forked from Minki/linux
Various SMB3 fixes for stable and security improvements from the recently completed SMB3/Samba test events
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQGcBAABAgAGBQJZxb1HAAoJEIosvXAHck9RH48L/AnYLWFHp+9RK+elSTAFJkOn seLJXoQTJtOQ9XA1Fz4wp5jiGTIJgx2Yq3Vj7hl8rQHNE6MvJxTfHxNSMwfrLUkS HznrXpagSsKFcAHTyHojL3ZZCOzRFOE5c08xpfJ9cGsL3boJGfh+cXawP/mXBpIR 6IP5Om97PMH5QZhfoVkDJT+/L1ZKYdBDPoX56RH33l5w0h5ctHz24Zfk6K1e/NRw /UMZ6di1FRxD5sZu+cQiKMymw/XohKOXkz48hj/x1wWZ0rkpxb4qlSRuQ5se9sKq AwpRWacZkN7Vhwl4hLzQV914tLSkT2Z/pTKTZ7Xn0UBxXIpU/hYq/TuzS6E74rcs n2H0FOdeaSPW7lE9Z0j0wWP3lNad2ii6qUE+BJxxaNTVa1Z5lOH2iNrmmp0HUi1G FnKBiYdws2uJQDYQBFlKyrZY14LvRB3MAXKV94qRr1KWoIqFLrg+4O0mf/TcvzIV fr8YT147UuK5FhSfLKJMJLQXYSGUA/M4QhdClFe+Sg== =FS3F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6 Pull cifs fixes from Steve French: "Various SMB3 fixes for stable and security improvements from the recently completed SMB3/Samba test events * tag '4.14-smb3-fixes-from-recent-test-events-for-stable' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6: SMB3: Don't ignore O_SYNC/O_DSYNC and O_DIRECT flags SMB3: handle new statx fields SMB: Validate negotiate (to protect against downgrade) even if signing off cifs: release auth_key.response for reconnect. cifs: release cifs root_cred after exit_cifs CIFS: make arrays static const, reduces object code size [SMB3] Update session and share information displayed for debugging SMB2/SMB3 cifs: show 'soft' in the mount options for hard mounts SMB3: Warn user if trying to sign connection that authenticated as guest SMB3: Fix endian warning Fix SMB3.1.1 guest authentication to Samba
This commit is contained in:
commit
69c902f597
@ -160,8 +160,13 @@ static int cifs_debug_data_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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if ((ses->serverDomain == NULL) ||
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(ses->serverOS == NULL) ||
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(ses->serverNOS == NULL)) {
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seq_printf(m, "\n%d) entry for %s not fully "
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"displayed\n\t", i, ses->serverName);
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seq_printf(m, "\n%d) Name: %s Uses: %d Capability: 0x%x\tSession Status: %d\t",
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i, ses->serverName, ses->ses_count,
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ses->capabilities, ses->status);
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if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
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seq_printf(m, "Guest\t");
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else if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
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seq_printf(m, "Anonymous\t");
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} else {
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seq_printf(m,
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"\n%d) Name: %s Domain: %s Uses: %d OS:"
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@ -461,6 +461,8 @@ cifs_show_options(struct seq_file *s, struct dentry *root)
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seq_puts(s, ",nocase");
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if (tcon->retry)
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seq_puts(s, ",hard");
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else
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seq_puts(s, ",soft");
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if (tcon->use_persistent)
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seq_puts(s, ",persistenthandles");
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else if (tcon->use_resilient)
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@ -1447,7 +1449,7 @@ exit_cifs(void)
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exit_cifs_idmap();
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
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unregister_key_type(&cifs_spnego_key_type);
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exit_cifs_spnego();
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#endif
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cifs_destroy_request_bufs();
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cifs_destroy_mids();
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@ -4154,6 +4154,14 @@ cifs_setup_session(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "Security Mode: 0x%x Capabilities: 0x%x TimeAdjust: %d\n",
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server->sec_mode, server->capabilities, server->timeAdj);
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if (ses->auth_key.response) {
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "Free previous auth_key.response = %p\n",
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ses->auth_key.response);
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kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
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ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
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ses->auth_key.len = 0;
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}
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if (server->ops->sess_setup)
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rc = server->ops->sess_setup(xid, ses, nls_info);
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@ -224,6 +224,13 @@ cifs_nt_open(char *full_path, struct inode *inode, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb,
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if (backup_cred(cifs_sb))
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create_options |= CREATE_OPEN_BACKUP_INTENT;
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/* O_SYNC also has bit for O_DSYNC so following check picks up either */
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if (f_flags & O_SYNC)
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create_options |= CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH;
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if (f_flags & O_DIRECT)
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create_options |= CREATE_NO_BUFFER;
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oparms.tcon = tcon;
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oparms.cifs_sb = cifs_sb;
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oparms.desired_access = desired_access;
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@ -1102,8 +1109,10 @@ cifs_push_mandatory_locks(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile)
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struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
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unsigned int num, max_num, max_buf;
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LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;
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int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
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LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
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static const int types[] = {
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LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
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LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
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};
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int i;
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xid = get_xid();
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@ -1434,8 +1443,10 @@ cifs_unlock_range(struct cifsFileInfo *cfile, struct file_lock *flock,
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unsigned int xid)
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{
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int rc = 0, stored_rc;
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int types[] = {LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
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LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES};
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static const int types[] = {
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LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES,
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LOCKING_ANDX_SHARED_LOCK | LOCKING_ANDX_LARGE_FILES
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};
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unsigned int i;
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unsigned int max_num, num, max_buf;
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LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE *buf, *cur;
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@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ cifs_unix_basic_to_fattr(struct cifs_fattr *fattr, FILE_UNIX_BASIC_INFO *info,
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fattr->cf_atime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastAccessTime);
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fattr->cf_mtime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastModificationTime);
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fattr->cf_ctime = cifs_NTtimeToUnix(info->LastStatusChange);
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/* old POSIX extensions don't get create time */
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fattr->cf_mode = le64_to_cpu(info->Permissions);
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/*
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@ -2024,6 +2026,19 @@ int cifs_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
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stat->blksize = CIFS_MAX_MSGSIZE;
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stat->ino = CIFS_I(inode)->uniqueid;
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/* old CIFS Unix Extensions doesn't return create time */
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if (CIFS_I(inode)->createtime) {
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stat->result_mask |= STATX_BTIME;
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stat->btime =
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cifs_NTtimeToUnix(cpu_to_le64(CIFS_I(inode)->createtime));
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}
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stat->attributes_mask |= (STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED | STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED);
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if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSED)
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stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED;
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if (CIFS_I(inode)->cifsAttrs & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ENCRYPTED)
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stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED;
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/*
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* If on a multiuser mount without unix extensions or cifsacl being
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* enabled, and the admin hasn't overridden them, set the ownership
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@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ assemble_neg_contexts(struct smb2_negotiate_req *req)
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build_encrypt_ctxt((struct smb2_encryption_neg_context *)pneg_ctxt);
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req->NegotiateContextOffset = cpu_to_le32(OFFSET_OF_NEG_CONTEXT);
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req->NegotiateContextCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
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inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context) + 2
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inc_rfc1001_len(req, 4 + sizeof(struct smb2_preauth_neg_context)
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+ sizeof(struct smb2_encryption_neg_context)); /* calculate hash */
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}
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#else
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@ -570,10 +570,11 @@ SMB2_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses)
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/* ops set to 3.0 by default for default so update */
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ses->server->ops = &smb21_operations;
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}
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} else if (rsp->DialectRevision != ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
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} else if (le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision) !=
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ses->server->vals->protocol_id) {
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/* if requested single dialect ensure returned dialect matched */
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "Illegal 0x%x dialect returned: not requested\n",
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cpu_to_le16(rsp->DialectRevision));
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le16_to_cpu(rsp->DialectRevision));
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return -EIO;
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}
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@ -655,15 +656,22 @@ int smb3_validate_negotiate(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
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/*
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* validation ioctl must be signed, so no point sending this if we
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* can not sign it. We could eventually change this to selectively
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* can not sign it (ie are not known user). Even if signing is not
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* required (enabled but not negotiated), in those cases we selectively
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* sign just this, the first and only signed request on a connection.
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* This is good enough for now since a user who wants better security
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* would also enable signing on the mount. Having validation of
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* negotiate info for signed connections helps reduce attack vectors
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* Having validation of negotiate info helps reduce attack vectors.
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*/
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if (tcon->ses->server->sign == false)
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if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST)
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return 0; /* validation requires signing */
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if (tcon->ses->user_name == NULL) {
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "Can't validate negotiate: null user mount\n");
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return 0; /* validation requires signing */
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}
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if (tcon->ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unexpected null user (anonymous) auth flag sent by server\n");
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vneg_inbuf.Capabilities =
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cpu_to_le32(tcon->ses->server->vals->req_capabilities);
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memcpy(vneg_inbuf.Guid, tcon->ses->server->client_guid,
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@ -1175,6 +1183,8 @@ SMB2_sess_setup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
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while (sess_data->func)
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sess_data->func(sess_data);
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if ((ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST) && (ses->sign))
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cifs_dbg(VFS, "signing requested but authenticated as guest\n");
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rc = sess_data->result;
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out:
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kfree(sess_data);
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