@ -1287,7 +1292,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_hmac_authenc(
/**
* Double-pass flow
* Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple */
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
*/
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
/* encrypt first.. */
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
@ -1305,7 +1311,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_hmac_authenc(
/* decrypt after.. */
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
must be after the cipher operation */
* must be after the cipher operation
*/
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
}
}
@ -1338,7 +1345,8 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc(
/**
* Double-pass flow
* Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple */
* i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
*/
if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
/* encrypt first.. */
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
@ -1353,7 +1361,8 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc(
/* decrypt after..*/
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
must be after the cipher operation */
* must be after the cipher operation
*/
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
}
}
@ -1712,8 +1721,10 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_gcm_setup_ghash_desc(
idx++;
/* Configure Hash Engine to work with GHASH.
Since it was not possible to extend HASH submodes to add GHASH,
The following command is necessary in order to select GHASH (according to HW designers)*/
* Since it was not possible to extend HASH submodes to add GHASH,
* The following command is necessary in order to
* select GHASH (according to HW designers)
*/
HW_DESC_INIT(&desc[idx]);
HW_DESC_SET_DIN_NO_DMA(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
HW_DESC_SET_DOUT_NO_DMA(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
@ -2044,7 +2055,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
/* Build CTR IV - Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in
* CTR key to first 4 bytes in CTR IV */
* CTR key to first 4 bytes in CTR IV
*/
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
if (areq_ctx->backup_giv == NULL) /*User none-generated IV*/
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
@ -2106,9 +2118,10 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 1;
} else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
/* In ccm, the IV needs to exist both inside B0 and inside the counter.
It is also copied to iv_dma_addr for other reasons (like returning
it to the user).
So, using 3 (identical) IV outputs. */
* It is also copied to iv_dma_addr for other reasons (like returning
* it to the user).
* So, using 3 (identical) IV outputs.
*/
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[1] = sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) + CCM_B0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[2] = sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) + CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;