arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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@ -42,6 +42,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
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{
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{
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current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
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current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
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/*
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* Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
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* the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
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*/
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dsb(nsh);
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isb();
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/* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
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/* On user-mode return, check fs is correct */
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set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
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set_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK);
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