forked from Minki/linux
net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular: - The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips. - A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack. - A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data. Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar. Signed-off-by: Marcin Kozlowski <marcinguy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
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if (start_of_descs != desc_offset)
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goto err;
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/* self check desc_offset from header*/
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if (desc_offset >= skb_len)
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/* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the
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* bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB
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*/
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if (pkt_count * 2 + desc_offset >= skb_len)
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goto err;
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/* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */
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skb_trim(skb, desc_offset);
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if (pkt_count == 0)
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goto err;
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