From 864c2357ca898c6171fe5284f5ecc795c8ce27a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 11:52:58 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] perf/core: Do not set cpuctx->cgrp for unscheduled
 cgroups

Commit:

  db4a835601b7 ("perf/core: Set cgroup in CPU contexts for new cgroup events")

failed to verify that event->cgrp is actually the scheduled cgroup
in a CPU before setting cpuctx->cgrp. This patch fixes that.

Now that there is a different path for scheduled and unscheduled
cgroup, add a warning to catch when cpuctx->cgrp is still set after
the last cgroup event has been unsheduled.

To verify the bug:

  # Create 2 cgroups.
  mkdir /dev/cgroups/devices/g1
  mkdir /dev/cgroups/devices/g2

  # launch a task, bind it to a cpu and move it to g1
  CPU=2
  while :; do : ; done &
  P=$!

  taskset -pc $CPU $P
  echo $P > /dev/cgroups/devices/g1/tasks

  # monitor g2 (it runs no tasks) and observe output
  perf stat -e cycles -I 1000 -C $CPU -G g2

  #           time             counts unit events
     1.000091408          7,579,527      cycles                    g2
     2.000350111      <not counted>      cycles                    g2
     3.000589181      <not counted>      cycles                    g2
     4.000771428      <not counted>      cycles                    g2

  # note first line that displays that a task run in g2, despite
  # g2 having no tasks. This is because cpuctx->cgrp was wrongly
  # set when context of new event was installed.
  # After applying the fix we obtain the right output:

  perf stat -e cycles -I 1000 -C $CPU -G g2
  #           time             counts unit events
     1.000119615      <not counted>      cycles                    g2
     2.000389430      <not counted>      cycles                    g2
     3.000590962      <not counted>      cycles                    g2

Signed-off-by: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nilay Vaish <nilayvaish@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478026378-86083-1-git-send-email-davidcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 0e292132efac..ff230bb4a02e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -902,6 +902,17 @@ list_update_cgroup_event(struct perf_event *event,
 	 * this will always be called from the right CPU.
 	 */
 	cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
+
+	/* Only set/clear cpuctx->cgrp if current task uses event->cgrp. */
+	if (perf_cgroup_from_task(current, ctx) != event->cgrp) {
+		/*
+		 * We are removing the last cpu event in this context.
+		 * If that event is not active in this cpu, cpuctx->cgrp
+		 * should've been cleared by perf_cgroup_switch.
+		 */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!add && cpuctx->cgrp);
+		return;
+	}
 	cpuctx->cgrp = add ? event->cgrp : NULL;
 }
 

From c499336cea8bbe15554c6fcea2138658c5395bfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 13:40:10 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] perf/x86/uncore: Fix crash by removing bogus event_list[]
 handling for SNB client uncore IMC

Vince Weaver reported the following bug when KASAN is enabled:

 [  205.748005] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in snb_uncore_imc_event_del+0x6c/0xa0 at addr ffff8800caa43768
 [  205.758324] Read of size 8 by task perf_fuzzer/6618

It's caused by accessing box->event_list.

For client IMC, there are no generic counters. It defines its own fixed
free running counters. So event_list and n_events are unused.

They can be removed safely, which fixes the bug.

( There's still the separate question of how uninitialized state snuck into
  this data structure - but that's a separate fix. )

Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: acme@kernel.org
Cc: davej@codemonkey.org.uk
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: eranian@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479235210-29090-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c | 12 ------------
 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
index 81195cca7eae..a3dcc12bef4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c
@@ -490,24 +490,12 @@ static int snb_uncore_imc_event_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
 
 	snb_uncore_imc_event_start(event, 0);
 
-	box->n_events++;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void snb_uncore_imc_event_del(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
 {
-	struct intel_uncore_box *box = uncore_event_to_box(event);
-	int i;
-
 	snb_uncore_imc_event_stop(event, PERF_EF_UPDATE);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < box->n_events; i++) {
-		if (event == box->event_list[i]) {
-			--box->n_events;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
 }
 
 int snb_pci2phy_map_init(int devid)

From e40ed1542dd779e5037a22c6b534e57127472365 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 10:15:06 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] perf/x86: Add perf support for AMD family-17h processors

This patch enables perf core PMU support for the new AMD family-17h processors.

In family-17h, there is no PMC-event constraint. All events, irrespective of
the type, can be measured using any of the six generic performance counters.

Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1479399306-13375-1-git-send-email-Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
index f5f4b3fbbbc2..afb222b63cae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/core.c
@@ -662,7 +662,13 @@ static int __init amd_core_pmu_init(void)
 		pr_cont("Fam15h ");
 		x86_pmu.get_event_constraints = amd_get_event_constraints_f15h;
 		break;
-
+	case 0x17:
+		pr_cont("Fam17h ");
+		/*
+		 * In family 17h, there are no event constraints in the PMC hardware.
+		 * We fallback to using default amd_get_event_constraints.
+		 */
+		break;
 	default:
 		pr_err("core perfctr but no constraints; unknown hardware!\n");
 		return -ENODEV;

From e96271f3ed7e702fa36dd0605c0c5b5f065af816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2016 13:38:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] perf/core: Fix address filter parser

The token table passed into match_token() must be null-terminated, which
it currently is not in the perf's address filter string parser, as caught
by Vince's perf_fuzzer and KASAN.

It doesn't blow up otherwise because of the alignment padding of the table
to the next element in the .rodata, which is luck.

Fixing by adding a null-terminator to the token table.

Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dvyukov@google.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Fixes: 375637bc524 ("perf/core: Introduce address range filtering")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/877f81f264.fsf@ashishki-desk.ger.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index ff230bb4a02e..6ee1febdf6ff 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -8029,6 +8029,7 @@ restart:
  * if <size> is not specified, the range is treated as a single address.
  */
 enum {
+	IF_ACT_NONE = -1,
 	IF_ACT_FILTER,
 	IF_ACT_START,
 	IF_ACT_STOP,
@@ -8052,6 +8053,7 @@ static const match_table_t if_tokens = {
 	{ IF_SRC_KERNEL,	"%u/%u" },
 	{ IF_SRC_FILEADDR,	"%u@%s" },
 	{ IF_SRC_KERNELADDR,	"%u" },
+	{ IF_ACT_NONE,		NULL },
 };
 
 /*

From ae31fe51a3cceaa0cabdb3058f69669ecb47f12e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2016 10:57:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] perf/x86: Restore TASK_SIZE check on frame pointer

The following commit:

  75925e1ad7f5 ("perf/x86: Optimize stack walk user accesses")

... switched from copy_from_user_nmi() to __copy_from_user_nmi() with a manual
access_ok() check.

Unfortunately, copy_from_user_nmi() does an explicit check against TASK_SIZE,
whereas the access_ok() uses whatever the current address limit of the task is.

We are getting NMIs when __probe_kernel_read() has switched to KERNEL_DS, and
then see vmalloc faults when we access what looks like pointers into vmalloc
space:

  [] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3685731 at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:435 vmalloc_fault+0x289/0x290
  [] CPU: 3 PID: 3685731 Comm: sh Tainted: G        W       4.6.0-5_fbk1_223_gdbf0f40 #1
  [] Call Trace:
  []  <NMI>  [<ffffffff814717d1>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x6c
  []  [<ffffffff81076e43>] __warn+0xd3/0xf0
  []  [<ffffffff81076f2d>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20
  []  [<ffffffff8104a899>] vmalloc_fault+0x289/0x290
  []  [<ffffffff8104b5a0>] __do_page_fault+0x330/0x490
  []  [<ffffffff8104b70c>] do_page_fault+0xc/0x10
  []  [<ffffffff81794e82>] page_fault+0x22/0x30
  []  [<ffffffff81006280>] ? perf_callchain_user+0x100/0x2a0
  []  [<ffffffff8115124f>] get_perf_callchain+0x17f/0x190
  []  [<ffffffff811512c7>] perf_callchain+0x67/0x80
  []  [<ffffffff8114e750>] perf_prepare_sample+0x2a0/0x370
  []  [<ffffffff8114e840>] perf_event_output+0x20/0x60
  []  [<ffffffff8114aee7>] ? perf_event_update_userpage+0xc7/0x130
  []  [<ffffffff8114ea01>] __perf_event_overflow+0x181/0x1d0
  []  [<ffffffff8114f484>] perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x20
  []  [<ffffffff8100a6e3>] intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x1d3/0x490
  []  [<ffffffff8147daf7>] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0x7/0x10
  []  [<ffffffff81197191>] ? vunmap_page_range+0x1a1/0x2f0
  []  [<ffffffff811972f1>] ? unmap_kernel_range_noflush+0x11/0x20
  []  [<ffffffff814f2056>] ? ghes_copy_tofrom_phys+0x116/0x1f0
  []  [<ffffffff81040d1d>] ? x2apic_send_IPI_self+0x1d/0x20
  []  [<ffffffff8100411d>] perf_event_nmi_handler+0x2d/0x50
  []  [<ffffffff8101ea31>] nmi_handle+0x61/0x110
  []  [<ffffffff8101ef94>] default_do_nmi+0x44/0x110
  []  [<ffffffff8101f13b>] do_nmi+0xdb/0x150
  []  [<ffffffff81795187>] end_repeat_nmi+0x1a/0x1e
  []  [<ffffffff8147daf7>] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0x7/0x10
  []  [<ffffffff8147daf7>] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0x7/0x10
  []  [<ffffffff8147daf7>] ? copy_user_enhanced_fast_string+0x7/0x10
  []  <<EOE>>  <IRQ>  [<ffffffff8115d05e>] ? __probe_kernel_read+0x3e/0xa0

Fix this by moving the valid_user_frame() check to before the uaccess
that loads the return address and the pointer to the next frame.

Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 75925e1ad7f5 ("perf/x86: Optimize stack walk user accesses")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/core.c | 10 ++--------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
index d31735f37ed7..9d4bf3ab049e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
@@ -2352,7 +2352,7 @@ perf_callchain_user32(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ent
 		frame.next_frame     = 0;
 		frame.return_address = 0;
 
-		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, fp, 8))
+		if (!valid_user_frame(fp, sizeof(frame)))
 			break;
 
 		bytes = __copy_from_user_nmi(&frame.next_frame, fp, 4);
@@ -2362,9 +2362,6 @@ perf_callchain_user32(struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *ent
 		if (bytes != 0)
 			break;
 
-		if (!valid_user_frame(fp, sizeof(frame)))
-			break;
-
 		perf_callchain_store(entry, cs_base + frame.return_address);
 		fp = compat_ptr(ss_base + frame.next_frame);
 	}
@@ -2413,7 +2410,7 @@ perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs
 		frame.next_frame	     = NULL;
 		frame.return_address = 0;
 
-		if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, fp, sizeof(*fp) * 2))
+		if (!valid_user_frame(fp, sizeof(frame)))
 			break;
 
 		bytes = __copy_from_user_nmi(&frame.next_frame, fp, sizeof(*fp));
@@ -2423,9 +2420,6 @@ perf_callchain_user(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *regs
 		if (bytes != 0)
 			break;
 
-		if (!valid_user_frame(fp, sizeof(frame)))
-			break;
-
 		perf_callchain_store(entry, frame.return_address);
 		fp = (void __user *)frame.next_frame;
 	}

From b8000586c90b4804902058a38d3a59ce5708e695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2016 18:17:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] perf/x86/intel: Cure bogus unwind from PEBS entries

Vince Weaver reported that perf_fuzzer + KASAN detects that PEBS event
unwinds sometimes do 'weird' things. In particular, we seemed to be
ending up unwinding from random places on the NMI stack.

While it was somewhat expected that the event record BP,SP would not
match the interrupt BP,SP in that the interrupt is strictly later than
the record event, it was overlooked that it could be on an already
overwritten stack.

Therefore, don't copy the recorded BP,SP over the interrupted BP,SP
when we need stack unwinds.

Note that its still possible the unwind doesn't full match the actual
event, as its entirely possible to have done an (I)RET between record
and interrupt, but on average it should still point in the general
direction of where the event came from. Also, it's the best we can do,
considering.

The particular scenario that triggered the bogus NMI stack unwind was
a PEBS event with very short period, upon enabling the event at the
tail of the PMI handler (FREEZE_ON_PMI is not used), it instantly
triggers a record (while still on the NMI stack) which in turn
triggers the next PMI. This then causes back-to-back NMIs and we'll
try and unwind the stack-frame from the last NMI, which obviously is
now overwritten by our own.

Analyzed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davej@codemonkey.org.uk <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Cc: dvyukov@google.com <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ca037701a025 ("perf, x86: Add PEBS infrastructure")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161117171731.GV3157@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c   | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 arch/x86/events/perf_event.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
index 0319311dbdbb..be202390bbd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c
@@ -1108,20 +1108,20 @@ static void setup_pebs_sample_data(struct perf_event *event,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * We use the interrupt regs as a base because the PEBS record
-	 * does not contain a full regs set, specifically it seems to
-	 * lack segment descriptors, which get used by things like
-	 * user_mode().
+	 * We use the interrupt regs as a base because the PEBS record does not
+	 * contain a full regs set, specifically it seems to lack segment
+	 * descriptors, which get used by things like user_mode().
 	 *
-	 * In the simple case fix up only the IP and BP,SP regs, for
-	 * PERF_SAMPLE_IP and PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN to function properly.
-	 * A possible PERF_SAMPLE_REGS will have to transfer all regs.
+	 * In the simple case fix up only the IP for PERF_SAMPLE_IP.
+	 *
+	 * We must however always use BP,SP from iregs for the unwinder to stay
+	 * sane; the record BP,SP can point into thin air when the record is
+	 * from a previous PMI context or an (I)RET happend between the record
+	 * and PMI.
 	 */
 	*regs = *iregs;
 	regs->flags = pebs->flags;
 	set_linear_ip(regs, pebs->ip);
-	regs->bp = pebs->bp;
-	regs->sp = pebs->sp;
 
 	if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR) {
 		regs->ax = pebs->ax;
@@ -1130,10 +1130,21 @@ static void setup_pebs_sample_data(struct perf_event *event,
 		regs->dx = pebs->dx;
 		regs->si = pebs->si;
 		regs->di = pebs->di;
-		regs->bp = pebs->bp;
-		regs->sp = pebs->sp;
 
-		regs->flags = pebs->flags;
+		/*
+		 * Per the above; only set BP,SP if we don't need callchains.
+		 *
+		 * XXX: does this make sense?
+		 */
+		if (!(sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)) {
+			regs->bp = pebs->bp;
+			regs->sp = pebs->sp;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Preserve PERF_EFLAGS_VM from set_linear_ip().
+		 */
+		regs->flags = pebs->flags | (regs->flags & PERF_EFLAGS_VM);
 #ifndef CONFIG_X86_32
 		regs->r8 = pebs->r8;
 		regs->r9 = pebs->r9;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
index 5874d8de1f8d..a77ee026643d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
+++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct debug_store {
  * Per register state.
  */
 struct er_account {
-	raw_spinlock_t		lock;	/* per-core: protect structure */
+	raw_spinlock_t      lock;	/* per-core: protect structure */
 	u64                 config;	/* extra MSR config */
 	u64                 reg;	/* extra MSR number */
 	atomic_t            ref;	/* reference count */

From 033ac60c7f21f9996a0fab2fd04f334afbf77b33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2016 13:53:54 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Allow only a single PMU/box within
 an events group

Group validation expects all events to be of the same PMU; however
is_uncore_pmu() is too wide, it matches _all_ uncore events, even
across PMUs.

This triggers failure when we group different events from different
uncore PMUs, like:

  perf stat -vv -e '{uncore_cbox_0/config=0x0334/,uncore_qpi_0/event=1/}' -a sleep 1

Fix is_uncore_pmu() by only matching events to the box at hand.

Note that generic code; ran after this step; will disallow this
mixture of PMU events.

Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vince@deater.net>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161118125354.GQ3117@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
index efca2685d876..dbaaf7dc8373 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ static struct intel_uncore_box *uncore_alloc_box(struct intel_uncore_type *type,
  */
 static int uncore_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event);
 
-static bool is_uncore_event(struct perf_event *event)
+static bool is_box_event(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return event->pmu->event_init == uncore_pmu_event_init;
+	return &box->pmu->pmu == event->pmu;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ uncore_collect_events(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *leader,
 
 	n = box->n_events;
 
-	if (is_uncore_event(leader)) {
+	if (is_box_event(box, leader)) {
 		box->event_list[n] = leader;
 		n++;
 	}
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ uncore_collect_events(struct intel_uncore_box *box, struct perf_event *leader,
 		return n;
 
 	list_for_each_entry(event, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
-		if (!is_uncore_event(event) ||
+		if (!is_box_event(box, event) ||
 		    event->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
 			continue;