forked from Minki/linux
ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in3bc3fe5e
(v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by6b7d31fc
(v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
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@ -1275,6 +1275,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
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/* overflow check */
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if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
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return -ENOMEM;
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tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
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newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
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if (!newinfo)
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@ -1822,6 +1823,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
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return -ENOMEM;
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if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
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return -ENOMEM;
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tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
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newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
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if (!newinfo)
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@ -2051,6 +2053,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
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ret = -EFAULT;
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break;
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}
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rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;
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if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
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target = 1;
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