forked from Minki/linux
efi: Get and store the secure boot status
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash it somewhere that the main kernel image can find. The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the ARM stub and (a) generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode. For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot loader or kexec. This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new kernel. Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org [ Small readability edits. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ Offset Proto Name Meaning
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1E9/001 ALL eddbuf_entries Number of entries in eddbuf (below)
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1EA/001 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries Number of entries in edd_mbr_sig_buffer
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(below)
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1EB/001 ALL kbd_status Numlock is enabled
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1EC/001 ALL secure_boot Secure boot is enabled in the firmware
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1EF/001 ALL sentinel Used to detect broken bootloaders
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290/040 ALL edd_mbr_sig_buffer EDD MBR signatures
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2D0/A00 ALL e820_map E820 memory map table
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@ -988,6 +988,13 @@ struct boot_params *efi_main(struct efi_config *c,
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else
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setup_boot_services32(efi_early);
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/*
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* If the boot loader gave us a value for secure_boot then we use that,
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* otherwise we ask the BIOS.
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*/
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if (boot_params->secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
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boot_params->secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
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setup_graphics(boot_params);
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setup_efi_pci(boot_params);
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@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ struct boot_params {
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__u8 eddbuf_entries; /* 0x1e9 */
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__u8 edd_mbr_sig_buf_entries; /* 0x1ea */
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__u8 kbd_status; /* 0x1eb */
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__u8 _pad5[3]; /* 0x1ec */
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__u8 secure_boot; /* 0x1ec */
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__u8 _pad5[2]; /* 0x1ed */
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/*
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* The sentinel is set to a nonzero value (0xff) in header.S.
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*
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@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ void common(void) {
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
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OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
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OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
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OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
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OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
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@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
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# Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
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lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o
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lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o
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# include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
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arm-deps := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c sort.c
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@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
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bool __nokaslr;
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static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
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{
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static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
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'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
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static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
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'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
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efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
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u8 val;
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unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
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efi_status_t status;
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status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
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NULL, &size, &val);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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if (val == 0)
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return 0;
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status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
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NULL, &size, &val);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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if (val == 1)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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out_efi_err:
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switch (status) {
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case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
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return 0;
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case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
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return -EIO;
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case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
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return -EACCES;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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}
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efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
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void *__image, void **__fh)
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{
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@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
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efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
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unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
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unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
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int secure_boot = 0;
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enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
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struct screen_info *si;
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/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
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@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
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pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
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secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
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if (secure_boot > 0)
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pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
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if (secure_boot < 0) {
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pr_efi_err(sys_table,
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"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
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}
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/*
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* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
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* ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
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* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
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* 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
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* boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
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*/
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if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
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if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
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strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
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pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
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} else {
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status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,
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61
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
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61
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
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@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
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/*
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* Secure boot handling.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2013,2014 Linaro Limited
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* Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org
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* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.
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* Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
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*
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* This file is part of the Linux kernel, and is made available under the
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* terms of the GNU General Public License version 2.
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*/
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#include <linux/efi.h>
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#include <asm/efi.h>
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/* BIOS variables */
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static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
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static const efi_char16_t const efi_SecureBoot_name[] = {
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'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0
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};
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static const efi_char16_t const efi_SetupMode_name[] = {
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'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0
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};
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#define get_efi_var(name, vendor, ...) \
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efi_call_runtime(get_variable, \
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(efi_char16_t *)(name), (efi_guid_t *)(vendor), \
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__VA_ARGS__);
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/*
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* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
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*/
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enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
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{
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u8 secboot, setupmode;
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unsigned long size;
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efi_status_t status;
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size = sizeof(secboot);
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status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &secboot);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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size = sizeof(setupmode);
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status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
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NULL, &size, &setupmode);
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if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
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goto out_efi_err;
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if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
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return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
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pr_efi(sys_table_arg, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
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return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
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out_efi_err:
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pr_efi_err(sys_table_arg, "Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
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if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
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return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
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return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
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}
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@ -1480,6 +1480,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
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bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
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extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
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enum efi_secureboot_mode {
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efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
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efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
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efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
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efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
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};
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enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
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/*
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* Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
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* reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
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