af_unix: limit unix_tot_inflight
Vegard Nossum found a unix socket OOM was possible, posting an exploit program. My analysis is we can eat all LOWMEM memory before unix_gc() being called from unix_release_sock(). Moreover, the thread blocked in unix_gc() can consume huge amount of time to perform cleanup because of huge working set. One way to handle this is to have a sensible limit on unix_tot_inflight, tested from wait_for_unix_gc() and to force a call to unix_gc() if this limit is hit. This solves the OOM and also reduce overall latencies, and should not slowdown normal workloads. Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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@ -259,9 +259,16 @@ static void inc_inflight_move_tail(struct unix_sock *u)
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static bool gc_in_progress = false;
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static bool gc_in_progress = false;
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#define UNIX_INFLIGHT_TRIGGER_GC 16000
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void wait_for_unix_gc(void)
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void wait_for_unix_gc(void)
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{
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{
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/*
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* If number of inflight sockets is insane,
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* force a garbage collect right now.
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*/
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if (unix_tot_inflight > UNIX_INFLIGHT_TRIGGER_GC && !gc_in_progress)
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unix_gc();
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wait_event(unix_gc_wait, gc_in_progress == false);
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wait_event(unix_gc_wait, gc_in_progress == false);
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}
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}
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